I INTRODUCTION

The Brazilian Competition Act, Law 12,529, enacted in 2011, is the main legislation regulating antitrust violations in Brazil. Intellectual property rights and the potential competition issues that may arise from them are not exempt from the scrutiny of the Brazilian competition authority - the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE).

CADE, among other roles, is responsible for ensuring due compliance with the rules provided for in the Brazilian Competition Act with respect to violations to the economic order. According to Article 36 of the Act, antitrust violations include any practices aimed at (1) limiting, restraining or in any way injuring free competition or free initiative; (2) controlling the relevant market of goods or services; (3) increasing profits arbitrarily; and (4) exercising a dominant position abusively.

Among the practices that may be framed as antitrust violations, CADE included (1) the abusive exercise or exploitation of intellectual or industrial property rights, technology or trademarks; and (2) the monopolisation or prevention of exploitation of industrial or intellectual property rights or technology.

Intellectual property rights, such as patents, industrial design rights and trademarks are, in turn, regulated by Law No. 9,279/1996. This Law reinforces the illegality of the abusive exercise of such rights, determining that the abuse may lead to the compulsory licensing of the patent among other sanctions.

Therefore, as in many other jurisdictions, the relevance of the interactions between antitrust and intellectual property has not been neglected by the Brazilian legislation. However, matters concerning potential conflicts between antitrust and intellectual property have been identified recently, as in other countries.

At first, the fact that antitrust law protects intellectual property rights may seem contradictory. On the one hand, the intellectual property law grants a sort of temporary monopoly for the holder of IP rights, which may reduce other companies' chances of competing effectively in the market related to those rights, potentially discouraging free competition. On the other hand, the antitrust law aims exactly at fostering free competition and avoiding the monopolisation of markets.

However, this contradiction was later found to be specious. In line with the specialised literature from other countries, such as the United States, the Brazilian competition authority adopted the understanding that the antitrust and IP laws are, in fact, complementary, having similar purposes. In this context, to ensure the innovation and welfare of consumers, CADE may be lenient in relation to a potential temporary restriction of competition, from a static point of view, in favour of a dynamic efficiency, which will, in the long term, provide the necessary incentives for innovation and for the creation of new and better products and services.2

Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, the complementary interactions between antitrust and IP do not imply that IP rights are absolute or that they are immune to antitrust scrutiny.

II YEAR IN REVIEW

CADE and the Brazilian courts were recently confronted with a matter related to the licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs). The debate about SEPs is very current in Brazil, and the majority of the decisions handed down to date have not been in line with the international precedents.

In the case examined in Brazil in 2015, which is still under discussion, a company that had been deprived of the use of an essential patent argued that the patent holder was abusing its rights and preventing market access. The patent holder was unwilling to negotiate royalty fees under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and instigated sham litigation against the company by filing injunctions that aimed at having the company's production discontinued. Although there were no notable developments in the case in 2016, it continues to be the most relevant case involving intellectual property and antitrust in Brazil.

The majority of the decisions handed down in the case by the courts stated that the patent holder was entitled to exercise its IP rights with the purpose of preventing others from using its technology, unless they were willing to pay the prices charged for royalties. Injunctions have been granted in the sense of discontinuing the company's manufacture of the product that contains the patented technology.

A claim for sham litigation was also filed before CADE in relation to the matter. The claim also alleged that the patent holder was abusing its dominant position.

CADE has issued a decision stating that (1) the injunctions filed by the patent holder do not constitute sham litigation; and (2) the negotiations related to the price of royalties are a private commercial matter, and it is not CADE's prerogative to decide on it.

One judicial decision goes in the opposite direction. This decision recognises the obligation imposed on an SEP holder to provide market access to other companies. Although this understanding represents only a minority of the decisions, it could indicate the possibility that Brazilian authorities are likely to start following international decisions in relation to matters involving antitrust and IP. Details of the case will be discussed below.

III LICENSING AND ANTITRUST

i Anticompetitive restraints

As mentioned above, IP rights are neither absolute nor immune to antitrust analysis. In fact, the exercise of such rights does not constitute, by itself, anticompetitive conduct, even if the exclusivity ensured by the law results in market power for the IP right holder. Nevertheless, if such rights are exercised in an abusive way, the exercise may be considered an antitrust violation, subject to CADE's review.

Despite the current low number of IP-related investigations and the lack of final decisions handed down by the Brazilian competition authority, some cases provide some guidance in relation to the analysis of anticompetitive practices concerning the abuse of IP rights.

In a recent decision, CADE, in line with other competition authorities, indicated that the anticompetitive practices concerning IP rights may be classified as (1) violations resulting from fraud or abuse in the registration procedure of the IP right; and (2) violations arising from the abuse of the IP right itself.3

According to CADE, practices aimed at manipulating, defrauding or abusing the registration procedure of IP rights may give rise to competition concerns. Based on studies performed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, CADE pointed out that cases of fraud or abuse in the registration procedure usually involve anticompetitive strategies aimed at manipulating ‘pending patents', given the time lapse in the assessment of the registration request. CADE mentioned patent ambush, patent flooding and the modification of pending patents as examples of relevant illegal conduct in such cases.

Moreover, CADE emphasised that anticompetitive effects may also be caused by the abusive exercise of IP rights, when the rights are not exercised in accordance with their social and economic purposes. Such abuse may be reflected, among other practices, in:

    • a horizontal restrains, such as licensing agreements entered into between parts active in the same segment, which may lead to anticompetitive restraints such as the division of markets;
    • b resale price maintenance, where the holder of the IP right imposes a resale price on the licensed company;
    • c tie-in sales, where the licence of a certain IP right is conditional on the acquisition of another licence or other products;
    • d exclusivity agreements;
    • e cross-licensing and pools;
    • f grant-backs; and
    • g refusal to license.

CADE's analysis with respect to such situations of abuse is based on the rule of reason. In this context, several elements are taken into consideration in the investigation of the anticompetitive practices related to IP rights.

In a recent decision, CADE indicated that to assess whether an abusive exercise of IP rights is indeed illegal, it is necessary to analyse whether (1) the IP right holder has a dominant position within the market concerned in the investigation; (2) there are structural conditions for the exercise of a dominant position; and (3) there was, in fact, abuse, damaging the competition.4

In relation to dominant position, the Brazilian Competition Act establishes that dominance is deemed when a company or group of companies (1) is capable of altering, in a unilateral or concerted manner, the market conditions; or (2) controls 20 per cent or more of the relevant market. The analysis of an eventual dominance also involves other factors, such as the existence of barriers to entry and effective rivalry within the market under analysis.

Moreover, CADE, in view of the rule of reason, analyses the net effects of the conduct under investigation. In this context, the Authority assesses whether the dynamic efficiencies resulting from the exercise of the IP right surpass its static inefficiencies. If the efficiencies do not outweigh the negative impacts, the conduct will be deemed anticompetitive and will lead to the imposition of sanctions by the Brazilian competition authority.

In cases of antitrust violations, under the Brazilian Competition Act, companies are subject to fines that may vary from 0.1 to 20 per cent of the gross turnover registered in the year prior to the initiation of the investigation, related to the field of activities affected by the practice. In relation to individuals, fines may reach up to 2 billion reais. Specifically in relation to IP rights, in some cases CADE may recommend to the Brazilian Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) the imposition of compulsory licensing, as the INPI is the competent authority to impose this penalty.

In a recent opinion, rendered in a case involving a potential abusive exercise of IP rights by auto part manufacturers to avoid the production and sale of auto parts supposedly protected by IP rights, CADE emphasised that the exercise of IP rights is not immune to an antitrust assessment. After examining the potential benefits of the conduct under investigation, CADE's investigative body concluded that the manufacturers had exercised their IP rights in an abusive way.5

Finally, it is worth noting that besides the role performed in relation to behavioural control, CADE is also responsible for the review of concentration acts. Taking that into account and pursuant to CADE's notification criteria, the transfer of IP rights may be analysed by the Brazilian competition authority, which will assess the potential competition concerns arising from the transaction.

ii Refusals to license

As mentioned above, in a recent decision handed down by CADE,6 the refusal to license was set out as an example of possible abusive conduct perpetrated by IP holders. According to CADE, in certain circumstances, such a refusal may be subject to antitrust assessment, as it may be related to an eventual abuse of dominant position by the player that refuses to negotiate with its competitors; however, the Brazilian competition authority has not analysed any related cases yet.

In this aspect, in line with competition authorities from other jurisdictions, CADE may examine the application of the essential facility theory, which reflects the idea that a good or service essential to the community cannot be subject to restrictions by those holding the right to explore it.7 According to CADE, the essential facility theory is based on four premises: (1) the existence of an essential input owned by a monopolist; (2) economic or legal unfeasibility or the lack of alternative means of provision of the input; (3) the refusal of access to the input to a competitor; and (4) if the provision of the input to a new competitor affects the quality of access to companies that already have access to it.8

CADE has already applied the essential facility theory in an investigation involving the refusal to sell. The case referred to the alleged impossibility of a company to comply with its contractual obligations concerning the provision of technical assistance services, in view of the defendant's refusal to sell maintenance parts, whose technology involved licences, patents and industrial secrets.

On that occasion, CADE concluded that the supply of parts and programs necessary for the maintenance of the equipment should be considered as essential facilities, considering that, without them, it would not be possible to continue competing in a consistent manner. However, it is worth noting that the investigation did not involve discussions concerning the right to patents or to royalties.

iii Unfair and discriminatory licensing

The Brazilian competition authority understands that abusive pricing is not illegal per se, but it will be deemed as such when it is a result of antitrust violations or when it gives rise to anticompetitive effects, such as the elimination of competition.

According to CADE, excessive prices may be classified as (1) exploitative prices, resulting from market power, when companies that hold a dominant position charge high prices to end consumers, with whom the company does not compete; and (2) exclusionary abuse, which aims at excluding a competitor from the market (usually perpetrated by vertically related companies). In relation to this particular issue, CADE defended its intervention on exclusionary abuse cases.9

CADE has analysed only a limited number of cases involving alleged discriminatory practices concerning the abusive pricing of royalties.10 However, in these limited cases, CADE shelved the investigation because of the lack of evidence that the defendant was indeed charging exclusionary prices.

In fact, in these cases, CADE noted that the dominant position held by the defendant in the case resulted from legal protection of its inventive activity, and that ‘excessive' prices, when distinguished from the profits that result from legitimately attained dominant positions, do not necessarily represent an antitrust violation.11 Taking that into account, CADE concluded that excessive prices are deemed illegal when they arise from the illegitimate use of market power or they give rise directly to anticompetitive effects, which is not the case with the legitimate exercise of IP rights.12

Further, it is worth mentioning that, in one of the cases, companies accused the holder of IP rights of discriminatory conduct, as the defendant had not registered patents involved in the manufacture of the product in all countries belonging to Mercosul, but only in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. In this sense, according to those companies, the costs of production in any other country bordering Brazil were reduced, in view of the absence of royalty fees, which would create an artificial competitive pressure in Brazil.13

However, CADE rejected the allegations, noting that the ‘artificial pressure' over the local manufacturers would affect the defendant itself, considering that the company has plants in Brazil. Moreover, even if the products under discussion were manufactured in a country where their patents were not registered, the sales in Brazil would depend on the payment of royalties. Finally, CADE pointed out that the decision to register a patent in certain countries is based on the analysis of benefits in relation to the costs and it does not necessarily reflect a strategy to discriminate against competitors.

iv Patent pooling

The effects of patent pooling on competition have been widely discussed in several jurisdictions, including Brazil. The debate about the manners in which patent pools may affect antitrust-related matters mainly concerns the existence of efficiencies arising from the inclusion of a group of patents in a pool, as well as potential harms that may arise from anticompetitive conduct involving patent pools.

The Brazilian competition authority has handed down decisions14 in which patent pools and their impact on the competition environment were analysed. In those decisions, CADE expressed an understanding that patent pools can be used as a tool to maintain and improve competition in the markets they relate to.

According to CADE, patent pools have the ability to integrate complementary technologies and reduce transaction costs by promoting the dissemination of those technologies. This would result in a substantial increase of the efficiencies, taking into account that licensees would be able to obtain, at once, the licences to use a group essential of patents necessary for the development of their products.

From the point of view of the Brazilian competition authority, patent pools would also be able to reduce the price of royalties paid for the use of patented technology and reduce the waiting time for the development of new products, taking into consideration that licensees would no longer need to perform multiple licensing operations.

However, CADE considered that patent pools, to bring benefits to competition, could not include technologies that were horizontally integrated, taking into account that competition between patents pertaining to the same pool have anticompetitive effects. This understanding derives from the fact that if companies include horizontally integrated technologies in the pool, the holders of the patents would no longer have an incentive to compete in relation to the process charged for their licences. Moreover, the companies would not have any incentives to compete at all in the markets in which the patents are inserted.

Also, only essential patents can be included in patent pools. The inclusion of non-essential patents into the pool could give rise to the possibility of tied-in sales. This would happen because licensees would be forced to obtain the licence for a non-essential patent wrongfully included in the group of essential patents necessary for the development of certain products.

In conclusion, although CADE considered patent pools as a means to improve competition in markets that use technology protected by essential patents, it also recognised that the pools have the ability to harm competition when misused.

v Software and trademark licensing

According to information publicly available, CADE has not recently investigated anticompetitive conduct involving software and trademark licensing. Nevertheless, considering the approach adopted by the Brazilian competition authority in cases related to other IP rights, it is certainly possible to affirm that software and trademark licensing is not immune to antitrust analysis and CADE will examine the net effects of the exercise of such rights.

IV STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS

i Dominance

The Brazilian Competition Act establishes that to assess whether a player has a dominant position in a certain relevant market the following issues must be considered: (1) the possibility of that player modifying, unilaterally or in a coordinated manner, the conditions of the market; and (2) whether the player holds at least 20 per cent of the market. The market share necessary to assess dominance may be altered by CADE depending on the circumstances and particularities of each market. The same criteria are used to assess a potential dominant position held by patent holders.

CADE has not taken dominant position into account in cases that involve patent rights. Although it has recognised abuses related to patents in the past, those decisions were based on arguments unrelated to the market power obtained through the patent rights.

In the first and only case analysed by CADE involving potential abuses related to SEPs,15 the authority did not make any considerations concerning the patent holders' dominant position. The claims made against the patent holder referred specifically to abuse of dominant position.

In the decision handed down by CADE, the authority understood that the activities of the patent holder were inserted in a different relevant market than the activities of the company licensees. This understanding was based on the fact that the patent holder only performed research and technology development. Therefore, the activities of the patent holder would be upstream from the market in which the activities of the licensees were included.

This understanding gives rise to potentially anticompetitive conduct, taking into account that the lack of dominant position may lead the competition authority to make a more superficial analysis of conduct related to patent rights. In the case mentioned above, CADE considered that, because the patent holder was not active in the same relevant market as the company allegedly affected by the potentially anticompetitive conduct, there would be no rationale behind promoting a market foreclosure.

ii Injunctions

Although CADE is the authority in charge of enforcing legislation related to competition matters, cases related to refusals to license have also been questioned before the Brazilian courts. Recent disputes related to the licensing of SEPs16 demonstrated that, while there has been some advance in ensuring a healthy competition environment in relation to the licensing of SEPs, the debate has a long way to go in Brazil.

Recently, a holder of an essential patent filed four requests for injunctions before the Brazilian courts. The injunctions aimed at preventing a company from continuing to use the patented technology. The company was willing to pay royalties for the use of the technology; however, the holder of the essential patent did not agree to grant the licence for a reasonable and fair price.

In this case, three out of the four injunction requests were granted in favour of the claimant. Consequently, the company was deprived of the right to use the patented technology and was required to take out of the market all products containing the technology. In summary, the essential patent holder was able to restrain the access of the potential licensee to the market through injunctions that prevented the use of an essential patent.

This understanding indicates that the Brazilian judicial branch is not yet factoring the anticompetitive results of refusals to license SEPs in its decision-making process.

However, one injunction request was not granted. A judge handed down a decision in favour of the company that needed the technology protected by the essential patent for the development of its products. The decision determined that the company was allowed to use the technology protected by essential patent, as long as 2 per cent of its profits were reserved for the payment of royalties to the patent holder.

Although this decision does not represent the majority of the cases, it certainly shows progress in the understanding related to the need to ensure market access through patent licensing.

The same case was later taken to CADE.17 The potential licensee alleged that the patent holder was promoting sham litigations to prevent it from using the essential patent. However, the competition authority deemed that the matter was essentially private and, therefore, it was not CADE's role to decide about it.

iii Licensing under FRAND terms

According to publicly available information, the obligation to license SEPs under FRAND terms has not yet been recognised by the Brazilian competition authority nor by Brazilian courts.

However, in a recent case18 involving a patent holder's refusal to license an SEP at reasonable and fair prices, the aggrieved company alleged that the patent holder should be obligated to negotiate under FRAND terms. The claimant's allegation was based on the fact that the patent holder had committed to enabling access to the patented technology when it signed an international agreement with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Under the agreement, the patent holder would be internationally bound by the obligation to negotiate royalties under FRAND terms.

Although the claimant's request has not been accepted by the courts so far, the mere presentation of such arguments before the Brazilian courts indicates that, in the near future, licensing under FRAND terms is likely to become a topic of discussion for the relevant authorities in Brazil. In this sense, the Brazilian authorities are likely to follow the practices of the European and US authorities, as they have done in other matters related to the intersection between antitrust and IP.

iv Anticompetitive or exclusionary royalties

A discussion concerning anticompetitive and exclusionary royalties related to SEPs has been initiated recently in Brazil.

In the case referred to in Sections IV.i, ii and iii, above, the amount paid for royalties for the licence of an essential patent was superficially discussed. On the occasion, the claimant alleged that the patent holder should be forced to negotiate royalties under FRAND terms. According to the claimant, the price charged for royalties by the essential patent holder was unreasonable and discriminatory.

The decision handed down by CADE stated that the negotiation of royalty prices was a private commercial matter that should be settled between the licensor and the licensee. In this sense, it may be concluded that, up to this point, the Brazilian competition authority has not issued a merits decision in relation to potentially anticompetitive or exclusionary royalties.

V INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MERGERS

i Transfer of IP rights constituting a merger

Besides the role performed in relation to behavioural control, CADE is also responsible for the review and approval of concentration acts.

Pursuant to the Brazilian Competition Act, any economic concentration acts in which (1) at least one of the economic groups involved in the transaction has registered annual gross sales or total turnover in Brazil equivalent or higher than 750 million reais, and (2) at least one other economic group involved in the transaction has registered annual gross sales or total turnover in Brazil the equivalent of 75 million reais or higher, in the year prior to the deal, must be notified to CADE. Moreover, concentration acts may be identified when one or more companies direct or indirectly acquire, through tangible or intangible assets, full or partial control of one or more companies.

Having said that, the transfer of IP rights may be subject to CADE's review. In 2015, the Brazilian competition authority analysed a transaction regarding the acquisition of certain assets, which involved solely the transfer of IP rights, such as the commercial brands related to the acquired business.19 The deal was approved without conditions by CADE and reinforces the necessity of notifying the transfer of IP rights.

Furthermore, the Brazilian Competition Act also establishes that joint ventures and associative agreements must be notified to the competition authority. In 2016, CADE enacted Resolution No. 17/2016, which provides some guidance for the notification of associative contracts.

According to this Resolution, for the purposes of notification, associative contracts include any agreements with a duration of more than two years that establish a common enterprise involving risk and income sharing and whose contracting parties are competitors in the relevant market related to the object of the agreement.

Since the enactment of Resolution No. 17/2016, no associative agreements involving the transfer of IP rights have been examined by CADE. However, notably, in 2017, CADE assessed whether a licensing agreement entered into by two video-game licensors was subject to mandatory notification under Resolution No. 17/2016. In that case, CADE decided that (1) the companies would not be competitors, because even though they were both video-game licensors, they would take different positions within the agreement - one of the companies would remain as the licensor and the other would be the licensee; and (2) there would be no risk or income sharing. Therefore, CADE understood that the agreement was not subject to mandatory notification.20

In this sense, considering this precedent, the discussion as to the necessity of notifying associative agreements involving IP rights - especially licensing - is still open.

ii Remedies involving divestitures of intellectual property

In the analysis of concentration acts, CADE may approve the transaction with or without conditions, depending on the competition concerns resulting from the deal.

When the transaction gives rise to negative effects on the competition, such as market foreclosure or a high degree of concentration, CADE may impose remedies on the companies. To comply with such orders, the applicants usually enter into a merger control agreement.

The remedies imposed by CADE in concentration acts may be classified as behavioural or structural. The structural remedies refer to the divestiture of part or all of the business and it may involve IP rights. In this sense, the divestiture of IP rights has been determined in several cases,21 which demonstrates its relevance as an instrument to help mitigate the competition concerns resulting from a transaction.

VI OTHER ABUSES

i Sham or vexatious IP litigation

As indicated above, a claim of sham litigation involving the filing for injunction requests that aimed at preventing a company from using an essential patent was recently presented to CADE.

On that occasion, the claimant alleged that the fact that the injunctions filed by the patent holder did not aim at discussing the price of royalties charged for the licensing of the technology, but only at requesting the discontinuance of the manufacture of the claimants' product, would indicate an attempt by the patent holder to restrain market access through sham litigation. The claimant also alleged that the patent holder was imposing an abusive royalty process, which should be negotiated under FRAND terms.

CADE handed down a decision shelving the proceedings because, according to the authority, there were no indicia of violation of the economic order. In its decision, CADE stated that there was no rationale behind the allegation that the patent holder's purpose was market foreclosure, as it is not active in the downstream market.

Moreover, CADE understood that the negotiations to reach an adequate fee for royalties related to the licensing of technology was not within the scope of the matters that should be decided by the competition authority. According to CADE, such negotiations are a private commercial matter, and should be resolved between the parties themselves. However, it is worth mentioning that appeals have been lodged against CADE's decision and these are still pending. Therefore, the authority's decision may still be reconsidered.

On past occasions,22 CADE has stated that patent registries that aim solely at blocking the access of other players to a certain relevant market should be considered as sham litigation. However, only a few decisions have been handed down that recognise this wrongful conduct.

In 2014, CADE analysed a case involving alleged sham litigation related to patent registries for drugs.23 The case concerned a patent holding company that filed numerous requests before the INPI with the purpose of extending its patent rights. In the multiple requests, the company tried to modify the scope of the patent to prolong the duration of its patent rights.

In this case, CADE recognised that the company had incurred sham litigation, taking into account that it was aware it did not hold the rights it was postulating for, and that it was knowingly trying to benefit from inexistent patent rights. CADE's decision was mainly based on the fact that the change of scope of the patent requests would demonstrate the company was aware it was not entitled to patent rights.

In CADE's understanding, for conduct to be considered as sham litigation, it has to fulfil two requirements: the purpose of obtaining a competitive advantage through litigation, and the known groundlessness of the requests made within that litigation. In the above-mentioned case, CADE understood both requirements were present.

In conclusion, even though only a few decisions handed down by the Brazilian competition authority have recognised abuses of patent rights related to sham litigation, those decisions demonstrate that the topic of abuse of patent rights has not been neglected by CADE.

ii Misuse of the patent process

The case referred to in Section VI.i, above24 is the most prominent example of misuse of the patent process recognised by CADE. In this case, the patent holder filed multiple requests before the INPI, as well as appeals before Brazilian courts, to have a non-existent patent right acknowledged.

In this case, CADE recognised that there had been a misuse of the patent process in the sense that the company was aware that it did not hold the patent rights it was requesting to have registered. Moreover, in its decision, CADE discussed the fact that the misuse of the patent process can lead to an artificial monopoly and grant undue advantages to the illegitimate patent holder.

VII OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS

In Brazil, the interactions between the IP and antitrust areas are a developing topic. As the number of IP and antitrust-related cases analysed by CADE and the judicial branch are modest, there are still many questions left open for discussion. There is certainly room for creativity and innovative approaches, but this may also mean that there is room for uncertainties.

In 2016, CADE was not faced with significant cases involving intellectual property, and no relevant decisions have been handed down by the competition authority on this topic. CADE continued to focus on the effectiveness of the new Brazilian Competition Act. The enactment of a new resolution on associative agreements, as mentioned above, reflects this effort. Considering that the relevance of the topic has been increasingly recognised in Brazil, especially because of the development of technology in the country, further crucial answers are expected to be provided in the coming years.

1 José Alexandre Buaiz Neto is a partner at Pinheiro Neto Advogados. Special thanks go to Isabela Pannunzio and Cassia Kinoshita, from Pinheiro Neto Advogados, for their time and valuable assistance in researching and drafting this chapter.

2 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.002673/2007-51.

3 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.002673/2007-51.

4 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.001315/2007-21.

5 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.002673/2007-51.

6 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.002673/2007-51.

7 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.005181/2006-37.

8 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.001315/2007-21.

9 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.000980/2000-23.

10 See Preliminary Investigations Nos. 08012.001315/2007-21 and 08012.005181/2006-37.

11 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.001315/2007-21.

12 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.000980/2000-23.

13 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.001315/2007-21.

14 See Concentration Act No. 08012.008810/2009-23.

15 See Preparatory Proceeding No. 08700.008409/2014-00.

16 See Preparatory Proceeding No. 08700.008409/2014-00.

17 See Preparatory Proceeding No. 08700.008409/2014-00.

18 See Preparatory Proceeding No. 08700.008409/2014-00.

19 See Consultation No. 08700.008419/2016-08.

20 See Concentration Act No. 08700.002894/2017-43.

21 See Concentration Acts Nos. 08012.004423/2009-18, 08700.001437/2015-70 and 08700.003462/2016-79.

22 See Preliminary Investigation No. 08012.005727/2006-50.

23 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.011508/2007-91.

24 See Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.011508/2007-91.