In Germany, the legal framework for intellectual property rights most importantly consists of the German Patent Act and the German Trade Mark Act. National competition (antitrust) law is codified in the German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC). The ARC has been widely aligned to EU competition law, which directly applies in cases with cross-border effects. The essential provisions are Section 1 ARC, which corresponds with Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (prohibition of agreements restricting competition) and Sections 19 and 20 ARC, which mainly correspond with Article 102 TFEU (abuse of a market dominant position).
Regarding the interface between intellectual property rights and competition law, there are no practically relevant specific statutory provisions. Rather, extensive case law has been developed with a view either to applying the cartel prohibition on certain types of agreements and restrictions, or to capturing certain types of behaviours as abusive. The core aspect of this IP-related competition law application is to comprehensively consider and duly respect the substance and scope of any exclusive right legitimately awarded to the IP owner.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that some IP-related statutory provisions, at least in appearance, have some similarity to competition law aspects; however, in substance they have a different, IP-related background. For example, Section 24 of the Patent Act provides for a compulsory licence based on public interest considerations. The German Federal Supreme Court has clarified already in its Standard-Spundfass judgment in 20042 with a view to competition law-based compulsory licences that ‘these two legal institutions have different goals and different preconditions' and may thus be applied independently from each other. Also, Section 23 of the Patent Act sounds familiar in the context of standard-essential patents (SEPs), a topic currently at the very forefront of IP-related competition law, as it provides for the possibility of a declaration by the patent holder in relation to the German Patent Office that every interested third party is entitled to use the invention in return for equitable remuneration. The main purpose of this provision, however, is merely to reduce the annual renewal fees.
II YEAR IN REVIEW
2017 has seen a revised version of the German competition act, the ARC, coming into force. However, the new law, in effect from 9 June 2017, mainly aims to facilitate cartel damages law claims by implementing the relevant EU Directive 2014/104/EU. Beyond that, the ARC has been modified with regard to various other aspects, none of which specifically targets the application of German competition law in the IP-related context.
The application of IP-related competition law in Germany remained especially marked during the past year by various court decisions dealing with the assertion of standard-essential patents, and thereby implementing and specifying the criteria for enforcing such patents, following the Huawei v. ZTE 3 decision handed down the year before by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), on 16 July 2015.4 This decision, rendered in preliminary proceedings based on a set of questions referred to the CJEU by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf in 2013,5 developed a set of criteria under which the proprietor of an SEP can legitimately, without violating Article 102 TFEU, seek an injunction based on such a patent (and claim for recall and destruction).
One additional IP-related highlight was the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf on the marketing of football media rights. The Court dismissed the appeal brought by one of the various third-party interveners, Sky, against the decision of the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) of April 2016 on the centralised marketing of media rights for the first and second German Federal Football League (Bundesliga).6
III LICENSING AND ANTITRUST
i Anticompetitive restraints
In German law, anticompetitive restraints in licensing agreements fall under Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU. This includes, inter alia, market and customer sharing, pricing, output limitations or no-challenge clauses.7 In this context, the Horizontal Guidelines of the Commission (2011/C 11/01) and Commission Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on technology transfer agreements (TT-BER), which is applicable in German law according to Section 2(2) ARC, are of particular importance. Based on the TT-BER, in particular, hardcore restrictions are of crucial relevance, such as the restriction of a party's ability to determine its prices when selling products to third parties, limitation of output, allocation of markets or customers, and restriction of the licensee's ability to exploit its own technology rights.
The Higher Regional Court of Celle decided in its decision of 14 October 2016 on several contractual restrictions in a research and development and technology transfer agreement between two parties in the sugar beet cultivation sector.8 The agreement involved various restrictions imposed upon one party, such as a far-reaching non-compete obligation and obligations to comprehensively transfer, or retransfer, the results of its research and development activities to the other party. On basis of the TT-BER and the R&D-BER, the Court considered the restrictions in question partly as hardcore but nevertheless saw them as ‘ancillary' to the competitively neutral main agreement between the parties and thus to a large extent compliant with Article 101 TFEU.
In the above-mentioned case regarding football media rights, the FCO had considered the centralised marketing by the German Federal Football League to fall under Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU, and had cleared it on the basis of a commitment decision pursuant to Article 32b ARC.9 The commitments, inter alia, referred to how the media rights in questions are to be structured in various ‘rights packages' and included specific provisions on the tender proceedings, most importantly a ‘no-single-buyer rule'. This rule aims to ensure, by way of a certain two-step approach, that no single undertaking would have a chance to acquire all rights for live broadcasting.
One of the joined parties of the FCO proceedings, Sky, which had acquired practically all live media rights in the previous tender, appealed against the FCO's decision, mainly attacking the ‘imposition' of the no-single-buyer rule by the FCO on the German Football League (by way of accepting a corresponding commitment) as being an unnecessary and excessive restriction severely harming Sky in its rights and commercial interests.
The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf dismissed the complaint in its decision of 3 May 2017.10 It held the complaint to be inadmissible.
The Court denied that the FCO's decision infringed any of Sky's rights as the decision itself had no legal effect on Sky since the decision's effects materialise only upon its implementation by a private third party - the German Federal Football League offering the media rights. However, even if one were to take these effects into consideration, the decision did not infringe Sky's rights as the no-single-buyer rule was obviously pro-competition, aiming to open up markets and increase competition - an objective clearly consistent with the legal framework and thus obviously not capable of infringing Sky in any of its rights whatsoever. In addition, the claimant was considered not to be affected sufficiently in its commercial interests. The Court already denied Sky's commercial interests in this context to be legitimate, inter alia, stressing that the no-single-buyer rule aims to avoid a monopoly-like situation in the relevant end-consumer market, and that Sky's interest in a tender without this rule thus consists in avoiding competition. Further the Court raised doubts as to whether the claimant's interests were ‘directly' affected and stressed that Sky in any case would not be ‘individually' affected since the no-single-buyer rule would apply equally to all potential bidders for the media rights concerned, in a similar way. The fact that the FCO in its decision explicitly referred to Sky when explaining its concerns was seen merely as a reflex of Sky having secured nearly all live broadcasting rights in the previous tender. Whether this past success might trigger the need for Sky to modify its business strategy now, in the light of a no-single-buyer rule, was not considered relevant by the Court. The Court stressed that media rights, from the outset, are only offered for a limited period, after which all market participants have to adjust their behaviour equally to the new tender proceedings, and the Court did not see any indication why claimant Sky would have been affected by the no-single-buyer rule in an appreciably stronger or structurally different way from its competitors.
ii Refusals to license
There are no specific statutory provisions regarding the refusal to license. Abuse of a market dominant position pursuant to Section 19(1) ARC is interpreted closely along the lines of its EU counterpart, Article 102 TFEU. In particular the conditions under which a refusal to license is deemed abusive derive from the case law of the CJEU, which has mainly been formed by the leading judgments in Magill11 and IMS Health.12, 13 Accordingly, a refusal to license may be abusive and a claim for a compulsory licence successful where (1) using the intellectual property right in question is indispensable for carrying out business on a neighbouring or downstream market, (2) the refusal to grant a licence prevents a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, or (3) the refusal is not objectively justified and would exclude competition. According to the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, a product is ‘new' in this sense where, from a demand-side perspective, there is no substitutability between the product of the licence-seeking undertaking on the one side and the intellectual property right owner's existing product on the other side.14
As regards patents that have already been licensed out by the patent owner, a refusal to license may be abusive and thus lead to a compulsory licence if the licensing practice of the patent owner is discriminatory or exploitative under Sections 19 and 20 ARC, Article 102 TFEU.15
Refusal to license regarding SEPs is discussed in Section IV, below.
iii Unfair and discriminatory licensing
Unfair or discriminatory licensing practices can fall under Sections 19 and 20 ARC, Article 102 TFEU and may be considered as an abusive (discriminatory) behaviour by a market-dominant intellectual property right owner (see Section III.ii, supra).
iv Patent pooling
In practice, the rules established at EU level apply.
v Software licensing
A case before the Regional Court of Hamburg16 dealt with the issue of an agreement between a software company and a distributor of used software according to which reselling without prior permission was prohibited. The court held that the behaviour was abusive under Sections 19 and 20 ARC and not objectively justified, referring to the UsedSoft judgment of the CJEU17 and stating that the applicable right was exhausted.
vi Trademark licensing
In general, restrictions of competition in trademark licensing agreements are compatible with the cartel prohibition of Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU if they are necessary to protect the continued existence of the trademark and legitimate interests for the restriction are given.18 Agreements on territorial protection, prohibition or restrictions on exercising, restrictions in quantity, reservation of customer groups, non-assertion and no-challenge agreements are principally deemed to be infringing Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU.19
In practice, delimitation agreements are of particular importance at the interface with competition law, as these agreements typically aim to settle disputes between the parties. Further details are provided in Section VI.iii, below.
IV STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
As mentioned above, in the recent past the application of IP-related competition law in Germany has remained dominated by the German courts' implementation and concretisation of the decision of the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE case on the question of the circumstances under which the assertion of SEPs constitutes an abuse of a market dominant position in the sense of Article 102 TFEU, and of the safeguards under which such an assertion constitutes the legitimate use of a granted exclusionary right.20
The question of dominance linked to owning SEPs was not the subject matter of the questions referred to the CJEU by the Regional Court of Düsseldorf. Nevertheless, Advocate General Wathelet briefly commented on the issue by stressing that owning an SEP does ‘not necessarily' mean that the patent owner holds a dominant position. The Advocate General went on to argue in a way that might be understood as him favouring a rebuttable presumption for market dominance as a result of owning an SEP; in any case, he stressed the importance for the national court to determine market dominance on a case-by-case basis.21 The CJEU did not deal with market dominance and confined his assessment explicitly to the criterion of an abuse in the sense of Article 102 TFEU.
German courts so far have not relied on a presumption of market dominance. In its decision of 26 March 2015 (i.e., prior to the CJEU's decision in Huawei v. ZTE of July 2015), the Regional Court of Düsseldorf22 rejected the alleged infringers' antitrust objection, or ‘FRAND defence',23 because it concluded that the plaintiff and patent owner could not be considered to hold a dominant market position. The Court stressed that there is no legal presumption linking SEP ownership and market dominance; rather, the existence of market dominance should be assessed on basis of the scope of the patent in suit and its actual significance in the relevant product markets. The court specified that an SEP leads to market dominance where the use of the patent is mandatory to enter the relevant downstream product market or where it is at least necessary to compete effectively in the market. Accordingly the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf stated in a recent decision that a dominant market position of the patent owner has to be determined by the court, with the defendant having to bear the burden of evidence.24
In cases where the CJEU's criteria are considered to be fulfilled (i.e., where an abuse by the plaintiff and patent owner is denied), there is a tendency not to address the patent owner's market position and leave it open whether the patent owner actually is market dominant.25
The question of whether or not an SEP holder acts abusively within the meaning of Section 19 ARC, Article 102 TFEU by bringing an action of injunction against an alleged infringer has been dealt with by German courts for years. This case law has most importantly been framed by the Federal Supreme Court's decision of 2009 in the Orange-Book-Standard26 case and a large number of subsequent cases of the instance courts.
Differing significantly from this German case law, the CJEU27 set forth specific requirements under which claiming for injunctive relieve (or recall or destruction) is not abusive under Article 102 TFEU:
- a First, prior to bringing an action, the SEP holder must alert the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that SEP and specifying the way in which it has been infringed.
- b Second, the SEP holder is obliged to provide an offer for a licence on FRAND terms after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. This offer must also be submitted to the alleged infringer prior to bringing an action.28 It has to be stressed that the CJEU corrected the wording of the reasoning after it adopted the judgment because of different interpretations on this point.
- c If the infringer does not accept the offer, he or she is obliged to make, promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms and, if the counter-offer is rejected, from that point on to provide appropriate security, in accordance with recognised commercial practices.
- d Finally, where no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND terms following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer, ‘the parties may, by common agreement request that the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third party'.
After the Huawei v. ZTE judgment was handed down, the German case law has to date focused on two aspects.
One major issue is the question as to whether some sort of ‘transitional law' applies to cases that were pending prior to the CJEU's judgment. In its judgment in May 2016, the Regional Court of Mannheim29 argued in favour of such a ‘transitional law' and considered the plaintiff and patent owner in this case not to have acted abusively even though he did not entirely fulfil the CJEU's criteria as to the pretrial obligations, namely the obligation to alert the standard user about the infringement by designating the SEP and specifying the way in which it has been infringed. The Regional Court of Mannheim mainly stressed that the patent owner, by bringing the action, had acted in good faith by applying the then existing German case law. The Court also interpreted the Huawei v. ZTE judgment as allowing the national courts to consider some of the CJEU's requirements not to be relevant, and based this interpretation, inter alia, on paragraph 70 of the CJEU's decision, according to which ‘it is for the referring court to determine whether the above-mentioned criteria are satisfied in the present case, in so far as they are relevant, in the circumstances, for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings'. The decision is under appeal, but the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe meanwhile handed down a decision in corresponding enforcement protection proceedings.30 The Higher Regional Court criticised the first instance approach as such but indicated that it is necessary to differentiate between a potential abuse in bringing action on the one hand and asserting the patent abusively up until the end of the court proceedings on the other hand.
Comparable to the Court of Mannheim's approach, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf31 also decided in favour of a ‘transitional period'. The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, in enforcement protection proceedings, stressed that the principles developed by the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE decision also apply in cases prior to the decision.32
One other major issue currently is the question of whether the Huawei v. ZTE criteria must be fulfilled ‘step by step' or whether a more general approach, weighing each parties' activities, is appropriate. Both the Regional Court of Düsseldorf33 and the Regional Court of Mannheim34 initially applied a more flexible approach in that they did not assess the FRAND character of the plaintiff and patent owner's licence offer in each and every detail. Following a more general assessment, the courts finally left it open whether the plaintiff's licence offer actually was FRAND and considered the relevant defendants not to have acted diligently by failing to swiftly provide a FRAND counter-offer. The competent Higher Regional Courts of Düsseldorf 35 and Karlsruhe36 respectively overturned this approach (in enforcement protection proceedings) and ruled in favour of a step-by-step approach according to which a plaintiff and patent owner's licence offer has to be scrutinised in detail as to whether it is FRAND; only upon such a FRAND offer are standard users and defendants obliged to make a FRAND counter-offer.37
iii Licensing under FRAND terms
A major issue in the field of SEP is the question of defining FRAND terms and conditions. Although a large number of German court cases have dealt with the FRAND defence so far, the exact determination of FRAND criteria remains basic and open to discussion.38 One important aspect in considering the FRAND character of an offer is the established licensing practice of the licensor or of other market participants.39 Accordingly the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf defined the term ‘non-discriminatory' to the effect that the patent owner has to offer the willing licensee a licence on conditions similar to those offered to other licensees or that the patent owner comprehensibly shows reasonable grounds for an unequal treatment. The Court stated further, that a judicial finding regarding a ‘non-discriminatory' offer requires -especially with regard to the amount of the licence fees - specific submission of facts by the patent owner with respect to licence agreements with third licensees. In the Court's opinion this would include specific statements to conditions agreed with other licensees as well as their importance on the relevant markets. Thus the patent owner may not assert that a non-disclosure agreement with third licensees excludes a specific submission of facts.40
V INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MERGERS
i Transfer of IP rights constituting a merger
Under German competition law, the transfer of intellectual property rights can constitute a merger by way of an acquisition of control within the meaning of Section 37(1) No. 2(a) of the ARC if the acquisition relates to a substantial part of the assets.41
ii Remedies involving divestitures of intellectual property
In a clearance decision, the FCO42 decided on ancillary provisions, inter alia, with regard to intellectual property rights: the Funke Media Group intended to acquire assets of TV programme guides. The FCO found that the acquisition would have led to the strengthening of a collective dominant position of the acquirer. Therefore, the acquirer was obliged to sell intangible assets regarding TV programme guides.
VI OTHER ABUSES
An example of an exploitative abuse within the meaning of Section 19 ARC is the recent investigation of the FCO regarding Google. The FCO had to decide on Google's practice of displaying snippets of search results regarding news publishers.43 Google refused to pay a fee for the displayed content and did not purchase any licences for the content. As a reaction to this unauthorised use of the content, several news publishers filed a complaint to the FCO with regard to their respective ancillary copyrights. After examining the complaint, the FCO held that it was highly likely that Google's behaviour was objectively justified and therefore did not constitute abusive conduct within the meaning of Section 19 ARC, Article 102 TFEU.
i Sham or vexatious IP litigation
In line with EU law, it is accepted under German law that the alleged infringer can raise the objection that the patent holder's claim is abusive within the meaning of Section 19 ARC, Article 102 TFEU because of a ‘patent ambush'.44 This means a situation where the patent holder does not disclose the existence of a patent application during the standard-setting process, and subsequently asserts that a patent is infringed.
In a civil case before the Regional Court of Düsseldorf,45 a holder of design rights regarding wheel rims claimed for injunctive relief regarding the use of design rights without a licence. The defendant argued that the assertion of design rights would be abusive in the sense of Article 102 TFEU because he had to produce parts that matched the car and would otherwise not be purchased (‘must match' part). The court rejected this argument. With reference to the case law of the CJEU (Magill46 and Volvo/Veng47), the court stated that the assertion of design rights can only be considered abusive in exceptional circumstances. The concrete design of the wheel rims is not technically necessary. It is possible, rather, for the defendant to produce wheel rims of similar quality, but with a different design. Beyond that, the court held that it is acceptable for a customer to purchase a wheel rim of the claimant or a complete set of wheel rims of other producers.
Furthermore in a case regarding the infringement of a standard-essential patent the Regional Court of Düsseldorf stated that a patent ambush with the intention of demanding excessive royalties does not necessarily lead to the patent owner's loss of a patent law claim to a cease-and-desist order. Rather, the legal consequence would be the patent owner's obligation to provide an offer for a licence on FRAND terms to the alleged infringer.48 The Higher Regional Court supported the Regional Court's view in its decision of 9 May 2016.49
Another example for a possible abuse of intellectual property rights litigation is the BMW-Emblem case of the Federal Supreme Court.50 The claimant, BMW, filed an action against a producer of spare parts that, inter alia, produces and supplies BMW emblems without a licence. The court rejected the defendants and held that the action was founded. Additionally, in an obiter dictum, the court stated that a manufacturer of spare parts for BMW that are visible (e.g., front or rear parts) could, under certain circumstances, be entitled to supply original BMW emblems from the intellectual property rights holder or at least grant the retrofitting by customers or by workshops on the customer's order under competition law.
ii Misuse of the patent process
In accordance with EU law, under the German provisions the strategic misuse of the patent process can be deemed to be abusive (Sections 19, 20 ARC, Article 102 TFEU).51
iii Anticompetitive settlements of IP disputes
Settlements of intellectual property disputes between competitors may, under certain conditions, constitute an infringement within the meaning of Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU. In line with EU law, under German antitrust law, patent settlements are generally accepted as a compromise to a bona fide legal disagreement.52 If there are serious objective indications for the settled right and the restrictions remain within the frame of objective uncertainties, the antitrust prohibition does not apply.53
Agreements between undertakings that aim to prevent the access of substitutes to the market, such as pay-for-delay or reverse-payment agreements, especially the delay of generic drugs' entry into the market, also fall under Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU.54
With regard to trademarks, undertakings also settle disputes on conflicting similar trademarks by ‘delimitation agreements'. The compatibility of such agreements can constitute an infringement of Section 1 ARC, Article 101(1) TFEU. As a general rule, delimitation agreements regarding trademarks constitute cartel infringements if market sharing or other restrictions of competition are intended.55 In its decision Winn & Coales v. DENSO, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf stated that a delimitation agreement does not restrict competition if it is neutral (i.e., if it only specifies the existing intellectual property rights).56
In a further decision, the Federal Supreme Court stressed that a trademark delimitation agreement does not necessarily include a prohibition against advertising in the other party's business district.57 Thereby, it contradicted the decision of the court of appeal, which held the relevant clause to be an unlimited delimitation agreement also prohibiting advertising with clarifying additional wording in the other party's business district, and therefore inadmissible under antitrust law. In contrast, the Federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant clause was that it had not been intended by the parties to prohibit advertising with additional distinguishing wording in the other's district.
VII OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS
The development at the interface between intellectual property and antitrust law remains highly dynamic in Germany. It can be expected that the specific interface between patent and antitrust law, mainly with regard to SEPs, will remain of crucial importance and will probably also have some influence on similar cases in other Member States of the European Union.
1 Jörg Witting is a partner at Bird & Bird LLP.
2 Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 13 July 2004, KZR 40/02, Standard-Spundfass. On the differences between a compulsory licence based on Section 24 of the Patent Act and a competition law-based compulsory licence, see also recently BPatG, judgment of 31 August 2016 - 3 LiQ 1/16 (EP) - Isentress.
3 CJEU, judgment of 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies v. ZTE.
4 CJEU, judgment of 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies v. ZTE.
5 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 21 March 2013, 4b O 104/12, LTE-Standard.
6 FCO, decision of 11 April 2016, B6-32/15.
7 See Nordemann, Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-Lindemann, 3rd Edition 2016, Chapter 3, paragraph 14 et seq.
8 Higher Regional Court of Celle, decision of 14 October 2016, 13 Sch 1/15.
9 FCO, decision of 11 April 2016, B6-32/15.
10 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 3 May 2017, VI Kart 6/16.
11 CJEU, judgment of 6 April 1995, C-241/91 P and C 242/91 P, Magill.
12 CJEU, judgment of 29 April 2004, C-418/01, IMS Health.
13 See Wolf, Münchener Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 2nd Edition 2015, Section 19 GWB, paragraph 33.
14 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 20 January 2011, I-2 U 92/10. See Kühnen, Handbuch der Patentverletzung, 8th Edition 2016, Chapter E., paragraph 212; see also recently Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 29 April 2016, I-15 U 47/15.
15 Kühnen, Handbuch der Patentverletzung, 8th Edition 2016, Chapter E., paragraph 214.
16 Regional Court of Hamburg, judgment of 25 October 2013, 315 O 449/12.
17 CJEU, judgment of 3 July 2012, C-128/11, UsedSoft.
18 See, e.g., Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 12 March 1991, KVR 1/90, Golden Toast; Higher Regional Court of Hamburg, judgment of 12 December 2013, 3 U 38/11, St. Pauli II; Bechtold/Bosch, GWB, 8th Edition 2015, Section 1, paragraph 79.
19 See Jestaedt, Langen/Bunte, Volume 2, Europäisches Kartellrecht, 12th Edition 2015, Nach Article 101 AEUV, paragraph 1252.
20 CJEU, judgment of 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies v. ZTE.
21 Advocate General's Opinion of 20 November 2014, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, paragraphs 57 and 58.
22 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 26 March 2015, 4b O 140/13.
23 ‘FRAND' refers to fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
24 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 17 November 2016, I-15 U 66/15.
25 See, for example, Regional Court of Mannheim, judgment of 8 January 2016, 7 O 96/14.
26 Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 6 May 2009, KZR 39/06, Orange-Book-Standard.
27 CJEU, judgment of 16 July 2015, C-170/13, paragraph 60 et seq., Huawei Technologies v. ZTE.
28 See Kühnen, Handbuch der Patentverletzung, 8th Edition 2016, Chapter E., paragraph 295, footnote 407.
29 Regional Court of Mannheim, judgment of 4 March 2016, 7 O 96/14.
30 Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, decision of 31 May 2016, 6 U 55/16.
31 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 3 November 2015, 4a O 93/14.
32 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 17 November 2016, I-15 U 66/15; see also Kühnen, Handbuch der Patentverletzung, 8th Edition 2016, Chapter E., paragraph 295 et seq.
33 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 3 November 2015, 4a O 144/14.
34 Regional Court of Mannheim, judgment of 4 March 2016, 7 O 96/14.
35 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 9 May 2016, 15 U 35/16.
36 Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, decision of 31 May 2016, 6 U 55/16.
37 See meanwhile: Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 31 March 2016, 4a O 126/14.
38 See, e.g., Hauck/Kamlah, ‘Was ist "FRAND"? Inhaltliche Fragen zu kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizenzen nach Huawei/ZTE', GRUR Int. 2016, pp. 420-426.
39 See Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14.
40 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 17 November 2016, I-15 U 66/15.
41 See Federal Supreme Court, decision of 10 October 2006, KVR 32/05, National Geographic I.
42 FCO, decision of 25 April 2014, B6-98/13.
43 FCO, decision of 8 September 2015, B6-126/14; see also Kersting/Dworschak, ‘Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverlage: Müsste Google wirklich zahlen? - eine kartellrechtliche Analyse', NZKart 2013, pp. 46-53.
44 See, e.g., Regional Court of Mannheim, judgment of 10 March 2015, 2 O 103/14.
45 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 10 March 2016, 14c O 58/15.
46 CJEU, judgment of 6 April 1995, C-241/91 P and C 242/91 P, Magill.
47 CJEU, judgment of 5 October 1988, 238/87, Volvo/Veng.
48 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 31 March 2016, 4a O 126/14.
49 Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision of 9 May 2016, I-15 U 35/16.
50 Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 12 March 2015, I ZR 153/14, BMW-Emblem.
51 See Huttenlauch/Lübbig, Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht, 3rd Edition 2016, Article 102, paragraph 289 et seq.; Schnelle, ‘Missbrauch einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung durch Patentanmeldungs- und -verwaltungsstrategien', GRUR-Prax 2010, pp. 169-173.
52 See Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements, 2014/C 89/03, paragraph 235.
53 See, e.g., Federal Supreme Court, 5 July 2005, X ZR 14/03, Abgasreinigungsvorrichtung.
54 See Wolf, Münchener Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 2nd Edition 2015, Volume 1, Einleitung, paragraph 1377 et seq.
55 Jestaedt, Langen/Bunte, Volume 2, Europäisches Kartellrecht, 12th Edition 2015, Nach Article 101 AEUV, paragraph 1257; Federal Supreme Court, judgment of 7 December 2010, KZR 71/08, Jette Joop.
56 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, judgment of 15 October 2014, VI-U (Kart) 42/13, Winn & Coales v. DENSO.
57 Federal Supreme Court, decision of 12 July 2016, KZR 69/14, Peek & Cloppenburg II.