I INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Mexico has increased its efforts to combat corruption; however, recent surveys still show a lack of sufficient progress to effectively root out graft in comparison to other Latin American countries. A recent index published by Americas Society/Council of the Americas (AS/COA) and consultancy firm Control Risks shows the foregoing, where the country with the highest overall score was Chile, and Mexico came in a distant sixth,2 followed by Guatemala and Venezuela.

As a result of the enactment of the constitutional anti-corruption amendment of May 2015, Mexico's primary anti-corruption body was created, the National Anti-Corruption System, which focuses on providing legal framework for oversight of public officials and private parties in the anti-corruption and anti-bribery context. The National Anti-Corruption System coordinates the federal, state and municipal levels to prevent, detect and prosecute corruption offences. The centrepiece of the constitutional anti-corruption amendment was the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, which now punishes both public officials and private parties, including both individuals and legal entities, for any bribery of public officials, whether in the federal, state or municipal public procurement context or otherwise. This key element, coupled with the advent of corporate criminal liability in 2016, have been the most notable anti-corruption developments in Mexico's history.

Although the federal laws to implement the National Anti-Corruption System entered into full force in July 2017, Mexico has been struggling to fully implement these provisions at the federal and state levels. First, as of this writing, appointments for the 18 federal anti-corruption judges of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice, who will have jurisdiction over serious administrative offences, are still pending. Thirteen out of the 18 nominees withdrew their nominations, and recently the Senate voted to reject the five remaining nominees. Now, it is time for President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to submit fresh nominations to Senate. Paradoxically, the government is seeking to reduce or eliminate these seats as part of its austerity measures. While it is not clear whether this proposal will move forward, this measure will definitely produce negative impacts on the National Anti-Corruption System.3 Second, at the local level, four out of 32 states have not yet harmonised their anti-corruption legislative framework with the federal anti-corruption legislation, in addition to seven out of 32 states that have not yet appointed members to one or more anti-corruption bodies.4

Despite these shortcomings, there have been positive developments in Mexico's efforts to combat corruption. On 1 December 2018, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador was sworn in as Mexico's President, vowing to lead a sweeping transformation against corruption, impunity and inequality. Since then, the country has been in a major austerity and anti-graft push.

This chapter provides an overview of Mexico's domestic anti-corruption framework, including criminal, civil and administrative legislation. It discusses the elements of anti-bribery legislation in various contexts, and examines related criminal offences. It closes with a section dedicated to a forecast for legislative developments and other final thoughts.

II DOMESTIC BRIBERY: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

i Criminal law

Criminal liability

Following the constitutional anti-corruption amendment of 2015, in July 2016, the Federal Congress passed an amendment to the Mexican Federal Criminal Code and the National Code of Criminal Procedures,5 to establish direct corporate criminal liability for certain white-collar crimes, including bribery. As a result, legal entities are now liable for crimes when (1) the offences are committed in their name, on their behalf, for their benefit, or using means provided by them; and (2) when the entity did not have 'proper controls' in place.6 Although some people believe that the lack of proper controls should be an element to be proven by the criminal authorities in prosecution, others believe that, in practice, the commission of a crime is prima facie evidence of a lack of controls, which would need to be rebutted by evidence of a compliance programme. Based on the foregoing, private parties, including both individuals and legal entities, can be criminally liable for bribery of public officials pursuant to the Mexican Federal Criminal Code and most of, if not all, local criminal codes.

Bribery of domestic officials offences

Mexico's Federal Criminal Code has provided for bribery of public officials since its first enactment in 1931,7 covering bribery of federal and some state public officials. Similarly, state criminal codes prohibit bribery of state and local public officials.

Article 222 of the Federal Criminal Code defines bribery and provides that bribery can be committed both by public officials, who solicit or receive a bribe, and by private individuals, who offer or pay to corrupt a public official. Mexico's Federal Criminal Code sanctions:

  1. the public official who, directly or indirectly, solicits or receives unduly for the public official or another person, money or any other gift, or accepts a promise to do or refrain from doing any just or unjust act in relation to the public official's function, employment, charge or commission; and
  2. whoever promises or gives any benefit to any public official, to cause the public official to do or refrain from doing an act related to the public official's function, employment, charge or commission.8

Definition of domestic public official

The Mexican Federal Criminal Code has a broad definition of 'public official'. This definition includes any individual who has employment, position or charge of any nature in: (1) the central Federal Public Administration or in the Mexico City Public Administration; (2) decentralised organisms; (3) majority state-owned companies; (4) organisations or entities that have been assimilated to majority state-owned companies; (5) public trusts; (6) state-owned enterprises; (7) autonomous constitutional bodies; (8) federal Congress; (9) federal judiciary; or (10) entities that manage federal economic resources.9

In addition, the relevant anti-bribery provisions of the Federal Criminal Code also apply to state governors, representatives, officials in local legislatures and magistrates in local courts.

Gifts, gratuities, travel, meals and entertainment

Mexican criminal law does not establish quantitative or qualitative limitations on hospitality expenses. In principle, a public official may not receive any gifts, gratuity, meal or entertainment for his or her own benefit. Whether a hospitality expense should be considered bribery will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. There is no de minimis exception to the prohibition on gifts to public officials, so all hospitality must be provided to the represented government entity and not to the public official personally.

Penalties

The Mexican Federal Criminal Code establishes the same penalties for both public officials and private parties, including both individuals and legal entities that corrupt public officials. Penalties for public officials and private parties include up to 14 years' imprisonment,10 fines of up to approximately US$670,11 removal from public office, if applicable, up to 20 years' prohibition from holding public office and debarment from participating in public procurement processes.12

Moreover, if the perpetrator is an elected public official or a public official whose appointment requires ratification by the Mexican Congress, penalties can increase by up to one-third,13 and by up to half if the public official is a member of a police, customs or immigration agency.14

In addition, if a court determines that an individual used the legal entity as an alter ego, it may impose suspension of the entity's activities or even the dissolution of the entity.15

Commercial bribery offences

In Mexico, commercial bribery per se is not a crime. However, although in practice we are not aware of it ever having been done, crimes such as fraud, forgery, theft and abuse of trust, which is similar to embezzlement,16 could be charged in cases of commercial bribery.

ii Administrative law

Bribery of domestic officials offences

The General Law of Administrative Responsibilities (GLAR) mainly targets domestic bribery in Mexico. This law punishes both public officials and private parties, including both individuals and legal entities, for any bribery of public officials, whether in the federal state or municipal public procurement context or otherwise. Specifically, the GLAR prohibits both:

Public officials from, directly or indirectly, soliciting or receiving unduly any benefit that is not included in their salary, for the public official, their relatives, or any individual or entity with whom the public official has a professional, labor, or business relationship, or partners or corporations related to, regulated or supervised by, the public official;17 and
Private parties, including both individuals and legal entities, from directly or indirectly, promising, offering or giving any undue benefit to any public official, where such benefit may be viewed as part of a quid pro quo arrangement to cause him or her to do or refrain from doing any just or unjust act related to a public official's function, employment, position, or charge; or to exert the real or apparent influence on the decision-making of a public official for the purpose of obtaining an undue benefit or advantage, regardless of the acceptance or receipt of the benefit, or the outcome.18 

Definition of domestic public official

The GLAR defines public officials as the individuals who have employment, position or charge, at the federal and state level, as provided in Article 108 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.19 The definition in the Mexican Constitution includes those elected by popular vote; members of the federal judiciary; and any individual that has an employment, position or charge of any nature in the federal Congress, the federal public administration, and the autonomous constitutional bodies.

Penalties

Penalties for public officials include up to 90 days' suspension from their employment in public office, removal of public office, double disgorgement, up to 20 years' debarment from holding public office or participating in public procurement processes, plus damages.20

Both individuals and legal entities can be sanctioned by double disgorgement or, even if there was no proven tangible benefit, sanctions can include fines of up to the equivalent of US$600,000 or US$6 million, respectively; up to 10 years' debarment from participating in public procurement processes; and damages. In addition, sanctions for legal entities may include suspension of the entity's activities or even dissolution of the entity.21

Gifts, gratuities, travel, meals and entertainment

The Code of Ethics of the Federal Public Administration strictly prohibits public officials from soliciting, accepting or receiving any gifts, for the public official, their spouse, relatives, individuals or entities with whom the public official has a professional, labour or business relationship, or partners or corporations related to, regulated or supervised by the public official. However, it does not provide for guidance on gifts, hospitality and entertainment.

Commercial bribery

Commercial or private-to-private bribery is not specifically proscribed by Mexican administrative anti-bribery provisions.

Public official's participation in commercial activities

Public officials are not forbidden from participating in commercial activities or in any other activities while serving as a public official, provided these activities do not conflict with their public functions.

Political contributions by foreign citizens or companies

Article 33 of the Mexican Constitution strictly prohibits foreign individuals and companies from participating in politics in Mexico. The Mexican public is very sensitive to foreign influences in politics, so multinationals would be well advised to steer clear of involvement in this area, including any political contributions.

Administrative and criminal enforcement

For corruption cases under the GLAR, enforcement authorities are (1) the Secretary of Public Administration and the local entities at the state level; internal control boards of each government entity; (2) the Superior Audit Office of the Federation and the superior auditing entities of the states; (3) the Federal Court of Administrative Justice and the local courts; (4) the Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico City Superior Court of Justice and the state courts; (5) the Federal Council of the Judiciary and the corresponding local entities; (6) and the responsibility units of the state-owned productive enterprises.22

Internal control boards, the Secretary of Public Administration and the local agencies are responsible for investigating, settling and ruling minor administrative offences and administrative offences.23 The Superior Audit Office of the Federation and the superior local auditing entities are responsible for investigating and settling serious administrative offences.24 The Federal Court of Administrative Justice and the state courts are responsible for ruling over sanctions for serious administrative offences committed by either public officials or private parties.25

Defences

Demonstrating the existence of adequate procedures and a compliance structure in place at the time of the commission of the bribery offence can be a mitigating factor for determining sanctions under the Federal Criminal Code and reduce sanctions by up to 25 per cent. In practice, we believe it can also influence the determination on the part of the prosecutor of whether or not the company had 'proper controls' in place, and so could be an affirmative defence to potentially bar any liability at all.

Pursuant to the GLAR, the existence of an adequate integrity policy or a compliance programme is a mitigating factor for reducing sanctions, as long as it has:

  1. a clear and complete organisational and procedures manual that clearly defines the functions and responsibilities of each department of the company, and clearly specifies the chains of command and leadership for each corporate structure;
  2. a code of conduct that is duly published and made known to every person in the organisation and that has systems and mechanisms for effective implementation;
  3. adequate and effective control, monitoring and audit systems that ensure compliance on a continuous and periodic basis throughout the organisation;
  4. adequate whistle-blowing systems both for internal reports and for reporting to authorities, as well as disciplinary processes with clear and specific consequences for those who act contrary to internal standards or to Mexican legislation;
  5. adequate systems and processes for training on ethics standards;
  6. human resources policies to avoid hiring people who could be a risk to the integrity of the company. These policies cannot enable discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, disabilities, social status, health status, religion, political opinion, sexual orientation, marital status or any other that compromises human dignity or curtails human rights and liberties; and
  7. mechanisms to ensure transparency and publication of interests (avoiding conflicts of interest) at all times.

Plea agreements

In Mexico, criminal cases are not resolved through plea agreements, where the defendant pleads guilty.

III ENFORCEMENT: DOMESTIC BRIBERY

The current administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has launched numerous probes into both public officials and private individuals and legal entities related to corruption and bribery offences. Recently, Pemex workers' union leader Carlos Romero Deschamps was accused of corruption, illicit enrichment and money laundering.26 Former federal super-delegate Carlos Lomelí is under investigation by the Secretary of Public Administration for alleged bribery, conflict of interest, illicit enrichment and influence peddling.27 Prominent lawyer Juan Collado, who is very well connected to Mexican political parties, was arrested under charges of money laundering and organised crime.28 Emilio Lozoya Austin, former Pemex CEO, and Alonso Ancira, director of steel company Altos Hornos de México, are part of an anti-graft probe under suspicion of bribery and money laundering.29

Perhaps the case of utmost importance is the ongoing probe initiated by Mexican General Prosecutor's Office into former Pemex CEO Emilio Lozoya Austin, for bribery, criminal association and money laundering charges related to US$10.5 million bribes he allegedly received between 2009 and 2012 from Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, in exchange for securing government contracts,30 in addition to a purchase of a property allegedly made with bribes paid by steel company Altos Hornos de México.31 Since the unravelling of the corruption scandal in late 2016, Mexico was the Latin American country to engage in the lowest level of investigations and enforcement against the alleged participants. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the investigation conducted by the then General Attorney's Office during the administration of former President Enrique Peña Nieto was delayed by Mexico's 2018 presidential elections. It was not until recently that the General Prosecutor's Office reopened the case and issued arrest warrants against Emilio Lozoya and some of his relatives for bribery, corruption and money laundering charges. However, using his defence attorney as means of communication, Lozoya has repeatedly insisted on his innocence and has even stated that he will provide evidence in this regard, while refusing to appear in court to respond to charges. In light of Mexico's increasing efforts to combat corruption, we expect enforcement authorities to effectively continue this investigation and avoid another chapter of impunity to pass on to history.

IV FOREIGN BRIBERY: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

i Criminal law

Criminal liability

Bribery of foreign public officials is prohibited by Article 222 bis of the Federal Criminal Code. Both individuals and legal entities are subject to criminal liability for foreign bribery.

Bribery of foreign officials offences

Bribery of foreign public officials is defined as giving, directly or indirectly, anything of value to a foreign public official, to influence him or her to act or refrain from acting in relation to functions inherent to his or her position, for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an undue business advantage in international commercial transactions.32

Definition of foreign public official

A foreign public official is defined as any individual holding public employment, commission, or office in the legislative, executive or judicial branch; or in any public entity, including state-owned companies, of a foreign country, and any official or agent of a public international agency or organisation.33

Gifts, gratuities, travel, meals and entertainment

Mexican criminal law does not provide for guidance on gifts, hospitality and entertainment for the benefit of foreign public officials.

Penalties

Sanctions for individuals can include fines of up to approximately US$670, up to 14 years' imprisonment,34 and up to 20 years' debarment from participating in public procurement processes and from holding public office.35 Legal entities can be sanctioned by up to six years' debarment from contracting with any federal public authority, coupled with a fine of up to approximately US$4,600.36 Additionally, if a court determines that an individual was effectively using the company as an alter ego, the court may impose the suspension of the company's activities or even its dissolution.37

ii Administrative law

Bribery of foreign public officials offences

Bribery of foreign public officials is not explicitly prohibited by the provisions of the GLAR.

Definition of foreign public official

There is no definition of foreign public official under Mexican administrative law.

Gifts, gratuities, travel, meals and entertainment

There are no administrative rules governing gifts, gratuities, travel, meals and entertainment for the benefit of foreign public officials.

V ASSOCIATED OFFENCES: FINANCIAL Record-keeping AND MONEY LAUNDERING

i Financial record-keeping laws and regulations

In Mexico, the provisions of the Commercial Code,38 the Federal Tax Code39 and the General Law of Business Corporations40 require the maintenance of accurate and complete corporate books and records. Publicly traded or listed companies are also subject to laws regarding periodic financial reporting and disclosure, and avoidance of self-dealing and insider trading. Financial institutions are subject to additional laws regarding their fiduciary duties toward the parties whose assets they hold.

In addition, the 'books and records' offences under the Federal Tax Code are as follows: (1) failing to keep an accounting system; (2) failing to keep a required book or register, or failing to maintain internal inventory control; (3) incomplete, inaccurate or false record-keeping; and (4) failing to demonstrate the existence of transactions covered by fake invoices.41 Sanctions can include fines of up to US$4,460.42 Furthermore, if individuals or legal entities are also sentenced for domestic or foreign bribery, these fines may increase by up to 150 per cent of the amount of bribes paid.43 Taxpayers can be also sanctioned by up to three years' imprisonment for (1) keeping a double set of books of accounting records; (2) concealing part of all the accounting books or records; and (3) declaring false or inaccurate information concerning accounting, tax or social transactions.44

ii Money laundering laws and regulations

The Federal Criminal Code strictly prohibits money laundering.45 Sanctions include up to fifteen years' imprisonment and fines of up to approximately US$23,000. The Banking Law governs anti-money laundering efforts in the banking context. In addition, the Mexican Congress passed a law intended to stop money laundering in the non-banking sectors of the economy, the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with Funds from Illicit Sources (the AML Law). Pursuant to the AML Law, high-risk activities, also called vulnerable activities, are subject to compliance with specific obligations if they exceed specific threshold amounts established by the AML Law.46 Vulnerable activities include the following: lottery or gambling activities; service card, credit card or other prepaid value card transactions; transactions with travellers' cheques; consumer loans, guarantees, credit or loans; construction, development or brokerage services involving real estate; sale of precious metals, stones or jewellery; auctions or sale of works of art; sale of automobiles; armouring services of vehicles or protection of premises; professional activities involving the transportation and custody of cash and valuables; certain professional services; services of public attesters; donations; customs brokerage services; creation of rights over real estate and; exchange of virtual assets through electronic platforms. Additionally, financial institutions are required to notify and maintain all information and documentation related to the participants and beneficiaries of the transactions involving vulnerable activities.47

iii Prosecution

The Financial Intelligence Unit of the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico's anti-money laundering watchdog, is responsible for investigating and prosecuting money laundering and terrorism financing, and overseeing compliance with the obligations set forth in the AML Law. Criminal prosecution requires that the Financial Intelligence Unit exercises its investigative powers and subsequently reports the potential misconduct to the General Prosecutor's Office to initiate the criminal prosecution of money laundering offences.48

VI ENFORCEMENT: FOREIGN BRIBERY AND ASSOCIATED OFFENCES

There is no evidence of actual prosecutions or convictions for foreign bribery and associated offences.49

VII INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

Mexico is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Mexico is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, accordingly.

VIII LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Relevant developments include the increased prosecution of administrative and criminal white-collar crimes by the General Prosecutor's Office, the Secretary of Public Administration and the Financial Intelligence Unit. In addition, the recent enactment of a new law that overhauls forfeiture of assets proceeding from illicit activities, including corruption, coupled with increasing efforts against tax evasion and tax fraud, and the recent launch of a whistle-blowing platform hosted by the Secretary of Public Administration, are of utmost importance.

Despite these developments, there have also been shortcomings. As of this writing, the appointment for the 18 federal anti-corruption judges of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice is still pending. In July 2019, the Mexican Senate voted to reject five nominees (13 out of the 18 nominees had withdrawn their nominations by that time). Now, it is the time for President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to submit fresh nominations to the Senate even though his administration is seeking to reduce or eliminate these seats as part of its austerity measures.

IX OTHER LAWS AFFECTING THE RESPONSE TO CORRUPTION

The Mexican Data Protection Law has become one of utmost relevance. During the last years, Mexico's data protection watchdog has become very active in pursuing enforcement actions and thus sanctions for non-compliance with the Mexican Data Protection Law has increasingly being applied in Mexico.

In addition, we expect that the recent National Asset Forfeiture Law that overhauls forfeiture of assets proceeding from illicit activities, including those related to organised crime, kidnapping, hydrocarbon, health, human trafficking, corruption, motor vehicle theft, illicit proceeds, and those committed by public officials, would become one of the most relevant laws affecting the response to corruption in Mexico. In practice, civil forfeiture has not existed in Mexico before this law. Under the terms of this new law, forfeiture is not limited to property related to a crime, and the level of evidence required is not clear. Furthermore, there is no statute of limitations, and recovery may be made against estates of deceased suspects.

X COMPLIANCE

As previously mentioned, in Mexico, there is no explicit affirmative defence for adequate procedures to negate corporate liability under the relevant anti-corruption legal framework. The existence of a compliance programme or an adequate integrity policy, however, can act functionally as an affirmative defence in some criminal cases and clearly may act as a mitigating factor for determining sanctions in administrative cases for legal entities, as long as it meets the characteristics described in Section II.iv.

The Secretary of Public Administration published the Model Program for Corporation Integrity to provide guidance on what constitutes an adequate integrity policy, as follows:

  1. include measures to promote internal standards and accountability in the company, in accordance with national and international commitments;
  2. ensure 'tone at the top' commitment from board of directors and general manager;
  3. require third-party intermediaries and distributors to adhere to the company's compliance policies;
  4. ensure that the Code of Conduct is adequately published and communicated to employees. Reference to the standards of the Confederation of Employers of the Mexican Republic (Coparmex) is recommended;
  5. apply the Code of Conduct in practice and promote reports of suspicious activities. Implementation by departments if a company has multiple divisions; and
  6. ensure that the anti-corruption policy takes into account the degrees of risk for the country, industry, transaction, commercial opportunity and commercial association. For these purposes, they should rely on the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control – Integrated Framework.

Financial organisations should refer to these three guidelines:

  1. the Sole Memorandum for Banks (CNBV);
  2. the Sole Memorandum for Stock Exchange (CNBV); and
  3. the Sarbanes Oxley Act.

Special attention should be paid to the following areas in the company: sales, contracts, human resources and government contacts. The guide also recommends observing the guide for the UK Bribery Act to:

  1. ensure that systems for self-reporting and training are adequate and efficient; and
  2. ensure that human resources department employs policies to avoid the employment of individuals who could become a risk to the integrity of the company.

XI OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS

President López Obrador began his term by continuing his campaign discourse on eliminating corruption. In his daily hour-long press conferences, Obrador has frequently called out specific transactions and even named companies that he promises to investigate fully. Claiming that the government procurement processes were in the past marred by corruption, he has suspended many of the rules that have previously governed these processes in favour of having members of his government that he trusts assigning contracts to companies that he perceives as trustworthy. Although this can make for attractive rhetoric, it can also undermine the rule of law.

The President also promised in his inaugural address that he would not persecute former political opponents through corruption investigations, leading many to understand that he was announcing a functional amnesty for past corruption at the same time that he declared that corruption would no longer exist in Mexico. As described above, however, investigations into high-profile corruption cases have been plentiful. In addition to the Odebrecht-related case, the new administration has been aggressive in investigating the Estafa Maestra (the 'master/teacher swindle') involving over US$250 million in fraudulent contracting during former administration. Various investigative journalists have reported that the Secretary of Social Development used a loophole in the procurement rules to award tens of millions of dollars in no-bid contracts to state-owned universities, which then illegally sub-contracted the services to shell companies, some of which they have traced to public officials and related persons. Former Secretary Rosario Robles, who served under former President Peña Nieto, is, as of this writing, under arrest without bail, awaiting trial on corruption charges. Reporters have speculated that this investigation may eventually lead to charges against Peña Nieto. No former president of Mexico since the aftermath of the Revolution (1910–1920) has ever been prosecuted, so this would be momentous.

Finally, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is intended to replace the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has been ratified by the Mexican Congress and awaits ratification by US and Canadian counterparts. Unlike the NAFTA, the USMCA has a chapter alone establishing commitments on anti-corruption efforts titled 'Transparency and Anti-Corruption'. If ratified, the USMCA will oblige the three parties to adopt or maintain anti-corruption legislative and other measures as may be necessary to combat corruption.


Footnotes

1 Jonathan Edward Adams is a partner and Lorena Castillo is a senior associate at Baker McKenzie. The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Marcela Véliz, junior associate at Baker McKenzie.

2 Lenton, Cristopher, 'Mexico Failing to Effectively Combat Corruption Despite Crackdown Efforts', Natural Gas Intelligence, July 1, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/118846-mexico-failing-to-effectively-combat-corruption-despite-crackdown-efforts.

3 Gina Hinojosa and Maureen Meyer, 'The Future of Mexico's National Anti-Corruption System: : The Anti-Corruption Fight Under López Obrador', August 2019,https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-National-Anti-Corruption-System-under-AMLO.pdf

4 Seguimiento Sistemas Locales Anticorrupción de las Entidades Federativas [Follow-up to the Local Anti-Corruption Systems of the States], National Anti-Corruption System, August 2, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,http://sna.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Seguimiento_32SLA_02.08.2019.pdf.

5 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 11 bis, National Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 421.

6 National Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 421.

7 Criminal Code for the District and Federal Territories,http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpf/CPF_orig_14ago31_ima.pdf, accessed 9 July 2016.

8 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 222.

9 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 212.

10 Federal Criminal Code, Arts. 222.

11 Throughout the chapter the exchange rate is MXN$19/US$1.

12 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 212.

13 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 212.

14 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 213 bis.

15 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 11.

16 Federal Criminal Code, Arts. 386, 243, 367, 382.

17 GLAR, Art. 52.

18 GLAR, Art. 66.

19 GLAR, Art. 3(XXV).

20 GLAR, Arts. 78 and 79.

21 GLAR, Art. 81.

22 GLAR, Art. 9.

23 GLAR, Art. 10.

24 GLAR, Art. 11.

25 GLAR, Art. 13.

26 Ward, Rebekah, Barrera, Adriana, Ore, Diego, Alire, David, Baum, Bernadette, 'Mexico government accuses oil workers union boss of corruption', Reuters, July 23, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-politics-corruption/mexico-government-accuses-oil-workers-union-boss-of-corruption-report-idUSKCN1UI2F8.

27 Morales, Alberto, 'SFP tiene 7 investigaciones abiertas contra Carlos Lomelí' [SFP has 7 ongoing probes against Carlos Lomelí], El Universal, July 15, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/sfp-tiene-7-investigaciones-abiertas-contra-carlos-lomeli.

28 Zavala, Susana, 'The Juan Collado case: deceits & identity theft', El Universal, July 14, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/english/juan-collado-case-deceits-identity-theft.

29 'Alonso Ancira rechazará extradición a México' [Alonso Ancira refuses extradition to Mexico], Excelsior, August 1, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/alonso-ancira-rechazara-extradicion-a-mexico/1327859.

30 Espino, Manuel, Lastiri, Diana. 'Lozoya, autor material del lavado en Odebrecht: Fiscalía' [Lozoya, perpetrator of money laundering in Odebrecht case: Prosecution Office], El Universal, July 19, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/politica/lozoya-autor-material-del-lavado-en-odebrecht-fiscalia.

31 Monroy, Jorge, 'Acusan a Lozoya de cohecho y dos ilícitos más' [Lozoya charged of bribery and two other offences], El Economista, July 17, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019,https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Acusan-a-Lozoya-de-cohecho-y-dos-ilicitos-mas-20190717-0006.html.

32 Federal Criminal Code, Art 222 bis.

33 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 222 bis.

34 Federal Criminal Code, Arts. 222 and 223.

35 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 212.

36 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 222 bis.

37 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 11 bis and 222 bis.

38 Commercial Code, Art. 16(III).

39 Federal Tax Code, Art. 28.

40 General Law of Commercial Companies, Art. 158(III).

41 Federal Tax Code, Art. 83(I)(II)(IV)(XVIII).

42 Federal Tax Code, Art. 84(I)(II)(III)(XVI).

43 Federal Tax Code, Art. 84.

44 Federal Tax Code, Art. 111.

45 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 400 bis.

46 Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with Funds from Illicit Sources.

47 Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Transactions with Funds from Illicit Sources, Art. 15.

48 Federal Criminal Code, Art. 400 bis.