I am delighted to continue to be associated with The Aviation Law Review, of which this is the seventh edition. Aviation has from the outset been one of The Law Reviews' most successful publications; its readership has been vastly enhanced by making it accessible online to over 12,000 in-house counsel, as well as subscribers to Bloomberg Law and LexisNexis. This year I welcome a new contributor from Cyprus, as well as extending my thanks and gratitude to our seasoned contributors for their continued support. Readers will appreciate that contributors voluntarily donate considerable time and effort needed to make these contributions as useful as possible to readers. They are carefully selected for their knowledge and insights into their subject and we are fortunate to enjoy their support.

At the time of writing, the shocking B737 Max disaster story continues to unfold. The method of self-approval adopted by Boeing with the support of the FAA has been the subject of much criticism, the more so since approval by the FAA has routinely been followed by other regulators hitherto without serious challenge and because the FAA was the last substantial regulator to ground the type following the two fatal accidents. In an unprecedented break with previous practice, EASA has announced that it is conducting its own 'independent' review of the design of the Max and that 'completion of it was a prerequisite for return to service of the aircraft'. EASA itself had adopted the practice of reciprocal recognition. There can be no doubt they knew of its drawbacks. There are eerie parallels between this and the Helios 737 accident where Boeing incorporated a warning system that it had superseded in other models, notwithstanding warnings following other depressurisation incidents from European accident investigation boards and NASA itself! The complacency of both the manufacturer and the FAA following the two fatal accidents has left many aghast.

Inevitably following the news, plaintiffs are seeking a route to the US for their compensation claims and seeking to avoid the forum non conveniens rule that in principle directs such lawsuits back to the countries with jurisdiction over the carrier – usually with the requirement of full Boeing cooperation with the plaintiffs' alternative choice of jurisdiction and provision of all discovery that would otherwise be mandated in US litigation. The manufacturer will also be seeking an early agreement with the operators' insurers, and any other interested parties, to a settlement agreement to try to limit its own exposure to non-US jurisdictions. The shortcomings discovered in the regulator's own processes may, however, hamper Boeing's efforts to escape US judicial oversight, as may the involvement of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the criminal investigation of the certification of the type, following the establishment of a grand jury investigation of the certification process. In the meantime, as a result of the grounding of the 737 Max, claims are mounting from operators that will dwarf the insurance coverage available (reportedly capped at US$250 million). In the meantime, Boeing's loss of orders will redound to the benefit of Airbus and other single-aisle aircraft manufacturers, as has been seen from orders announced at the Paris Air Show; notwithstanding the loyalty displayed by the International Airlines Group with regard to its order for 200 737 MAX aircraft.

It is hoped EASA will also reconsider its reliance on other regulators' type certificates, as well as any reliance it places on European manufacturers for type approval. The cost of adequate regulation in all jurisdictions must be met centrally, as was heavily recommended as long ago as 2000 in the Rand Institute's report 'Safety in the Skies' on the aviation accident investigation process.

Inevitably, the European aviation legal scene continues to be dominated by Brexit where reassuring words, at least by regulators in the UK, have yet to be converted into terms of final agreements. This has led major carriers to focus on developing European air operator certificates and some are also now ensuring they satisfy the European tests for majority ownership, which may cause interesting issues in the future for some of the low-cost carriers that heretofore have been able to operate from the UK – although the UK has signalled by means of a draft statutory instrument that it will not apply the EU majority ownership and control rules once the UK leaves the Union.

Another current project of note within Europe concerns the infamous EU Regulation 261/2004, which from its beginnings as an attempt to ensure fair treatment of passengers (or, as frequently rumoured, the reprisal of a snubbed EU Commissioner determined to show she was not to be ignored) has become, by virtue of the legislative inclinations of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a monster devouring the assets and threatening the safety of European airlines. The Regulation has been grotesquely judiciously distorted since its adoption. The ECJ has devastated the balance of the regulation by destroying the defence of 'exceptional circumstances' as a defence to claims, as well as by applying a time limit for making claims of up to 10 years, and finally by eliding delay and cancellation in determining availability of compensation. This was achieved without any attempt to determine the financial impact on carriers who have seen regional routes in particular become inoperable due to cost resulting in losses of prized European connectivity. All this in return for the sake of a few hundred euros' 'compensation' to individuals for minor inconvenience and perhaps a misguided boost to the popularity of the nanny super state!

The regulation is being reviewed by the EU on the assumption that the UK is leaving, and that Spain will withdraw its blockade on this and other projects as a result. The Steer group has been commissioned to review and report back and has instigated a number of enquiries to various organisations as a result. The omens are not good. The review is being conducted of the effect of the regulation, but has consciously ignored regional carriers in its case studies and has been heavily weighted to claimants' associations whose raison d'être is the collection of fancy percentages on claims made.

As was made clear at a recent conference of the European Regions Airlines Association, the uninformed extrajudicial legislative impulses of the CJEU in this area threatens regional connectivity and the operation of routes that are only marginally profitable. The European Regions Airline Association continues, with other industry groups, to lobby for change. Local governments whose industry and regional connectivity is threatened by this project need to join forces with consumer associations interested in consumers' freedom of movement and industry interested in logistics to make their interest in continued connectivity heard.

The second European Aviation Environmental Report (EAER) was published this year and provides an updated assessment of the environmental performance of the aviation sector published in the first report of 2016. It reports that continued growth of the sector has produced economic benefits and connectivity within Europe and is stimulating investment in novel technology but recognises that the contribution of aviation activities to climate change, noise and air quality impacts is increasing, thereby affecting the health and quality of life of European citizens. Countermeasures are being developed, but their combined effect has reportedly not kept pace with the recent strong growth in the demand for air travel, thereby leading to an overall increase in the environmental impact. If Member States would stop pandering to uninformed sectional national and labour interests to permit the true operation of the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) programme the direction of travel would be altered overnight, but as usual incompetent short termism prevails in politics to the detriment of industry and the environment. It is hoped one day we will see an unfettered SESAR introduced, although the recent EU decision to prevent UK carriers from using carbon offsets does not suggest an overwhelming dedication to pollution reduction.

The tension between 'just culture' and the criminal law and their inherent incompatibility has been highlighted again by the convictions in Switzerland of three air traffic controllers in relation to separate incidents of conduct found by the Swiss court to have been negligent. One of the instances involved a separate conviction of the pilot of one of the affected aircraft. The incidents involved serious mistakes by air traffic control, which were corrected either by the controller or the affected pilots, so the Swiss law requirement of a 'real collision risk' seems unduly aggressively to have been applied in these cases. Criticisms of the Swiss courts aside regarding the convictions, the fact of prosecutions highlights again the 'myth' of 'just culture' as being a philosophy in actual practice, as opposed to a touching expression of faith dispelled by the reality that prosecutors and courts will recognise that some priority should be given to safety over criminalisation. Unnecessary prosecutions make confidential reporting an ever more risky approach for those at the sharp end of aviation.

Following the high-profile collapse of Monarch Airlines preceded by a number of other highly expensive forays by the state into the provision of private air transport, an airline insolvency review was established by the Chancellor to research better ways to deal with the collapse of airlines. The review has now reported. The obvious solution adopted elsewhere of using the assets of the insolvent airline to repatriate its customers is one of the alternatives recommended and it is hoped, notwithstanding the current stasis in legislation in the UK for other reasons, will be one given urgent attention. The creation of a special administration regime changing the purpose of an airline's administration to the repatriation of its passengers as a first priority over payment of creditors and ensuring payments of salaries and costs during rescue efforts would enormously mitigate the cost otherwise imposed on taxpayers via the UK government's current approach of arranging and paying for alternative air transport from other operators where inevitably the rates charged are at the highest end of the spectrum.

Illicit drone activity has been a significant feature of the past year and has resulted in the closure for significant periods of time of a number of major airports. Those incidents, including threats by environmental groups deliberately to use drones to close Heathrow Airport, highlight the fact that technology has got ahead of regulation and counter technology. Last year ICAO issued guidance material on safety management, seeking a 'total system safety' in which all users of the aviation environment operate within a fully integrated safety system. How that might affect rogue users is not clear given the ease with which operators can interfere with any inbuilt protections in the drone itself. Inevitably claims from passengers arise as a result of delays and equally inevitably, by virtue of the operation of EU261, airlines will continue to bear significant costs regardless of fault simply for caring for passengers. This may compel them at last to take seriously the prospects for claims against third parties such as airport operators, air navigation service providers and conceivably the drone manufacturers themselves.

Once again, I would like to extend my thanks to the many contributors to this volume and welcome those who have joined the group. Their studied, careful and insightful contributions are much appreciated by all those who now refer to The Aviation Law Review as one of their frontline resources.

Sean Gates
Gates Aviation Ltd
London
July 2019