Perhaps unsurprisingly, the more notable decisions in the past year have tended to focus on banks' terms and conditions of business and the enforcement of unpaid debts.

The courts have largely upheld the express terms of the contracts that banks have entered into with their customers. This has included upholding limitations and exclusions of liability, where the banks have been challenged for advice they allegedly gave or for failing to comply with their obligations as trustees, and declining to imply terms into contracts or to accept that a customer's subjective understanding of a pre-contractual representation by a bank representative was sufficient to found a claim in misrepresentation when that subjective understanding was at odds with the objective interpretation. These decisions seem to be largely consistent with the general approach taken by the courts to the interpretation of the express terms of banks' customer contracts and a reluctance by the courts to find new duties of care to impose on banks in their customer relationships beyond those already imposed by statute or regulation.

Meanwhile a number of recent decisions in insolvency proceedings have tended to highlight the Hong Kong courts' approach to cross-border insolvency, the extent to which they will support insolvency proceedings initiated in foreign jurisdictions and the expectations on banks in terms of complying with orders made in foreign insolvency proceedings.


The Banking Ordinance (Cap 155), which provides the legal framework for banking regulation, has been updated by the Banking (Amendment) Ordinance 2018 (BAO). On 13 July 2018, certain provisions of the BAO were brought into operation and the Banking (Exposure Limits) Rules (Cap 155R) were amended so as to remove the obsolete regulatory barrier discouraging the development of banks' equity derivative businesses in Hong Kong. On 1 July 2019, the remaining provisions of the BAO were brought into operation to implement the latest international standards on banking regulation promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

The Insurance Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2015 (Commencement) Notice 2019 was gazetted in May 2019. The full provisions of the Insurance Companies (Amendment) Ordinance came into operation on 23 September 2019. From then, the Insurance Authority took over the regulatory function from three Self-Regulatory Organisations to license and supervise all insurance intermediaries in Hong Kong, including granting licences, conducting inspections and investigations, and imposing disciplinary sanctions where applicable. So far, the Insurance Authority has formulated two sets of rules: the Insurance (Maximum Number of Authorised Insurers) Rules and the Insurance (Financial and Other Requirements for Licensed Insurance Broker Companies) Rules, which both took effect on 23 September 2019. Further rules, codes and guidelines are expected to be published in the next few months that will be of relevance to both insurance agents and brokers.


Civil procedure in Hong Kong has not been substantially reformed since the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform (CJR), which came into effect on 2 April 2009. The CJR focuses on reducing the cost of delay and proper case management. The underlying objectives are to increase the cost-effectiveness of court practice and procedure; to deal with each case as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable; to promote procedural economy; to ensure fairness between the parties; to facilitate settlement; and to ensure fair distribution of court resources. These principles are clearly set out in the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).

It is worth noting the expansion of the jurisdiction of the District Court (DC) since 3 December 2018, when the general financial limit of the civil jurisdiction of the DC increased from HK$1 million to HK$3 million; the equity jurisdiction of the DC, where the proceedings do not involve or relate to land, increased from HK$1 million to HK$3  million, and where the proceedings wholly involve or relate to land, increased from HK$3 million to HK$7 million. The judiciary envisaged that these changes would enhance access to the judicial system for the public and reduce the pressure particularly on the Court of First Instance (CFI).

The Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (FDRC) opened in June 2012 as a forum for individual customers alleging mis-selling by banks and other financial intermediaries to make low-value claims, originally not exceeding HK$500,000, under a framework of 'mediation first, arbitration next'. Prior to the establishment of the FDRC, an aggrieved customer's only way of recovering financial losses was to bring court proceedings. This was often too costly and time-consuming for relatively low-value claims. In January 2018, the jurisdiction of the FDRC was expanded including to allow certain commercial customers as well as individuals to bring claims and increase the maximum claimable amount to HK$1 million. Although this means that there remains some overlap in the respective jurisdictions of the FDRC and DC for claims up to HK$1 million, the extensions of the jurisdictions of both fora, including the more recent extension of the civil jurisdiction of the DC for claims up to HK$3 million, are intended to provide principally retail customers with more flexible options for pursuing claims and achieving resolutions in a more expeditious and affordable way.

Although a class action regime is still absent in Hong Kong, a cross-sector working group was established in 2013 by the Department of Justice to study and consider the recommendations by the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (LRC) from the previous year. As at 17 April 2019, the working group has held 25 meetings since its inception, while a sub-committee set up under the working group has met 30 times. According to the Secretary for Justice, the working group's study mainly focuses on the LRC's recommendation on an incremental implementation approach, starting with consumer cases. Before putting forward a recommendation to the Hong Kong government, the working group would need to study the proposed definition of 'consumer cases', the certification criteria for a class action to be adopted by the court, and the design of the procedural rules and other ancillary measures. However, the Secretary for Justice has indicated that there is still no specific timetable for consulting the public. The draft consultation document is being reviewed by the working group and is currently proposed to cover specific issues, including a close scrutiny of what will be meant by 'consumer' and 'consumer cases', the inclusion and exclusion of potential litigants from a class action, procedural features of such a class action regime, and the determination and distribution of class action awards. Further progress in implementing the LRC's recommendations should be observed closely as a class action regime may have a significant impact on banking litigation.


Common interim measures include applications for summary and default judgments. Under Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court, a plaintiff may apply for a summary judgment on the ground that the defendant has no defence to a claim or has no defence to a claim except as to the amount of damages claimed. Alternatively, a plaintiff may, after the expiry of the period fixed by or under the rules for service of the defence, enter a final default judgment against the defendant if he or she fails to serve the defence on the plaintiff.2

A plaintiff may apply for a Mareva injunction to restrain the defendant from removing assets held in Hong Kong or even outside Hong Kong. Section 21M of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4 JCHCO) enables the CFI to grant interim relief, such as a Mareva injunction, despite the absence of substantive proceedings in Hong Kong, where there are or will be proceedings outside Hong Kong yielding a judgment that may be recognised and enforced in Hong Kong. The interim relief is in aid of the foreign proceedings, and therefore would not be restricted in its application to any time before the actual commencement of enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong. The Court rejected the construction that the assistance that the CFI can provide under Section 21M in aid of foreign proceedings has to cease when judgment is obtained in the foreign proceedings, because any such interpretation would result in assistance being unavailable when it is most needed.3

There have been new developments in applying to the Mainland courts for interim measures in relation to arbitral proceedings. On 2 April 2019, the Hong Kong government signed the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Assistance in Court-ordered Interim Measures in Aid of Arbitral Proceedings by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Arrangement). After signing the Arrangement, Hong Kong has become the first and only jurisdiction outside the Mainland where parties to arbitral proceedings, seated in Hong Kong and administered by a list of arbitral institutions established or set up in Hong Kong, can apply to the Mainland courts for interim measures. The list of approved arbitral institutions was confirmed by the Hong Kong government and the Supreme People's Court on 1 October 2019, the date the arrangement came into effect. In the case of the Mainland, available interim measures include property preservation, evidence preservation and conduct preservation. In the case of Hong Kong, available interim measures include injunctions and other interim measures for the purpose of maintaining or restoring the status quo pending determination of the dispute; taking action that would prevent, or refraining from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral proceedings; preserving assets; and preserving evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.


Legal advice privilege (LAP) and litigation privilege (LP) are the two main types of legal professional privilege (LPP) that apply in Hong Kong.

LP applies to communications between parties or their lawyers and third parties for the purpose of obtaining information or advice in connection with existing or contemplated litigation. In order for a communication to be protected by LP, litigation must be in progress or reasonably in contemplation; the relevant communication must have been made with the dominant purpose of anticipated or actual litigation; and the matter must be adversarial as opposed to investigative or inquisitorial.

LAP protects confidential communications between a client and its lawyer for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. Its protection does not cover third-party communications and is unlikely to extend to legal advice that may be given by other professionals such as accountants and surveyors in light of a recent English Supreme Court decision4 which would be of persuasive value to the Hong Kong courts. The Court of Appeal in CITIC Pacific Limited v. Secretary for Justice and Commissioner of Police5 has set out a broad definition of 'client' where LAP would protect communications and documents produced by a company's employees (not limited to employees authorised to seek and receive legal advice) provided that the communications and documents have been produced for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. Hong Kong's approach in declining to follow the narrow interpretation of 'client' adopted in Three Rivers6 has recently found support in another English Court of Appeal case.7 Although the English Court did not decide on matters relating to LAP, it acknowledged concerns with the narrow interpretation of 'client' in Three Rivers and that English law appears to be out of step with the international common law on the issue. The apparent endorsement of the approach taken in Hong Kong means financial institutions should remain vigilant and be aware of the positions in different jurisdictions in relation to LPP.


i Anti-suit injunctions

In cross-border disputes, anti-suit injunctions will be useful to restrain the pursuit of foreign proceedings brought in breach of jurisdiction clauses, particularly if the agreement is to arbitrate in Hong Kong. The CFI has the power to grant anti-suit injunctions under Section 45 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) and Section 21L of the HCO. Recently, the Court reaffirmed that foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement or an exclusive jurisdiction clause are a breach of contract that ordinarily will be restrained by the grant of an injunction restraining the party in breach from conducting such proceedings, unless strong reasons to the contrary are shown.8 When interpreting an arbitration clause, the Court followed the modern approach in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and others v. Privalov and others,9 which is to give effect to the commercial purpose of the arbitration clause. Thus, the construction of an arbitration clause should start with the presumption that the parties, as rational business people, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered to be decided by the same tribunal, unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the tribunal's jurisdiction. If there is no rational basis upon which business people would be likely to wish to have only some issues arising out of, or in connection with, the agreement containing the arbitration clause determined by arbitration, there needs to be very clear language before deciding that they must have had such an intention.

An anti-suit injunction can also be granted to restrain a claimant from bringing foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration clause even where the claimant is not a party to the contract containing the arbitration agreement. For instance, if the claimant is entitled to enforce an obligation under the contract containing the arbitration agreement, the Court would be willing to intervene because enforcement by arbitration alone is an incident of the obligation that the claimant seeks to enforce and therefore, the defendant is entitled to have any claim against him or her pursued in arbitration.10

Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (including Mainland judgments) and awards

On 18 January 2019, a new arrangement was signed between the Mainland and Hong Kong for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments, the sixth arrangement concerning various aspects of mutual legal assistance in civil and commercial matters and the third of these to provide for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. It is not yet known when the arrangement will come into effect, but when it does, it will largely supersede the current arrangement by envisaging that a wider range of civil and commercial judgments will be recognised and enforced by the courts of both jurisdictions. The arrangement provides greater clarity as to what constitutes a 'civil and commercial' case, which excludes non-judicial proceedings and judicial proceedings relating to administrative or regulatory matters. A number of types of matters that may otherwise be considered as 'civil and commercial' (at least in certain circumstances) are also specifically excluded. These include matrimonial or family matters, which are already covered by the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in Matrimonial and Family Cases, succession cases, corporate or personal insolvency and debt restructuring cases, certain types of judgments involving intellectual property rights, maritime matters, judgments on the validity of an arbitration agreement and the setting aside of an arbitral award. Nonetheless, while the arrangement may not be a comprehensive mechanism for reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters between the courts of the Mainland and Hong Kong, it is a welcome development in terms of its widened scope and greater clarity.

In CL v. SCG,11 the CFI re-affirmed and clarified principles surrounding limitation periods for enforcing an arbitration award in court. There, the issue was when precisely the cause of action in an action to enforce an award accrued. The Court held that the cause of action arises when the party against whom the award is made fails to make payment within a reasonable time of the publication of the award and demand being made. What constitutes a reasonable time for payment and performance under an award would depend on the terms of the award as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. Where an arbitral award can be enforced in the Mainland and Hong Kong, a party should take into account Article 2 of the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which prohibits enforcement in the Mainland and Hong Kong at the same time. The Court clarified that the time limit continues to run while a successful party to an arbitral award applies for enforcement on the Mainland, and that such party should consider withdrawing and procuring determination of a pending application for enforcement on the Mainland before applying for enforcement in Hong Kong, prior to the expiry of the relevant limitation period.

In Foshan Nanhai Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd v. Foshan Ruifeng Petroleum and Chemical Fuel Co Ltd,12 the CFI considered whether the PRC branch of a bank could register a Mainland judgment in Hong Kong. A key issue was whether the PRC proceedings were properly constituted, which depended on whether the branch had capacity to sue. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited (In Liquidation) v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Limited - Macau Branch (In Liquidation),13 the Court of Appeal had stated that irrespective of the law governing the constitution or incorporation of the bank or the branch of a bank, the branch is not a legal person under the law of Hong Kong and, as such, can never sue or be sued in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the Court held that the proceedings were properly constituted because under PRC law, the branch has capacity to sue and that PRC law was the relevant law to consider in deciding whether the branch had capacity to sue in those proceedings.

ii Recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings

Banks may sometimes be asked to comply with requests from foreign insolvency officeholders appointed in the country of incorporation of a company in liquidation, and the question of whether the bank would need to see a Hong Kong court order before complying may arise. The Court has clarified that whether the foreign insolvency officeholder would need to obtain a Hong Kong court order requires drawing a balance between the foreign insolvency officeholders' need for convenience and the need for court supervision that the creditors may expect.14 In relation to the foreign insolvency officeholders' information needs, provided that the directors of the company could obtain the information, the foreign insolvency officeholders, as agents of the company, should be able to obtain the same information from third parties, such as bank account documents in Hong Kong, without a prior Hong Kong recognition order. However, if the foreign insolvency officeholders propose to take possession of or deal with assets in Hong Kong, it would be appropriate for them to obtain a Hong Kong recognition order first.

The Court has re-affirmed that the assistance it will give officeholders in foreign insolvency proceedings may include allowing the foreign officeholders to pursue restructuring options in Hong Kong (even where those restructuring options may not be available as a matter of Hong Kong law, but only under the law of the jurisdiction of the foreign proceedings).15 This has become particularly relevant in respect of companies incorporated in Bermuda and listed in Hong Kong, which are subject to provisional liquidation in Bermuda since under Bermuda law provisional liquidators can be appointed for the purpose of exploring a restructuring even where there is no evidence of jeopardy to assets (such jeopardy being a requirement in Hong Kong following Re Legend International Resorts Ltd).16


Litigation between customers and banks often arises from issues relating to alleged mis-selling, construction of contracts, and winding up petitions.

The Court has also reiterated the highly restrictive approach of the law to implied terms. In Lo Yuk Sui v. Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd formerly known as International Bank of Asia Ltd,17 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the law on implied terms had not been changed by the observations of Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telcom,18 which were subsequently clarified by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom not to be authoritative guidance on the law of implied terms. The Court of Appeal agreed that there has not been any relaxation of the traditional, highly restrictive approach to the implication of terms. The law maintains that the process of implying a term into a contract must not require the rewriting of the contract in a way that the court believes to be reasonable, or that the court prefers to the agreement the parties have actually negotiated. A term is to be implied only if it is necessary to make the contract work. This may be the case if (1) the term to be implied is so obvious that it goes without saying, or (2) it is necessary to give the contract business efficacy, or both. The concept of necessity must not be watered down; necessity is not established by showing that the contract would be improved by the addition. The fairness or equity of a suggested implied term is an essential but not a sufficient pre-condition for inclusion. If there is indeed an express term in the contract that is inconsistent with the proposed implied term, the latter cannot, by definition, meet these tests, since the parties have demonstrated that the proposed implied term is not part of their agreement.

In DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Sit Pan Jit,19 a private bank customer sought to argue he had been induced to purchase structured investment products by a reckless or negligent misrepresentation made by his relationship manager. The Court of Final Appeal reiterated the principle that the customer's subjective understanding of the bank's statements is not relevant to proving an actionable misrepresentation against the bank based on the statements objectively understood.

Creditors such as banks often serve statutory demands on debtors ahead of filing winding up petitions in actions to recover a liquidated debt. Recent decisions have further explored the question whether a statutory demand or subsequent winding up petition should be set aside without any need by the debtor to show a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds as regards the subject debt because the underlying transaction document contained an arbitration agreement. Following a decision of the CFI in 2018, a statutory demand should be set aside or winding up petition should generally be dismissed if: (1) the contract under which the debt is alleged to arise contains an arbitration clause that covers any dispute relating to the debt; (2) the company disputes the debt relied on by the petitioner; and (3) the company takes the steps required under the arbitration clause to commence the contractually mandated dispute resolution process (which might include preliminary stages such as mediation) and files an affirmation in accordance with Rule 32 of the Companies (Winding Up) Rules (Cap 32H) demonstrating this.20 Even more recently, the Court of Appeal has questioned, albeit in obiter dicta, the appropriateness of this three-part test as unnecessarily curtailing a creditor's statutory right to petition for a winding up based on insolvency. It is contrary to public policy to preclude or fetter the exercise of this statutory right.21


There have been developments in the extent to which banks are able to limit and exclude liability through their terms of business and statutory control of such terms.

Courts have found in favour of banks in recent mis-selling cases. In Shine Grace Investment Ltd v. Citibank, NA,22 the bank was able to rely on a contractual clause, which stated that the customer should make its own judgment in relation to its investment transactions. The bank and its staff disclaimed any duty to give advice or make recommendations and even if suggestions were made by them, they assumed no responsibility for any investment made. Referring to such 'non-reliance clauses', the Court found that the bank had not assumed any duty or responsibility to advise its customers, no matter what recommendations or suggestions the bank might have provided to the customer in the course of their relationship. The Court further held that the proposition that there exists a freestanding common law duty of explanation (to the effect that where a banker chooses to volunteer an explanation in respect of a financial product, the banker is subject to a duty to explain fully and accurately the nature and effect of the product), irrespective of whether a banker has assumed legal responsibility to advise its customers in light of the contractual arrangement between the parties and all other relevant factual circumstances, is inconsistent with the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Chang Pui Yin & Ors v. Bank of Singapore Limited.23

The Court has recently examined 'anti-Bartlett' provisions. These are terms often incorporated by banks when acting as trustees to exempt or limit their liability in respect of the duty of care they would otherwise assume to supervise trust-owned companies as much as other trust assets. In Zhang Hong Li v. DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd,24 the Court of Appeal examined the legal effect of anti-Bartlett provisions contained in a discretionary trust (governed by Jersey law). The Court held that such provisions did not exempt the bank, as trustees of the trust, from liability, and that the provisions did not have the legal effect of making the trustees liability-free rubber-stampers of the investment recommendations by the trust's investment adviser. There existed a residual obligation on the trustees that the provisions had not excluded, and thus the bank, as trustee, had a 'high level supervisory role', the purpose of which was to ensure that the value of the trust fund was subject to appropriate controls, reviews, investment expertise and management. The Court further highlighted that the bottom line for the implementation of this high level supervision was to the bank's mandatory approval of investments (although not preapproving them) and its power to override the investment adviser's decisions and reverse the transaction she advised. This is especially in light of the fact that the trustees must have been aware that the beneficiaries of the discretionary trust included minor children, and the contemporaneous documentary evidence showed that the trustees were well aware that the investment adviser's style of investment was unsuitable for a discretionary trust, the purposes of which included asset protection and family wealth succession. However, this may not be the end of the matter as the bank has been granted leave by the Court of Final Appeal in respect of the anti-Bartlett provisions.25

Litigation concerning the effect of exclusion of liability clauses frequently refers to the requirement in the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71) (CECO) that the exclusion is reasonable in context. In Chang Pui Yin v. Bank of Singapore Ltd,26 the Court of Appeal found for the customers of the bank, and held that, in addition to reviewing the drafting of such a clause, the substance in the context of the dealings between the bank and its customers must also be examined in order to determine whether that clause is effective to exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty of the bank. In that case, the clause in question failed to exclude or restrict liability for negligence because it did not satisfy the requirement of reasonableness in the CECO.


Anti-money laundering remains a major regulatory focus in Hong Kong by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Hong Kong's banking authority. On 30 April 2018, the Hong Kong government published a territory-wide Hong Kong Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Report, which set out Hong Kong's ability to combat money laundering, as well as the risks and vulnerabilities concerning money laundering and terrorist financing in sectors such as banking. The banking sector was assessed as 'high risk' and the HKMA will continue to focus on addressing such risks by monitoring new typologies, addressing any information gaps, adopting a risk-based approach, cooperating with cross-border regulatory authorities, and supporting innovative financial crime controls. Anti-money laundering fines have grown increasingly hefty and the HKMA continues to reprimand and fine banks for contraventions of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (Cap. 615). One bank was fined HK$5 million in August 2018 for deficiencies in relation to transaction monitoring and another was fined HK$12.5 million in December 2018 for deficiencies across key control areas. One likely result of the continuing focus by regulators on anti-money laundering controls is an increased scrutiny by banks of their contractual terms with customers including their ability to require information from customers to meet anti-money laundering obligations, to freeze money in customer accounts following a suspicious transaction report and, in extremis, to terminate customer accounts where there are money laundering concerns.

In the realm of data protection, the Court of Appeal has recently held that claims can be litigated in courts with higher jurisdiction than that indicated in the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) (PDPO). The Court of Appeal held that although the District Court is expressly empowered by the PDPO to be the court in which to commence claims under Section 66(1) of the PDPO (the statutory right of action for individuals who suffer damage by reason of misuse by a data user of their personal data), the jurisdiction of the CFI is not ousted. Hence, a case can be transferred to, and litigated in, the CFI.27 As substantial repositories of personal data, banks are under constant scrutiny in respect of how they manage personal data both from regulators and customers.

On 6 July 2019, additional measures came into effect applying to the online and offline sales of 'complex products' (which are described by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), the principal financial and securities regulator in Hong Kong, as products whose terms, features and risks are not reasonably likely to be understood by retail investors because of their complex structures). These measures include performing a suitability assessment on all complex products, regardless of whether there has been any solicitation or recommendation. After a consultation with the banking industry in 2018, and to avoid a perceived risk of regulatory arbitrage, the HKMA has extended some of these measures to certain non-SFO-regulated structured investment products.


Regulators will maintain pressure on banks to comply with their regulatory obligations both as gatekeepers to prevent financial crime and in respect of their obligations to customers. Customers will no doubt continue to test the boundaries of these obligations, particularly if economic conditions deteriorate and the financial sector comes under more stress. At the same time, the closer judicial and reciprocal links between Hong Kong and the Mainland in respect of the enforcement of judgments and interim awards in arbitration should enhance investor and creditor confidence in cross-border transactions thereby enhancing liquidity.


1 Mark Hughes is a partner at Slaughter and May.

2 The Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), O.19.

3 The Export-Import Bank of China v. Taifeng Textile Group Co Ltd & Anor [2018] HKCU 2653.

4 R (on the application of Prudential plc and another) v. Special Commissioner of Income Tax and another [2013] UKSC 1.

5 [2015] 4 HKLRD 20.

6 Three Rivers DC v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556.

7 Serious Fraud Office (SFO) v. Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) [2018] EWCA Civ 2006.

8 Giorgio Armani SpA v. Elan Clothes Co Ltd [2019] HKCFI 530.

9 [2007] 4 All ER 951.

10 Dickson Valora Group (Holdings) Company Limited v. Fan Ji Qian [2019] HKCFI 482.

11 [2019] HKCFI 398.

12 [2019] HKCU 976.

13 [1997] 1 HKLRD 304.

14 Re The Joint Provisional Liquidators of China Lumena New Materials Corp (in provisional liquidation) [2018] HKCFI 276.

15 Re Joint Provisional Liquidators of Hsin Chong Group Holdings Ltd [2019] HKCFI 805.

16 [2006] 2 HKLRD 192.

17 [2019] HKCU 818.

18 [2009] 1 WLR 1998.

19 [2017] HKCU 397.

20 Lasmos Limited v. Southwest Pacific Bauxite (HK) Limited [2018] HKCFI 426.

21 But Ka Chan v. Interactive Brokers LLC [2019] HKCA 873

22 [2018] HKEC 2123.

23 [2017] HKCU 1817.

24 [2018] HKCU 2522.

25 Zhang Hong Li & Ors v. DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd & Ors [2019] HKCU 1578.

26 [2017] HKCU 1817.

27 Lee Kwok Tung Albert v. Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited CACV 180/2017.