i Statutory framework

The Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), in conjunction with various regulations, forms the competition regime in India. While there are many sectoral regulators responsible for maintaining fair competition in their respective sectors, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), established under Section 7 of the Act, is the principal regulator for anticompetitive behaviour across all sectors.

Provisions of Section 3 of the Act and various regulations, particularly the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 (the Leniency Regulations), deal with anticompetitive agreements, including cartels. 'Cartel' has been defined under the Act to include 'an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement among themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services'. Therefore, to establish the existence of a cartel, the existence of an 'agreement' needs to be proved first.

'Agreement' under the Act has been defined very widely and includes an arrangement or understanding or acting in concert and is not limited to written formal agreements. Section 3(1) of the Act sets out a general prohibition on all agreements that have or are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) within India, while Section 3(3) specifically sets out that certain horizontal agreements, including cartels, will be presumed to have an AAEC in India, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the accused to rebut the presumption. These horizontal agreements include those that:

  1. directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices;
  2. limit or control production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services;
  3. share the market or source of production, or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market, or any other similar way; or
  4. directly or indirectly result in bid rigging or collusive bidding.

The CCI is the enforcing body, assisted by its investigative arm, the office of Director General, CCI (DG). Most cartel investigations have been initiated by the CCI upon receipt of information either as a complaint or a leniency application, although the CCI has also initiated suo moto action or has initiated proceedings upon receipt of a reference made by a government or statutory authority. The CCI directs the DG to commence an investigation if it is of the view that there exists a prima facie case warranting an investigation. The DG cannot initiate an investigation suo moto. Once the DG submits an investigation report to the CCI, the CCI can either direct the DG to investigate further or it can continue with its inquiry and call upon the parties to make written and oral pleadings. On reaching a positive finding of the existence of a cartel and any resulting infraction, the CCI may impose a penalty and pass any other order that it deems fit. The order of the CCI can be appealed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).2 Any order of the NCLAT is finally appealable before the Supreme Court of India (SC).

The penalty that may be imposed in the case of any anticompetitive conduct cannot be more than 10 per cent of the average of the turnover3 of the contravening enterprise for the three preceding financial years. However, in the case of a cartel, the CCI can impose a penalty of up to three times the profit of the contravening enterprise or 10 per cent of the turnover of the contravening enterprise, for each year of the continuance of the cartel, whichever is greater. Further, the directors and other employees of the contravening entity found responsible can also be penalised under the Act.

The CCI has held that an agreement by itself cannot be the basis of cartel prosecution and that there have to be economic consequences arising out of such an agreement. Cases in which the CCI has prosecuted cartels will show that the CCI relies not only on direct evidence but also on indirect evidence and economic analysis.4

There are no criminal sanctions in India for cartelisation. However, non-compliance with the orders of the CCI or the NCLAT can attract criminal liability.

ii Guidelines and policy

The substantive provisions of the Act dealing with anticompetitive behaviour have only been in force since 2009. Competition jurisprudence is still developing in India. Both legal practitioners and the CCI rely on cases decided upon by the courts of the United States and the European Commission for guidance. The CCI has not issued any policy or guidelines for cartels.

iii Cartel enforcement

Cartel enforcement has been a focus for the CCI since the beginning but has taken time to gain traction. During the past year, the CCI has been aggressive in investigating cases relating to cartels. Apart from imposing monetary penalties on several companies, including their officers, the CCI has also conducted dawn raids on companies active in the commodity trading and alcoholic beverages markets.

As at November 2019, the CCI had issued a total of 63 orders penalising companies (including their officers) for cartel infringements (out of which, eight orders were passed in 2019). The total in monetary fines imposed by the CCI for cartel infringements to date is approximately 9 billion rupees (fines totalling more than 700 million rupees have been imposed in 2019).

In 2019, the CCI passed two orders in cases involving leniency applications. Interestingly, in one of the cases, a Japanese auto-parts manufacturer had filed a leniency application with the CCI disclosing details of a cartel operated by Japanese auto-parts manufacturers in Japan that affected the Indian market.


The CCI has been granted extraterritorial jurisdiction over any anticompetitive conduct occurring outside India if such conduct has caused, or is likely to cause an AAEC within India. To date, the CCI has not exercised this extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Section 18 of the Act permits the CCI to enter into any memorandum or arrangement, with the prior approval of central government, with any agency of any foreign country for the purpose of discharging its duties or performing its functions under the Act. The CCI has executed memoranda of understanding on cooperation with several competition agencies, including those of the United States, the European Union and Australia, in an attempt to set up a framework for cooperation and exchange of information. The scope and content of these arrangements are not publicly known.

It is believed that there is a fair amount of coordination and dialogue with regulators in other jurisdictions through the International Competition Network and other channels, although there is no provision permitting the CCI to share information or documents with other jurisdictions without the consent of the concerned parties.


An action taking place outside India that has or is likely to have an AAEC in the relevant market in India may be the subject of an inquiry by the CCI under Section 32 of the Act.

The Act provides for certain affirmative defences and exemptions, namely:

  1. joint venture: while certain horizontal agreements have been presumed to harm competition, an exemption from this presumption is offered to an efficiency-enhancing joint venture. The burden of demonstrating such efficiencies lies with the enterprise seeking the exemption. If the efficiency gain is shown to exceed the harm to competition, the party is not likely to be held to be in contravention of the anticompetitive behaviour on an application of the rule of reason;
  2. intellectual property rights defence: the Act provides that, notwithstanding the anticompetitive agreement provisions of the Act, a person shall be free to impose restrictions insofar as the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and for the protection of, and prevention of any infringements of, any intellectual property rights granted under India's intellectual property laws;
  3. export cartels exemption: the Act provides that restrictions relating to anticompetitive agreements, including cartels, do not apply to the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent that the agreements relate exclusively to production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services. This exemption may be read to exclude export cartels (i.e., cartelisation of markets outside India); and
  4. statutory exemption: under Section 54, central government can exempt any class of enterprise from the application of competition law in the interests of security of the state or public interest (exemption has been granted to vessel-sharing agreements within the liner shipping industry from the provisions of Section 3 of the Act for a period of three years from 4 July 2018).5


The leniency policy in India is governed by Section 46 of the Act read with the Leniency Regulations, which set out the requirements for qualification, the procedure to be followed for the imposition of a lesser penalty and the benefits available.

The Leniency Regulations provide for a reduction in the penalty of up to 100 per cent if an applicant makes a vital disclosure about the existence of a cartel to the CCI and if no reduction in penalty has been granted to any other applicant by the CCI. This benefit of reduction in penalty would be granted to an applicant only if the CCI does not have sufficient evidence, or any evidence at all, to establish the existence of a cartel.

In August 2017, far-reaching amendments were made to the Leniency Regulations (2017 Amendment). By way of the 2017 Amendment, the scope of an 'applicant' under the Leniency Regulations has been expanded to specifically include an individual who has participated in a cartel on behalf of an enterprise to make a leniency application to the CCI for a grant of a lesser penalty. Further, the 2017 Amendment provides an option to an enterprise making a leniency application, to include the names of individuals involved in the cartel (on behalf of the enterprise) for whom it wishes to seek a lesser penalty.

The most salutary development pursuant to the 2017 Amendment is that the grant of a reduction in penalty to an applicant (including an individual) who meets the conditions required, is now mandatory. Prior to the 2017 Amendment, it was left to the discretion of the CCI to reduce a penalty and by how much, if at all. However, the percentage by which a penalty would be reduced is still discretionary and there is still no guarantee of a full reduction.

The leniency regime also sets out a marker system for applicants. An applicant can approach the CCI on a no-names basis and provide details of the infringement and the evidence in its possession. The CCI will employ a priority status based on the time of the initial contact. The first applicant to contact the CCI, albeit orally, will be given the status of first applicant. If the initial contact is oral, the applicant will need to ensure that the documentary evidence is provided to the CCI within 15 calendar days of receiving a direction from the CCI to submit the application. Failure to do so will result in the loss of the priority status.

The Act and applicable regulations do not provide for any specific guidance as to the nature and level of detail of the evidence required. Once a marker has been given, the CCI does not deal with another applicant until a decision regarding the first applicant has been made.

The conditions that need to be met for an applicant to qualify for the benefit of a reduced penalty include:

  1. ceasing to have further participation in the cartel from the time of its disclosure, unless otherwise directed by the CCI;
  2. providing vital disclosure in respect of a violation under Section 3(3) of the Act;
  3. providing all relevant information, documents and evidence as may be required by the CCI;
  4. cooperating genuinely, fully, continuously and expeditiously throughout the investigation and other proceedings before the CCI; and
  5. not concealing, destroying, manipulating or removing the relevant documents in any manner that may contribute to the establishment of a cartel.

Subsequent applicants may be granted a reduction in penalty on making a disclosure by submitting evidence that, in the opinion of the CCI, may provide significant added value over and above the evidence already in the possession of the CCI or the DG to establish the existence of a cartel. The applicant marked second in the priority status may be granted a reduction of up to 50 per cent of the leviable penalty, while the applicant marked third or later in the priority status may be granted a reduction of up to 30 per cent of the leviable penalty. Neither a successful nor an unsuccessful applicant for leniency is given immunity from civil claims.

In terms of the applicable regulations, no leniency application can be entertained after the DG's investigation report is received by the CCI.

As such, under the Leniency Regulations, the CCI grants confidentiality regarding the applicant's identity, and the information and evidence furnished by an applicant. However, pursuant to the 2017 Amendment, the DG is allowed to disclose the information and evidence furnished by an applicant to any party if the DG deems the disclosure necessary for the purposes of the investigation. Nevertheless, disclosure can only be made after obtaining prior approval from the CCI in the form of a reasoned written order.

As at November 2019, the CCI has passed nine orders in cases involving leniency applications. In 2019, the CCI granted a reduction in penalty to leniency applicants in two cases. The trend in recent leniency cases indicates that the CCI will consider granting a 100 per cent reduction in fines or complete immunity only when the leniency applicant has disclosed evidence relating to the cartel that the CCI has used as the basis for starting its investigation.

In January 2019, the CCI initiated an investigation pursuant to a leniency application filed by Panasonic Corporation (Japan) on behalf of itself and Panasonic India and their respective office bearers disclosing a cartel between Panasonic India and Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co Limited (Godrej). The CCI noted that, based on the evidence collected, which included an anticompetitive clause in the written agreement entered into between Panasonic India and Godrej for supply of zinc-carbon dry cell batteries (DCBs), and email communications between their key managerial personnel, there existed a bilateral cartel between Panasonic and Godrej in the market for institutional sales of DCBs. The CCI noted that the leniency application made true and vital disclosures, which enabled the CCI to form a prima facie opinion regarding the existence of the cartel. Accordingly, the CCI granted a 100 per cent reduction in penalty to Panasonic India and its respective office bearers.6

In August 2019, the CCI initiated an investigation pursuant to a leniency application filed by NSK Limited (Japan) disclosing a cartel between NSK and JTEKT Corporation, Japan in relation to the supply of electric power steering systems to three automotive original equipment manufacturers. Subsequently, JTEKT also filed a leniency application with the CCI.7

The CCI noted that NSK and JTEKT met on various occasions and exchanged commercially sensitive information about prices, quantity, etc., in Japan. As a result of such contact, NSK was able to quote higher prices in India, which also benefitted its subsidiary in India. Accordingly, the CCI held that NSK and JTEKT and their Indian subsidiaries indulged in anticompetitive conduct in contravention of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act.

Given that NSK was the first to approach the CCI as a leniency applicant, and provided full disclosure, the CCI granted a 100 per cent reduction in penalty to NSK's Indian subsidiary and its office bearers. Further, for providing significant added value to the case, the CCI granted a 50 per cent reduction in penalty to JTEKT's Indian subsidiary along with its office bearers.


Under the Act, in the case of cartels, the CCI has the power to impose a penalty of up to three times the profit or 10 per cent of the turnover of each participating enterprise for each year of continuance of a cartel agreement, whichever is the greater. If an enterprise is a company, any of its directors or officials who are guilty are also liable to be proceeded against.

While the CCI has not framed any guidelines or offered any sort of guidance on calculating penalties, the SC in Excel Crop limited the penalty levied on multi-product companies to the turnover attributable solely to the product that was the subject of the contravention (i.e, the 'relevant turnover'). Further, the SC provided a two-step methodology for calculating a penalty:

  1. step 1: determining the relevant turnover – the relevant turnover should be the entity's turnover pertaining to products and services that have been affected by a contravention; and
  2. step 2: determining the appropriate percentage of penalty based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The guidelines laid out by the SC will help to eliminate the application of disproportionate penalties on enterprises and demonstrate appropriate mitigating circumstances for the imposition of a lesser penalty.

In addition to the imposition of penalty, the CCI may also pass orders, inter alia, directing the parties to terminate the agreement and to refrain from re-entering such an agreement, or to modify the terms of the agreement.

The Act does not provide for criminal liability other than for wilful default in implementing orders issued by the CCI. Non-compliance with CCI orders may result in a fine of up to 250 million rupees or imprisonment for up to three years, or both, while non-compliance with orders issued by the NCLAT may lead to a fine of up to 100 million rupees or imprisonment for up to three years or both.

Non-cooperation during an investigation may also lead to the imposition of a penalty by the CCI. The CCI imposed a fine of 10 million rupees on Google for its failure to comply with the directions given by the DG seeking information and documents.8 The CCI also imposed a fine of 15 million rupees on Monsanto and its affiliate companies for their failure to provide information sought by the DG in respect of its authorised representatives.9 Further, in a recent case in which the CCI imposed a penalty on an individual for non-cooperation with the DG, the NCLAT set aside the penalty after the individual apologised.10


The information received from an 'informant' or collected suo moto is reviewed by the CCI to determine whether there exists a prima facie case that warrants an investigation by the DG.

Both the CCI and the DG have been conferred with the same powers as those conferred on an Indian civil court, including the power to summon any person and enforce his or her attendance, and powers of discovery and enforcement of production of documents. Additionally, the DG has been vested with the power to conduct searches and seizures.

Following the repeal of the Companies Act 1956 and the enactment of the Companies Act 2013, the DG is no longer required to obtain a court-issued warrant to conduct a search and seizure. According to media reports, the DG conducted three dawn raids in 2019.

In March 2019, the DG raided the offices of Glencore, Africa's Export Trading Group and Edelweiss Group in relation to alleged cartelisation of prices in the pulses market.

In July 2019, the DG raided the offices of a French firm, Mersen SA, and Assam Carbon Products in relation to alleged bid rigging of tenders floated by Indian Railways for carbon brushes.

In September 2019, the DG raided the offices of four companies – Climax Synthetics Private Limited, Shivalik Agro Poly Products Limited, Arun Manufacturing Services Private Limited and Bag Poly International Limited – in relation to alleged bid rigging of tenders floated by the Food Corporation of India for the sale of tarpaulin.


The Act does not provide for the private enforcement of rights. Compensation claims for damages by private parties have to be filed before the NCLAT. The NCLAT is yet to pass an order addressing a claim for damages.

As per the Act, such claims can be made either after the CCI arrives at a finding of contravention, or after the NCLAT arrives at a finding of contravention if the decision by the CCI is appealed. However, as a matter of practice, the NCLAT awaits the decision of the SC on merits before proceeding to hear compensation claims. The Metropolitan Stock Exchange has filed an application seeking compensation from the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) on the basis of an order of the CCI finding NSE guilty of abusing its dominant position to oust players from the derivatives trading market. However, the NCLAT has deferred hearing the compensation application until the SC decides finally on the merit of whether NSE abused its dominant position or not. Similarly, in two other cases,11 compensation applications were filed by Crown Theatre against Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation for facilitating cartelisation between film distributors to deny the screening of Tamil and Malayalam films in the state of Kerala, and by Sai Wardha Power Limited against Coal India Limited for abuse of dominance in the market for the production and supply of non-coking coal to thermal producers in India. Both are currently pending before the NCLAT.

Although damages jurisprudence in this area is yet to develop in India, it is possible for one or more persons, with the approval of the NCLAT, to file compensation claims on behalf of many.

If a loss is shown to have been suffered by a party as a result of a contravention of the substantive provisions of the Act, the suffering party can approach the NCLAT for an award of restitutive compensation. If many persons have suffered loss or damage from an action of the same enterprise or group of enterprises, an application for an award of compensation can be made by just one of those persons on behalf of them all. However, since the quantum of the fine is indicative of the severity of the offence, it may be an important factor that is considered when calculating the award.


Apart from the significant amendments in the leniency regime and leniency orders, there have been some notable decisions in relation to cartel enforcement in India during the past year.

In October 2018, the SC set aside an order passed by the CCI penalising 45 manufacturers of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders for cartelising and bid rigging in a tender floated by Indian Oil Corporation Limited for supplying 14.2kg-capacity LPG cylinders. The SC observed that price parallelism is not sufficient to prove concerted action. The market conditions prevalent were that of an oligopsony, and parallel behaviour was not the result of any concerted practice. It was observed that in an oligopsony, parallel pricing simpliciter would not lead to the conclusion that there was concerted practice and there has to be other credible and corroborative evidence.

In December 2018, the SC dismissed an appeal filed by the CCI challenging a Bombay High Court (BHC) decision holding that the CCI is not empowered to deal with the technical aspects associated with the telecoms sector that arise solely from the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act (TRAI Act) and related regulations. In this case, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJio) alleged that telecoms companies Airtel, Vodafone and Idea (collectively, OPs), under the aegis of the Cellular Operators Association of India, formed a cartel to deny points of interconnection (POIs) to RJio. Based on the complaint, the CCI passed a prima facie order directing the DG to investigate the conduct of the OPs. The SC, broadly agreeing with the BHC, held that while the CCI has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon issues governed by the TRAI Act, the issue of denial of POIs, being a technical issue, is pending before the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and that the TRAI is the more appropriate authority to consider these issues. Accordingly, only when the jurisdictional facts are determined by the TRAI and it prima facie concludes that the OPs have indulged in a cartel, can the CCI start its investigation. Thus, the jurisdiction of the CCI is not barred but simply pushed back to a later stage.12

In January 2019, the SC set aside a judgment of the Delhi High Court (DHC) and confirmed the power of the DG to conduct 'search and seizure' operations. In this case, the CCI directed the DG to investigate the conduct of JCB India Private Limited in relation to abuse of its dominant position. Post the CCI order, the DG raided the offices of JCB in September 2014. After the raid, JCB challenged the DG's dawn raid before the DHC on the ground that the DG had obtained only a 'search warrant' from the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM), authorising him to only search the premise and not seize any material. The DHC held that the CMM had merely authorised the DG to search the premises of JCB and not specifically to seize any material during the search operation. Accordingly, the seizure of material by the DG in absence of explicit authorisation by the CMM was beyond the powers of the DG, and the DG was restrained from utilising any of the seized material.13 Aggrieved, the CCI approached the SC, which held that the authorisation of search extends to seizure as well, as a search by itself without the power of seizure would not be sufficient for the purposes of the investigation.

In July 2019, the CCI received a complaint against PVR Limited, Inox Leisure Limited, Cinepolis India Private Limited and Carnival Motion Pictures Private Limited (collectively, cinema exhibitors) alleging that the Cinema Exhibitors formed a cartel, inter se, or under the aegis of FICCI Multiplex Association of India. The complainant, inter alia, alleged that pursuant to the cartel, the cinema exhibitors indulged in:

  1. undue imposition of a virtual print fee;
  2. imposition of non-negotiable revenue-sharing terms;
  3. delays in advances and payments made to content companies; and
  4. a lack of transparency regarding the advertising and promotion policy during the exhibition of films.

The CCI observed that the complainant failed to place on record any agreement between the cinema exhibitors that evidenced the meeting of minds. As such, mere alleged parallel conduct in an oligopolistic market is not sufficient to prima facie establish a cartel among the cinema exhibitors such as would warrant an investigation. The complainant must discharge the initial burden of proof to warrant an investigation by the CCI. Accordingly, the CCI dismissed the complaint.14

In August 2019, the CCI penalised 51 LPG cylinder manufacturers (collectively, bidders) for cartelising and bid rigging in a tender floated by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, for procurement of LPG cylinders. The CCI, suo moto, initiated the investigation based on an anonymous letter alleging that the bidders indulged in cartelisation by collectively withdrawing their bids simultaneously on the same date. The CCI found that:

  1. common agents were working for the cylinder manufacturers in absence of any confidentiality agreements;
  2. there were email exchanges between the bidders revealing exchange of information in relation to bid price;
  3. the withdrawal letters were identical in nature;
  4. there were common IP addresses from which bids were uploaded; and
  5. there was collusive decision-making by the opposing parties under the guise of an LPG cylinders manufacturers association.

The CCI imposed a cumulative penalty of approximately 39 crore rupees on the bidders and approximately 45 lakh rupees on their office bearers, which was calculated at 1 per cent of their average relevant turnover and income, respectively.15

In the same month, the CCI also penalised SAAR IT Resources Private Limited, CADD Systems and Services Private Limited and Pentacle Consultants (I) Private Limited for rigging bids for a tender floated by the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) for selection of an agency for carrying out a geo-enabled tree census using geographic information system and global positioning system technology. The complainant alleged that the parties rigged the PMC's tender and committed various irregularities with a view to predetermining the outcome of the tender. Based on the evidence collected by the DG, the CCI observed that:

  1. CADD and Pentacle acted as proxy or cover bidders for SAAR;
  2. the demand draft for the earnest money deposit (to be deposited along with the tender documents) for both CADD and Pentacle was arranged by SAAR;
  3. SAAR facilitated submission of Pentacle's online bid from computer systems located in its own office;
  4. there existed similarities in the documentation of the bid documents between CADD, SAAR and Pentacle (such as date format, paragraph alignment, etc.); and
  5. the call detail records and screenshots of messages between the companies' office bearers evidenced that they were in touch with each other in relation to the submission of the bids.

The CCI imposed a penalty of approximately 1 crore and 25 lakh rupees, 11 lakh rupees and approximately 1 crore and 33 lakh rupees on SAAR, CADD and Pentacle, respectively, calculated at 10 per cent of their average turnover in the previous three years.16

In September 2019, a Division Bench of the DHC upheld the DG's right to expand the scope of an investigation to matters beyond what is directed in the prima facie order passed by the CCI.17 The DHC held that the prima facie order of the CCI only triggers an investigation by the DG and does not restrict the DG to examine matters that do not form a part of the complaint. However, the scope of the DG's investigation has to be guided by the language of the prima facie order.

On 26 July 2019, the Competition Law Review Committee (the Committee) constituted by the government of India in October 2018 submitted its report to the Union Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs setting out its recommendations for strengthening the competition law framework. The report contains various recommendations with respect to the substantive aspects of the Act.

The key recommendations of the Committee concerning cartels and leniency are as follows:

  1. introduction of provisions for certain types of agreements to cover hub-and-spoke cartels, as well as agreements that do not strictly fit within typical horizontal or vertical agreements;
  2. introduction of provisions for settlement and for providing commitments in relation to anticompetitive agreements (including cartels) and abuses of dominant position;
  3. introducing the concept of 'leniency plus';
  4. introducing provisions to enable the withdrawal of leniency applications; and
  5. issuance of penalty guidelines to ensure better transparency and faster decision-making.


1 Farhad Sorabjee and Vaibhav Choukse are partners at J Sagar Associates.

2 The NCLAT replaced the Competition Appellate Tribunal with effect from 26 May 2017.

3 Turnover is to be interpreted as relevant turnover as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Excel Crop Care Ltd v. Competition Commission of India, Civil Appeal No. 2480 of 2014.

4 Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Pvt Ltd, Case No. 5 of 2009.

5 Notification No. SO 3250 (E) [F No. 5/20/2011-CS]. The exemption to vessel-sharing agreements has been repeatedly granted since 2013.

6 In Re: Anticompetitive conduct in the dry-cell batteries market in India, suo motu Case No. 3 of 2017.

7 In Re: Cartelisation in the supply of electric power steering systems, suo motu Case No. 7(01) of 2014.

8 In Re: Consim Info Private Limited v. Google Inc USA and Ors, Cases Nos. 7 and 30 of 2012.

9 In Re: M/s Nuziveedu Seeds Limited and Ors v. Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Limited and Ors, Case No. 107 of 2015.

10 AKMN Cylinders (P) Ltd & Anr v Competition Commission of India and Anr, Competition (AT) No. 50 of 2018.

11 Crown Theatre v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation, CA (AT) (COMPAT) No. 1 of 2017 in Competition Appeal (AT) No. 16 of 2017; Sai Wardha Power Ltd v. Coal India Ltd & Ors, Transfer CA (AT) (Compensation) No. 1/2017.

12 Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited & Ors (2019) 2 SCC 521.

13 Competition Commission of India v. JCB India Limited & Ors, Criminal Appeal No. 76-77 of 2019.

14 Unilazer Ventures Private Limited v. PVR Ltd and Ors. Case No. 10 of 2019.

15 In Re: Alleged cartelisation in supply of LPG cylinders procured through tenders by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, suo motu Case No. 1 of 2014.

16 Nagrik Chetna Manch v. SAAR IT Resources Private Limited & Ors, Case No. 12 of 2017.

17 Competition Commission of India v. Grasim Industries Limited, LPA No. 137 of 2014.