I Introduction

Generally, Czech competition laws follow EU law in all substantive matters, while also setting out national procedures for enforcement. There are several layers of provisions, each carrying differing levels of force. At the base is constitutional law, followed by EU laws and international treaties, and finally domestic legislation. The Office for Protection of Competition (the Competition Authority) has issued several guidelines, known as 'soft law', on the application, procedures and enforcement of competition law. This chapter focuses on domestic law, with the influence of international law being highlighted where relevant.

Constitutional layer

Article 26, Paragraph 1 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms2 establishes the right to engage in enterprise and pursue other economic activity, whereas Paragraph 2 of the same Article specifies that the exercise of certain professions or activities may be subject to special conditions or restricted by law. This Article is interpreted by the Czech Constitutional Court as an implicit obligation on the state to create and maintain the conditions for fair competition and a fair business environment.3 This Article is also the basis for the right of both individuals and legal entities to conduct business, although such activities may be restricted by law in certain cases. Competition law is considered to be one such way of restricting dominant businesses in pursuing their economic activities.4 Such restrictions and their application must be proportionate and rational and must have a legitimate goal, otherwise they will be deemed unconstitutional.

Domestic legislation

The fundamental law establishing the rules governing dominant market position and the abuse of that position is the Act on the Protection of Competition,5 which protects competition in the products and services (goods) market. This Act is modelled on Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Since 2016, Article 19a of the Act on the Protection of Competition prohibits public authorities from disrupting competition (unless such disruption is permitted or required by special laws). It can mainly be used in the case of discriminatory regulations or other measures adopted by municipal or regional authorities.6

The Act on Compensation of Competition Law Damage7 incorporates the relevant EU directive into domestic law.8 This Act sets out the applicable procedures for private enforcement (see below).

The Act on Significant Market Power in the Sale of Agricultural and Food Products and its Abuse9 (the Act on Significant Market Power) targets certain kinds of abuses of market power in contractual relationships10 in place with the overseeing Competition Authority. Its purpose is to protect the weaker party to a contract (individual suppliers, or small or medium-sized enterprises) from systemic abuse from a retail market player with significant market purchasing power.

Soft law

The Competition Authority has published several Guidelines. The relevant Guidelines that remain applicable to date are as follows:

  1. Notice on alternative solution of certain competition issues;
  2. Guidelines on determining fines for breaching the Act on Protection of Competition;
  3. Guidelines on applying the leniency programme in accordance with Article 22ba of the Act on the Protection of Competition; and
  4. Guidelines on applying the accelerated procedure in accordance with Article 22ba of the Act on the Protection of Competition.

Where possible, these guidelines follow the model set up by the European Commission.

II Year in review

On average, the Competition Authority opens only one case of abuse of dominant position and two to three cases of abuses of significant market power per year.11 The cases decided in 2018 are shown in the table below.

Company Investigating authority Type of case Fine or resolution
České dráhy Competition Authority Abuse of dominant position US$700,000
Kaufland Competition Authority Abuse of significant market power Settlement reached
Globus Competition Authority Abuse of significant market power US$8.25 million
Rewe Buying Group, BILLA, Penny Market Competition Authority Abuse of significant market power US$7.2 million

The decision in the Kaufland case is interesting for two reasons. First, it is a prime example of a settlement procedure. Second, the case revolved around a system connected to the advertising company Markant, in that Kaufland forced its suppliers to take part in this system and to pay a fee for it. Despite this being the exact same system that Globus ČR, ks used for its suppliers, Kaufland reached a settlement based on its commitment to restoring competition, whereas Globus was fined US$8.25 million, a sum that the latter claims would lead it to become insolvent. Globus has appealed this decision, arguing that the decision made in the Kaufland case, and the practice of settlement, should be taken into account.

The most significant cases of both 2017 and 2018 concerned cartels,12 and both were in connection with public procurement processes in the field of construction. Unusually high fines were issued in both cases (US$13 million and US$70 million, respectively) and both decisions were later reversed by the courts. The main issue at stake was the dawn raids carried out by investigators allegedly in the form of 'fishing expeditions', where the stated scope of the investigation was wide-ranging. As a result, the Competition Authority seized a vast number of documents and data that pointed to a widespread bid-rigging ring of construction companies. The Supreme Administrative Court noted13 that this was in violation of the law and that the Competition Authority was required to have clearly stated its suspicion of this widespread ring if it were to lawfully conduct a dawn raid of that scope. The scope of any dawn raid must be proportionate to the reasoned suspicion that exists at the time of the raid. If the Competition Authority finds new evidence during a dawn raid that indicates that the initial scope of the raid should be extended, it must initiate new proceedings or expand the ongoing proceedings before carrying out another dawn raid with the extended scope.

Another key matter is a police investigation that started in March 2019, concerning Petr Rafaj, the Head of the Competition Authority, on suspicion of exerting undue influence in the investigations and decision-making of the Competition Authority. Although little is known on this for now, it sheds doubts on the fairness of the Competition Authority's work in past years.

III Market definition and market power

i Market definition

The definition of relevant market under the Act on the Protection of Competition is identical to that of EU law. In practice, the Competition Authority and courts follow the soft law of the EU Commission and EU case law.14 To determine the relevant market, the Competition Authority uses similar econometric and other markers as are used by the European Commission (e.g., small but significant and non-transitory increase in price, price elasticity and correlation tests); however, it tends to do so on a smaller scale and with a lower degree of expertise.

ii Market power

Market power is defined in Article 10 of the Act on the Protection of Competition, wherein dominant market position occurs where the market power of one or more competitors acting in concert enables them to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its customers and consumers.

Such market power is assessed based on the value of the volume supplied or purchased in the (relevant) goods market (market share) during the period under examination, as well as on other markers, including competitors' economic and financial power, legal and other barriers to market entry, vertical integration, market structure and respective market shares.

Market share in the relevant market is the starting point for assessing market power. Once the market has been defined, the Competition Authority compares statistical data on the relevant competitors and may request internal data from them to assess the market structure and market share of the competitor or competitors in question. However, even where the market share of a competitor is above 75 per cent, the Competition Authority also usually analyses and evaluates other markers in order to provide the grounds for its final decision.15

Relative dominance in the food industry

The Act on Significant Market Power was enacted in 2009 and revised in 2017. Any entity engaged in purchasing food products for their subsequent resale and that has significant market power is prohibited from abusing this power.

Significant market power is defined as a position from which the purchaser16 can unjustifiably extract advantages from suppliers in relation to the purchase of food or in relation to the provision or receipt of services related to the sale and purchase of food. The main criteria for assessing this power are market structure, market-entry barriers and the financial power of the purchaser. Any purchaser acting on behalf of another purchaser is regarded as though they were a single purchaser.

Significant market power can be assumed to exist when the criteria set forth in the Act are met. Any purchaser or purchasing alliance whose annual turnover from the resale of food and the provision of related services in the Czech Republic is higher than approximately US$230 million is regarded as being a purchaser with significant market power.

The initial consequences of this were originally significant, as a purchaser could be considered to be in abuse of significant market power even where the suppliers in question had significantly higher market power (absolute conception).17 However, the Act was later revised in light of criticism, with significant market power and the abuse of that power now being assessed by the Competition Authority on the basis of the absolute conception of market power, with a corrective mechanism in place to ensure that a purchaser is not considered as having significant market power where the supplier has greater market power.18

IV Abuse

Abuse of a dominant position is defined in Article 1, Paragraph 1(b) and Articles 10 and 11 of the Act on the Protection of Competition.

Abuse of a dominant position can be committed by one competitor or by several competitors acting in concert. Dominant position is defined as a market power that enables any competitor to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its customers and consumers. Dominant position must be proved and is presumed that, until proven otherwise, market share below 40 per cent rules out dominant position.

i Overview

Abuse of dominant position falls under two distinct legislative instruments. The first is the Act on the Protection of Competition, which targets behaviour that has disrupted or could disrupt competition, regardless of whether this is engaged in collectively or individually. The second is the Act on Significant Market Power, which is applied in a slightly different way (see below).

ii The Act on the Protection of Competition

The Act on the Protection of Competition follows the EU's definition of abuse of dominant position, providing a general clause and six typical types of abuse.19

The Competition Authority relies heavily on the guidelines and case law of the European Union and cites them in most of its decisions, in which it also applies EU principles. While a per se approach may have been more common several years ago, today, the Competition Authority claims to embrace this effects-based approach.

Exclusionary abuses

Exclusionary pricing

With the exception of the above-mentioned landmark case Student Agency v. Asiana, very few cases20 have been initiated in relation to predatory pricing. In short, the Competition Authority takes a more holistic and effects-based approach to this behaviour and tries to assess its impact. In this respect, where a sales price is below the cost price, this alone is not sufficient to disrupt competition, rather the impact of the entire period in which these prices are maintained would also have to be measured. Predatory pricing can therefore be a legitimate tool in competition.

Czech case law on margin squeezes is still immature. However, a few investigations have been conducted by the Competition Authority in the field of telecommunications21 and energy.22 In these cases, the Competition Authority has cited the guidelines and case law of the European Union.

Exclusive dealing

In line with EU law, Czech domestic law deems that exclusive dealing and rebates may be anticompetitive where enforced by a dominant competitor. Anticompetitive exclusive dealing is rare. The most thorough decision can be found in relation to Telefonica Czech Republic.23 In this decision from 2004, which was finally confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2012, the Competition Authority provides clarification on the subject of rebates, and attempts to draw a distinction between permitted forms of quantity discounts as compared with unlawful rebates, in which it cites EU case law. The biggest issue encountered by the Competition Authority in relation to this case was that exclusive discounts were tied to the length of the contract and the length of the consumers' future undertaking, whereas the actual volume of the services used by the consumer was disregarded. In this case, termination of the contract before a certain date was made particularly difficult.

Refusal to deal

The Competition Authority has ruled on several cases where a dominant competitor has refused to deal with a consumer or suddenly terminated a contract to gain an advantage in a limited market. No rules have been established to regulate this issue and such cases are decided on a case-by-case basis. However, certain conclusions can be drawn. First, as has been confirmed in the courts,24 the Competition Authority must take into account both sides of the contract, primarily to assess their dependence on one another more thoroughly. Market power is used as a marker in these cases only sparingly. Similarly, when a transportation company that provides 100 per cent of the public transport in a city decides to terminate a contract owing to the city council having grossly breached its contract, it may do so, but must do so in a way that does not cause harm to the city or to consumers.25

Another, quite distinct, issue is the essential facilities doctrine. The basic requirement for such cases was set in a 2001 decision of the High Court.26 Where this doctrine is invoked, the Competition Authority must prove that an essential facility exists. If it is proven to exist, then abuse of dominant position may occur both by refusing access to the facility or by setting burdensome barriers to its access. Moreover, the essential facilities doctrine may be invoked even if such facility is not a prerequisite for the existence and activity of the competitor, but where refusal of access to the facility makes it difficult for it to compete with a vertically integrated competitor.27


Discrimination is a broad area characterised by different forms of behaviour that often overlap with the abuses described above. Unlike the practice of the EU, where discrimination in competition alone is not deemed to constitute an abuse of dominant position, the Competition Authority has tended to adopt a per se approach in its early cases,28 stating that, if a dominant competitor enforces discriminatory conditions that would be lawful if they were applied by a non-dominant competitor, but if this conduct causes harm to another competitor, then such conduct constitutes an abuse of dominant position.

If a competitor has a dominant position in a vertically integrated market, an abuse of dominant position may also exist where different conditions are placed on other competitors as compared with those placed on its own subsidiary.29 Similarly, in its decision made in the case involving RWE Supply & Trading CZ, a.s.,30 the Competition Authority ruled that different contractual terms and conditions may be applied for a dominant competitor, provided that such differences do not bar consumers from competing with the dominant competitor's concern in a downstream market.

Also of interest is the ongoing case involving České dráhy, a.s.,31 in which the Supreme Administrative Court reversed a previous decision on the grounds of insufficient evidence. However, this highlighted the shift from a per se approach to assessing abuses of dominant position, as per the standard set in the AKZO decision,32 to a more holistic method whereby the Competition Authority employs an effects-based approach to the assessment of such cases, and explains why – in the case in question – the prices below cost were exclusionary for competitors and how they disrupted competition, which serve to exemplify this shift in approach.

Exploitative abuses

The most important decision in this regard is the decision reached in the case involving Intergram,33 in which the Competition Authority elaborated on the issue of excessive pricing and how it should be assessed, in which it cited EU case law. Where it is not possible to compare the price against the consideration (the monopolist performs operations that are delegated to it by the state), then the Competition Authority shall compare similar pricing in other jurisdictions, assuming that the regulatory frameworks and practice of these jurisdictions are similar.

iii Abuse of significant market power in the food industry

Since 2017, the legal framework and practice of the Competition Authority have provided for the absolute conception together with a corrective mechanism. Where a purchaser is assumed to have significant market power (see above) and the Competition Authority initiates proceedings against it, the purchaser can raise the objection in such proceedings that it cannot be considered to have significant market power with respect to other suppliers because, for instance, it is the weaker party in its relationship with them. The Competition Authority might then find that the purchaser holds and has abused significant market power in its relationship with some suppliers and not with others.

The types of conduct that constitute abuses of significant market power can be grouped into:

  1. disproportionate contractual terms and conditions between the supplier and the purchaser, primarily with regard to pricing;34
  2. the enforcement of pricing, provision of services or any other consideration not included in the contract between the parties;35
  3. discrimination between suppliers for comparable goods without fair reason;
  4. auditing or control of the supplier; or
  5. disregard of the outcomes of inspections carried out by public authorities.

Moreover, contracts between the purchaser and suppliers must meet special requirements relating to form, content and term, as stipulated in Article 3a of the Act on Significant Market Power.

V Remedies and sanctions

Breach of competition legislation may trigger both administrative and criminal liability. However, abuse of dominant position and abuse of significant market power are administrative offences only.

If a legal entity proves that it has made every effort that could be reasonably required of it to prevent any breach of the law, then it will not be held liable for such an offence.

i Sanctions

Each offence is described in the legislation referred to above. Generally, for disruption of competition, perpetrators are subject to fines of up to US$40,000 or 10 per cent of their net annual turnover, whereas for obstructing an investigation or proceedings, fines of up to US$15,000 or 1 per cent of net annual turnover can be handed down. The Competition Authority may mitigate or aggravate the fine, or may use any of the other instruments provided for in the Act on Liability for Administrative Offences36 or in the Guidelines on Determining Fines. Usually, the Competition Authority takes into account the annual turnover of the perpetrator in the relevant market, the duration of the abuse, the seriousness of the abuse and the behaviour of the perpetrator, and also checks whether the fine will be destructive for the perpetrator.

The Competition Authority is often criticised for handing down lenient fines and for not enforcing them sufficiently. The biggest fine issued to a cartel in the construction industry was US$70 million, although this was later rescinded by the courts. The highest fines range between US$4 million and US$14 million, and the average fine is close to US$1.5 million.

ii Behavioural remedies

Both the Act on the Protection of Competition and the Act on Significant Market Power provide the option for unlawful situations to be redressed outside of proceedings.

Both acts give the Competition Authority the power to impose measures of redress with the purpose of reinstating effective competition and to set a time limit for doing so. However, neither act explains these measures in detail and they are, for the present, not employed by the Competition Authority. Failure to comply with such a measure of redress would constitute an offence.

VI Procedure

Generally, both the Act on the Protection of Competition and the Act on Significant Market Power contain a set of mainly specific substantive rules. Few of their provisions, however, contain specific procedural steps or instruments. Thus, they are not standalone legislative acts and the Code of Administrative Procedure must therefore be applied with certain modifications.

The Competition Authority actively oversees competition and initiates investigations where necessary. Investigations and other proceedings can only be initiated at its sole discretion. As a government office, it is also required to receive, analyse and report the findings of third-party concerns; however, proceedings concerning abuses of dominant position and significant market power can only be brought ex officio.37

The Competition Authority has the authority to conduct investigations (including both dawn raids and requests for documents)38 before or after initiating proceedings. The only limitation placed on the Competition Authority in this respect is that any investigation conducted prior to initiating proceedings must be proportionate to the purpose of that investigation.39 The person under investigation can refuse to cooperate if the investigation extends beyond its stated scope and purpose,40 whereas after initiating proceedings, the Competition Authority can expand the investigation as regards the evidence gathered.41 Investigations may also be conducted on premises other than business premises after consent has been granted by the relevant court. A detailed record must be taken of all investigations conducted on premises.

The most recent case law has confirmed that a defence may be filed against investigations on business premises in the form of a suit against public authority interference42. The case law has also provided further clarification on the process for dawn raids (see Section II). In 2017, the Competition Authority issued its Information Paper summarising the procedure for dawn raids.43

Interim measures may be imposed where there is a concern that proper enforcement may be in jeopardy. However, such measures may only be imposed during official proceedings.44

There are no strict time limits applicable to the Competition Authority, and the general time limits set forth in the Code of Administrative Procedure apply. However, these can be extended subject to the complexity of the case in question and are not binding on the Competition Authority. Nevertheless, any unnecessary prolongation of these time limits is unlawful and can lead to compensation claims for damage arising from such extensions. On average, cases are decided in one to two years, while the longest cases can take up to 12 years when all legal remedies are employed.45

A settlement procedure is in place for both reducing fines and dropping proceedings. The Competition Authority will issue a statement of objection informing the perpetrator of the offence committed, the possible consequences of the offence, the probable amount of the fine and the main evidence. The perpetrator can then accept liability for the offence and assume commitments to restoring competition. If the Competition Authority accepts these commitments, it may drop the proceedings. The perpetrator can also reach settlement with the Competition Authority following a ruling on the offence. The fine can be dropped or reduced if the Competition Authority decides, upon the request of the perpetrator, that a lower fine would be sufficient for the offence committed. In all cases, the perpetrator must admit to having committed the offence.

Procedures are most often conducted in writing. Oral hearings can be arranged if they are necessary for the perpetrator to properly exercise its rights.

The decisions of the Competition Authority are subject to appeal. However, the second instance for such decisions is the Head of the Competition Authority. The decisions of the Head of Competition Authority can be appealed with the administrative courts, with the decisions of the administrative court subsequently subject to appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, which is the court of final instance. Where a decision may have infringed constitutional rights (in particular, when an in situ investigation has been conducted unlawfully), a constitutional appeal can be filed with the constitutional court. Finally, where basic rights may have been breached unlawfully, the European Court of Human Rights may decide that such breach should be redressed.46 Generally, the prospect of successful appeal against a decision of the Competition Authority is relatively high.

VII Private enforcement

In 2017, the Act on Compensation of Damage in the Area of Economic Competition integrated EU Directive 2014/104 on antitrust damages actions into domestic law.

The goal of the Act is to facilitate both follow-on and stand-alone actions for private enforcement of competition law, in case of both a breach of EU law and the antitrust laws of Member States.

Decisions of the Competition Authority handing down convictions serve as evidence in civil proceedings, with the conclusion of guilt held as indisputable. Damage must be proven by evidence. The Act entitles the plaintiff to demand access to the documentation of both the defendant and the Competition Authority. Both of these possibilities are limited, however, as the Competition Authority may refuse to provide documents if it deems that doing so would jeopardise the effective enforcement of competition law where such documents contain sensitive information or business secrets or where such access would not be proportionate to the scope of the plaintiff's application.47

The biggest novelty of the Act is the introduction of a type of discovery in Czech procedural law. To acquire documents from the defendant, the plaintiff must file an application demanding access to documentation. This application must provide sufficient facts and evidence from which to attest to the credibility of the plaintiff's claim and right to damages. The court may then order the defendant to provide such documents or classes of documents that are necessary and proportionate to such claim. The respect of such an injunction is secured by high fines that can go up to 1 per cent of the turnover or approximately US$500,000. However, the plaintiff remains liable for any damage that may be incurred by such documents being handed over. The effectiveness and usability of these instruments is yet to be tested in the Czech Republic.

There are not yet any official statistics on the number of cases introduced under the new Act. Based on informal information, however, this is estimated to be about a dozen, mostly following on from EC decisions.

Collective actions cannot yet be brought in the Czech Republic.

VIII future developments

In early 2019, a police investigation concerning Petr Rafaj, who has been the Head of the Competition Authority with responsibility for the office's policies since 2009, went public. The investigation concerns suspicions of the office exerting undue influence in the investigations and decision-making of the Competition Authority. Little is known on this for now, but it is generally supposed that if he is formally charged (which is not yet the case), he will have to step down from office and it is possible that a new Head of the Competition Authority will change the office's policy, which is presently under criticism for failing to enforce competition law effectively, handing down lenient fines and mishandling procedures – in particular, its inability to ensure that dawn raids are conducted legally.

Another future possibility is that private enforcement will be combined with collective actions. At present, Czech law does not regulate for collective actions; however, a government Bill, containing opt-out class actions, is currently going through the legislative process. However, although the enactment of legislation on collective actions has long been called for in the Czech Republic, there is sizeable opposition to the Bill and its prospects remain unclear.


1 Jaromír Pumr is an associate and Robert Pelikán is a partner at Wolf Theiss.

2 Constitutional Act No. 2/1993 Coll.

3 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 8 October 2009, No. IV ÚS 27/09.

4 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 21 July 2016, No. III ÚS 3472/15.

5 Act No. 143/2001 Coll.

6 The Competition Authority has already ruled on certain cases in this matter; for example, in 2018, in Case No. S0444/2016/VS-25120/2017, in which the city council of Děčín was found guilty of having removed competition in the lottery market and was fined US$25,000.

7 Act No. 262/2017 Coll.

8 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.

9 Act No. 395/2009 Coll.

10 For example, negotiation or enforcement of contractual terms that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties, as stipulated in Article 4, Paragraph 2(a).

11 The number of cases in 2018 is comparatively similar to the annual numbers in the 2015–2017 period; see Annual Report of the Competition Authority for the Year 2017 (www.uohs.cz/cs/informacni-centrum/vyrocni-zpravy.html).

12 In which more than 20 construction companies acted in concord as an organised structure of companies that were influencing tens of public procurement processes in relation to the maintenance and repair of public property. As it was later decided that there were two different organisational structures, this was separated into two cases.

13 Decision No. 3 As 157/2017-231.

14 Decisions of the Competition Authority usually refer to the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law.

15 Such as legal barriers to market entry or positions of competitors. It is not unusual for the Competition Authority to ask a competitor for statements on the market structure and their positions, including when they are not party to the proceedings, or to conduct market research via questionnaires. This can also be seen in the landmark decision of the Competition Authority on the abuse of dominant position in which the Competition Authority used thorough analyses to define the market and assess the market share; File No. S162/2008/DP-4490/2010/820/DBr; similarly, as with Decision No. S0220/2006/DP-18887/2018/830/DKl in which the Competition Authority also took note of the vertical integration of the competitor even though the market share of the competitor was above 90 per cent. However, in most cases, the Competition Authority states that when the market power is greater than 75 per cent, it is not necessary for additional criteria to be evaluated.

16 Article 2 of the Act on Significant Market Power defines the purchaser as an 'entrepreneur or purchasing alliance if they purchase food for resale or receive or provide services relating to the purchase of food'. A person acting on behalf of another purchaser is also considered to be a purchaser.

17 Until 2017, this concept was disputed, with the Competition Authority upholding the absolute conception of significant market power. When the purchaser did have significant market power, it was banned from the actions stipulated in law notwithstanding its supplier's market position.

18 This view was upheld by the Competition Authority in Case No. R0001/2018/TS-31480/2018/310, dated 31 October 2018, in which it explained the move to the updated conception. However, the Competition Authority will only apply this corrective measure upon the objection of the purchaser.

19 The Act specifically mentions: leveraging, tying and bundling of services, discriminatory terms and conditions, refusal to deal, predatory pricing and denial of access to an essential facility.

20 Decision on the anticompetitive behaviour of a Czech train transporter consisting of predatory pricing proven to have been set in order to inhibit competition; Case No. UOHS-R 155/2008/01-5485/2009/310/MVr.

21 See, for example, Decision No. 2 As 357/2017-37.

22 Case No. ÚOHS-R63/2011/HS-8361/2012/320, in which a coal company was found not guilty of having abused a dominant position, including through pricing. This decision was later upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court; Decision No. 6 As 89/2015-51.

23 Telefonica was found to be in abuse of its dominant position by imposing rebates; Case No. 1/03-3250/03-0RP.

24 In Case No. 5 Afs 46/2012-69, Chemopetrol, a.s. v. Česká Rafinérská, a.s..

25 In particular, it must do so with sufficient advanced notice, as confirmed by a decision of the Regional Court of Brno; No. 62 Ca 42/2007-337.

26 Decision No. 2 A 10/2000-58.

27 For example, when a transportation company operates both buses and bus stations, as confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court in Decision No. 8 Afs 48/2007-235.

28 Decision of the Head of the Competition Authority, No. R034/2002.

29 Decision of the Head of the Competition Authority, No. R002/2004.

30 File No. R15/2015/HS-24337/2015/310. This case is also interesting as the Regional Administrative Court and then the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed that the intra-enterprise doctrine cannot be used if a controlling competitor in the concern has contractually bound its subsidiaries to apply certain additional conditions while contracting distributors outside of the concern.

31 Case No. 62 Af 96/2014-1464.

32 Decision of the European Court of Justice No. SDEU C-62/86.

33 The proceedings were discontinued after Intergram appealed and the case was rescinded by the Head of the Competition Authority in Decision No. R003/2005. Intergram is a collective administrator of rights of performers and producers of audio and visual recordings.

34 For example, in its Decision No. S0161/2017-22390/2017/461/MNo, the Competition Authority ordered the COOP group to refrain from demanding a 2 per cent price reduction from its suppliers backed by the threat of reducing the amount of its purchased products by 30 per cent (leaked internal letter requesting this action). The COOP group has close to an 11 per cent market share.

35 For example, in the ongoing proceedings with Globus ČR, ks, the company demanded that its supplier purchase marketing services from Globus' subsidiary.

36 This Act is fully applicable to these proceedings with slight modifications; Act No. 183/2017 Coll.

37 The initiation of proceedings means that the Competition Authority serves notice on a person in accordance with law, usually in writing.

38 Investigations include requesting documents, investigating the business premises of the person under investigation and investigating non-business premises.

39 Based on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Delta Pekárny, a.s. v. Czech Republic case, the Competition Authority was required to have reasonably specific evidence and reasons for conducting an investigation in the form of a dawn raid, as confirmed by case law; see, for instance, the decision of the Regional Administrative Court in Brno, No. 29 A 165/2016, highlighted by the Supreme Administrative Court.

40 Official request for information or notification of an in situ investigation.

41 In the Supreme Administrative Court Decision No. 5 Aps 4/2011-326, the Court stated that it is not the purpose of the preliminary investigation (before the initiation of proceedings) to gather information and evidence for a final decision on the matter.

42 See the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in Case No. 5 Afs 7/2011. This possibility also exists following the revision of the Act on the Protection of Competition.

44 Interim measures may be imposed upon serving notice of the initiation of proceedings.

45 For example, Case No. ÚOHS-S0220/2006/DP-18887/2018/830/DKl.

46 This occurred in 2014 in the landmark case of Delta Pekárny, a.s. v. Czech Republic, No 91/11.

47 Both the Act on Compensation of Damage in the Area of Economic Competition and the Act on the Protection of Competition regulate this process and the provision of documents in detail.