The abuse of a dominant position is prohibited under Section 7 of the Competition Act.2 Furthermore, the concept of dominance is defined in Sections 4(2) and 4a of the Competition Act. The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) has the authority to investigate competition matters.3 The FCCA may order a dominant undertaking to terminate an unlawful conduct or resolve a restriction through commitments. The decisions of the FCCA may be appealed to the Market Court and further to the Supreme Administrative Court. The Market Court has the authority to impose fines that have been proposed by the FCCA.
The enforcement procedure in abuse of dominance cases is set out in the Competition Act. The concepts of dominance and abuse thereof are, with minor exceptions, similar to those found in the EU competition rules. When an abuse of dominance may affect trade between EU Member States, the Finnish authorities must also apply the provisions of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the interpretation thereof. The FCCA may issue legally non-binding guidelines that are consistent with the guidelines and Block Exemption Regulations of the European Commission.4 To date, no specific guidelines on abuses of dominance have been issued by the FCCA; however, the guidelines on the assessment of the amount of fine5 and guidelines on prioritisation6 are relevant to abuse of dominance cases.7 In addition, the FCCA's brochure on the inspection of business premises is relevant also to abuse of dominance cases.8
II Year in Review
Based on published data, the FCCA decided not to investigate or not to take an action in most of the abuse of dominance cases decided in 2018. Some cases were resolved after the companies in question had changed their behaviour during the FCCA's investigation, and therefore the FCCA concluded that there was no reason to continue the investigation. These decisions indicate that the FCCA effectively uses its authority to prioritise matters and directs its resources to investigating the most harmful competition restrictions from a competition policy point of view.
In 2018, the FCCA made one commitment decision regarding the terms and conditions of the rightholder membership agreement of Finnish Composers' Copyright Society Teosto (a non-profit collective management organisation that collects royalties on behalf of songwriters and composers in Finland). The FCCA expressed preliminary doubts on compatibility of the exclusivity clauses in Teosto's rightholder membership agreement. The FCCA accepted the commitments offered by Teosto concerning a wider range of individual management copyright options for composers, lyricists and publishers, and resolved the case.9
The administrative courts did not adjudicate any cases related to abuse of dominance in 2018.
III Market Definition and Market Power
The definitions of relevant product and geographical market correspond to the approach of the European Commission and the European court praxis. It is explicitly stated in legislative materials that the definition of markets is an economic-based factual matter that may be determined by, for example, conducting a market survey.10 Substitutability of demand is the most decisive factor in the determination of a relevant product market, but supply-side substitutability is also taken into consideration by the FCCA.
Dominant position is defined in Section 4(2) of the Competition Act as follows:
A dominant position shall be deemed to be held by one or more undertakings or association of undertakings who, either within the entire country or a given region, hold an exclusive right or other dominant position in a specified product market so as to significantly control the price level or terms of delivery of that product, or who, in some other corresponding manner, influence the competitive conditions on a given level of production or distribution.
Despite of the specific definition included in the Competition Act, the concept of dominance is interpreted consistently with EU competition law.11
However, there is an exception to the determination of dominance concerning the Finnish daily consumer goods market. According to Section 4a of the Act, grocery chains with a market share exceeding 30 per cent in the retailing of daily goods in Finland are considered to hold a dominant market position. The aim of the provision was to improve the functionality of competition on the highly concentrated Finnish retail trade market and to ensure that competitors are not excluded from the market. It is, however, explicitly stated that the objective is not to prevent competition on the merits, but to ensure that companies deal with suppliers and other market actors in a non-discriminatory manner.12 The FCCA has publicly stated that the provision does not influence the application of the constituent elements of the abuse of dominance. Furthermore, the FCCA has emphasised that the prohibition of the abuse is only targeted at actions that can be distinguished from the competition on merits.13
Two or more undertakings may hold a joint dominant position. In the Automatia case, the FCCA took the preliminary view that joint venture Automatia and its owner banks had joint dominance in the cash-dispensing market in Finland.14 The FCCA stated that to hold joint dominance, the companies must, in an economic sense, act as one economic entity on the market. The FCCA did not require the companies to act identically in every situation, but it was fundamental that they were able to act in a similar manner and to a reasonable extent independently from their competitors, customers and consumers. The FCCA's view was also that the joint venture Automatia formed a structural and economic link between the owner banks, since they offered cash withdrawal services to their customers via Automatia. Despite the fact that they made the pricing decisions independently, as a result of this link, they had an incentive to price withdrawals made using auto-teller machines (ATMs) outside the Automatia network in a way that would encourage their customers to use Automatia's ATMs. The case was closed with a commitment decision. In another more recent Automatia case, which concerned the real-time payment markets in Finland, the FCCA took a similar preliminary view. In its preliminary assessment, the FCCA stated that Automatia and its owner banks had a structural, economic and ownership-based link and a market position where they could influence the market in a harmful manner and abuse the market power of their joint venture without significantly or immediately losing market shares to competitors. However, this case was also closed with a commitment decision.15
The definition of abuse of dominance included in Section 7 of the Competition Act corresponds almost word for word to the wording of Article 102 of the TFEU. The interpretation of the abuse of dominance is also similar to the application of Article 102.
ii Exclusionary abuses
Predatory pricing refers to a pricing policy in which the dominant company prices its products below costs in the short term to foreclose existing or potential competitors from the market. In its assessment of predatory pricing, the FCCA has referred to the criteria set out in the European Court of Justice Akzo judgment.16
In Valio,17 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the Finnish dairy company Valio had abused its dominant position by engaging in predatory pricing in the fresh milk market. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Market Court's decision to impose a €70 million fine on the company and found that Valio had abused its dominant position in the Finnish fresh milk market. A central issue in the case was the calculation of costs and, in particular, the treatment of the price of raw milk paid to the farmers. Valio is a cooperative owned by farmers, and it has undertaken to buy all the raw milk produced by its owners, and, therefore, the company disagreed with the view to consider the cost of raw milk as a variable cost. The Court, however, held that the relevant average fresh milk prices of Valio were below the company's average variable costs between 1 March 2010 and 20 December 2012, and that application of such prices generally indicates predatory pricing.
Margin squeeze means that a vertically integrated company weakens the position of a competitor in the end-product market by overpricing an intermediary product. The Market Court has dealt with alleged margin squeeze in several cases concerning subscriber connections in the telecommunications market. In the Oulun Puhelin, Aina Group, Kymen Puhelin and TeliaSonera Finland cases, the Market Court imposed fines totalling €220,000 on the companies for the abuse of a dominant position. According to the Market Court and the FCCA, the companies held dominant positions in their respective geographical areas and abused their market positions by favouring their own service providers with regard to the rents they charged for subscriber connections. The price bias made it difficult for competitors to gain access to the market in consumer services provided over subscriber connections, such as broadband and business-to-business services.18
The Lännen Puhelin case concerned margin squeeze and refusal to supply in the broadband services market. As regards the margin squeeze, the company offered end customers a broadband product based on a different network technology from that of its wholesale product available to competitors. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Market Court's decision and considered that, because of the different cost structure of the two technologies, it was not possible to assess whether the company had engaged in margin squeeze.19 According to the FCCA's report to the Market Court, the prices for the wholesale product had even exceeded the retail prices.20
The FCCA has published a memorandum on its evaluation criteria concerning the abuse of dominance in the broadband market. In its memorandum, the FCCA takes the preliminary view that local telecoms operators have dominant positions in their traditional business areas in the markets of subscriber lines as well as the wholesale of broadband services. When assessing the margin between wholesale and retail pricing, the FCCA calculates a weighted average of the monthly gross margin of the asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) connections. If this is negative, the FCCA takes the preliminary view that the pricing fulfils the criteria for an illegal margin squeeze.21
In the Abloy case, the FCCA assessed, inter alia, whether the marketing support paid by the company to accredited dealers constituted an illegal retroactive target rebate. The FCCA took into consideration that, for about half of the dealers, the support amounted to approximately one-third of their operating income, and was thus highly important and loyalty enhancing. The FCCA considered that the marketing support was non-transparent and its grounds were unclear. According to the FCCA, this could have had exclusionary effects at least on some individual product groups. Following negotiations, the FCCA decided not to proceed with the case after the company voluntarily amended its discounting system on the basis of FCCA guidance.22
Refusal to deal
In Lännen Puhelin, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the FCCA's claim that the company had abused its dominant position by refusing to supply its wholesale ADSL broadband product to its competitors. The Court quoted the Oscar Bronner23 criteria and stated that it was necessary to assess whether the refusal to supply in fact removed all competition from the market. According to the decision, the fact that two competitors had managed to construct their own networks covering a significant area of Lännen Puhelin's network coverage area proved that the refusal had not effectively removed competition.24
In the SNOY case, the Supreme Administrative Court generally upheld the Market Court's decision and fined Suomen Numeropalvelu (the Finnish number service) €90,000 for refusal to supply in the wholesale market for telephone subscriber information. The company maintained the only nationwide database of telephone subscriber information in Finland and refused to deliver the information to its customer, which offered its services on the internet for free and without registration. Suomen Numeropalvelu justified its refusal by invoking data protection legislation, but this argument was not accepted by the Market Court.25
In the Automatia case, the FCCA considered that the three banks holding joint dominance in the cash distribution market engaged in discriminatory pricing. According to the FCCA, the price difference of withdrawals made from their joint venture's ATMs and withdrawals made from other ATMs was higher than the difference in costs. The FCCA accepted the commitments offered by the banks, through which the companies undertook to price the cash withdrawals in a non-discriminatory manner.26
iv Exploitative abuses
There is quite a lot of old Finnish case law concerning excessive pricing, but the assessment in these cases has been somewhat formal, and it is expected that the FCCA will concentrate more on economic effects in its future assessments. This shift to a more economic approach can be seen in the district heating survey. The FCCA assessed the reasonableness of the pricing of district heating companies in a large survey from 2009 to 2011. The FCCA closed its investigations by stating that the average price level of the district heating companies were high compared with the profitability and risk level of their business operations, but it considered that the threshold for intervention required by the Competition Act was not exceeded.27
V Remedies and Sanctions
According to the Competition Act, the FCCA is entitled to impose behavioural remedies, determine commitments offered by the undertakings as binding, withdraw the benefit of a block exemption, issue interlocutory injunctions and impose periodic penalty payments. The Market Court has the authority to impose fines proposed by the FCCA for competition restrictions.
The Market Court may impose a maximum fine of 10 per cent of the concerned undertaking's turnover during the year in which the undertaking was last involved in the infringement. The fine will be imposed unless the conduct is deemed minor or the imposition of the fine is otherwise unjustified in respect of safeguarding competition. It is explicitly stated in the Competition Act that the fine may also be imposed on a company to which the business activity has been transferred. The Market Court shall impose the fine proposed by the FCCA.
In its Fining Guidelines, the FCCA states that the fine needs to generate a sufficient deterrent and general preventive effect.28 The amount of the fine is based on an overall assessment, and attention will be paid to the nature and extent, the degree of gravity and the duration of the infringement.
In Valio,29 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Market Court's decision to impose a fine of €70 million on the company for its abuse of dominance. This is the highest fine imposed in dominance cases – and in all competition restriction cases in general – in Finland to date. In the assessment of the fine, the Supreme Administrative Court and Market Court took into account, inter alia, the object of Valio's conduct, the notion that Valio's conduct was not in line with the fundamental principles of the internal market and the fact that Valio has previously been the subject of an abuse of dominance decision that included the imposition of a fine on the company.
Furthermore, the FCCA and the Market Court may impose periodic penalty payments to enforce an order, condition, prohibition or obligation issued on the basis of the Competition Act. The Market Court has the authority to order a periodic penalty payment to be paid.
ii Behavioural remedies
If the FCCA considers conduct to amount to an abuse of dominance prohibited in the Competition Act or Article 102 of the TFEU, it may impose behavioural remedies. First, the FCCA can order the undertaking to terminate the prohibited conduct. This was done in the Valio case, where the FCCA ordered Valio to cease the alleged predatory pricing of fresh milk and thus, in practice, raise its prices. The Market Court further obliged Valio in its interim decision30 to comply with the FCCA's order. The FCCA may also oblige an undertaking to deliver a product to another undertaking on conditions similar to those that it offers others in a similar position. In addition, the FCCA is also entitled to give these orders as interim measures. Furthermore, the FCCA may issue an interlocutory injunction if the application of a competition restraint is deemed to require immediate cessation. After the interlocutory injunction, the FCCA must take a final decision or make a proposal to the Market Court within 60 days. Prior to issuing an interlocutory injunction, the FCCA must hear the undertaking.
iii Structural remedies
Unlike the Commission, the Finnish competition authorities do not have the authority to impose structural remedies (however, see Section VIII).
The FCCA is responsible for the investigation of competition restraints and the effects thereof as well as for initiating the necessary proceedings to eliminate the harmful market effects of the restraints. The FCCA can begin investigations as a result of complaints by third parties and on its own initiative. The FCCA can also conduct sector inquiries, and these may result in the initiation of further proceedings.
In addition to the FCCA, the regional state administrative agencies have the authority to investigate competitive conditions and competition restrictions. Upon the mandate of the FCCA, the agencies are also entitled to take other measures to promote competition within their respective regions.
The FCCA has the right to prioritise its tasks. According to Section 32 of the Competition Act, it shall not investigate a case in the following situations: it cannot be deemed likely that an infringement prohibited in Sections 5 or 7 (Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, respectively) of the Competition Act exists; competition in the relevant market may be considered functional as a whole, irrespective of the suspected infringement; and the complaint in the matter is manifestly unjustified.
The prioritisation of cases can also mean that the handling of a case with potential significance and likely anticompetitive objects or effects may be postponed if there are other ongoing investigations with even greater significance.31
The FCCA must take the decision to not to investigate a matter without delay. In its Guidelines, the FCCA has set the following non-binding deadlines: one month for closing cases to which Article 32 is clearly applicable; four months for completing a preliminary survey according to which further actions can be determined; and six months for closing non-significant cases, and drafting of investigation plans and determining objective internal deadlines for cases that require further actions.32 Overall, the FCCA seeks to handle all competition cases within three years.33 To date, however, more extensive investigations have, in practice, required a longer process.
The undertaking subject to the FCCA's investigation is obliged to submit information to the FCCA or the relevant regional state administrative agency upon request. This obligation covers all documents and other information needed for the investigation of the content, purpose and impact of a restraint on competition and for clarifying the competitive conditions, as well as information necessary to enable the authority to determine whether the undertaking holds a dominant position. In practice, the FCCA usually sends an undertaking a request for information or arranges a meeting with the representatives of the undertaking to gather the information. Furthermore, the FCCA has the right to hear representatives of the undertaking in person if it is considered necessary for the investigation and the person may, for a justified reason, be suspected of having acted in the implementation of the restraint on competition.
The FCCA also gathers information by conducting inspections. These inspections may be announced, or they may be 'dawn raid' inspections. In addition to business premises, the FCCA has the right to inspect other premises (e.g., the homes of the management of the undertaking) if reasonable suspicion exists that bookkeeping or other documents relating to the business and the object of the investigation may be held there and if these documents may have relevance in proving a serious violation of Section 7 of the Competition Act or Article 102 of the TFEU. However, the FCCA must seek advance permission from the Market Court to conduct an inspection outside the business premises, and the Market Court may prohibit the inspection if it considers it arbitrary or excessive. Although unannounced inspections are usually conducted in cartel investigations, the FCCA has conducted several dawn raids in abuse of dominance investigations during recent years. The rights of the FCCA to carry out inspections of companies that have outsourced their information management to a third party were added to the Competition Act in 2015. After this amendment, the FCCA has had the right to request information directly from such third-party service providers at the expense of the company subject to inspection and regardless of location of the outsourced information. In 2017, the FCCA published a brochure on the inspection of business premises under Section 35 of the Competition Act.
The rights of defence of an undertaking subject to proceedings, including the right to be informed about an ongoing investigation, the right to receive information and the right to be heard, are set out in the Competition Act.
Prior to making a final decision or a proposal to the Market Court, the FCCA will issue a confidential draft decision to the undertaking under investigation. The undertaking has the right to respond to the draft decision, and it may request an informal meeting with the FCCA to present its opinion on the draft decision. A decision34 may be appealed to the Market Court and further to the Supreme Administrative Court. A decision of the Market Court concerning the imposition of fines may be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.
A case can also be resolved through a commitment decision. The FCCA may accept the commitments offered by an undertaking as binding if the commitments are such that the restrictive nature of the conduct can be eliminated. If an underlying fact significantly changes, the undertaking infringes the commitments, or the decision has been based on insufficient, false or misleading information, the FCCA may reinitiate proceedings.
VII Private Enforcement
The Finnish competition law regime is twofold: in addition to administrative enforcement, it contains rules for private enforcement according to which a private litigant can have an unlawful agreement declared null and void, and damage that occurred from the violation compensated.
Section 8 of the Competition Act provides that an unlawful agreement cannot be applied or implemented (i.e., the agreement or part thereof is null and void by law). The provision applies only inter partes and cannot be invoked by third parties.
Section 2 of the Act provides the right for damages to anyone who has suffered damage from an infringement regardless of whether the relationship is contractual or non-contractual. The liability to compensate the damage is joint and several. Joint and several liability of immunity recipients and small and medium-sized enterprises is, however, limited.
Collective actions are available but only to a limited extent in disputes between consumers and undertakings under the Act on Class Actions.37 A class action can only be brought by the Consumer Ombudsman and, to date, the Consumer Ombudsman has not brought any class actions for competition law damages. In the pending Asphalt cartel and Raw wood cases, however, which involve numerous plaintiffs, practices that resemble those of collective actions have been adopted. In these cases, the court has joined the separate actions of each of the claimants to proceed together, thus entailing procedural and cost benefits.
An action for damages can be brought either as a stand-alone or a follow-on case in arbitration or in a general court. Except for the follow-on cases related to abuse of dominance that are currently pending before the general courts, there have not been many follow-on cases related to the abuse of dominance in Finland, and so far, all cases have been withdrawn; instead, abuse of dominance is more often invoked as grounds for action in contractual disputes. In general, a claimant's burden of proof is easier to meet in a follow-on case than in a stand-alone case. As of 26 December 2016, a final administrative decision concerning an infringement of competition law has a binding effect on the civil court.
In Finland, only single damages can be awarded, and the damages law doctrine relies heavily on the principle of non-enrichment. Compensation covers both direct and indirect economic damage, inter alia, compensation of costs, price difference or lost profits.38 Compensation also includes interest; in practice, penal and return interest may form a significant part of the compensation.
The burden of proof is reversed with respect to cartels; a cartel is expected to have caused damage unless proven otherwise by the defendant. Unlike in cartel damages cases, there is no legal assumption of damage in Finland in cases concerning the abuse of dominance, and the claimant bears the burden of proof of damage.39 There is no single way of calculating the damage, but in recent case law related to cartel damages, competition economics and extensive economic evidence on the financial effects of the infringement have been utilised. The court has the power to assess the quantum of damage if the claimant has proven the damage suffered, but evidence of the amount cannot be presented or can be presented only with difficulty.
Furthermore, there must be a causal link between the harm suffered and the violation of the competition law. The claimant must prove that the damage has resulted from the competition law infringement, and not from the market conditions or general market structure. In addition, liability for damage also requires that the occurrence of the damage as a consequence of the violating act was foreseeable by the undertaking at the time the act was made. This means that there is no liability for indirect damage or consequential loss.40 Contributory negligence on the part of the injured party may also have a significant effect on the liability.
According to Chapter 21 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the party that loses the case is liable for all reasonable costs incurred by the necessary measures of the opposing party.
According to Section 10 of the Act on Actions for Antitrust Damages, the right to claim compensation expires if the action has not been instituted within five years of the date when a claimant has become aware, or should have become aware, of the infringement, the damage and the party responsible. The five-year limitation period is, however, suspended for the duration of an investigation by the competition authorities, until one year has elapsed from the issuance of a binding decision, as well as for the duration of settlement negotiations. The right to damages is not, however, time-barred if proceedings are brought within one year of the issuance of a binding decision, or within 10 years of the day of infringement of the competition law or the end of a continued infringement.
VIII Future Developments
The FCCA has indicated that it will focus on removing structural restraints on competition, and on discriminating and binding practices aimed at foreclosing competitors from a market.41 The FCCA's focus on exclusionary practices has already been seen in the recent case law of the FCCA where the authority has been most concerned with conduct involving margin squeeze, predatory pricing, refusals to deal and restrictive rebates.
The review of abuse of dominance cases is likely to give more weight to economic-based assessments in the future, which can already be seen in the OP Financial Group case resolved in February 2019. Between 2015 and 2018, the FCCA conducted an extensive economic and legal analysis related to OP Financial Group's customer bonus scheme but found no evidence to support the alleged abuse of dominance.42
The importance and effectiveness of private enforcement is expected to increase in Finland, both through the landmark judgments in the Asphalt cartel case and the Raw wood case, as well as through the recent Act on Actions for Antitrust Damages.
In March 2017, the Ministry of Employment and Economy published a report of the working group on reforming the Competition Act,43 and the government proposal relating to the first part of the reform was given in May 2018 and approved by the Parliament on 7 March 2019.44 As regards the abuse of dominance, the government proposal contains an additional ground for prioritisation of the FCCA's cases. According to the government proposal, the FCCA could take into consideration the significance of a competitive restraint as a ground for prioritisation. Other amendments relate, inter alia, to the inspection powers of the FCCA and information exchange between certain authorities notwithstanding the confidentiality regulations. Some of the amendments proposed by the working group, such as the possibility of structural remedies as a consequence of an abuse of dominant position, were left out of this government proposal owing to the forthcoming legislative process of the directive to make national competition authorities more effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) during 2019 to 2021.
The amendments of the Competition Act are expected to enter into force by the end of 2019.
1 Jussi Nieminen is a partner and Kiti Karvinen is a senior associate at Castrén & Snellman Attorneys Ltd.
2 948/2011 as amended. The Competition Act replaced the old Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992, as amended). The provisions of the Act on Competition Restrictions apply to a large extent to violations that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Competition Act on 1 November 2011.
3 Regional state agencies also have limited powers to investigate competition matters and, by mandate of the FCCA, to take measures to promote competition in their region.
4 Government Proposal 88/2010, p. 6.
5 Guidelines on the Application of the Competition Act 3/2011.
6 Guidelines on the Application of the Competition Act 4/2011.
7 In addition, the FCCA has issued guidelines on leniency and guidelines on merger control.
8 Brochure on the inspection of business premises under Section 35 of the Competition Act (2017).
9 FCCA Decision No. 503/KKV14.00.00/2014, Säveltäjäin Tekijänoikeustoimisto Teosto ry.
10 Government Proposal 148/1987, p. 18.
11 Government Proposal 148/1987, p. 18.
12 Government Proposal 197/2012, p. 20.
13 FCCA Newsletter 26 March 2014.
14 FCCA Decision No. 964/61/2007, Nordea Pankki Suomi Oyj, OP-Keskus cooperative and Sampo Pankki Oyj.
15 FCCA Decision No. 1469/14.00.00/2015, Automatia Pankkiautomaatit Oy.
16 Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, KHO:2016:221, Valio Oy and Market Court Decision No. 458/12/KR and 36/13/KR, Valio Oy.
18 FCCA Proposals to the Market Court No. 950/61/2002, Oulun Puhelin Oyj, Aina Group Oyj, Kymen Puhelin Oy, TeliaSonera Finland Oyj, and Market Court decisions No. 189/07/KR, Oulun Puhelin Oyj, No. 356/07/KR, TeliaSonera Finland Oyj, No. 355/07/KR, Kymen Puhelin Oy and No. 354/KR/07, Aina Group Oyj.
19 Supreme Administrative Court Decision No. 2474/2/08 and Market Court Decision 260/04/KR, Lännen Puhelin Oy.
20 FCCA Proposal to the Market Court No. 949/61/2002, Lännen Puhelin Oy.
21 FCCA Memorandum 3 September 2009.
22 FCCA Decision No. 428/V1.6.61/2006, Abloy Oy.
23 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner.
24 Supreme Administrative Court Decision No. 2474/2/08, Lännen Puhelin Oy.
25 Market Court Decision No. 1097/61/2003.
26 FCCA Decision 964/61/2007, Nordea Pankki Suomi Oyj, OP-Keskus cooperative and Sampo Pankki Oyj.
27 FCCA press release, 16 January 2012.
28 FCCA Fining Guidelines, p. 6.
29 Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, KHO:2016:221, Valio Oy.
30 Market Court Decision No. 36/13/KR, Valio Oy.
31 FCCA's Guidelines on prioritising the handling of competition restrictions, 4/2011, p. 9.
32 FCCA's Guidelines on prioritising the handling of competition restrictions, 4/2011, p. 14.
33 The FCCA's operational and financial plan for 2017 to 2019.
34 A proposal to the Market Court to impose a fine is not considered an administrative decision of the FCCA.
35 1077/2016. The Act implements the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
36 If the infringement occurred prior to 26 December 2016, the repealed Section 20 of the Competition Act or other applicable laws apply to the right for damages and liability thereof.
38 See Government Proposal 83/2016.
39 See the judgment in Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, where the district court found the abuse of dominance but dismissed the claim because the claimant failed to prove the damage. The Appeal Court later overruled the judgment of the district court.
40 Government Proposal 88/2010, p. 66.
41 The operational and financial agreement for 2019 to 2022 between the Ministry of Employment and Economy and the FCCA, p. 2.
42 FCCA Decision No. 015/KKV14.00.00/2015, OP Financial Group.
43 Ministry of Employment and Economy's Publication, Competition and Consumers 16/2017.
44 Government Proposal 68/2018, 24 May 2018. In April 2019, the ratification of the President of the Republic of Finland is pending.