I OVERVIEW

Energy regulation and market control continues to be a highly politicised issue in Australia. Debate surrounding the benefits of renewable energy versus traditional energy sources such as coal continues to create confusion about the future direction of Australia's energy policy. Despite the growing national and global political pressure on emissions reduction and climate policy, and the ever present demand for reliable and cost-effective energy supply, the fundamentals of energy policy remain unchanged.

A successful and efficient energy policy should aim to deliver:

  1. reduced electricity costs for households and industry (which are being crippled by soaring electricity prices);
  2. reduced carbon emissions so that Australia can meet its commitment at the Paris climate change conference to reduce emissions by between 26 and 28 per cent, as compared with 2005 levels, by 2030;2 and
  3. stability and reliability of supply so that consumers can be confident of uninterrupted supply, including during peak demand periods.

Since 2007, Australia has seen a parade of different energy policies at the federal level, with not one staying in place for more than a couple of years. This has left the electricity generation, transmission and retail industry in limbo, and no doubt has been the driver behind the lack of investment in new generation facilities, which has in turn driven up electricity prices and provided no coherent or integrated pathway for investment in grid upgrades and carbon reduction schemes.3

In many ways, the chaos at the federal level has left state governments and industry to go it alone. Therefore, we have seen state governments each introduce their own energy policies, designed to address the three issues noted above, and industry making investment decisions based predominantly on those market drivers that are divorced from the influence of federal policy.

Given the differing energy regulation and markets, this chapter summarises the following in each state of Australia and looks at possible policy and market developments:

  1. regulatory framework;
  2. transmission and distribution networks;
  3. retail markets; and
  4. policies and developments.

II REGULATION

i The regulators

The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) is the industry-funded organisation that oversees the functioning of the National Electricity Market (NEM) in the states of Queensland, New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia and the Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) in Western Australia (which supplies electricity to the South West Interconnected System (SWIS)).

The NEM is regulated pursuant to the National Electricity Rules and National Electricity Law created by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). The WEM is regulated pursuant to the WEM Rules and related WEM Market Procedures. In 2016, there was a proposal for Western Australia also to be regulated by the National Electricity Rules and National Electricity Law4 so that Australia could have national uniform regulations; however, this proposal stalled and, following the Western Australian state election in 2017, neither major party's platform includes amendments to energy regulation in Western Australia at this time.

In relation to the NEM, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) oversees economic regulation and compliance with the National Electricity Rules and is accountable to the Commonwealth government as an arm of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) works alongside the AER and AEMO to determine the policy and governance structures that support Australia's energy markets. The AEMC is responsible to the COAG. To coordinate the operation of the AEMO, the AER and the AEMC in overseeing energy policy and regulation relating to the NEM, these organisations also come together as members of the Market Bodies Forum, which reports to the COAG in relation to matters requiring action on the part of these organisations.5

In relation to the WEM, the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) is established under the Economic Regulation Authority Act 2003 (WA) as an independent statutory authority designed to oversee the energy industry in WA and ensure that all parties abide by the relevant regulations. It issues licences to providers of various sources of energy, including electricity. In addition, the ERA monitors and publicly reports on industry performance, including the WEM, taking enforcement action when required. It also has authority through various codes6 to approve contracts and service standards that protect residential and small business electricity, gas and water customers and assess the performance of utilities in relation to the treatment of customers experiencing financial hardship.

The Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) established the Clean Energy Regulator (CER), a non-corporate Commonwealth entity for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). As an independent statutory authority, the CER is comprised of the chair and members, who set the 'strategic direction'7 for the agency's administration of its regulatory schemes. The role of the CER is to administer climate change law legislated by the Australian government to measure, manage, reduce or offset Australia's carbon emissions.8 Accordingly, the CER has administrative responsibilities for the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Scheme under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007, the Emissions Reduction Fund under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, the Renewable Energy Target under the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000, and the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units under the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011.9

The Energy Security Board (ESB), established by the COAG Energy Council, aims to provide oversight regarding the future direction of the NEM, with its focus placed on maintaining reliability and security. The ESB's main purpose is to implement the outcomes suggested by Australia's Chief Scientist, Dr Alan Finkel, in his June 2017 paper 'Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market – Blueprint for the Future'.10 The key outcomes of this blueprint are increased security, future reliability, lower emissions and rewards for consumers. It is expected the new market framework will apply from the mid 2020s.

ii Regulated activities

NEM

The National Electricity Law and associated National Electricity Rules regulate market activities, and the National Energy Retail Law and associated National Energy Retail Rules regulate retail activities. A National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) has also been adopted in all states participating in the NEM, other than Victoria. However, Victoria has now completed a process of harmonising the Victorian Energy Retail Code with the NECF and intends to facilitate a smooth transition to the NECF from existing frameworks.12

The following key activities are regulated within the NEM by the AER:

  1. At a wholesale level, participant bidding, dispatch and prices, network constraints and outages and forecasting in relation to demand and capacity are monitored by the AER to ensure there is no misuse of market power.
  2. In relation to networks, the AER sets a maximum revenue that network service providers can earn based on proposals submitted by those providers that detail their required revenues based on customer demand, their cost base, age depreciation of their infrastructure and maintenance measures required to maintain network safety and stability.
  3. At a retail level, the AER provides a price comparison guide on its website (applicable to those jurisdictions that have adopted the National Energy Retail Law) to provide customers with visibility of costs and charges by the different providers. Thus, the AER seeks to reduce prices in the market through aiding competitive tension between providers, rather than setting retail energy prices. The AER also authorises new retail providers and enforces compliance with the National Energy Retail Law, Rules and Regulations.13

WEM

Pursuant to the Electricity Industry Act 2004 (WA) (the EI Act), there is a legal requirement to obtain different classifications of electricity licences from the ERA if you intend to:

  1. construct or operate generating works;
  2. construct or operate a transmission system of a voltage of 66kV or higher;
  3. construct or operate a distribution system of a voltage of less than 66kV;
  4. sell electricity to customers; or
  5. construct or operate any combination of generation, transmission, distribution and retail activities for the purpose of supplying electricity to customers other than through the SWIS.14

However, there are also certain activities in the electricity industry that fall outside the scope of the licensing requirements under the EI Act and do not require a licence; these include:

  1. self-supply, when the generating works, transmission system or distribution system is to be used solely for the supply of electricity for consumption by the person who owns, controls or operates the works or system or a related body corporate of that person; and
  2. when the sale of electricity is to a person who is not the end-use customer; for example, a generator who sells electricity solely to retailers is not required to hold an electricity retail licence.

iii Ownership and market access restrictions

NEM

The NEM is described as an open access transmission system whereby generators apply to the network service provider with an access proposal and the network service provider makes an offer to connect to generators whose load meets network requirements and will enhance the reliability of supply on the network. Network service providers must invest in network upgrades as and when needed to meet their statutory obligations to maintain reliability of supply to end customers. Generators have a right to connection but not to being able to export all their output to the system and therefore pay a fix connection charge. Customers then bear the cost of network use by paying variable charges linked to demand. Network service providers can also invest in network upgrades along their region of the network to reduce network congestion, provided this passes a cost benefit test relating to the benefit to market participants and consumers of the proposed investment. The AER also creates incentive schemes to promote investment by network service providers in targeted areas of the network to meet its network planning objectives.15

WEM

The Electricity Networks Access Code 2004 (the Access Code) established under the EI Act provides the framework for the independent regulation of certain electricity networks in WA.16 The objective of the Access Code is to promote efficient investment in, and operation and use of, networks and services of networks in WA and to promote competition in electricity retail and wholesale markets.17 The Access Code allows a 'coverage application' to be made to the Minister for Energy requesting that the whole or any part of an electricity network be covered. If a network is covered, it is deemed to be regulated and must have an approved access arrangement in place that sets out the terms of access to the network, including the conditions and prices that apply to the covered services of the network.

Service providers of a regulated network must submit their own access arrangement information to the ERA, which allows:

  1. the ERA, users and applicants to understand how the service provider established the proposed arrangement; and
  2. the ERA to form an opinion as to whether the proposed access arrangement complies with the Access Code.18

Currently, the SWIS is the only regulated network in WA and Western Power is the service provider. Unlike the NEM, the WEM is described as having a 'physical firm access' system whereby generators are only able to connect to the network if they can show that their generation output will not interfere with other generators on the network who have a firm right to export their capacity onto the network. This means that if the network is already constrained in the region where the generator wants to connect its asset, the generator must pay to upgrade the transmission line to alleviate the congestion. This is beneficial in the sense that generators are incentivised to connect in areas of low congestion to avoid the cost of upgrading the network, customers now bear the costs of network upgrades and, once connected, generators can be certain that they will be able to export their output. However, the downside of this regime is that it has resulted in an overinvestment in the transmission line as it has been built to carry the output of all generators at all times; in fact, in practice, not all generators will be exporting at the one time. In turn, generators pass on the cost of network upgrades through higher prices, resulting in higher electricity prices for consumers.19 This system is threatening to prevent new entrants to the market because although there may be sufficient spare capacity on the network at various times throughout the day, the existing generators have a contractual right to 'unconstrained network access', which means that this spare capacity is held aside for the existing generators, thus reducing the available capacity for new generators to provide for.

iv Transfers of control and assignments

If a proposed acquisition may have an actual or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in the market, approval of the proposed transaction may be required under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) from the ACCC. The ACCC may provide either formal or informal clearance, which typically takes up to three months. Alternatively, the Australian Competition Tribunal may grant authorisation based on a 'net public benefit test' if it is satisfied that the proposal is likely to result in such a benefit to the public that it should be allowed to occur, even if it is likely to substantially lessen competition in the market.

The ACCC has previously expressed concerns about the accumulation of market power through merger activity in the electricity sector, and the potential for anticompetitive conduct to ensue from vertically integrated structures.20

Those investors who are either based overseas or owned by a foreign entity must apply to the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) for approval from the Federal Treasurer if they are seeking to acquire a 'substantial interest' in an Australian company (i.e., 20 per cent or more), assets of an Australian business or Australian land. The acquisition of electricity generation or distribution assets by foreign persons and companies is likely to trigger a requirement for FIRB approval. Once FIRB is notified, the board will consider the proposed transaction and assess whether it is against the 'national interest'. The Australian Taxation Office and the ACCC are among the departments that have been actively assessing foreign investment proposals.21

On the recommendation of FIRB, the Federal Treasury may then issue a notice of no objection or, if the transaction is against the national interest, disallow the proposed transaction, or impose conditions on how it may be conducted.22 The FIRB approval process generally takes up to 40 days from the time the application is made; however, FIRB may extend this period for a further 90 days for complex applications. During the current worldwide pandemic relating to the new coronavirus, and the covid-19 disease, applications may take up to six months to process.

III TRANSMISSION/TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION SERVICES

i Vertical integration and unbundling

Although the generation, transmission and retail sections of the electricity market were segregated in the 1990s, there has been a trend towards vertical integration by generators and retailers as a means of managing market risk and reducing reliance on hedging arrangements. Although vertical integration reduces reliance on contract markets, it results in a potential barrier to entry for retailers or generators who are not vertically integrated. This trend is visible within the private businesses that own most of the generation capacity, with the AER stating that a few large vertically integrated participants control the significant majority of generation capacity and output in Victoria, NSW and South Australia, and the government generators and retailers in Queensland and Tasmania.23

Similarly, there is a significant degree of vertical integration in WA with Synergy, a state-owned corporation, owning or controlling the majority of generating plants on the SWIS while also supplying more than half of the state's consumable load.24 Western Power, as another state-owned entity, then builds, maintains and operates the SWIS distribution network.

Similarly the North West Interconnected System (NWIS), which is the interconnected electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, operates though a vertically integrated model, with Horizon Power (also a state-owned entity) being responsible for the generation, procurement, distribution and retail of electricity to NWIS customers. The NWIS is owned by significant users of the electricity network: Horizon Power, Alinta Energy, BHP Billiton, Pilbara Iron (Rio Tinto) and ATCO Australia. The Western Australia government is currently working on implementation of a light-handed access regime and to establish an independent system operator for the Pilbara region. The focus of the reform initiative is to implement a regulatory regime that is a more efficient alternative to facilitate third-party access to electricity networks and at a lower cost than the default arrangements currently in place under the Access Code. New regulatory arrangements are intended to commence in 2020.25

ii Transmission/transportation and distribution access

Across the different networks within Australia, the connection process is broadly similar. Generators must approach the network service provider with a connection proposal that details the design and technical connection requirements of the generation facility. The network service provider then considers the enquiry or application against set criteria (such as the technical rules for the SWIS in Western Australia and the reliability standards set by the National Electricity Rules on the east coast).26 The network service providers are responsible for approving the connection of new generation systems to their network. A system can only be connected once all the applicable connection eligibility criteria have been met, as a means of ensuring that the quality and reliability of supply is of an appropriate standard. The connection of new generation systems may also be subject to the completion of overall network upgrades or the installation of new infrastructure to ensure network capacity is large enough to service the additional generation capacity, and community and industrial demand. Therefore, the approval process depends on the size of the system to be embedded and the capacity of the network in the region where it will be installed.27

iii Rates

In the NEM, network service providers set network charges, but they are limited by a cap on allowable revenue set by the AER. The amount of allowable revenue is based on the revenue required for the network service provider to cover its costs of reliably supplying customers and to provide an appropriate return on capital.

In relation to the SWIS in Western Australia, a schedule of network charges is submitted by Western Power to the ERA, which then assesses and approves the proposed schedule of network charges by reference to the price control and pricing methods in Western Power's access arrangement.28

iv Security and technology restrictions

As a general principle, all primary equipment on the transmission and distribution system must be protected so that if an equipment fault occurs, the faulty item is automatically removed from service by circuit breakers or fuses. Protection systems must be designed so that, if there is a fault, unnecessary equipment damage is avoided and any reduction of power transfer capability or level of service to users is minimised.29

The scale and changing nature of electricity networks now dictates that security is of greater significance. The roles of key electricity sector stakeholders are changing, with a gradual shift towards a shared responsibility for network security, with customers becoming generators who use distributed generation technologies, and vendors assuming new responsibilities to provide advanced technologies as well as their own security mechanisms. With these changes, all stakeholders are becoming responsible for ensuring the continued overall security and resilience of the broader grid, including through:

  1. facilitating public-private partnerships to accelerate cybersecurity initiatives for the grid of the 21st century;
  2. funding research and development of advanced technology to create a secure and resilient electricity infrastructure;
  3. supporting the development of cybersecurity standards to protect against vulnerabilities, including alignment with international standards;
  4. facilitating timely sharing of actionable and relevant threat information;
  5. advancing risk management strategies to improve decision-making;
  6. supporting sector incident management and response; and
  7. enhancing and augmenting the cybersecurity workforce within the electric sector.30

In 2018, the AEMO, in collaboration with industry and government partners, developed a tailored cybersecurity framework for the Australian energy sector, known as the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security Framework (AESCSF). This allows participants to undertake assessments of their own cybersecurity capability and use the results to inform and prioritise investment to improve their own cybersecurity.31 In December 2018, the inaugural Summary Report into the Cyber Security Preparedness of the National and WA Wholesale Markets was issued, addressing the following issues:

  1. the cyber maturity of all energy market participants to understand where there are vulnerabilities;
  2. an assessment of current regulatory procedures to ensure they are sufficient to deal with any potential cyber incidents in the NEM;
  3. assessment of the AEMO's cybersecurity capabilities and third-party testing; and
  4. an update from all energy market participants on how they undertake routine testing and assessment of cybersecurity awareness and detection, including requirements for training employees before they access key systems.

Although there have been no major changes from the inaugural AESCSF assessment, the 2019 version of the AESCSF includes many important lessons learned from the 2018 assessment process and the feedback received.

With the growth of renewable technologies, the AEMO will continue to undertake studies designed to investigate how the integration of these technologies is likely to affect market operation in the future. The 2019 AEMO Power System Security Guidelines outline how the AEMO seeks to operate the power system, and meet its power system security responsibilities generally, and the information and actions required from participants to assist in maintaining or restoring power system security.32

v Development of energy markets

NEM

The NEM is a spot market in which generators offer to supply specified amounts of electricity at a set price for set periods and can revise and resubmit this offer at any time. Based on the bids submitted, the AEMO then decides which generation offers to accept and therefore which generators shall be dispatched to meet demand in the most cost-efficient manner. The spot price for electricity in the NEM is driven by supply and demand and set at half-hour intervals. The National Electricity Rules set a maximum spot price, which is adjusted annually for inflation.33 There is a different spot price in each of the five NEM regions. Customers purchase their electricity from a retailer, which charges a set price based on customers' contract plan. The retailer then bears the price risk of fluctuations in the spot price and must manage this risk through entering into wholesale hedging contracts.34

WEM

The WEM is a capacity market, with each retailer required to acquire capacity credits from the AEMO, or generators directly, to match their individual capacity requirements. These capacity requirements are based on estimates made by the AEMO in relation to the overall capacity requirement of the SWIS for the next 10 years, in accordance with provisions specified in the Western Australian Market Rules. As well as supplying capacity credits to retailers, the AEMO is also responsible for assigning capacity credits to generation facilities.35

After determining the amount of reserve capacity required, the AEMO places obligations on market customers (i.e., retailers) to purchase capacity credits equivalent to their forecast contribution to peak demand. Those supplying electricity to the network earn 'capacity credits' by providing capacity to the system and, where that generation arises from renewable sources, can also earn renewable energy certificates (formerly known as RECs and, since 2011, split into small-scale technology certificates and large-scale generation certificates depending on the eligible electricity generated). These are created in the CER's REC Registry to be bought, sold, traded or surrendered. Commonly referred to as 'green products', they can be bought by customers with electricity as part of a bundled power purchase arrangement so that customers can use them to meet their own obligations to surrender renewable energy certificates or sell to the AEMO through a capacity auction.

In the WEM, only the electricity volume that is not already covered by bilateral contracts is traded. For example, market customers (typically electricity retailers) may need to purchase additional electricity over and above their contracted position because of fluctuations in the weather or unanticipated increases in demand. In this situation, the market customer makes bids on the market for the volume of electricity required to balance its contract position and pays the market price for that balancing amount of electricity. The WEM's bilateral net settlement system for uncontracted energy is overseen by the AEMO.

IV RENEWABLE ENERGY AND CONSERVATION

Developments in renewable energy

A 2019 report by the AEMO titled 'International insights for Australia' states that parts of Australia are experiencing some of the highest levels of wind and solar generation in the world, with a large focus on high levels of residential solar. As of March 2020, Australia's renewable power percentage sits at 19.31 per cent; however, the focus is on the variability and uncertainty of higher levels of wind and solar generation.36 One of the most publicised recent developments in the renewable energy industry in Australia was the deal struck between the South Australian government and technology company Tesla to deliver up to 50,000 solar power systems for domestic use, using Tesla's domestic lithium-ion batteries.37 This project is in addition to the Tesla Powerpack battery system, coined the 'world's largest lithium-ion battery', a 100MW battery that is connected to the Hornsdale wind farm.38 The development of lithium ion battery systems is expected to increase the viability of renewable energy power generation on a commercial and domestic scale in the coming years and provide much-needed stability to the South Australian grid, which had been plagued by load shedding events. The Tesla Powerpack has been in operation since December 2017 and is said to be performing in line with, and in some cases exceeding, expectations in terms of its ability to respond to outages and peaks in demand.39

Further, in early 2019, the federal government announced that it would assist funding for the Snowy Hydro 2.0 project in Tasmania by investing A$1.4 billion in equity. If completed, Snowy Hydro will be one of the largest pumped hydro projects in the world and add 2,000MW of energy generation and 175 hours of storage to the NEM. This expansion of Tasmania's famous Snowy Hydro facility will provide critical storage capacity and dispatchable base load power that will help support the network and counter the influx of intermittent renewable generation facilities.40

V THE YEAR IN REVIEW

i NEM

Significant change continues to occur in the NEM, with which regulators are grappling at a regulatory level, including changes in:

  1. the mix of generation facilities connected to the network with a decline in dispatchable generation (with the retirement of ageing traditional coal-fired plant) and increased renewable generation, which is variable by nature;
  2. patterns of demand with higher ramping and more customers exporting to the network with their own rooftop generation facilities; and
  3. weather patterns with prolonged heatwaves that are placing more stress on the network.41

The AEMO has considered these issues and how they interact with the spot price electricity market and has determined that a market based on real-time spot market price and bilateral contracts is no longer offering the best outcome. This is because with the increased presence of renewables on the network, generators' are needing to compete with low-cost renewables in the spot market and in situations where the spot price is below that of the generator's marginal costs, there is no incentive for the generator to bid on the market during these periods. Unfortunately, this is compromising reliability on the network because the more stable and traditional dispatchable generators are withdrawing from the market during peak demand periods when that reliability is needed.42 Therefore, the AEMO considers that a series of reforms will be required to augment the current market design to better suit supply and demand characteristics going forward by appropriately valuing generation resources with flexibility and dispatchability to incentivise investment in these facilities.43

ii WEM

During 2018, a WEM Reform Coordination Committee was established to manage a three-stage reform process within the WEM to implement an open access regime for the connection of new generation facilities (similar to that in the NEM) by October 2022.44 The reforms aim to make more efficient use of the existing transmission infrastructure, attract private sector investment by reducing barriers to entry (particularly for renewables) and generally improve the wholesale market to reduce the retail price for consumers.45 By moving to an open access regime, it is hoped to make the market more efficient by dispatching to the generator with the lowest-cost power, rather than the generator that has priority access to network capacity (i.e., unconstrained access).46 This system ought to make it easier for new renewable generation facilities to connect to the network and also increase their economic viability because with their low operating costs, they ought to provide power at the lowest cost and therefore be dispatched first. As part of the reform process, it is anticipated that those generators with 'unconstrained access' will be paid some form of compensation for the loss of that right, which will be negotiated individually with those generators.47 To date, this process has been driven by stakeholder consultation under the WA government's Energy Transformation Strategy.

VI CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The continued transformation of Australia's electricity market in recent years has, with the growth in the renewables sector, brought about considerable policy and regulatory changes. Notwithstanding these changes, the energy market still faces major challenges, the first of which is the geographical isolation that restricts certain areas from being serviced by the existing electricity network. The second is the status of the existing grids' current regulations and technology, which do not support the optimisation of renewable energy generation. Wind and solar electricity generation offers a clean, green and potentially cost-effective means of meeting the peak electricity demand of Australia's growing metropolitan population and can also service remote off-grid communities through stand-alone facilities. Therefore, it is imperative that Australia continues to invest in the technological research and development, infrastructure upgrades and legislative reforms required to ensure Australia builds on this natural advantage to reduce the cost of electricity for families and businesses while also securing efficient and reliable electricity supplies for future generations.


Footnotes

1 Simon Rear is a partner, Fiona Ellett is an of counsel and Connor McClymont is an associate at Squire Patton Boggs.

2 Australian Government Department of Environment and Energy, 'Australia's 2030 climate change target' (2015), at https://publications.industry.gov.au/publications/climate-change/climate-change/publications/factsheet-australias-2030-climate-change-target.html.

3 Power prices rose by 117 per cent between 2008 and 2018, more than four times the average price increase across other sectors during that time (source: Australian Bureau of Statistics).

4 National Electricity (Western Australia) Bill 2016 Explanatory Memorandum.

6 See Economic Regulation Authority [ERA], at https://www.erawa.com.au/about-us/legislation, for access to Code of Conduct for the Supply of Electricity to Small Use Customers 2018, Electricity Industry (Customer Transfer) Code 2016, Electricity Networks Access Code 2004 and Electricity Industry (Metering) Code 2012.

7 Clean Energy Regulator, 'Who we are' (6 March 2020), at www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/About/ Who-we-are.

8 id.

9 Clean Energy Regulator, 'What we do' (14 December 2016), at www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/About/What-we-do.

10 Dr Alan Finkel AO, 'Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market – Blueprint for the Future', June 2017 (pub. Commonwealth of Australia), at https://www.energy.gov.au/sites/default/files/independent-review-future-nem-blueprint-for-the-future-2017.pdf.

11 See Essential Services Commission, 'Harmonisation of the Energy Retail Code and Guidelines with the National Energy Customer Framework' – Final Decision Paper, July 2014; and https://www.energy.vic.gov.au/ legislation/national-energy-customer-framework/the-national-energy-customer-framework-in-victoria, last updated 9 June 2017.

13 Australian Energy Regulator [AER], 'Our role', at https://www.aer.gov.au/about-us/our-role.

14 Electricity Industry Act 2004 (WA), Section 4; Economic Regulation Authority, Licence Application Guidelines (November 2016), 2.

15 Factsheet: How transmission frameworks work in the NEM (18 July 2017).

16 Economic Regulation Authority, Guidelines for Access Arrangement Information (last updated 27 October 2018), 1.

17 Electricity Networks Access Code 2004 (WA), Section 2.1.

18 Electricity Networks Access Code 2004 (WA), Section 4.1, Section 4.48.

19 Government of Western Australia, Department of Treasury, Public Utilities Office, 'Improving access to the Western Power Network: Proposed approach to implement constrained network access' (9 August 2018), at https://www.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-08/Consultation-Paper-Two-Improving-access-to-the- Western-Power-Network_0.pdf.

20 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Informal Merger Review, at https://www.accc.gov.au/business/mergers/informal-merger-review (April 2020).

21 Angus Grigg and Angela Macdonald-Smith, 'ATO to “test national interest”', Australian Financial Review (1 April 2016).

22 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth), Section 17.

23 AER Report, 'State of the Energy Market 2018', Chapter 1: Retail Energy Markets.

24 Alinta Energy, Public Submission to Assistant Director of Electricity, Economic Regulation Authority (21 December 2015), at https://www.erawa.com.au/cproot/14016/2/Alinta%20Energy%20-%20Public%20Submission%202015.pdf.

26 Australian Energy Market Operator [AEMO], 'Power system requirements', March 2018 Reference paper, at http://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/Security_and_Reliability/ Power-system-requirements.pdf.

29 Western Power, Technical Rules, Revision 3, 1 December 2016, Section 2.9.1, at https://westernpower.com.au/media/2312/technical-rules-20161201.pdf.

30 Michael Paparo, 'Roadmap for Standards and Grid Cyber Security – Final Report December 2018' at https://www.standards.org.au/getattachment/08026958-1513-4ddb-92b8-eab395e132fa/Grid-Cyber-Security-Roadmap.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU.

33 AEMO, 'Fact Sheet – the National Electricity Market' (April 2020).

35 AEMO Western Australia, 'About the Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM)', at https://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Wholesale-Electricity-Market-WEM (last accessed April 2020).

36 AEMO, 'Maintaining Power System Security with High Penetrations of Wind and Solar Generation', International Insights for Australia, October 2019, at https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/ Security_and_Reliability/Future-Energy-Systems/2019/AEMO-RIS-International-Review-Oct-19.pdf.

37 Nick Harmsen, 'Elon Musk's Tesla and SA Labor reach deal to give solar panels and batteries to 50,000 homes', ABC News (4 February 2018), at www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-04/elon-musk-tesla-to-give-solar-panels- batteries-to-sa-homes/9394352.

38 Nick Harmsen, 'Elon Musk's giant lithium ion battery completed by Tesla in SA's Mid North', ABC News (24 November 2017), www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-23/worlds-most-powerful-lithium-ion-battery- finished-in-sa/9183868.

39 See https://hornsdalepowerreserve.com.au/overview/ (last accessed April 2020).

40 See https://www.snowyhydro.com.au/our-scheme/snowy20/ (last accessed April 2020).

41 AEMO, 'AEMO observations: Operational and market challenges to reliability and security in the NEM', March 2018, page 3, at https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Media_Centre/2018/AEMO-observations_operational-and-market-challenges-to-reliability-and-security-in-the-NEM.pdf.

42 id., at page 10.

43 id., at page 11.

44 Government of Western Australia, Department of Treasury, 'Wholesale Electricity Market Reform Program – Industry Reform, 20 September 2018, at https://www.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-08/WEM-Reform- Program-Industry-Forum-September-2018_0.pdf.

45 'Improving access to the Western Power Network: Proposed approach to implement constrained network access' (footnote 19, above), at page 4.

46 id., at page 5.

47 id., at page 7.