In 1992 the Member States of the European Union discussed, for the first time, the issue of gambling in the internal market following a report prepared by Coopers & Lybrand for the EU Commission. At the European Council meeting of 11–12 December in Edinburgh they agreed not to pursue any harmonisation at European level of gambling activities.3

As a result of this decision, the EU gambling debate shifted, to a large extent, towards the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Gambling services were addressed in a few directives, but were mostly excluded from the scope of application.4

Today the CJEU has provided rulings in more than 40 cases and new cases are regularly referred from national courts throughout the EU.

Looking at the abundant case law, two main lines of discussion can be distinguished. One is concerned with the question of restrictive gambling policies and the consistency with EU internal market rules on free movement. The other concerns the CJEU looking into the way that licences and concessions are allocated.

There is also gambling case law regarding the Notification Directive5 and regarding taxation but this will not be discussed in this chapter.

i National restrictive gambling policies and consistency with EU law

The first landmark gambling case was referred in 1992. Schindler concerned lottery tickets for the German Lottery sent by mail by a German agent to citizens living in the UK that were seized by the Customs authorities since, at the time, no lottery activity was permitted.6

Several Member States disputed the competence of the EU, arguing that gambling was not an economic activity within the ambit of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and as a consequence did not fall under the free movement principles. The ruling of the CJEU was therefore extremely important in the development of the internal market issue on gambling. The CJEU considered gambling to be an ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of the TFEU that falls under the free movement of services of Article 56 of the TFEU. Nonetheless, it is an economic activity of a particular nature. Given the moral, religious and cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of gambling, Member States can maintain restrictions to the free movement insofar as it is applied in a non-discriminatory and proportionate manner in order to protect consumers and public order.

In Läärä the question was raised as to whether national legislation that gives a public body the right to operate slot machines in the territory of the Member State concerned is compatible with free movement principles. Although Schindler related to the organisation of lotteries, the CJEU found the considerations of that case to be equally applicable to other comparable forms of gambling. The CJEU further clarified the Member States’ power to determine the extent of the protection to be afforded on its territory with regard to lotteries and other forms of gambling. It falls under the national authorities’ power of assessment.7 Even if the national legislation at issue forms a restriction of the free movement of services, the CJEU found the conferral of exclusive rights to a single public body to be a proportionate measure in order to reach the objectives of limiting exploitation of the human passion for gambling, and to avoid the risk of crime and fraud related to games of chance.8

This case law was confirmed in the Anomar9 and Zenatti10 cases. The CJEU added that a limited authorisation of gambling on the basis of special or exclusive rights granted or assigned to certain bodies must reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities. A levy on the proceeds of authorised games can only constitute an incidental beneficial consequence and cannot be the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted.11 In Gambelli, the CJEU again confirmed its previous jurisprudence but gave the national judge a number of guidelines to assess whether the Italian betting legislation infringes the TFEU. Restrictions on gaming activities must not only reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities but they must also serve to limit betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner. Member States’ authorities cannot invoke public order concerns relating to the need to reduce opportunities for betting in order to justify restrictive measures, while at the same time inciting and encouraging consumers to participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting to the financial benefit of the public purse.12

In Lindman, the CJEU found that Article 56 of the TFEU precludes a Member State from applying rules under which winnings from games of chance organised in other Member States are treated as income of the winner chargeable to income tax, whereas winnings from games of chance conducted in the Member State in question are not taxable.13 In this context, the CJEU investigated the appropriateness and proportionality of the Finnish restrictions and declined to accept the Finnish public interest related to public health as no evidence was submitted regarding the risks connected to playing games of chance, or on the existence of a particular causal relationship between such risks and the participation by Finnish nationals in lotteries organised in another Member State.

The theory of ‘controlled expansion’ was developed in Placanica. A policy of controlled expansion in the betting and gaming sector may be entirely consistent with the objective of drawing players away from clandestine betting and gaming to activities that are authorised and regulated. Authorised operators must therefore represent a reliable, but at the same time attractive, alternative to a prohibited activity. Advertising on a certain scale and the use of new distribution techniques can fall within the ambit of a controlled expansion policy.14

In Ladbrokes, the EFTA Court added that this theory of controlled expansion could also be applied when the objective of the state, in this case Norway, was to protect consumers.15 The CJEU later confirmed the possibility of controlled expansion in gambling with a view to protecting consumers (and not just fighting crime and fraud related to illegal gambling).16

The EFTA Court provided further guidance regarding the marketing of gaming services from abroad in this case. Taking into account the margin of discretion for the contracting parties, different levels of protection may exist throughout the European Economic Area (EEA). To the extent the national judge would find the exclusive rights system in place to be a lawful restriction, the host state has the right to prohibit the provision and marketing of games of chance from abroad, irrespective of whether these are lawful in their state of origin. Even if the restrictions are unlawful, the state can still require a licence in view of possible differences in the level of protection throughout the EEA. The EFTA Court thereby clearly dismissed the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of gambling. Even if the legislation and practice in the home state of the operators ensures a high level of protection in relation to the sociological features characterising that state, this may not necessarily amount to the same level of protection with respect to the features characterising the state where the services are to be provided.

In ESA v. Norway, the EFTA Court found that a monopoly operator in the field of gaming machines presumably serves the aim of fighting addiction better than a licensing system with commercial operators.17 The monopoly on gaming and gambling was compatible with the EEA Agreement.18

On 8 September 2009, the CJEU provided its landmark ruling in the Liga Portuguesa case that follows the line of the previous case law related to gambling services.19 The ruling was a victory for the EU Member States as the CJEU clearly recognised the Member States’ right to regulate and control their national online gambling markets, thereby also explicitly denying the application of the principle of mutual recognition in this field. With this ruling, the CJEU established the core principles of the discretionary power of the EU Member States in the field of online gambling.

A key element in the reasoning of the CJEU is that games of chance accessible via the internet involve different and more substantial risks of fraud by operators against consumers compared to the traditional markets for such games. The CJEU thus found internet games to be more dangerous than physically offered games, even when regulated and controlled by the competent authorities of the Member State of residence of the consumer. Member States are therefore allowed to impose proportionate and necessary restrictions on the offer of online gambling services.

In the Dutch Betfair20 and Ladbrokes21 cases of 3 June 2010, the CJEU confirmed the findings of Liga Portuguesa that there is no mutual recognition in the gambling sector. As mentioned, it expanded the scope of application of the theory of controlled expansion from being limited to public order concerns to also comprising the objective of general consumer protection related to gambling. Furthermore, the CJEU made it clear that passive provision of games of chance can be prohibited or restricted, meaning that the mere accessibility of online gambling products from a Member State can be sufficient to be regarded as providing services there. Member States are hence allowed to block all unauthorised websites of operators offering online gambling services accessible to its consumers.

In the joined cases Sjöberg and Gerdin, the CJEU found the Swedish gaming legislation that prohibits advertising for gambling activities by private operators who aim to make profit, to be consistent with EU law. Member States can reserve the right to organise gambling services only to licensed operators who do not seek to make any profit. However, EU law does not allow a factual difference in the punishment for promotion of illegal gambling activities organised by a Swedish operator on the one hand, and the promotion of illegal gambling activities organised by operators of another Member State on the other.22 Sanctions for illegal domestic and illegal foreign operators can be covered under different formal legislation but the sanctions cannot be discriminatory as a consequence.

On 8 September 2010, the CJEU issued its judgments in the Markus Stoss,23 Carmen Media24 and Winner Wetten25 cases. The Court questioned the state of the Germany monopoly and emphasised that a national court may consider a monopoly not suitable for guaranteeing achievement of the objective set if at the same time: (1) advertising measures emanating from the holder of such a monopoly and relating to other types of games of chance that it also offers are not limited to what is necessary in order to channel consumers towards the offer emanating from that holder, (2) other types of games of chance may be operated by private operators holding an authorisation, and (3) the competent authorities tolerate policies of expanding supply of other types of games of chance not covered by the said monopoly that, moreover, represent a higher risk of addiction than the games subject to that monopoly.

This signified the end of the German monopoly on lotteries and sports betting as it existed at the time but the CJEU did not rule against the existence of a monopoly for games of chance as such. In general, the CJEU was of the opinion that a monopolistic approach is better than a competitive environment. However, a measure as restrictive as a monopoly must be accompanied by a legislative framework suitable for ensuring that the monopolistic operator will pursue the determined objective in a consistent and systematic manner.

The CJEU here again addressed advertising and repeated its previous case law, according to which advertising must remain measured and strictly limited to what is necessary to channel consumers towards authorised channels. Aggressive advertising does not fit within a consistent approach.26

Since online gambling carries more risks in the area of consumer protection, a stricter approach is required and a prohibition measure covering any offer of games of chance via the internet may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for pursuing the legitimate objectives determined such as the protection of young persons, even though the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels.27 The responsibility for an effective enforcement system and tackling illegal online gambling lies with the Member States. The CJEU thereby – indirectly – emphasises the need for a gambling regulator.

Further guidance regarding state gambling monopolies was given by the CJEU in Zeturf, and Dickinger and Ömer.

In Zeturf28 the CJEU confirmed the discretionary power of the Member States to decide to grant exclusive rights to a single body that is subject to strict control by the public authorities. However, operators holding exclusive rights over the organisation of horse races as well as over the betting on those races are in a very favourable position to increase betting activities, by organising more events on which bets can be placed. It is for the national court to determine whether the commercial policy pursued by the monopoly operator is part of a policy of controlled expansion.

In order to be consistent with the objectives of combating criminality and reducing gambling opportunities, national legislation establishing a gambling monopoly must be based on a finding that criminal and fraudulent activities linked to gambling and gambling addiction constitute a problem in the Member State in question, which the expansion of authorised and regulated activities would be capable of solving. A restriction on the activity of collecting bets should be examined independently of the medium through which they are made since the internet constitutes a simple channel through which games of chance may be offered and again the CJEU recognises the particularities of an online offer.29

In Dickinger and Ömer, the CJEU acknowledged once again the legality of a monopolistic gambling model, in particular for online gambling, as being an efficient and appropriate way to ensure control over gambling activities and to prevent and combat gambling addiction, and fraud and crime.30

In Stanleybet and Others, the CJEU ruled that it is within the jurisdiction of the national courts to determine whether a monopoly carried out in an EU Member State complies with the requirements provided for by the case law of the CJEU (i.e., non-discrimination and proportionality, including consistency). In case a national law would be considered non- compliant with EU law, the CJEU ruled that the refusal to allow a transitional period in the event of incompatibility with Articles 49 and 56 of the TFEU does not necessarily lead to an obligation for the Member State concerned to liberalise the market in games of chance if such a liberalisation is incompatible with the level of consumer protection and the preservation of order in society which that Member State intends to uphold.31

In Pfleger the CJEU reaffirmed its long-standing case law under which free, undistorted competition in the market of games of chance can have severely detrimental effects. Each Member State can assess whether, in the context of the legitimate aims it pursues, it is necessary to prohibit betting and gaming wholly or in part, or to lay down restrictions and supervisory rules that live up to the conditions in the CJEU’s jurisprudence.32 A global assessment by the national court of the circumstances in which restrictive legislation was adopted and implemented is therefore necessary. The CJEU reiterated that stand-alone fiscal objectives pursued by the Member State, without a consistent and protective regulatory framework, do not suffice to justify a limitation of free movement. Another important aspect highlighted in this case is that if a restrictive system is considered incompatible with EU law, it cannot give rise to penalties for an economic operator.

Digibet and Albers concerned the consistency of the German online gambling regime and, specifically, whether different types of regulatory regimes can coexist alongside each other in a federal state (such as Germany). Although it could be alleged that the existence of a more liberal gambling policy in one German state could damage the consistency of the entire German gambling policy, the CJEU considered that, in the case at hand, the impact on the overall consistency is both limited in time as well as geographically.33

In Stanley International Betting, the CJEU strengthened the discretion of the Member States relating to the non-harmonized gambling sector. If, in the future, the national authorities wanted to reduce the number of licenses granted or exercise stricter control over activities in the field of betting and gambling, such measures would be facilitated if all the licenses were awarded for the same duration and expired at the same time.34

In general, the main issue that the CJEU must assess is whether a national gambling policy meets the proportionality requirement, which implies that it seeks to attain the legitimate objectives pursued in a ‘consistent and systematic manner’. In Admiral Casinos, the CJEU clarified that this means that the legislation concerned must meet the concern to reduce opportunities for gambling or to fight gambling-related crime not only at the time of its adoption, but also thereafter. It hence found that a dynamic approach must be adopted by the national judge in reviewing the proportionality of restrictions laid down in gambling legislation.35

When it comes to financial requirements imposed on gambling operators, the CJEU accepted that the requirement for a share capital of a certain amount may prove to be of use in order to reduce criminality linked to betting and gambling by ensuring economic and financial standing of operators.36 The CJEU also found that the obligation of providing statements from two banks is manifestly capable of ensuring that the economic operator has an economic and financial standing enabling him or her to fulfil the obligations he or she may contract towards winning gamblers.37

Several other cases are still pending before the CJEU and it can be assumed that several more will follow. In the GBGA case, Advocate General Szpunar issued an opinion and found that the United Kingdom and Gibraltar are to be considered as a single Member State for the purposes of the application of Article 56 of the TFEU.38

In Online Games the referring judge asked clarification on the proof to be provided by Member States required to make the assessment of the proportionality of a gambling regime (which implies assessing whether it was genuinely put in place to achieve the objectives it claims to pursue). Advocate General Sharpston is of the opinion that the task of putting forward a justification underlying the measure before adopting it, should remain a matter only for the Member State concerned.39

In Global Starnet (C-322/16) the referring judge questioned whether a national law laying down new requirements and obligations for concession holders in the online gambling market, including for existing concession holders, by means of an addendum to the existing agreement and without any period for gradual compliance, is compatible with EU law.40

In Sporting Odds (C-3/17) the referring judge raised 16 questions regarding the Hungarian gambling legislation.41

ii The allocation of licences and concessions

In Placanica, the CJEU ruled on the issue of getting access to a licence through a tendering process. The Italian legislation at stake excluded all operators listed on the stock market from participating in a concession tender procedure for reasons of combating criminal involvement in gambling. According to the CJEU, sufficient alternative and less restrictive means were available to check the accounts and activities of such operators regarding the argument invoked that the shareholders of such companies were not always identifiable. This condition as such constituted an unjustifiable restriction of the free movement principles.42 It is not compliant with EU law to apply criminal sanctions against the concerned operator for not abiding by the administrative formalities linked to the concession system.43 In other words, if an operator did not have the possibility to acquire a licence, and this was because of a restriction that is not compliant with EU law, this operator cannot be sanctioned for offering gambling services without a licence.

In Commission v Italy the CJEU found that the renewal of old licences without putting them out to tender was not an appropriate means of attaining the objective pursued by the Italian state, going beyond what was necessary in order to preclude operators in the horse race betting sector from engaging in criminal or fraudulent activities.44 But a licensing system that limits the total number of operators in the national territory can be justified as such in the light of considerations of public interest, if it fulfils the proportionality test.45

In Betfair the CJEU further acknowledged that restrictions regarding the procedures for the grant of a licence to a single operator or for the renewal thereof, may be regarded as being justified if the Member State decides to grant a licence to, or renew the licence of, a public operator whose management is subject to direct state supervision or a private operator whose activities are subject to strict control by the public authorities.46

As mentioned above in the German Markus Stoss and Carmen Media cases, the CJEU seems to favour a monopolistic approach over a competitive licensing system in the gambling sector, although both can be in conformity with EU law. Member States may take the view that granting exclusive rights to a public body whose management is subject to direct state supervision or to a private operator over whose activities the public authorities are able to exercise tight control, is likely to enable them to tackle the risks connected with the gambling sector and pursue the objectives more effectively than in a system that authorises operators to carry on their business in the context of a non-exclusive legislative framework.47

In Engelmann the CJEU ruled on 9 September 2010, only one day after the German rulings. Here the CJEU required an open procedure for the allocation of gambling licences in a multiple licensing system. A limitation of the number of concessions can be justified as it enables a limitation of the gambling opportunities and thus allows to attain a public interest. A licence duration of 15 years can also be justified having regard to the concessionaire’s need to have a sufficient length of time to recoup the investments required by the setting up of a gaming establishment.48

However, the obligation of transparency implies that competent authorities must ensure, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of publicity sufficient to enable the service concession to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the award procedure to be reviewed.49 The CJEU thereby makes a distinction with the sole licensing system (see the Dutch Betfair case) in which the transparency principles do not call for a mandatory licensing procedure, if the exclusive right is granted to an operator under strict state control.

In Costa and Cifone, the CJEU found the Italian rules establishing a state monopoly and a system of licences and authorisations to be discriminating where a minimum distance requirement for the establishment of new licence holders discriminates against operators excluded from the 1999 tendering procedure.50 Regarding the justification for the said discrimination, the CJEU recalls that grounds of economic nature (such as the objective of ensuring continuity, financial stability or a proper return on investment for operators) cannot be accepted as overriding reasons in the public interest to justify a restriction to the freedom provided by the TFEU. The objectives of reducing betting and gaming activities as well as the fight against criminality may justify restrictions on fundamental freedoms but this was not the case here.

In Biasci and Rainone the CJEU confirmed that Member States are allowed to set out the obligation to be granted a concession and a police permit in order to open betting agencies in Italy.51 Nevertheless, a licensee is allowed to have certain activities on servers outside Italy provided that they are subject to control in Italy and that there is direct contact between the operator and the consumer.

On 4 February 2016 the CJEU issued an important judgment in the Ince case. The Court reiterated that as a consequence of the principle of primacy of directly applicable EU law, national legislation concerning a public betting monopoly that violates free movement cannot continue to apply during a transitional period.52 Member States, however, remain free to undertake reforms of existing monopolies in order to make them compatible.53


Over the past couple of years, the EU institutions have increased their involvement in shaping the gambling policy. The way EU secondary law developed or did not develop in this area has shown how sensitive this matter is for governments. Today, all three political EU institutions (the European Parliament, Council and Commission) actively take part in the political debate regarding gambling services.

In the second half of 2008, the French presidency initiated the first formal discussions on gambling between the Member States in the Establishment and Services Working Group. This resulted in a constructive dialogue, reflecting on the very specific nature of gambling services that reflects differences between the Member States’ approaches.54 Under the Swedish presidency (second semester 2009), the formal discussions focused on the social cost of gambling and responsible gaming measures.

The March 2009 European Parliament Resolution on the integrity of online gambling (also known as the ‘Schaldemose Report’)55 called for wide-ranging EU actions that would have a direct impact on the sector.56 The report addressed crucial issues such as transparency of the online gambling markets, the combating of fraud and crime, consumer protection, establishment of a code of conduct, and research, control and supervision. Member States are further advised to document the extent and growth of their online gambling markets. The report also urges the Commission to undertake an impact assessment of the effects of national regulation in relation to integrity, social responsibility, consumer protection and matters relating to taxation.

During the Spanish presidency (first semester of 2010), the Member States agreed on a shared definition of illegal gambling and significant attention was paid to the sanctions Member States can impose to fight illegal gambling. Online gambling could be defined as ‘gambling in which operators do not comply with the national law of the country where services are offered, provided those national laws are in compliance with EU Treaty principles’. Malta opposed this definition during the Competitiveness Council of May 2010.57

The Belgian presidency (2010) focused on actual problems generated by cross-border gambling services, the role of the national (or regional) public authority and the sustainable contributions by lotteries to society. During the Competitiveness Council of 10 December 2010 the ‘Conclusions on the framework for gambling and betting in the EU Member States’ were adopted with unanimity. To ensure effective regulation of gambling services, the Council agreed that the Member States need to be given the responsibility to supervise the provision of gambling services in their territories through regulatory public authorities, established according to national legislation. These authorities may have various tasks.

All EU Member States have different types of state lotteries or lotteries licensed by the competent state authorities. Contributions of lottery and related services play an important role for society, for example for the funding of good causes, directly or indirectly where applicable. This specific role needs to be recognised in discussions at the European level.

The importance of the Council conclusions cannot be emphasised enough. Although they do not create a legally binding framework, they express the common political view shared by all EU Member States and oblige the Commission to deal with the issues directly.

Two other reports were adopted by the European Parliament during 2011 and 2013.58 They did not fundamentally change the scope of the discussion.

On 23 December 2012 the Commission adopted the Communication ‘Towards a comprehensive European framework for online gambling’. Among the priorities, as outlined, were the adoption of the consumer protection recommendation, the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (the AML Directive), the infringement cases, the match-fixing problems and the standardisation of gambling equipment. The last point has been replaced by a request for standardisation on reporting.

While numerous infringement cases seem to be processed, none of them went up to the CJEU until now. We therefore believe that it is premature to comment on these procedures. The question of match-fixing has currently been addressed by the Macolin convention of the Council of Europe, but no further EU measures have been taken.

Two last issues are of importance: the AML Directive and the European Commission recommendation.

The final text of the future AML Directive was adopted on 20 May 2015. The Directive will apply to all offline and online gambling service providers, while the Third AML Directive only addressed casinos. However, with the exception of casinos, and following an appropriate risk assessment, Member States may decide to exempt, in full or in part, providers of certain gambling services from national provisions transposing this Directive on the basis of the proven low risk posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services.

Finally, there is the recently adopted European Commission Recommendation on principles for the protection of consumers and players of online gambling services and for the prevention of minors from gambling online.59 In principle, a recommendation is a non-binding legal instrument available under the TFEU.

This Commission initiative is highly contentious with certain Member States. According to Belgium, the European Commission exceeded its competence by adopting a recommendation without precise legal basis and in disrespect of the institutional balance.60 Belgium therefore initiated an annulment procedure against the recommendation at the General Court. The General Court declared the case inadmissible. An appeal is pending before the CJEU.

1 Philippe Vlaemminck is a partner, Robbe Verbeke is a senior associate, Beata Guzik is a director and Justine Van den Bon is a junior associate at Pharumlegal.

2 Some cases of the EFTA Court are also mentioned given their specific relevance.

3 Point 3 of Annex 2 to Part A of the Conclusions of the Presidency – European Council in Edinburgh 11–12 December, 1992.

4 Among the directives excluding gambling we find the following: the Directive on Electronic Commerce 2000/31/EC, the Services Directive and the Audio-visual Media Services Directive.

5 Directive 2015/1535/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241/1, 17 September 2015.

6 Judgment of the CJEU of 24 March 1994, Schindler, C-275/92, EU:C:1994:119.

7 Judgment of the CJEU of 21 September 1999 Läärä, C-124/97, EU:C:1999:435, paragraph 33.

8 Ibid., paragraph 42.

9 Judgment of the CJEU of 11 September 2003 Anomar e.a., C-6/01, EU:C:2003:446.

10 Judgment of the CJEU of 21 October 1999 Zenatti, C-67/98, EU:C:1999:514.

11 Ibid., paragraph 36. The CJEU previously observed in paragraph 60 of Schindler, even if it is not irrelevant that lotteries and other types of gambling may contribute significantly to the financing of benevolent or public-interest activities, that motive cannot in itself be regarded as an objective justification for restrictions on the freedom to provide services.

12 Judgment of the CJEU of 6 November 2003 Gambelli, C-243/01, EU:C:2003:597, paragraphs 67 and 69. The CJEU repeated this in its judgment of of 11 June 2015 Berlington Hungary e.a., C-98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 61.

13 Judgment of the CJEU of 13 November 2003 Lindman, C-42/02, EU:C:2003:613, paragraph 21.

14 Judgment of the CJEU of 6 March 2007 Placanica, C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, EU:C:2007:133, paragraph 55.

15 EFTA judgment of 30 May 2007, case E-3/06, Ladbrokes v. Norway, available at www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/3_06_Judgment_EN.pdf, paragraph 87. In this case, the EFTA Court was asked to formulate an advisory opinion on the Norwegian sport betting market. An advisory opinion of the EFTA Court is comparable to a preliminary ruling of the CJEU, except that an advisory opinion is not binding upon the national court that referred the question concerned to the EFTA Court.

16 Judgment of the CJEU of 3 June 2010 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, EU:C:2010:307; judgment of the CJEU of 3 June 2010 Ladbrokes, C-258/08, EU:C:2010:308.

17 EFTA Court judgment of 14 March 2007, E-1/06, ESA v. Norway, available at www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/1_06_Judgment_EN.pdf, paragraph 51.

18 The European Economic Area Agreement applies to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein and the free movement rules laid down in the agreement are comparable to the principles of the TFEU.

19 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 September 2009 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional, C-42/07, EU:C:2009:519.

20 Judgment of the CJEU of 3 June 2010 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, EU:C:2010:307.

21 Judgment of the CJEU of 3 June 2010 Ladbrokes, C-258/08, EU:C:2010:308.

22 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 July 2010 Sjöberg and Gerdin, C-447/08 and C-448/08, EU:C:2010:415, paragraphs 56 and 57.

23 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 September 2010 Markus Stoss and others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, EU:C:2010:504.

24 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 September 2010 Carmen Media, C-46/08, EU:C:2010:505.

25 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 September 2010 Winner Wetten, C-409/06, EU:C:2010:503.

26 Markus Stoss and others, C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, paragraph 103.

27 Carmen Media, C-46/08, paragraph 105.

28 Judgment of the CJEU of 30 June 2011 Zeturf, C-212/08, EU:C:2011:437, paragraph 57.

29 Ibid., paragraphs 72 and 75.

30 Judgment of the CJEU of 15 September 2011 Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09, EU:C:2011:582.

31 Judgment of the CJEU of 24 January 2013 Stanleybet and Others, C-186/11, EU:C:2013:33, paragraph 46.

32 Judgment of the CJEU of 30 April 2014 Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, EU:C:2014:281, paragraph 45.

33 Judgment of the CJEU of 12 June 2014 Digibet and Albers, C-156/13, EU:C:2014:1756, paragraph 36.

34 Judgment of the CJEU of 22 January 2015 Stanley International Betting, C-463/13, EU:C:2015:25, paragraph 54.

35 Judgment of the CJEU of 30 June 2016 Admiral Casinos, C-464/15, EU:C:2016:500, paragraphs 34 and 36.

36 Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09, paragraph 77.

37 Judgment of the CJEU of 8 September 2016 Politanò, C-225/15, EU:C:2016:645, paragraph 46.

38 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 19 January 2017 in case C-591/15 The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited and the Queen, EU:C:2017:32.

39 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 9 March 2017 in case C-685/15 Online Games, EU:C:2017:201, paragraph 53.

40 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 June 2016 – Global Starnet Ltd v. Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Amministrazione Autonoma Monopoli di Stato (C-322/16), OJ C 343/24, 19 September 2016.

41 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 3 January 2017 – Sporting Odds Limited v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása (C-3/17), OJ C 112/16, 10 April 2017.

42 Placanica, joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, EU:C:2007:133, paragraph 62.

43 Ibid., paragraph 71.

44 Judgment of the CJEU of 13 September 2007 Commission v Italy, C-260/04, EU:C:2007:508, paragraph 34.

45 Judgment of the CJEU of 31 January 2008 Centro Europa 7, C-380/05, EU:C:2008:59, paragraph 100.

46 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, paragraph 59.

47 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, paragraph 81.

48 Judgment of the CJEU of 9 September 2010 Engelmann, C-64/08, EU:C:2010:506, paragraphs 45 and 48.

49 Ibid., paragraph 50.

50 Judgment of the CJEU of 16 February 2012 Costa and Cifone, C-72/10 and C-77/10, EU:C:2012:80.

51 Judgment of the CJEU of 12 September 2013 Biasci and Rainone, C-660/11, EU:C:2013:550, paragraph 27.

52 Winner Wetten, C-409/06, paragraph 69.

53 Judgment of the CJEU of 4 February 2016 Ince, C-336/14, EU:C:2016:72, paragraph 54.

54 See progress report of the French presidency of the EU, ‘Gambling and betting: legal framework and policies in the Member States of the EU’, dated 27 November 2008, 16022/08.

55 C Schaldemose, ‘Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection’, Report on the Integrity of Online Gambling, (17 February 2008), 2008/2215(INI).

56 European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2009 on the integrity of online gambling (2008/2215(INI)).

57 See progress report of the Spanish presidency of the EU, ‘Legal framework for gambling and betting in the Member States of the European Union’, dated 11 May 2010, 9495/10.

58 European Parliament Resolution on online gambling in the internal market (10 September 2013), European Parliament resolution on online gambling in the internal market (15 November 2011).

59 Commission Recommendation of 14 July 2014 on principles for the protection of consumers and players of online gambling services and for the prevention of minors from gambling online, OJ L 214/38, 19 July 2014.

60 Order of the General Court of 27 October 2015 Commission v. Belgium, T-721/14, EU:T:2015:829. Appeal against this decision was brought before the CJEU, known as case C-16/16 P. An oral hearing will take place on 2 June 2017.