I Introduction

In 1992 the Member States discussed for the first time the issue of gambling in the internal market following a report prepared by Coopers & Lybrand for the EU Commission. At the European Council meeting of 11–12 December in Edinburgh they agreed not to pursue any harmonisation of gambling activities at European level.2

As a result of this decision, the EU gambling debate shifted to a large extent towards the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court). The Court has provided rulings in more than 40 cases. New cases are still regularly referred from national courts throughout the EU. The importance of preliminary referrals has even increased given recent changes in the European Commission’s position on gambling (see below).

This chapter will address a number of important aspects related to gambling following from the most relevant case law of the Court.

Taxation will not be discussed in this chapter, and neither will the existing secondary legislation be reviewed, as in most relevant matters gambling services have explicitly been excluded from the scope of application.3 The competition law aspect in the gambling sector relates to a variety of issues such as state aid cases in the horse race betting sector but will not be discussed in further detail.4

II Gambling as an economic activity of a peculiar nature

The first landmark gambling case was referred in 1992. A British law imposed a ban on national lotteries, following which lottery tickets for the German lottery sent by mail to citizens living in the United Kingdom were seized by the customs authorities. This was put into question insofar as the law prevented companies established in other Member States from providing such services in the United Kingdom. The Court’s ruling in Schindler rendered in 1994 was extremely important for the discussion on gambling in the internal market.5

Several Member States had disputed the competence of the EU, arguing that gambling was not an economic activity within the ambit of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (the EEC Treaty) and, as a consequence did not fall under the free movement principles. The Court, however, considered gambling to be an ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of the EEC Treaty, thus falling under the freedom to provide services, today provided in Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Nonetheless, it is an economic activity of a peculiar nature given the particular moral, religious and cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of gambling, in all the Member States. Lotteries involve a high risk of crime or fraud and are an incitement to spend, which may have damaging individual and social consequences.6

In light of the peculiar nature of gambling, the Court affirmed several times that free, undistorted competition in the market of games of chance can have severely detrimental effects. The general approach, as used for other services on the internal market, of promoting free competition to the benefit of the consumer in terms of quality, and price is not maintained when it comes to gambling services. Operators of games of chance would be led to compete with each other in inventiveness to make what they offer more attractive, thereby increasing consumers’ expenditure on gaming as well as their risk of addiction.7

III The organisation of gambling in the Member States

i Restrictions and their justifications
General

As indicated above, gambling services are regulated by the Member States rather than by the EU. In the absence of EU harmonisation in the field, Member States are free to set the objectives of their policy on betting and gaming in accordance with their own scale of values and, where appropriate, to define in detail the level of protection sought. This also holds true for online gambling.8

As a consequence, holding a licence to offer gambling in a Member State will not suffice to be entitled to provide similar services in another Member State. The Court has explicitly denied the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of gambling, meaning that a Member State must not recognise the controls and rules set in place by another Member State. The EFTA Court takes the same view.9

However, this does not mean that Member States are not subject to any limitations in how they organise their gambling markets. When a Member State implements legislation restricting the free movement principles, notably the freedom to provide (gambling) services, then this is to be considered a derogation from the general principle and it must meet certain conditions in order to be justified.

Basically, any national measure that creates a framework in which gambling services cannot be offered freely throughout the internal market of the EU, can be considered a restriction of the freedom to provide services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU.

Such limitation to the freedom to provide services can be justified under the following conditions:

a either they are imposed for reasons of public order, public security or public health (Article 62 TFEU iuncto Article 52 TFEU);

b either they are imposed for ‘overriding reasons in the public interest’,10 which includes consumer protection, combating fraud and crime, but also combating the squandering of money. In this case, the measures in question may not be discriminatory.11

In addition, restrictive measures imposed must be proportionate, meaning they are suitable for the objectives pursued and not go beyond what is strictly necessary. Moreover, national legislation is appropriate only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner.12 This condition is an assessment also known as the proportionality test.

Proportionality test

The proportionality test has been clarified in the abundant case law of the Court, and whether a restrictive measure complies with this proportionality test is generally for the national courts to assess on the basis of the Court’s findings.

The mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection that differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment of the need for and proportionality of the relevant provisions. Those provisions must be assessed solely by reference to the objectives pursued by the competent authorities of the Member State concerned and the level of protection that they seek to ensure.13

In Carmen Media the Court held that, in the matter of games of chance, it is, in principle, necessary to examine separately for each of the restrictions imposed by the national legislation whether they comply with the proportionality test.14

When looking at national restrictive measures, it is important to take into account that the Court does not recognise standalone fiscal objectives pursued by Member States in their gambling policy, without a consistent and protective regulatory framework in place. They thus cannot serve as a justification of restrictions on the freedom to provide services.15 Incidentally, a restriction on gambling activities may benefit the budget of the state.16

Moreover, restrictions must also serve to limit betting and gaming activities in a consistent and systematic manner. Member States’ authorities cannot invoke public order concerns relating to the need to reduce opportunities for betting in order to justify restrictive measures, while at the same time inciting and encouraging consumers to participate in lotteries, games of chance and betting to the financial benefit of the public purse.17 This concern to reduce opportunities for gambling or to fight gambling-related crime must not only be met at the time of its adoption, but also thereafter. National courts must thus adopt a dynamic approach when assessing the proportionality and consistency of a measure.18

It is thereby for the Member State wishing to rely on an objective capable of justifying a restriction to supply the court called on to rule on that question with all the evidence of such a kind as to enable the court to be satisfied that the measure does indeed comply with the requirements deriving from the principle of proportionality. The national court must carry out a global assessment of the circumstances in which restrictive legislation was adopted and implemented. If a Member State is not able to produce studies serving as the basis for the adoption of the legislation at issue, it does not deprive that Member State of the possibility of establishing that an internal restrictive measure satisfies those requirements.19

Within this context of a restrictive market approach, the theory of ‘controlled expansion’ developed in Placanica came as a correction. The objective of drawing players away from clandestine betting and gaming – and, as such, activities that are prohibited – to activities that are authorised and regulated, may be entirely consistent with a policy of controlled expansion. But, in order to make the operators active in the sector subject to control and channelling the activities of betting and gaming into the systems thus controlled, authorised operators must be able to represent a reliable, and at the same time attractive alternative to a prohibited activity. This may as such necessitate the offer of an extensive range of games, advertising on a certain scale and the use of new distribution techniques.20 This was later confirmed in Pfleger.21

The Court later confirmed the possibility of controlled expansion with a view to protecting consumers to the extent that there is a large illegal market.22 This was previously also held, but in a slightly different way, by the EFTA Court.23

ii The monopoly and licence systems

Both the conferral of exclusive rights to a single body24 (the monopoly system) and the attribution of licences25 (the licence system) have been recognised by the Court as potentially proportionate measures to reach the objectives of limiting exploitation of the human passion for gambling in order to avoid the risk of crime and fraud related to games of chance.

Limited authorisation of gambling must indeed reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities.26 Equally, the co-existence of a monopoly for certain games of chance and concessions to private operators for other games of chance can be a proportionate measure in light of the objectives pursued.27

Monopoly system

A monopoly system can be in conformity with EU law, as is clear from the following case law of the Court.

The conferral of exclusive rights to operate gambling to a single public body can be a proportionate measure in order to reach the objectives of limiting exploitation of the human passion for gambling and to avoid the risk of crime and fraud related to games of chance.28

It has even been held, both by the EFTA Court29 and the Court,30 that a monopoly system sometimes serves the aim of fighting addiction related to gambling more effectively than would be the case with a system authorising the business of operators which would be permitted to carry on their business in the context of a non-exclusive legislative framework.

When seeking a particularly high level of protection, a Member State is entitled to take the view that it is only by granting exclusive rights to a single entity – which is subject to strict control by the public authorities – that it can tackle the risks connected with the gambling sector. Thereby pursuing the objective of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling and combating addiction to gambling with sufficient effectiveness.31 However, when it comes to combating criminality and in order to be consistent with this objective, national legislation establishing a gambling monopoly must be based on a finding that criminal and fraudulent activities linked to gaming and gambling addiction are a problem in the territory of the Member State concerned, which the expansion of authorised and regulated activities would be capable of solving.32 It has recently been confirmed by the Court that it is for the national courts to carry out a global assessment of the circumstances in which restrictive legislation was adopted and implemented on the basis of the evidence provided by the competent authorities of the Member State, seeking to demonstrate the existence of objectives capable of justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the TFEU and its proportionality.33

In Dickinger and Ömer, the Court specifically recognised the legality of a monopolistic gambling model with regards to online gambling.34

In Markus Stoss, the Court held that a monopoly will only satisfy the requirement of proportionality, insofar as the said monopoly is accompanied by a legislative framework suitable for ensuring that the holder of the said monopoly will in fact be able to pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, such an objective by means of a supply that is quantitatively measured and quantitatively planned by reference to the said objective and subject to strict control by the public authorities.35 In Sporting Exchange, the Court has elaborated on the notion of strict control, and stated that this can comprise either a public operator whose management is subject to direct state supervision, or a private operator whose activities are subject to strict control by the public authorities.36

In the same respect, any advertising issued by the holder of a public monopoly must remain measured and strictly limited to what is necessary in order to channel consumers towards authorised gaming networks (policy of ‘controlled expansion’).37 In Markus Stoss, Carmen Media38 and Winner Wetten,39 the Court further clarified the conditions under which a monopoly system can be compliant with EU law. A monopoly may be considered not suitable for achieving the objective for which it was established when at the same time advertising measures emanating from the holder of such a monopoly and relating to other types of games of chance that it also offers are not limited to what is necessary in order to channel consumers towards the offer emanating from that holder, but are designed to encourage the propensity of consumers to gamble and stimulate their active participation in the latter for purposes of maximising the anticipated revenue from such activities.40

It must also be noted that, even if the monopoly system is found to be incompatible with the provisions on free movement, this does not necessarily lead to an obligation for the Member State concerned to liberalise the market in games of chance if it finds that such a liberalisation is incompatible with the level of consumer protection and the preservation of order in society which that Member State intends to uphold. Member States remain free to undertake reforms of existing monopolies in order to make them compatible with the Treaty provisions, inter alia by making them subject to effective and strict controls by the public authorities.41 This has been confirmed by the Court in Ince.42

Licence or concession system

A licensing or concession system can also be in conformity with EU law. A licensing system that restricts the number of operators in the national territory is capable of being justified by general interest objectives.43 This kind of limitation on the freedom to provide services must also comply with the proportionality test as set out above and must reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution of gambling opportunities.44

It is consistent case law that national legislation that prohibits operating activities in the betting and gaming sector without a licence or police authorisation issued by the state, constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.45 However, the Court confirmed in Biasci and Rainone that Member States are allowed to set out the obligation to be granted a concession and a police permit in order to open betting activities.46

In Engelmann the Court ruled that a limitation of the number of concessions can be justified as it enables a limitation on gambling opportunities, and thus allows for the attainment of a public interest objective. Limiting the licence duration for a casino to 15 years can also be justified having regard to the concessionaire’s need to have a sufficient length of time to recoup the investments required by the setting up of a gaming establishment.47

As regards licensing in a semi-monopolistic system, the Court held in Sporting Exchange that competition in the market of games of chance would be detrimental and therefore limitations can be justified. Restrictions regarding the procedures for the grant of a licence to a single operator, or for the renewal thereof, may be regarded as being justified if the Member State decides to grant a licence to, or renew the licence of, a public operator whose management is subject to direct state supervision of a private operator whose activities are subject to strict control by the public authorities. In this case, the grant or renewal of exclusive rights without any competitive tendering procedure was not disproportionate.48

Dual system

It is also possible that in one Member State, some types of games of chance are subject to a public monopoly, while others are subject to a system of authorisations granted to private operators. This has recently been confirmed by the Court in Sporting Odds.

Still, such a system of dual organisation of the market for games of chance may be contrary to Article 56 TFEU if it is found that the competent authorities pursue policies seeking to encourage participation in games of chance other than those covered by the state monopoly rather than reduce opportunities for gambling and limit activities in that area in a consistent and systematic manner so that the aim of preventing incitement to squander money on gambling and of combating addiction to the latter, which was at the root of the establishment of the said monopoly, can no longer be effectively pursued by means of the monopoly.49

Such a system of dual organisation of the market for games of chance exists in many Member States, where there will often be the coexistence of a monopoly lottery operator with licence holders for other types of games of chance (e.g., casinos or sports betting).

iii The allocation of exclusive rights and licences

The manner in which gambling rights are granted or refused must equally be in line with the rules of the EU. This means, most notably, when issuing gambling licences (or similar authorisations), public authorities are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaties in general, including Article 56 TFEU and, in particular, the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and with the consequent obligation of transparency.50

In Costa and Cifone, the Court held that the obligation of transparency applies if the licence in question may be of interest to an undertaking located in a Member State other than that in which the licence is granted. Without necessarily implying an obligation to call for tenders, that obligation of transparency requires the licensing authority to ensure, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of publicity sufficient to enable the licence to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the award procedures to be reviewed.51

The principle of equal treatment requires that all potential tenderers be afforded equality of opportunity and accordingly implies that all tenderers must be subject to the same conditions. If there is unequal treatment by discriminating certain operators, justification must be based on reasons of public order, public security or public health (see Article 62 TFEU iuncto Article 52 TFEU). It is thereby settled case law that grounds of an economic nature, such as the objective of ensuring continuity, financial stability or a proper return on past investments for operators who obtained licences, cannot be accepted as overriding reasons in the public interest.52

Rules on granting gambling licences apply equally to the renewal of existing licences.53 In the same vein, it was considered that the renewal of old licences without putting them out to tender was not an appropriate means of attaining the objective pursued, going beyond what was necessary in order to preclude operators in the horse race betting sector from engaging in criminal or fraudulent activities.54

The right to offer gambling services can be granted through a licence, but also by way of a service concession. Until recently, service concessions were not governed by any of the directives by which the EU legislature has regulated the field of public procurement.55 The applicable rules for authorities granting concession were grounded on the above-mentioned principles derived from Article 56 TFEU and the Court’s case law on that subject.

Since currently, however, the Concession Directive applies to certain gambling service concessions, but not to lotteries.56

Still, the granting of concessions for lottery services should be in accordance with the Court’s case law.

In other words, if a Member State opts to grant, for instance, a state-owned or directly controlled company the right to exclusively offer certain gambling services, it is not required to comply with the principles of non-discrimination and transparency. It may simply appoint the service provider of its choice.

IV Online gambling

In Liga Portuguesa, the Court established the core principles of the Member States’ discretionary power in the field of online gambling. A key element in the reasoning of the Court is that games of chance accessible via the internet involve different and more substantial risks of fraud by operators against consumers compared to the traditional markets for such games. This because of the lack of direct contact between consumer and operator. The Court thus found internet games to be more dangerous than physically offered games, even when regulated and controlled by the competent authorities of the Member State of residence of the consumer. Member States are therefore allowed to impose proportionate restrictions on the offer of online gambling services.

The fact that the principle of mutual recognition does not apply is especially relevant for online gambling. Simply because an operator is licensed in one Member State, this does not mean that this licence should be recognised in another Member State.57 The consequence is that cross-border services provision, which is notably done via the internet when it comes to gambling, is as such not allowed. Even passive provision of games of chance can be prohibited or restricted, meaning that the mere accessibility of online gambling products from a Member State can be sufficient to be regarded as providing services there.58 Member States are hence allowed to block all unauthorised websites of operators offering online gambling services accessible to its consumers.

In Carmen Media the Court clearly recognised again the added dangers of games of chance over the internet, which should be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of the measures put in place by the Member States. A stricter approach may be considered required and a prohibition measure covering any offer of games of chance via the internet may, in principle, be regarded as suitable for pursuing the legitimate objectives determined such as the protection of young persons, even though the offer of such games remains authorised through more traditional channels.59 The responsibility for an effective enforcement system and tackling illegal online gambling lies with the Member States.

In Biasci and Rainone, the Court continued on the notion of ‘direct contact’. The fact that an operator must have both a licence and a police authorisation in order to access the market in question is not, per se, disproportionate in the light of the objective pursued by the national legislature, which is to combat criminality linked to betting and gaming. However, precluding all cross-border activity (in particular business-to-business) in the betting and gaming sector, irrespective of the form in which that activity is undertaken and, in particular, in cases where there is the possibility of direct contact between consumer and operator and where physical checks for police purposes can be made of an undertaking’s intermediaries who are present on national territory, is contrary to the provisions of Article 49 and 56 TFEU.60

However, recently, the Court ruled in Sporting Odds that in order to link land-based to online gambling, it could in some circumstances be considered disproportionate to reserve the grant of a licence to organise online games of chance exclusively to operators of games of chance holding a concession for a casino situated on national territory. The Court finds that this a discriminatory rule that can only be justified if it is covered by an express derogating provision, such as Article 52 TFEU, namely public policy, public security or public health. It is thus not enough to argue that online gaming, which involves higher risks than traditional games of chance, can only be reserved to trustworthy operators running a casino on national territory that satisfy the requirements of consumer protection and public order.61

V Other issues

i Advertising

The Court has at regular intervals been asked to pronounce itself on the scope of advertising in the context of a Member State’s gambling policy.

In the context of the policy of ‘controlled expansion’, operators should be allowed to extend their games of chance, advertise on a certain scale and use different kinds of distribution channels in order to compete against illegal operators. This is to be able to offer a reliable alternative to illegal gambling.62

Advertising is allowed when it is necessary to attract players to the controlled channels of games of chance, but it cannot incite players to excessive gambling.63 It must thus remain measured and strictly limited to what is necessary to channel consumers. Stimulating active participation, such as by trivialising gambling or giving it a positive image because of the fact that revenues derived from it are used for activities in the public interest, or by increasing the attractiveness of gambling by means of enticing advertising messages depicting major winnings in glowing colours, is not allowed.64

In HIT LARIX, the Court stated that Member States may prohibit advertising for foreign (land-based) gambling establishments and make an exception only for those operators that can demonstrate that the level of protection in their country of establishment is similar to the level of protection in the Member State where they want to make publicity. However, the Court also added that such condition could be seen as disproportionate if it would require the rules to be identical (even in the case such rules would have been pursuing the objective of player protection) or alternatively, in case the rules were not directly related to risks inherent to gambling (regardless of the objective of the legislation).65

Finally, in Sjöberg and Gerdin, the Court found that the freedom to provide services precludes legislation of a Member State subjecting gambling to a system of exclusive rights, according to which the promotion of gambling organised in another Member State is subject to stricter penalties than the promotion of gambling operated on the national territory without the due authorisation. Also here, the Court ruled that advertising to residents of that state can be prohibited if gambling is prohibited and where gambling is organised for the purposes of profit by private operators in other Member States.66

ii Sanctions

In Placanica, the Court ruled that it is not compliant with EU law to apply criminal sanctions against the concerned operator for not abiding by the administrative conditions linked to the concession system if such conditions are found to be disproportionate.67 In other words, if an operator did not have the possibility to acquire a licence, and this was a result of a restriction that is not compliant with EU law, this operator cannot be sanctioned for offering gambling services without a licence. This has been confirmed in the Pfleger case.68

Another way by which gambling operators may dodge sanctions for offering gambling services without the necessary licence, is by invoking, as the case may be, that the legislation on the basis of which they would be sanctioned was not notified to the European Commission under the Notification Directive69 when this was actually required.

If legislation had to be notified, but that did not happen, it is not possible to rely upon the provisions of that legislation against an individual.70

VI Outlook

Currently, when discussing the outlook of what will happen at EU-level, one topic that emerges is Brexit. What will happen when the United Kingdom leaves the EU and how the new relationship between them will be constructed is totally unclear today. However, in two gambling cases the Court clarified the position of Gibraltar in its relations with the UK. In the GBGA and Fisher cases, the Court declared that, from an internal market perspective, Gibraltar and the United Kingdom form part of one single Member State, meaning that the free movement provisions of the EU Treaties do not apply to services provided between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom.71

On 7 December 2017, the Commission decided to close all infringement procedures and pilot cases, and to reject all complaints in the gambling sector. This is in line with its political commitment to be more strategic in enforcing EU law. The Commission considers that complaints in the gambling sector can be handled more efficiently by national courts also in light of the numerous judgments of the Court on national gambling legislation. The Commission encourages the use of national remedies when facing problems with EU law in the gambling sector.

With that decision, the Commission also referred to its recommendation on consumer protection and advertising in the online gambling sector.72 This recommendation was the subject of an annulment proceeding brought by Belgium. According to Belgium, the European Commission exceeded its competence by adopting a recommendation without legal basis and in disrespect of the institutional balance. The Court ruled here that, following the Order of non-admissibility by the General Court, the recommendation is, in light of the wording, the content and the purpose of the contested recommendation, not intended to have binding legal effects, with the result that it cannot be classified as a challengeable act for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU.73

According to the Court, recommendations are intended to confer on the institutions a ‘power to exhort and to persuade’, distinct from the power to adopt acts having binding force. The Court further stated that it is not sufficient that an institution adopts a recommendation that allegedly disregards certain principles or procedural rules in order for that recommendation to be amenable to an action for annulment.74

More recently, the Commission adopted a general recommendation on fighting illegal content online,75 in which illegal content is defined as ‘any information which is not in compliance with Union law or the law of a Member State concerned’. The Commission is also working on a comprehensive policy to address taxation in the digital single market, which may very well affect taxation on online gambling services.

1 Philippe Vlaemminck is a partner, Robbe Verbeke is a senior associate and Justine Van den Bon is a junior associate, at Pharumlegal. References to EU law are references to the current TFEU articles even if at the time of the case the EC Treaties did apply.

2 Point 3 of Annex 2 to Part A of the Conclusions of the Presidency - EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN EDINBURGH 11-12 DECEMBER, 1992.

3 In the Commission staff working document on “Online gambling in the Internal Market” accompanying the Communication Towards a comprehensive framework for online gambling of 23 October 2010, the Commission refers to the long-standing definition that exists for gambling activities in general in EU secondary legislation as being the one relied upon to exclude such services from the Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC). Also in later secondary legislation gambling is explicitly excluded, namely so in the Services Directive (2006/123/EC), the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2010/13/EU) as well as in the recent proposal for a Regulation on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market.

4 We refer to, among others, the following cases: Commission Decision of 19 June 2013 on State aid No SA.30753 which France is planning to implement for horse racing companies; Commission Decision of 2 July 2013 on State aid No. SA.35200 – German – Rennwett- und Lotteriegesetz (RWLG); Commission Decision of 10 August 2016 on State aid No SA.46216 – United Kingdom – Horserace Betting Levy; Commission Decision of 3 January 2017 on State aid No.46556 – Finland – Aid to the central and regional trotting tracks in Finland and Commission Decision of 4 December 2017, SA.48604 – Denmark – aid scheme for the horse racing sector.

5 Judgment of the Court of 24 March 1994 Schindler, C-275/92, EU:C:1994:119.

6 Ibid., par. 60.

7 Judgment of the Court of 24 January 2013 Stanleybet International e.a., joined Cases C-186/11 and C-209/11, EU:C:2013:33, par. 45 and judgment of the Court of 30 April 2014 Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, EU:C:2014:281, par. 46.

8 Judgment of the Court of 8 September 2009 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, C-42/07, EU:C:2009:519.

9 EFTA judgment of 30 May 2007, case E-3/06, Ladbrokes v. Norway, available at www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/3_06_Judgment_EN.pdf , par. 87. In this case, the EFTA Court was asked to formulate an advisory opinion on the Norwegian sport betting market. An advisory opinion of the EFTA Court is comparable to a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union, except that an advisory opinion is not binding upon the national Court which referred the question concerned to the EFTA Court.

10 Judgment of the Court of 19 July 2012 Garkalns, C-470/11, EU:C:2012:505, par. 39 and the case law cited.

11 See, e.g., Stanleybet International e.a., joined cases C-186/11 and C-209/11, par. 22.

12 Stanleybet International e.a., joined cases C-186/11 and C-209/11, par. 27 and judgment of the Court of 28 February 2018 Sporting Odds, C-3/17, EU:C:2018:130, par. 33.

13 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International, C-42/07, par. 58.

14 Judgment of the Court of 8 September 2010 Carmen Media, C-46/08, EU:C:2010:505, par. 60 referring to the judgment of 6 March 2017 Placanica, joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, EU:C:2007:133, par. 49.

15 Judgment of the Court of 15 September 2011 Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09, EU:C:2011:582, par. 55 and Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, par. 54.

16 Judgment of the Court of 11 June 2015 Berlington Hungary e.a., C-98/14, EU:C:2015:386, pars. 60 and 61. This has recently been confirmed in Sporting Odds, C-3/17, par. 28.

17 Judgment of the Court of 6 November 2003 Gambelli, C-243/01, EU:C:2003:597, pars. 67 and 69. The Court confirmed this in Berlington Hungary e.a., C-98/14, par. 61.

18 Judgment of the Court of 30 June 2016 Admiral Casinos, C-464/15, EU:C:2016:500, pars. 34 and 36.

19 Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, pars. 50 to 52 and the case-law referred to.

20 Placanica, joined cases C-338/04, C-359/05 and C-360/04, par. 55.

21 Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, par. 56.

22 Judgment of the Court of 3 June 2010 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, EU:C:2010:307 and judgment of the Court of 3 June 2010 Ladbrokes, C-258/08, EU:C:2010:308.

23 EFTA judgment of 30 May 2007, case E-3/06, Ladbrokes v. Norway.

24 Judgment of the Court of 21 September 1999 Läärä, C-124/97, EU:C:1999:435.

25 Judgment of the Court of 31 January 2008 Centro Europa, C-380/05, EU:C:2008:59, par. 100.

26 Judgment of the Court of 21 October 1999 Zenatti, C-67/98, EU:C:1999:514, par. 36.

27 Sporting Odds, C-3/17, par. 33.

28 Läärä, C-124/97, par. 42.

29 EFTA Court Judgment of 14 March 2007, E-1/06, ESA v. Norway, available at www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/1_06_Judgment_EN.pdf, par. 51. The monopoly on gaming was thus found to be compatible with the free movement provisions as enshrined in the EEA Agreement.

30 Judgment of the Court of 8 September 2010 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, EU:C:2010:504.

31 Ibid., pars. 81 and 83; Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09, par. 48 and judgment of the Court of 30 June 2011 Zeturf, C-212/08, EU:C:2011:437, par. 41.

32 Zeturf, C-212/08, par. 72.

33 Sporting Odds, C-3/17, par. 53. See to that effect also the judgment of the Court of 14 June 2017 Online Games, C-685/15, EU:C:2017:452, par. 67.

34 Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09. See also Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Bwin International, C-42/07.

35 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, par. 83.

36 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, par. 59.

37 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, par. 103.

38 Carmen Media, C-46/08.

39 Judgment of the Court of 8 September 2010 Winner Wetten, C-409/06, EU:C:2010:503.

40 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07, C-359/07, C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, par. 107.

41 Stanleybet International e.a., joined cases C-186/11 and C-209/11, par. 46.

42 Judgment of the Court of 4 February 2016 Ince, C-336/14, EU:C:2016:72, par. 54.

43 Centro Europa, C-380/05, par. 100. The Court refers here to Placanica, joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, par. 53.

44 Zenatti, C-67/98, pars. 35 and 36.

45 Gambelli e.a., C-243/01, par. 59.

46 Judgment of the Court of 12 September 2013 Biasci and Rainone, C-660/11, EU:C:2013:550, par. 27.

47 Judgment of the Court of 9 September 2010 Engelmann, C-64/08, EU:C:2010:506, pars. 45 and 48.

48 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, par. 60.

49 Sporting Odds, C-3/17, pars. 23 and 24.

50 See, e.g., Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08, par. 39; Judgment of the Court of 7 December 2000 Telaustria and Telefonadress, C-324/98, EU:C:2000:669, pars. 60 to 62; Judgment of the Court of 10 September 2009 Eurawasser, C-206/08, EU:C:2009:540, par. 44 and judgment of the Court of 13 April 2010 Wall, C-91/08, EU:C:2010:182, par. 33.

51 Judgment of the Court of 16 February 2012 Costa and Cifone, joined cases C-72/10 and C-77/10, EU:C:2012:80, par. 55. The Court refers to the judgment of 13 September 2007 Commission v. Italy, C-260/04, EU:C:2007:508, par. 24 and the case law cited.

52 Costa and Cifone, joined cases C-72/10 and C-77/10, pars. 57 and 59.

53 Engelmann, C-64/08.

54 Commission v. Italy, C-260/04, par. 34.

55 See, e.g., Sporting Exchange (Betfair), Case C-203/08, par. 39.

56 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1-64.

57 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional, C-42/07, pars. 68 to 70.

58 Sporting Exchange (Betfair), C-203/08 and Ladbrokes, C-258/08.

59 Carmen Media, C-46/08, par. 105.

60 Biasci and Rainone, C-660/11, pars. 27 and 37.

61 Sporting Odds, C-3/17, pars. 40 to 44.

62 Placanica, C-338/04, par. 55.

63 Dickinger and Ömer, C-347/09, par. 68.

64 Markus Stoss and Others, joined cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07, par. 103.

65 Judgment of the Court of 12 July 2012 HIT LARIX, C-176/11, EU:C:2012:454, pars. 29 to 32.

66 Judgment of the Court of 8 July 2010 Sjöberg and Gerdin, joined cases C-447/08 and C-448/08, EU:C:2010:415, pars. 46 and 57.

67 Placanica, joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, par. 71.

68 Pfleger e.a., C-390/12, par. 64.

69 Directive 2015/1535 of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (codification), OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1-15. Previously: Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations.

70 Judgment of the Court of 19 July 2012 Fortuna, joined cases C-213/11, C-214/11 and C-217/11, EU:C:2012:495 and judgment of the Court of 13 October 2016 M&S, C-303/15, EU:C:2016:721.

71 Judgment of the Court of 13 June 2017 Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited (GBGA), C-591/15, EU:C:2017:449 and judgment of the Court of 12 October 2017 Fisher, C-192/16, EU:C:2017:762.

72 Commission Recommendation on principles for the protection of consumers and players of online gambling services and for the prevention of minors from gambling online 2014/478/EU, OJ L 214, 19.7.2014, p. 38-46.

73 Judgment of the Court of 20 February 2018 Belgium v. Commission, C-16/16P, EU:C:2018:79.

74 Ibid., pars. 26 and 28.

75 Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online, C(2018) 1177 final.