This is the sixth edition of The Insolvency Review. Once again this volume offers an in-depth review of market conditions and insolvency case developments in key countries around the world. A debt of gratitude is owed to the outstanding professionals the world over who dedicated their time and talents to this book. Their contributions reflect diverse viewpoints and approaches, which in turn reflect the diversity of their respective national commercial cultures and laws.

The preface to the fifth edition explored the trend in favour of insolvency regimes that offer debtors the opportunity to restructure debts and operations and emerge as going concerns. These regimes generally share certain core features, including an emphasis on reorganisation rather than liquidation, a stay of enforcement proceedings, continuity of management, protections for new financing, and claim classification and voting mechanisms that bind hold-out creditors to the terms of a restructuring if requisite conditions are met. Recent examples evidencing this trend include Singapore's sweeping reforms to its corporate insolvency laws,1 which incorporate a number of features similar to those of US Chapter 11 and English schemes, and the recommendations set forth in the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU (the Proposed Pre-Insolvency Directive).2

In some jurisdictions, approaches to insolvency that embrace these core principles have tended to favour a variety of interests other than those of creditors. Among other things, some offer enhanced protections to the debtor, shareholders or employees. For example, the new Singapore law lacks a provision that would allow for share capital to be transferred (or extinguished and reissued) to creditors or other parties without the approval of shareholders, and the Proposed Pre-Insolvency Directive does not provide the debtor's creditors with the opportunity to solicit votes on a competing restructuring plan or valuation estimate. Other jurisdictions (e.g., Mexico) provide certain constituencies, for example workers who are owed wages, priority status over secured creditors.

While the trend of favouring non-creditor interests continues to gain traction in some jurisdictions, it is by no means universal. Some countries take a more 'pro-creditor' approach. Features of such regimes may include the automatic replacement of existing management with an administrator or liquidator, prohibitions on seeking court protection without creditor consent, the absence of a stay of enforcement proceedings such that secured creditors may foreclose on their property, and required compliance with the absolute priority rule.3 While some creditor-friendly features, such as the absolute priority rule, are fully compatible with reorganisation, other features, like the absence of a stay or an absolute requirement that creditors consent to a reorganisation, make it more likely a debtor will liquidate. In such jurisdictions, reorganisation may be difficult or, as a practical matter, impossible without creditor support.

Increasingly, countries cannot be pigeon-holed into 'pro-creditor' or 'pro-debtor' categories. Rather, the various jurisdictions surveyed in this book and across the globe are on a continuum that ranges from strongly pro-creditor to strongly pro-debtor. Movement in either direction is justified by perceptions of trade-offs, for example between benefits to healthy companies ('ex ante' benefits) and benefits for firms in distress and their stakeholders ('ex post' benefits).4 Creditor friendly regimes tend to claim ex ante benefits such as encouragement of lower borrowing costs, more robust capital markets and incentives for appropriate risk-taking, and optimal allocation of assets to their highest and best uses. Pro-debtor regimes tend to emphasise maximising the total value of assets of insolvent companies, preserving the going-concern value of viable enterprises that would likely be forced to liquidate in an overly creditor-friendly environment, and distributional considerations (such as mitigating hardships to employees and shareholders).

It is difficult to verify whether pro-creditor regimes generate ex ante benefits because the benefits are difficult to isolate and the causes and effects are hard to confirm.5 A jurisdiction's insolvency regime is only one of many factors influencing the availability of and access to credit in a national economy. Recently, however, Germany's rather abrupt change from a highly pro-creditor insolvency regime to a very pro-debtor insolvency regime provided an opportunity to observe the effects of such a change at work. Earlier this year, the Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable6 (the HLS Bankruptcy Roundtable) reported on a draft article by Canipek, Kind and Wende7 evaluating this natural experiment.

The prior German insolvency regime favoured liquidation of the insolvent company and the sale of its assets. As Canipek et al. note, in the case of bankruptcy, existing management had to be replaced with an administrator, who in practice was often a person with limited management skills and a liquidation-oriented attitude. Ninety-nine per cent of all firms that filed for bankruptcy liquidated, with over half doing so within three months of the filing date.8 On 1 March 2012, the then existing law was amended by the Act of the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Companies (ESUG). As discussed in detail in the Germany chapter of this book, ESUG incorporated many debtor-friendly elements, including a three-month stay period and an injunction against secured creditors for the duration of the case. To offer a sense of how significantly ESUG changed the nature of Germany's insolvency framework, Canipek et al. note that, on the well-known creditor rights index of La Porta et al., which varies between zero (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights), German bankruptcy laws shifted from a score of 3.5 to a score of 1.0.9

In the HLS Bankruptcy Roundtable post, Canipek et al. describe the conclusions of their study as follows:

In the study, we show that high-tangible-asset companies – which the reform predominantly affected – turned away from being overly risk-averse at the cost of profitability, relative to low-tangibility control firms. Specifically, weaker creditor rights motivated affected firms to increase financial leverage and to prefer the more flexible unsecured debt. Moreover, affected firms reduced unprofitable but risk-lowering expansions and sold off less profitable but easily-marketable assets that are useful in downturns by providing the liquidity that can prevent bankruptcy. Our results suggest that weaker creditor rights encourage firms to eliminate protection mechanisms formerly constructed to contract around liquidation-oriented bankruptcy provisions. This view is supported by the increased profitability and higher risk of treated firms after the reform.

The stronger pre-ESUG creditor rights not only produced ex post deadweight losses in terms of inefficient liquidation, but also discouraged firms to make profitable investment decisions. This reveals ex ante inefficiencies of creditor rights, an aspect largely ignored in the extant literature.

This conclusion is interesting. If the argument for pro-creditor regimes is that they increase ex ante efficiency, then they need to actually deliver ex ante benefits. Canipek et al. offer empirical support for the proposition that pro-creditor insolvency regimes do not deliver the predicted benefits for healthy companies, since their selling points (for example, lower borrowing costs) come with inherent costs (for example, incentives to avoid insolvency even when it is inefficient to do so). However, while the HLS Bankruptcy Roundtable post suggests that broad implications may be taken from Canipek et al., the study is narrowly focused on comparing ESUG with the pre-ESUG regime. This leaves open the possibility that there may be combinations of pro-creditor and pro-debtor features in between these extreme formulas – regimes in a 'middle ground' – that strike an optimal balance.

In this sixth edition, readers will have the opportunity to consider the merits of restructuring regimes that take each approach and whether regimes that take a middle ground – exhibiting an appropriate combination of pro-debtor and pro-creditor features – are best. One such 'middle-ground' approach – with a statutory stay of creditor remedies, continuation of the debtor-in-possession, a limited period for the debtor to exclusively control the reorganisation plan process and the possibility of creditor cramdown if the absolute priority rule is followed – will be quite familiar to our American readers.

The recent trend towards legal frameworks that adopt features of Chapter 11 perhaps demonstrates a growing belief that some pro-debtor features, like reorganisation and debtor control, are, on the whole, more conducive to wealth creation and preservation. Perhaps the trend is driven by competition for investment, on the theory that companies and investors would prefer to preserve going concern value in the case of a downturn, as is suggested by Singapore's recent enactments. Whatever the drivers, I expect that the trend away from liquidation and in favour of reorganisation will continue, and that, within the reorganisation framework, countries will continue to experiment with both pro-creditor and pro-debtor features in an to attempt to find the optimal balance.

I once again want to thank each of the contributors to this book for their efforts to make The Insolvency Review a valuable resource. As I have noted in prior editions, this book is a significant undertaking because of the current coverage of developments we seek to provide. As always, my hope is that this year's volume will help all of us, authors and readers alike, reflect on the larger picture, keeping our eye on likely, as well as necessary, developments, both on the near and distant horizons.


1 See Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017 (Bill No. /2017), available at

2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU (22 November 2016) (the Proposed Pre-Insolvency Directive), available at

3 See, e.g., La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 1998, Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113–1155, available at

4 McGowan, Müge Adalet and Dan Andrews, Insolvency Regimes and Productivity Growth: A Framework for Analysis, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economics Department Working Papers No., 1309, July 1, 2016, available at ECO/WKP(2017)57&docLanguage=En.

5 Fisher, Timothy C G and Martel, Jocelyn, The Impact of Debtor-Friendly Reforms on the Performance of a Reorganization Procedure (January, 18 2012). Available at SSRN:

6 The Effect of Creditor Rights on Capital Structure, Investment, Profitability, and Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Harvard Law School Bankruptcy Roundtable, July 10, 2018,

7 Canipek, Aras, Axel Kind and Sabine Wend, The Effect of Creditor Rights on Capital Structure, Investment, Profitability, and Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, March 2018, available at SSRN:

8 id. at 7.

9 id. at 2.