2016 and the beginning of 2017 were marked by significant court decisions regarding international arbitration in France, the enactment of new legislation, as well as new ICC Rules of Arbitration.


i Developments affecting international arbitration
New Article 2061 of the Civil Code dealing with arbitration clauses

Law No. 2016-1547 of 18 November 20162 brought several changes to the Civil Code, notably in the sections related to arbitration.

The most important amendment concerning arbitration is under Article 2061 of the Civil Code. Article 2061 previously provided as follows: ‘[u]nless otherwise provided by the law, an arbitration clause is valid in contracts concluded by reason of a professional activity.' Article 2061, as amended, now reads as follows: ‘[a]n arbitration clause must have been agreed by the party against which it is invoked, unless that party has succeeded to the rights and obligations of the party which initially accepted it. When a party did not contract for the purpose of its professional activity, the clause cannot be invoked against it.' This amendment reflects the legislator's desire no longer to deal with arbitration clauses under the angle of their validity,3 but of their acceptance by the parties against which they are invoked. It also means that it is now possible to validly introduce an arbitration clause in a contract that was not concluded for the purpose of professional activities. To that extent, Article 2061 opens to arbitration a very broad scope of activities. Arbitration clauses can now be introduced into real estate contracts with individuals, insurance contracts, consumer contracts, etc., as long as the arbitration clause was accepted. By focusing on the acceptance of the party against whom the clause is invoked, as opposed to its validity, Article 2061 now gives an option to non-professional parties who can show that they did not initially accept the arbitration clause to choose between arbitration and litigation when a dispute arises. The clause invoked against a non-professional party can validly be accepted after the dispute arises. Article 2061, however, deals with domestic arbitration only. In international arbitration, French law has long held that in certain circumstances, consumers or non-professional parties could validly enter into arbitration clauses.4 Case law is much more restrictive for employees.5

Article 59 of the Sapin II Law regarding enforcement against sovereigns

Article 59 of Law No. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on ‘Transparency, Anti-corruption Measures and the Modernisation of the Economy' (Sapin II Law)6 significantly changed the law regarding state immunity from execution. It is the first time that France has legislated on the question. Case law was the primary source of state immunity from execution in France before that. While it does not have anything to do with the primary purpose of that law, which is to provide for more efficient prevention, detection and repression of corruption, Article 59 purports to codify customary law on state immunity from execution as reflected in the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UN Convention). However, Article 59 includes conditions that the UN Convention does not include and cannot be equated with a codification of customary law.

Three new articles were introduced by that law in the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings. From now on, pursuant to Article L111-1-1, a judge will have to give a prior authorisation to carry out any provisional or enforcement measures affecting property belonging to a state. It does not mean that one could previously enforce an award against a sovereign in France without a judge's review. An action for exequatur, or confirmation of the award, had to be filed. The very purpose of exequatur is to render an arbitral award enforceable under a domestic legal system. The necessity to go through exequatur still exists. The novelty is that, in addition to exequatur to be granted by a judge, a second and different judge will have to review whether enforcement can be granted against the sovereign before any such enforcement measure can be taken. In addition, pursuant to Article L111-1-2, at least one of the following conditions will have to be satisfied for the judge to authorise those measures:

  • a the state must have expressly consented to the application of the measure;
  • b it must have allocated or earmarked the specific asset targeted to the satisfaction of the claim that is the purpose of the proceeding; or
  • c when a judgment or an arbitral award has been rendered against the state, it must be established that the asset at issue is specifically in use or intended to be used by the state concerned for purposes other than government non-commercial purposes and is linked to the entity against which the proceeding is initiated.

Article L111-1-2 also provides for a non-exhaustive list of property considered as specifically used or intended to be used by the state for government non-commercial purposes. Pursuant to Article L111-1-3, provisional or enforcement measures cannot be carried out with regard to property used or intended to be used for the exercise of diplomatic, consular or special missions of the foreign states absent an express and specific waiver. Consequently, the Sapin II Law distinguishes between property that is used or intended to be used for government non-commercial purposes where a general waiver would be sufficient, and property that is used or intended to be used for diplomatic, consular or special missions where an ‘express and specific' waiver will be necessary.

While this new piece of legislation will put an end to uncertainties that had arisen from several changes in the case law over the past few years in the area of the state's waiver of immunity from execution, as described below, it will also significantly complicate the enforcement of awards against sovereign assets in France. It will allow judges to prevent misguided enforcement proceedings against states. This was possible before, but only after the seizure or attachment had been made, under the form of an action for lifting it. Nevertheless, there are causes for concern. First, the need for the judge's preliminary authorisation to carry out any provisional or enforcement measures seems to be hardly compatible with the urgent character of certain enforcement measures. It may enable a state to relocate certain moveable assets before the judge issues his or her authorisation if the state has reason to think that an attachment may be imminent. Any effect of surprise that is generally inherent in enforcement proceedings may be lost. Second, Article 59 of the Sapin II Law is a step backward (at least as far as the rights of creditors are concerned) compared to the case law of the Court of Cassation. As explained in the seventh edition of this publication,7 states may use their immunity from execution as a defence against the enforcement of arbitral awards, but have the possibility to waive it. In 2011,8 the Court of Cassation held that this waiver had to be ‘express and special'. In 2013,9 it specified that a state could waive its immunity if the specific assets or categories of assets for which the waiver was granted were expressly set out in the contract. In 2015,10 the Court of Cassation again modified its approach and decided that the waiver would only need to be ‘express' without imposing any other condition. The Sapin II Law imposing an ‘express and specific' waiver of sovereign immunity from execution with respect to diplomatic protection renders this jurisprudence inoperative.

2017 amendments to the ICC Arbitration Rules (Rules)

The ICC introduced amendments to its Rules, which became effective on 1 March 2017.11 The amended Rules will apply to all arbitrations starting from that date unless the parties have agreed otherwise. One of the most significant novelties in the Rules is the introduction of the expedited procedure.12 This procedure will automatically apply when the amount in dispute does not exceed US$2 million,13 as well as when the parties have agreed to use it for higher-value disputes.14 However, this procedure will not apply to disputes arising out of an arbitration agreement concluded before 1 March 2017 if the parties have agreed to opt-out of this procedure or when the ICC Court, upon request by a party, has decided that this procedure would be inappropriate.15 Under the expedited procedure, the proceedings are simplified. The ICC Court may appoint a sole arbitrator even if the arbitration agreement provides otherwise.16 The establishment of terms of reference is no longer mandatory, and the arbitral tribunal will have to hold a case management conference within 15 days after it has received a file from the ICC, as opposed to one month otherwise (two months under the prior version of the Rules).17 Additionally, the parties will not be able to present new claims after the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, unless authorised by the arbitral tribunal to do so.18 The arbitral tribunal also has the possibility, after consultation with the parties, to decide a case based on the documents in the record, without any hearing.19 The arbitral tribunal will have six months to render its award from the date of the case management conference.20 Finally, fees for this procedure will be calculated on a different scale than the one used for higher value arbitrations, and should normally be lower by approximately 20 per cent.

ii Arbitration developments in local courts
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators

In last year's edition,21 we described in detail the Tecnimont case, which gave rise to several significant decisions of the French courts over the past decade. In the last decision rendered in this case in 2016,22 the Paris Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the challenge to the award based on the arbitrators' independence and impartiality on the ground that the new information concerning the chair of the arbitral tribunal did not significantly increase doubts regarding his independence and impartiality compared with the elements available to the parties at the beginning of the arbitral proceedings. This decision inevitably puts a heavier burden on the parties, given that the Court of Appeal considered that the parties should have conducted the necessary research to discover the relevant information about the arbitrator, such information being public and easily accessible according to the Court of Appeal.

In May 2016, the Court of Cassation confirmed this approach according to which the parties have a duty to investigate in order to identify relevant information about the arbitrators.23 In this case, the President of the Paris First Instance Court ordered exequatur of an award rendered in Russia against a Russian company. The Russian company argued that exequatur should be refused because an expert presented by the other party was a member of the same university as one of the arbitrators, which had not been revealed. The Paris Court of Appeal rejected the argument and confirmed the decision granting exequatur of the award. The Russian company seized the Court of Cassation. In a decision rendered on 25 May 2016, the Court of Cassation rejected the cassation appeal. The Court held that, through simple research on freely accessible websites, the Russian company could have been aware of all relationships complained of between the arbitrators and the legal experts who produced a consultation as part of the arbitration. The Court of Cassation confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in that the arbitrators' relationship with the legal experts was common knowledge and that the Russian company could have easily learned about it.

Another decision rendered by the Court of Cassation on the question of independence and impartiality of arbitrators deserves mention.24 In this case, the arbitral institution, the Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris (Chamber), formed a cassation appeal against a decision rendered by the Paris Court of Appeal in 2012,25 rejecting its third-party challenge of another decision of the Paris Court of Appeal annulling an award on the ground that the arbitrators had not provided any declaration of independence when requested to do so by one of the parties.26 In its appeal, the Chamber alleged that the award should not have been annulled given that the challenge of the award had not been brought within the time limit imposed by the Chamber's arbitration rules.27 The Court of Cassation considered that because the arbitral tribunal never provided any declaration of independence to the parties, the period of 15 days mentioned in the arbitration rules allowing the parties to challenge an arbitrator had never started. This period could only start from the moment the parties knew or could have known about the relevant facts.

International public policy

Pursuant to Article 1520-5 CCP, French courts may set aside an award rendered in France in international arbitration when the award violates ‘international public policy.' In the sixth edition, we had explained in detail the evolution of the approach taken by French courts when controlling whether an award was in conformity with international public policy.28 By way of summary, from 2004, French courts considered that an award could be set aside on grounds of public policy only when a ‘flagrant, effective and concrete' violation of international public policy had occurred.29 In several decisions rendered between March and October 2014,30 the Paris Court of Appeal nuanced its prior position and removed the criterion of ‘flagrancy' from its review of alleged violation of international public policy.31 The Court of Cassation did not follow suit, however.

In 2016, the Paris Court of Appeal introduced a new criterion of ‘manifest' violation of international public policy32 somewhat reminiscent of the ‘flagrancy' criterion that appeared to have been abandoned. The case concerned a dispute arising out of a contract between a French company, Bauche, and a Swiss company, Indagro. The dispute was brought before the London Maritime Arbitration Association in September 2008. The sole arbitrator rendered his award in May 2015, ordering Bauche to pay damages to Indagro. After Indagro obtained exequatur of the award in France, Bauche appealed the order. Bauche notably alleged that recognising or granting enforcement of an award that allegedly gave effect to an agreement obtained by corruption violates international public policy.

While reviewing the award, the Court of Appeal held that the judge should check whether recognition or enforcement of the award would violate international public policy in a ‘manifest, effective and concrete' manner. It also added that the French judge was not bound by the arbitrators' appreciations in this respect, nor by the law applicable to the merits chosen by the parties. Significantly, the Court of Appeal decided that the control of ‘international public policy' should be performed both in fact and law. The Paris Court of Appeal analysed the facts of the case and concluded that the contract could only have been obtained through corruption. As a result, it quashed the order of the judge granting exequatur to the award.

The Bauche approach regarding the ‘manifest' breach of international public policy was followed in other recent cases, which appears to signal a new trend in the case law of the Paris Court of Appeal.33 It is not clear at this point how the ‘full' control of international public policy, both in fact and at law, is compatible with the ‘manifest' criterion reintroduced by the Paris Court of Appeal. One reason that could be discerned - or at least speculated on - is the fact that the Paris Court of Appeal, seeing that the Court of Cassation has so far refused to deviate from its 2008 SNF case law regarding the ‘flagrant, effective and concrete' breach of international public policy required to set aside or refuse to recognise an international award on grounds of public policy, would somehow wish to (appear to) realign itself with that case law, while at the same time maintaining a somewhat higher level of control than the Court of Cassation as per the SNF approach.

In another case, the Paris Court of Appeal annulled an award rendered against the government of Iraq in favour of two German companies. The Court decided that the tribunal breached the principle of equality of arms, ‘an essential component of the right to a fair trial', and thus breached (procedural) international public policy.34 The arbitration dealt with contracts entered into by Iraq in the 1980s. The arbitration took place between 2003 and 2006, while Iraq was first at war and then in a situation of civil unrest ‘worse than civil war' according to a UN declaration. Iraq had requested a suspension of the arbitration. This had not been granted by the tribunal, which instead granted several extensions to Iraq. The Court decided that the tribunal had a duty:

[...] to adapt its obligation of celerity in the conduct of the arbitration to these exceptional events, all the more since the claimant had waited 15 years to introduce the arbitration and did so 8 months after the war broke out in Iraq, and that the granting by the tribunal of extensions of two to three months to make filings was not, in the circumstances, of such a nature as to re-establish equality between the parties and the loyalty of the debates.

The Court deemed as a consequence that Iraq had been placed ‘in a substantially disadvantageous situation' compared to the claimants. Interestingly, the Court did not state what the tribunal should have been doing in the circumstances.

Proceedings involving the ICC - respective roles of the juge d'appui and the institution

In a decision rendered on 24 May 2016,35 the Paris Court of Appeal held that the ability for parties to choose to submit their dispute to an arbitral institution prevents the juge d'appui 36 from being able to intervene and rule on an issue that should be resolved by the arbitral institution under its arbitration rules. This case concerned an ICC arbitration between Cameroon and a Belgian company, Garoube. Because Garoube had failed to pay the additional advance on costs fixed by the ICC, the ICC informed the parties that the claims should be considered as withdrawn, and invited the arbitral tribunal to suspend its activities. Garoube seized the juge d'appui, being the President of the Paris First Instance Tribunal. The juge d'appui held that the ICC decision amounted to a breach of the right to a fair trial, and ordered the ICC to restore the claims and invite the arbitral tribunal to resume its activities and render an award on the first phase of the arbitration. The ICC moved to seize the Paris Court of Appeal, and requested that the decision rendered by the juge d'appui be reversed on the basis that he had exceeded his powers. The Court of Appeal first held that the ability for the parties to decide that their dispute will be submitted to an arbitral institution excludes the possibility for the juge d'appui to intervene, except in the silence of the institution's rules. In addition, it specified that when a party disputes the performance by the arbitral institution of the arbitration agreement, it should seize the competent judge, being the court having jurisdiction to hear contractual claims, not the juge d'appui. Finally, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the juge d'appui based on the ground that he had exceeded its powers in substituting himself for the arbitral institution, and breached the adversarial principle when rendering his decision without hearing the respondent in the arbitration, Cameroon.

In a separate case, the Paris First Instance Tribunal also considered that it had jurisdiction to decide whether two decisions taken by the ICC Court of Arbitration should be set aside.37 The case concerned a contract entered into by two companies, Heli Union and Airbus Helicopters, in 2010. In accordance with the contract, Airbus Helicopters undertook to provide four helicopters to Heli Union. In 2014, Heli Union requested the termination of the contract and the reimbursement of the deposit paid at the signature of the contract, as well as damages.

In 2016, Heli Union submitted the dispute to the ICC. During the proceedings, the Secretariat and the Court fixed different advances on costs and provided for different allocations of said costs between the parties. Heli Union seized the Paris First Instance Tribunal to request the annulment of the last two decisions of the ICC Court on advances on costs. Heli Union argued that the First Instance Tribunal had jurisdiction over this case since it was the only one competent to decide issues of denial of justice and breaches of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to a fair trial. Airbus Helicopters and the ICC alleged that Heli Union's claim was inadmissible on the ground that from the moment the parties had agreed to the arbitration clause, the arbitration rules of the selected institution must apply to the parties and their relationship. The First Instance Tribunal held that Heli Union's claim was admissible, as it concerned the enforcement of the contract with the Institution, and analysed whether the decisions taken by the ICC Court were in conformity with the ICC Arbitration Rules. It considered that they were and declared the claim unfounded. It added that when alleging that the allocation of costs was disproportionate, Heli Union never argued that it was in a situation of impecuniosity that prevented it from paying the advance on costs and would deprive it of its right to a fair trial, which would have constituted a denial of justice. Consequently, it rejected the claims.

International arbitration and French administrative courts

As mentioned in last year's edition,38 on 17 May 2010, the Tribunal des Conflits39 rendered an important decision40 on jurisdictional issues stemming from the separation of the administrative and judicial courts, and the existence of two parallel systems in France. In this case, the Tribunal des Conflits reached the decision that when a contract was administrative in nature and at the same time involved the interest of international trade (i.e., was capable of being settled in international arbitration in French international arbitration law parlance), any challenge against an award made under such contract should fall under the jurisdiction of the judicial courts, except in specific cases that should be brought before the administrative courts. The Council of State (the highest French court for administrative matters) also held on 19 April 2013 that a challenge against an award rendered in France in a dispute arising from a contract concluded between a French public entity and a foreign private party had to be brought before French administrative courts.41 However, the decision would not be the same for awards rendered outside of France. In such case, administrative courts could not hear the challenge against the award; instead, judicial courts would have jurisdiction. The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed this approach in a decision of 10 September 2013 on the basis of the principle of separation between administrative and judicial courts.42 Nevertheless, the Court of Cassation reversed this decision on 8 July 2015, reasoning that judicial courts should have exclusive jurisdiction to order enforcement in France of awards rendered outside France.43 The thrust of that decision is that having an administrative court review the award, and potentially its merits under French administrative law, contravenes French international obligations under the New York Convention, which the Court of Cassation added was part of the ‘international arbitral legal order'.

In a decision rendered on 9 November 2016,44 the Council of State took a different position and set aside an award rendered in arbitral proceedings between a French public entity and foreign private parties. It confirmed the jurisdiction of French administrative courts to rule upon awards rendered in international arbitration dealing with administrative contracts in two situations: when the award was rendered in France, and when enforcement of the award was requested in France, regardless of the seat of the arbitration. In its decision, the Council of State explained that its role was not to review the award on the merits but to ensure that the arbitrators' decision did not violate a public policy rule. It also established the modalities of its control of the award and set out the different elements it had to review to decide whether the award should be set aside. The Council of State first held that it had to review the legality of the arbitration clause. Additionally, it held that an award shall be set aside if:

  • a the arbitral tribunal decided the dispute without jurisdiction;
  • b the arbitral tribunal was unlawfully constituted;
  • c it decided that the dispute was contrary to its mandate;
  • d the adversarial principle was violated; or
  • e the arbitral tribunal did not state reasons for its decision.

These grounds largely mirror the grounds for annulment listed in Article 1520 CPC and applied by judicial courts. The fact that both administrative and judicial courts now claim to have jurisdiction over annulment proceedings of awards in certain circumstances adds some unwarranted complexity and uncertainty to French law of international arbitration, which one would hope will be resolved by some legislative intervention.

Investment treaty awards

In February 2017, the Paris Court of Appeal for the first time rendered a decision in relation to an award rendered under the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules.45 This case concerned a dispute arising from different mining concessions between a Canadian company, Gold Reserve, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Based on the Canadian-Venezuela bilateral investment treaty (treaty), on 21 October 2009, Gold Reserve initiated arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules. After five years of proceedings, in 2014, the arbitral tribunal awarded US$740 million to the Canadian company.

Venezuela challenged the award before French courts. Venezuela first alleged that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because Gold Reserve had acquired Canadian nationality only after restructuring its company, and consequently could not be considered as meeting the requirements under the treaty. Venezuela also asserted that the organisation of the hearing was not fair, given that the arbitral tribunal had refused to postpone the hearing following the death of Venezuela's Attorney General. Additionally, Venezuela argued that the arbitral tribunal violated the adversarial principle by using a method for calculating damages that had not been raised by the parties. Venezuela also claimed that the arbitral tribunal rendered its award in equity and that its decision was based on ideological considerations. Finally, Venezuela argued that the arbitral tribunal ruled on the dispute contrary to its mandate due to its misunderstanding of the different companies constituting the Gold Reserve Group.

The Paris Court of Appeal rejected all of Venezuela's claims. It first decided that the arbitral tribunal had correctly decided that the claimant had an investment under the relevant bilateral investment treaty. It then dismissed an argument by Venezuela that it had not been treated fairly in the arbitration following the decease of its agent in the case. It also rejected two arguments that the arbitral tribunal was motivated by ‘ideological considerations' and had not based its decision on the applicable law, on the one hand, and had granted indemnification to the wrong party on the other.

The absence of consequences in France of the setting aside of an award at the seat of the arbitration

Following the awards on the merits rendered in July 2014 in Yukos, Yukos' shareholders sought recognition and enforcement of the awards in several jurisdictions around the world, including first and foremost France. The fact that, in April 2016, The Hague District Court decided to set aside the awards on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal did not stop Yukos' shareholders' efforts to seek enforcement of the awards in France.

In two decisions rendered on 5 October 2016,46 the Paris Court of Appeal, seized with an action to decide on the validity of various enforcement measures made against the interests of certain Russian state-owned entities, stated that it did not belong to it to decide that the action had become without purpose based on the decision of The Hague Court to set aside the awards, because a separate chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal had been seized of that action separately. Although the Court did not directly address the point, leaving it to a further decision of the Court of Appeal, the fact that it had no difficulty with the setting aside of the awards in The Hague is in line with the long-standing position of French courts to the effect that the setting aside of an award at the seat of the arbitration is not a ground to refuse recognition and enforcement of that award in France.47


While the French legal system, which has traditionally favoured international arbitration, has consolidated some of its bases in 2016, with a new Article 2061 of the Civil Code for instance, it has also seen some less desirable developments such as the Sapin II Law, making it more difficult now to enforce arbitral awards against sovereigns in France or the uncertainties surrounding the regime of awards rendered against French public entities involving some French administrative law questions. These are signs that should remind all actors concerned that the balance of the French international arbitration ‘ecosystem' should never be taken for granted, although there is no doubt a willingness of the majority of such actors, courts, legislators and practitioners alike, to continue to nurture it.

1 Jean-Christophe Honlet and Barton Legum are partners, Anne-Sophie Dufêtre is of counsel and Annelise Lecompte is an associate at Dentons.

2 Available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/11/18/JUSX1515639L/jo.

3 This is in line with French case law, which has long retained a ‘principle of validity' of arbitration clauses in international matters. Civ 1, 5 January 1999, Case No. 96-21430.

4 Civ 1, 21 May 1997, Case No. 95-11427; Civ 1, 30 March 2004, Case No. 02-12259.

5 Soc. 12 March 2008, Case No. 01-44654.

6 Available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do?idDocument=JORFDOLE000032319792&type=general&legislature=14.

7 The International Arbitration Review, Seventh Edition, 2016, pp. 210-1.

8 Civ 1, 28 September 2011, Case No. 09-72057.

9 Civ 1, 28 March 2013, Case No. 11-13323.

10 Civ 1, 13 May 2015, Case No. 13-17751.

11 Available at iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration.

12 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 30 and Appendix VI.

13 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 30(2)(a) and Appendix VI, Article 1(2).

14 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 30(2)(b).

15 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 30(3).

16 ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix VI, Article 2(1).

17 ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix VI, Article 3(3).

18 ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix VI, Article 3(2).

19 ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix VI, Article 3(5).

20 ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix VI, Article 4(1).

21 The International Arbitration Review, Seventh Edition, 2016, pp. 208-9.

22 CA Paris, 12 April 2016, Case No. 14-14884.

23 Civ 1, 25 May 2016, Case No. 14-20532.

24 Civ 1, 31 March 2016, Case No. 14-20396.

25 CA Paris, 30 October 2012, Case No. 11-08277.

26 CA Paris, 10 March 2011, Case No. 09-21413.

27 Chamber Arbitration Rules, Article VIII:

[…] As from the date of commencement of the arbitration proceedings as notified to the parties pursuant to Article IX hereunder, the parties are allowed a period of fifteen clear days to submit in writing to the President of the Chambre any motivated request for withdrawal for the reasons given here above. With reference to Article 1456 of the CPC, the parties are allowed the same period to make known to the Committee their motivated refusal to accept the appointment of an arbitrator who has informed them of a reason for withdrawal he has supposed exists as regards himself personally […]

28 The International Arbitration Review, Sixth Edition, 2015, pp. 254-6.

29 See CA Paris, 18 November 2004, Case No. 02-19606 (Thales case). See also Civ 1, 4 June 2008, Case No. 06-15320 (SNF case).

30 See CA Paris, 4 March 2014, Case No. 12-17681 and CA Paris, 14 October 2014, Case No. 13-03410, CA Paris, 4 November 2014, Case No. 13-10256, CA Paris, 23 September 2014, Case No. 12-21810, 13-09296, 13-17187.

31 See The International Arbitration Review, Sixth Edition, 2015, pp. 255-6.

32 CA Paris, 27 September 2016, Case No. 15-12614.

33 CA Paris, 21 February 2017, Case No. 15-01650. CA Paris, 16 May 2017, Cases No. 15-17442 and 23790.

34 CA Paris, 8 November 2016, Case No. 13-12002.

35 CA Paris, 24 May 2016, Case No. 15-23553.

36 The juge d'appui is competent, inter alia, over issues that might arise in the designation of the members of the arbitral tribunal.

37 TGI Paris, 19 December 2016, Case No. 16-15973.

38 The International Arbitration Review, Seventh Edition, 2016, p. 211.

39 The Tribunal des Conflits is a French court that decides which among the judicial or administrative courts have jurisdiction to hear any given case.

40 Tribunal des Conflits, 17 May 2010, Case No. 10-03754.

41 Council of State, 19 April 2013, Case No. 352750.

42 CA Paris, 10 September 2013, Case No. 12-11596.

43 Civ 1, 8 July 2015, Case No. 13-25846.

44 Council of State, 9 November 2016, Case No. 388806.

45 CA Paris, 7 February 2017, Case No. 14-21103.

46 CA Paris, 5 October 2016, Case No. 16-09363 and Case No. 16-02572.

47 Civ 1, 23 May 1994, Case No. 92-15137, Civ 1, 29 June 2007, Case No. 05-18053.