The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation formed of seven individual emirates, with its administrative capital in Abu Dhabi. The UAE was formed on 2 December 1971, following the dissolution of the former Trucial States.

The UAE Provisional Constitution was adopted upon the UAE's formation. It defines the political and legal framework of the UAE, including the allocation of powers between the federal government and the government of each individual emirate. While the individual emirates are subject to UAE federal law, they retain the right to pass their own laws in areas that are not otherwise reserved for federal jurisdiction, and they remain in control of their own internal administration. Laws that were in effect in the individual emirates prior to the formation of the UAE also continue to remain in effect unless they are superseded by federal law, conflict with federal law or are repealed by the government of the relevant emirate.

As an Islamic country, UAE law is heavily influenced by the Islamic shariah, and shariah still applies directly in areas such as family law and the law of succession. The UAE is predominantly a civil law jurisdiction, with a codified system that shares many features with Egyptian law. In common with other civil law jurisdictions, the UAE does not recognise a system of binding precedent, although decisions of the higher courts can be used as persuasive (but not binding) authority. There can be practical difficulties in obtaining copies of decided cases, however, as there is no regular system of reporting and copies of decisions are sometimes only made available to the parties involved.

Three emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Ras Al Khaimah) continue to maintain their own individual court systems, which apply both federal law and the laws of the relevant emirate. The remaining four emirates (Sharjah, Ajman, Um Al Quwain and Fujairah) all participate in a federal court system, which has the Federal Supreme Court (sometimes referred to as the Union Supreme Court) at its head. Each of the federal courts and the courts of individual emirates conduct proceedings entirely in Arabic. Lawyers must be licensed as advocates to file cases and to appear before the courts, a requirement that essentially limits rights of audience to Emirati nationals.

An important feature of the UAE legal landscape is the existence of freezones. These are defined areas that are exempted from aspects of both UAE federal law and local emirate law. The two most significant freezones for the purposes of arbitration in the UAE are the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM). The DIFC and the ADGM each have separate and distinct systems of law, which are based predominately on English common law. They each also have their own courts, which operate in English apply to rules of procedure that are based heavily on those used by the English High Court. The DIFC has been in existence since 2002, and in operation since 2004. The ADGM is much newer, having been established in 2013.

There is, as yet, no UAE federal arbitration law. This is despite various attempts, including draft arbitration laws that were released for consultation in 2008, 2010 and 2012. UAE arbitration law (other than in the DIFC and ADGM) instead comprises only a small number of provisions of the Federal Civil Procedure Law.2 These provisions are not based on the UNCITRAL model law; nor do they otherwise reflect what might be considered ‘best practice' in the international arbitration community.

When combined with the UAE courts' inconsistent approach to arbitration-related cases, the lack of a modern arbitration law can sometimes be problematic. There are many procedural pitfalls into which the unwary may fall, and the UAE courts have shown themselves willing on occasion to entertain arguments based upon these pitfalls. It is generally accepted, for example, that the Federal Civil Procedure Law requires all members of an arbitral tribunal physically to be in the UAE when signing the award, even if they have to travel to Dubai solely for this purpose.3 Arbitrators must also sign every page of their award, or else risk having it set aside, even where the award is hundreds of pages long and has to be issued in triplicate.4 Then, of course, there is the requirement for witnesses to give their evidence on oath,5 as illustrated by the now infamous Bechtel case, in which an arbitral award was set aside despite the parties' express agreement that a simple affirmation would suffice.6

In contrast, both the DIFC and ADGM have modern and well-drafted arbitration laws. The DIFC Arbitration Law7 was adopted in 2008, and amended in 2013. It closely follows the 2006 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The DIFC's reputation as a ‘pro arbitration' jurisdiction is further enhanced by a high-quality bench, which has a track record of decisions that demonstrate their willingness to support arbitration proceedings and properly to enforce awards. The ADGM has an arbitration law8 that is based on the 2006 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law, together with elements of the English Arbitration Act.9 Like the DIFC, the ADGM also has a high-quality bench, although it is relatively new and so has yet to establish a track record of positive decisions on arbitration-related cases.

There are three main arbitral institutions in the UAE, two of which are based in Dubai and the third in Abu Dhabi. These are the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), the DIFC-LCIA and the Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Centre (ADCCAC). DIAC is the older and more established of the two Dubai-based institutions, and is often seen as synonymous with arbitration seated ‘onshore' (i.e., outside of the DIFC) Dubai. The DIFC-LCIA is an offshoot of the LCIA based in the DIFC. ADCCAC is based in Abu Dhabi, and is still the institution of choice for many entities based in the capital. As yet, there is no arbitration institution based in the ADGM, although it is likely that such an institution will be announced in the relatively near future.


i Establishment of a judicial tribunal for the Dubai courts and the DIFC courts

For a number of years, the DIFC courts have taken a broad view of their jurisdiction. This is apparent from cases such as National Bonds v. Taaleem,10 in which the DIFC Court of Appeal held that a reference to the ‘Court of Dubai' was intended to mean the DIFC courts,11 and Corinth v. Barclays Bank plc,12 in which the DIFC Court of Appeal held that the DIFC courts had jurisdiction over the global operations of a well-known English bank because there was a branch of that bank in the DIFC. Perhaps most controversial, however, is the DIFC courts' willingness to entertain the use of the DIFC as a ‘conduit' jurisdiction for the enforcement of arbitral awards in ‘onshore' Dubai. This is possible because the Judicial Authority Law13 permits a party with an arbitral award in its favour first to take that award to the DIFC courts for recognition before seeking execution of the resultant DIFC court judgment in the Dubai courts.14 In cases such as Eagan v. Eava,15 Meydan Group v. Banyan Tree16 and Fiske v. Firuzeh,17 the DIFC courts have permitted the DIFC to be used in this manner, even where there are no assets or other connection with the DIFC, and where the award in question was not a foreign award but was issued in ‘onshore' Dubai.

This broad view of the DIFC courts' jurisdiction has led to potential conflicts in jurisdiction between the DIFC courts and the courts of ‘onshore' Dubai. This is thought to be the main reason for Decree No. 19 of 2016, which was issued by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Mahktoum, Ruler of Dubai and Vice President of the UAE, on 9 June 2016 (Decree). The Decree establishes a judicial committee that is tasked with resolving conflicts of jurisdiction between the Dubai courts and the DIFC courts.18 The committee is chaired by the President of the Dubai Court of Cassation and comprises three other judges of the Dubai courts, together with three DIFC court judges. In the event of a tie, the chair of the committee has the casting vote. This means that there is an inbuilt majority for the ‘Dubai court' members of the committee.

Some potential issues with the Decree were identified shortly after it became public knowledge. There is no obvious right for a respondent to any application to the committee be heard. Indeed, the Decree does not even require a respondent to be notified that an application has been made to the committee, or to be provided with a copy of its decision. This is particularly troublesome as the decisions of the committee appear to be final, binding and not subject to any right of appeal.19

Although the committee's decisions are not reported publicly, copies of its first four decisions have now become available through unofficial channels. These decisions are dual-language (Arabic and English) and brief, with relatively little by way of reasoning. In substance, two of the four decisions are relatively uncontroversial.20 Those decisions rejected applications to stay ongoing DIFC court proceedings because there were no ongoing proceedings in the Dubai courts. As there were no parallel proceedings, there was no conflict of jurisdiction.

Of more concern are the other two decisions of the committee. Those cases involved attempts by award creditors to use the DIFC as a conduit jurisdiction for the enforcement of ‘onshore' Dubai-seated arbitral awards.21 In both decisions, the committee ordered that the DIFC courts should ‘cease to entertain' proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards at issue in favour of proceedings that had been brought before the Dubai courts challenging the validity of those awards. These decisions were passed by majority vote, in each case, with all the DIFC court members of the committee dissenting.

On their face, at least, these two decisions of the committee may seriously curtail the ‘conduit' jurisdiction of the DIFC courts, at least with regard to Dubai-seated arbitral awards. In fact, the Daman Real Estate decision is not an example of a ‘conduit jurisdiction' case at all, as the award debtor in that case is based in the DIFC and likely has assets within the DIFC against which the arbitral award can be enforced. It should also not be controversial that the courts of the seat of the arbitration (in this case ‘onshore' Dubai) have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the award, and so only the Dubai courts can hear an action to have the award set aside. In any event, the reasoning of the committee does not apply directly either to foreign awards or foreign court judgments, and so does not obviously affect the ‘conduit jurisdiction' of the DIFC courts in those specific contexts.

Compounding the uncertainty created by the first decisions of the committee is a recent judgment of the Dubai Court of First Instance in the long-running case of Meydan v. Banyan Tree. In that judgment, the Dubai court purported to annul decisions of both the DIFC Court of First Instance and the DIFC Court of Appeal in one of the first ‘conduit' jurisdiction cases. Referring to the committee's decision in Daman Real Estate, the Dubai Court of First Instance concluded that the DIFC courts lacked jurisdiction to recognise and enforce an ‘onshore' Dubai seated arbitral award because there were no assets against which to enforce within the DIFC. The Dubai courts' judgment in this case is problematic for a number of reasons, not least because it seems to be inconsistent with the Judicial Authority Law. It is anticipated that the decision may soon be the subject of an appeal.

ii Article 257 of the UAE Federal Penal Code

In a development that has caused significant consternation in the UAE arbitration community, a recent change to Article 257 of the UAE Penal Code22 imposes criminal liability
on arbitrators, experts and translators who issue decisions and opinions contrary to their duties of integrity and impartiality. This amendment became effective on 18 October 2016, and represents a major change to the prior law, which imposed a lower standard and which affected only court-appointed experts and translators.

There are various problems with the new Article 257. Perhaps most significantly, there is no definition of key terms such as ‘integrity' and ‘impartiality'. This makes it very hard for arbitrators, experts and translators to know precisely what is required of them if they are to avoid falling foul of Article 257. There is also no apparent requirement for any form of intent or conscious act, so that an arbitrator, expert or translator may be punished under Article 257 even though he or she has acted entirely inadvertently. This is particularly concerning given the possible penalties for breach of Article 257, which include a lengthy period of imprisonment, and a ban on acting as an arbitrator, expert or translator in the future.

Of most concern, however, is the potential for Article 257 to be misused by parties or their counsel. Even prior to the new Article 257, there were instances in which criminal complaints were made against arbitrators by a party unhappy with the outcome of their case. Article 257 now provides a clear basis for unfounded complaints to the authorities. A criminal complaint under Article 257 would likely result in temporary imprisonment, or at least confiscation of the subject's passport, while the complaint is investigated.

There is extensive anecdotal evidence that the new Article 257, while no doubt well-intentioned, is already having unfortunate consequences for arbitration in the UAE. Several arbitrators have resigned their appointments in response to Article 257, and many more are refusing to accept future appointments in UAE-seated arbitrations. The same is true of many experts. There are also reports of Article 257 being used to threaten arbitrators in ongoing proceedings.

iii Changes to the DIFC-LCIA rules

The DIFC-LCIA has issued the first revision to its arbitration rules, which apply to all DIFC-LCIA arbitrations commenced on or after 1 October 2016. The changes to the DIFC-LCIA arbitration rules bring them into line with the current version of the LCIA rules, to which revisions were made in 2014.

Key changes in the new DIFC-LCIA rules include:

  • a emergency arbitrator provisions: parties will now have the option of applying to the LCIA court for the appointment of a temporary sole arbitrator to conduct what are termed ‘emergency proceedings'. The emergency arbitrator will have power to deal with claims for ‘emergency relief', which is not defined but is likely to include injunctions or orders for specific performance;
  • b provision for the consolidation of arbitrations: the arbitral tribunal will have greater powers to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings;
  • c legal representation: the new rules give arbitral tribunals more power regarding the appointment, replacement and conduct of the parties' legal representation. The revised rules require parties to seek a tribunal's approval of any changes to their legal representation. Importantly, the tribunal can withhold any such approval where the change could ‘compromise the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the finality of any award';
  • d conduct of legal representatives: annexed to the new rules are General Guidelines for the Parties' Legal Representations, which are identical to those found annexed to the 2014 revision of the LCIA Arbitration Rules. The revised rules give arbitral tribunals powers to take quasi-disciplinary action against legal representatives who breach these guidelines; and
  • e arbitrators' availability: the new rules require prospective arbitrators to confirm that they have sufficient availability for the arbitration proceedings to be conducted expeditiously. An arbitrator's appointment can now be revoked if he or she does not conduct proceedings with reasonable diligence and efficiency.

In addition to these new rules, the DIFC-LCIA also has a new Registrar, Robert Stephen. Mr Stephen's appointment as Registrar took effect from 1 May 2017. He took over from the previous registrar, Mr Mohamed ElGhatit, who was appointed in February 2016.

iv Consultation draft of new DIAC rules

Dubai's other main arbitration institute, DIAC, has also been innovating over the past year. In August 2016, DIAC issued a draft of a revised set of arbitration rules for public consultation. These new rules are intended to replace the existing rules, which have been in effect since 2007 and which are now showing their age.

The draft DIAC rules are similar in many respects to the new DIFC-LCIA rules. For example, the draft DIAC rules contain emergency arbitrator provisions, and provisions for the expedited formation of arbitral tribunals. The draft DIAC rules also fix some of the well-known problems with the current rules, most obviously by including specific reference to an arbitral tribunal's authority to award the costs of legal representation. The consultation period for the draft DIAC rules has now closed, and it is anticipated that the new rules will come into effect at some point this year.

In addition to its draft new rules, DIAC has recently also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the DIFC Dispute Resolution Authority (DIFC DRA). The DIFC DRA replaced the DIFC Judicial Authority and has taken over governing the DIFC courts, as well as other DIFC judicial and academic institutions. The MOU seeks to expedite the recognition and enforcement of DIAC arbitration awards in the DIFC courts. In addition, DIAC has opened an office in the DIFC, again with the aim of expediting and assisting with the enforcement of DIAC arbitration awards in the DIFC courts. Although not included in the consultation draft that was published last year, it is also understood that the new DIAC rules, when they come into effect, will provide for the DIFC to be the default seat for DIAC arbitrations.

v DIFC courts Technology and Construction Division

The DIFC courts have recently held a public consultation regarding a new draft Part 56 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts. This draft concerns the establishment of a specialist Technology
and Construction Division to hear claims involving ‘issues or questions which are technically complex'.23 The Division will be headed by a judge appointed to be in charge of the division.24

Although the draft rules do not define the term ‘technically complex', there is a non-exhaustive list of examples.25 These include building, construction and engineering disputes, claims by or against architects, engineers and other consultants, and disputes relating to computers, software and network systems. Also included are challenges to arbitrators' decisions in construction and engineering disputes.26

The draft rules appear to be aimed at encouraging parties to choose the DIFC courts to resolve technically complex disputes, including construction cases, the clear majority of which are currently referred to arbitration. The Technology and Construction Division is to be modelled closely on the English Technology and Construction Court, which has proved popular as a forum for technically or factually complex cases.

The draft rules were published on 20 March 2017, and the consultation period ended on 22 April 2017.

vi Arbitration developments in UAE courts (excluding the DIFC)

In recent years, the UAE courts have developed something approaching a track record on the enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly foreign awards under the New York Convention.27 Against this positive background, two recent decisions of the Dubai Court of Cassation (the highest court in Dubai) are a salient reminder of some of the inconsistencies that can persist when dealing with arbitration matters before the ‘onshore' UAE courts.

The first case concerned an attempt by an award creditor to enforce a London-seated ICC award in the Dubai courts.28 In March 2016, the Dubai Court of Appeal refused enforcement because it was not satisfied that the United Kingdom was a signatory to the New York Convention. This decision was appealed to the Dubai Court of Cassation, which moved with commendable speed to find that the United Kingdom was party to the New York Convention, reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordering enforcement of the award. The Dubai Court of Cassation issued its judgment on 19 June 2016.

In many respects, the Dubai Court of Cassation's judgment is very encouraging. Not only did the Court of Cassation move quickly to overturn what was generally recognised as a ‘rogue' Court of Appeal judgment, but it recognised expressly that enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE should take place pursuant to the New York Convention, rather than the more onerous requirements of the Civil Procedure Law.29 Unfortunately, while the Dubai Court of Cassation undoubtedly reached the correct result, it did so on what many will see as the wrong grounds. This is because the UAE did not make the reciprocity reservation when it became party to the New York Convention. The New York Convention therefore requires the UAE courts to enforce all foreign arbitral awards, and not just arbitral awards issued in countries that are also signatories to the New York Convention.

The second case concerns an application to the Dubai courts by an award debtor seeking to set aside an award that had been issued in a Dubai-seated DIAC arbitration. In that case, which remains unreported, it is understood that the award creditor argued that Article 216(1) of the Civil Procedure Law does not permit an application to set aside an award until the award creditor has sought to have that award ratified or enforced in the UAE. The award creditor had not sought ratification of the award in the UAE as it was instead in the process of enforcing overseas.

The Dubai Court of Cassation seems to have accepted the award creditor's argument, finding that the Civil Procedure Law could not be used to challenge an arbitral award until there had been an application to ratify or to enforce the award. In reaching this conclusion, the Dubai Court of Cassation appears to have departed from numerous other cases in which the opposite conclusion was reached.30 The Court also seems to have overlooked Article 213(3) of the Civil Procedure Law, which is usually taken to provide a clear right for an award debtor to challenge an award.

This case is particularly surprising, as if it were to be followed it would effectively leave award debtors with no way to challenge an UAE-seated arbitral award unless the award creditor seeks to ratify or enforce that award before the UAE courts. Of course, no other courts will have jurisdiction to hear a set-aside application where the arbitration proceedings are seated in the UAE.

vii Arbitration developments in the DIFC courts

The DIFC courts have demonstrated a pro-arbitration stance throughout their history, and this has continued in their most recent arbitration-related decisions.

In Ginette v. Geary,31 an award debtor applied to the DIFC courts to set aside a DIFC-seated award issued under the DIFC-LCIA rules, arguing that the individual who signed the contract containing the arbitration agreement did not have authority to agree to arbitration. The DIFC Court of First Instance rejected that argument, finding that the individual signatory had apparent authority even if he lacked actual authority under the articles of association of the relevant company. There was a dispute in that case as to whether DIFC law or Dubai law applied, and so the judge considered the issue under both (he ultimately found that DIFC law applied). Relying on a Dubai Court of Cassation decision from 2014,32 the judge found that UAE law also recognised the doctrine of apparent authority, such that there would be the same result regardless of whether DIFC law or UAE law applied.

In Gavin v. Gaynor,33 the DIFC Court of First Instance found that a reference in a contract to ‘the courts in Dubai, the UAE' was a reference to the DIFC courts, and a reference to ‘the law of the UAE law' was a reference to DIFC law. On that basis, the DIFC Court of First Instance held that the DIFC was the parties' implied choice of seat for arbitration proceedings where no seat had otherwise been specified. Interestingly, in that case the DIFC courts relied on evidence of a meeting that took place in the DIFC post-contract to find that the DIFC courts had jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5 of the Judicial Authority Law.

In two further cases, the DIFC courts demonstrated their respect for the proper limits of their jurisdiction. In Gaetan v. Geneva,34 an application to the DIFC courts for the appointment of an arbitrator was refused because the arbitration agreement at issue was invalid. This was the result of Article 6 of UAE Federal Law No 18 of 1981, pursuant to which the defendant in the case had previously referred the dispute to the Committee of Commercial Agencies. The DIFC court also went on to find that it would have lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator even if the arbitration agreement had been valid, because the arbitration agreement did not confer jurisdiction on the DIFC courts, and none of the other jurisdictional ‘gateways' otherwise applied.

In Brookfield v. DIFC Investments,35 the DIFC Court of First Instance declined to grant an anti-suit injunction restraining a party from maintaining proceedings brought before the ‘onshore' Dubai courts for the appointment of an expert engineer. In that case, the DIFC courts found that there was no breach of the arbitration agreement because the Dubai court expert proceedings were not binding upon the parties, and so could not have any impact on the parties' substantive rights. The DIFC courts concluded that they had jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit injunction in the terms sought, but ultimately took the view that ‘it would be an unusual and exceptional case where the Court [would issue an anti-suit injunction], particularly bearing in mind the appropriate respect that the courts of the two different systems in the Emirate of Dubai must have for each other'.


It will be apparent from the discussion above that arbitration in the UAE has had a challenging year. The impact of the Decree is still far from certain, but there are concerning signs that the upcoming year may prove difficult for those seeking to rely upon the DIFC as a ‘conduit' jurisdiction for the enforcement of arbitral awards. Article 257 of the Federal Penal Code is perhaps even more worrying, particularly given the huge amount of negative publicity that it has generated.

The outlook for the future is far from bleak, however, not least because of the continued work of the DIFC courts and the recent and continued innovations by both major arbitration centres in Dubai. The UAE courts, and particularly the Dubai courts, have shown an ever-greater willingness to enforce arbitral awards in recent years, and that trend is not undermined solely by the two cases decided by the Dubai courts in the past year. Indeed, in one of those cases the Dubai Court of Cassation showed itself to be ‘pro-arbitration' even if the reasoning adopted may potentially be incorrect. What is still needed above all else is a modern, fit-for-purpose federal arbitration law. If and when such a law is promulgated, the landscape for arbitration in the UAE, and the outlook for the future, will quickly become much more positive.

1 Stephen Burke is a partner at Baker Botts LLP.

2 Law No. 11 of 1992, as amended by Law No. 10 of 2014.

3 Article 212(4) of the Federal Civil Procedure Law.

4 Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 156 of 2009.

5 As required by Article 211 of the UAE Federal Civil Procedure Law.

6 International Bechtel Co, Ltd v. Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai (Petition No. 503/2003).

7 DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008, as amended by DIFC Amendment Law No. 1 of 2013.

8 ADGM Arbitration Regulation 2015.

9 Arbitration Act 1996.

10 National Bonds Corporation PJSC v. (1) Taaleem PJSC and (2) Deyaar Development PJSC [2011] DIFC CA 001.

11 See also Investment Group Private Limited v. Standard Chartered Bank [2015] DIFC CA 004 and Gavin v. Gaynor [2015] DIFC CFI 017.

12 Corinth Pipeworks SA v. Barclays Bank Plc [2011] DIFC CA 002.

13 Law No. 12 of 2004 in respect of the Judicial Authority at Dubai International Financial Centre, as amended.

14 Article 7 of the Judicial Authority Law.

15 (1) Egan (2) Eggert v. (1) Eava (2) Efa [2013] DIFC ARB 002.

16 Meydan Group LLC v. Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd [2014] DIFC CA 005.

17 (1) Fiske (2) Firmin v. Firuzeh [2014] DIFC ARB 001.

18 Article 2 of the Decree.

19 This is suggested by Article 3B of the Decree.

20 Cassation Case No. 5 of 2016 (Gulf Navigation Holding PJSC v. DNB Bank ASA), relating to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and Cassation Case No. 3 of 2016 (Marine Logistics Solutions LLC v. Wadi Woraya LLC), relating to the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.

21 Cassation Case No. 1 of 2016 (Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Limited v. Oger Dubai LLC) and Cassation Case No. 2 of 2016 (Dubai Waterfront LLC v. Chenshan Liu).

22 UAE Federal Law No. 7 of 2016.

23 Draft Rule 56.3.

24 Draft Rule 56.6.

25 Draft Rule 56.3 (1) to (10).

26 Draft Rule 56.3(10).

27 See, for example, Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 132 of 2012 (Airmec Dubai, LLC v. Maxtel International LLC), Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 434 of 2014 (Al Reyami Group LLC v. BTI Befestigungstechuk GmbH & Co of KG) and Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 693 of 2015.

28 Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 384 of 2016.

29 UAE Federal Law No. 11 of 1992.

30 For example, Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 274 of 2013 and Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 292 of 2012.

31 Ginette PJSC v. (1) Geary Middle East FZE (2) Geary Limited [2015] DIFC ARB 012.

32 Dubai Court of Cassation Case No. 547 of 2014.

33 [2015] DIFC CFI 017.

34 Gaetan Inc v. Geneva Investment Group LLC [2015] DIFC ARB 010.

35 Brookfield Multiplex Constructions LLC v. (1) DIFC Investments LLC (2) Dubai International Financial Centre Authority [2016] DIFC CFI 020.