The current US corporate lending market is sophisticated, extremely large and highly varied, having numerous types of borrowers, loan products and lenders. According to Thomson Reuters LPC, there was an aggregate of approximately US$2.5 trillion of loans issued to corporate borrowers in the United States in 2017, with leveraged loans accounting for approximately US$1.4 trillion. Borrowers span every industry, and the loan markets they can access depends in large part on their capitalisation and credit profile. Loan products span from unsecured revolving credit facilities for investment grade companies and widely syndicated covenant-lite term loan facilities for large-cap leveraged loan borrowers to more traditional ‘club deal’ senior secured credit facilities for middle market borrowers (generally defined as borrowers with less than US$500 million in annual sales or less than US$50 million in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA)). Lenders include traditional banks, finance companies and institutional investors such as collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), hedge funds, loan participation funds, pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies.

In general, loan issuance volume has remained relatively high in recent years, although there has also been increased volatility. The US loan market continues to experience adjustments for a changing regulatory environment – in particular, the leveraged lending guidelines issued by federal regulators in March 2013, which were further clarified in November 2014 by a FAQ issued on the guidance, seem to be continuing to have a strong influence on the loan markets, though late in 2017 the fate of the guidance was thrown into doubt (as discussed in more detail below).

Leveraged loan issuance levels related to M&A increased significantly during 2017. Thomson Reuters LPC noted that leveraged loan issuances related to M&A jumped by 15 per cent in 2017, and leveraged buyout (LBO) activity (which accounted for approximately 40 per cent of all M&A loan issuances in 2017) was up 44 per cent from 2016. Thomson Reuters LPC also reports a sharp increase in the market share of refinancing activity, as opposed to new-money loans.

The US leveraged loan market remains relatively favourable for borrowers, in a multi-year trend that has persisted since the recovery from the financial crisis. For example, the market share of covenant-lite loans, which depends on incurrence-based covenants rather than maintenance covenants, has been increasing consistently since the hiatus during the financial crisis. Other borrower-favourable terms that remain prevalent in the US leveraged loan market include soft-call prepayment premiums, the ability to incur refinancing facilities, the ability to buy back loans in the market on a non-pro rata basis, covenant baskets that can grow over time based upon a percentage of adjusted EBITDA or consolidated total assets, and loosened collateral requirements. In addition, many borrowers, especially borrowers owned by large financial sponsors, have been able to take the lead in drafting loan commitments and definitive loan documentation and have obtained committed covenant levels and baskets at the commitment stage.


In recent years, federal regulators have increased their focus on the US corporate lending market, and leveraged lending in particular (though it appears that that trend may be starting to reverse in the current US regulatory climate). In March 2013, federal regulators issued new leveraged lending guidelines to address concerns that lenders’ underwriting practices did not adequately address risks in leveraged lending with appropriate allowances for losses. These guidelines apply to federally supervised financial institutions that are substantively engaged in leveraged lending activities. Lenders noted that a number of the guidelines issued were vague and subjective, including the definition of leveraged lending, the description of underwriting standards and the reporting and analytics requirement. Compliance with the guidelines was required by May 2013, but the full force of their impact only started being felt by the market in 2014, particularly in the fourth quarter. In November 2014, regulators released an FAQ on the guidance, and in their Shared National Credit Report issued the same month, they chastised lenders for non-compliance. Most of the attention concerning federal guidance is focused on their assertion that ‘a leverage level […] in excess of 6x Total Debt/EBITDA raises concerns for most industries’. In addition, regulators noted that in most cases before extending leveraged loans, it should be established that a company will be able to fully amortise its senior secured debt or repay at least half of its total debt within five to seven years. Regulators have stated that these guidelines are not intended to establish any bright-line tests, but loans that do not meet these guidelines will generally become subject to heightened scrutiny. In addition to contributing to sharp reductions in lending activity in certain segments of the market, this guidance started to affect the average debt-to-EBITDA levels, which had consistently climbed in the years leading up to 2014 before dropping and flattening out near the 6.0 mark (average levels were 6.35 times in 2017, 6.08 times in 2016 and 5.96 times in 2015 for broadly syndicated LBO transactions, according to Thomson Reuters LPC). A recent development casts some doubt on the continued effectiveness of the leveraged lending guidance – late in 2017, after being prompted by a US Senator (Pat Toomey), the Government Accountability Office determined that the guidance is actually a ‘rule’ that should have been subjected to Congressional review pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. It now appears likely that the banking agencies will need to resubmit the guidance for Congressional review and comment, so it is possible that the guidance will be modified or potentially even revoked altogether.

In December 2013, the final Volker Rule was issued, which limits the number of trading and investment activities of banking entities. Banking entities will also be required to comply with extensive reporting requirements in respect of permitted trading and investment activities. The Volker Rule compliance period began in July 2017, and the reporting requirements became effective in June 2014. In December 2016, risk retention rules that were made applicable to CLOs came into effect, initially casting a large shadow over the leveraged loan market (given that CLOs are a prominent source of capital for leveraged lending transactions), but a federal court decision in February 2018 invalidated the rules insofar as they apply to open-market CLOs. The risk retention rules had required CLO managers to purchase and hold 5 per cent of the fair value of the liabilities of the CLO, either through a pro rata share of the CLO’s notes, a residual interest in the CLO’s equity or a combination of both. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) argued that the rules do not work for much of the CLO market for structural reasons, and filed a lawsuit against the Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although the federal district court granted summary judgment against the LSTA in December 2016, that decision was reversed in February 2018, with the federal appellate court remanding the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the risk retention rule to the extent it applies to open-market CLOs.

Federal regulators have also continued to enforce sanctions and anti-corruption and anti-terrorism laws, and have recently reinvigorated their efforts. As a result, and in response to ever increasing fines for violations, lenders have expanded the compliance terms included in credit documentation. These efforts have included broader representations and warranties with fewer materiality and knowledge qualifiers, as well as affirmative and negative covenants that require compliance with sanctions regulations and anti-bribery laws, and restrict borrower activities in restricted countries or with restricted entities to the extent that such activities would involve loan proceeds.

US banks also continue to address the Basel III requirements. Basel III requires banks to meet a number of capital requirements to strengthen a bank’s liquidity and contain its leverage. Among other things, Basel III requires banks to increase their holdings of Tier 1 capital to at least 7 per cent of their risk-weighted assets to meet additional liquidity and capital requirements. In December 2014, the Federal Reserve proposed that the eight largest US banks should comply with capital requirements that are even more restrictive than those outlined by Basel III, including an additional capital cushion. According to the Federal Reserve, most of the firms should already meet the new requirements, and all are taking steps to meet them by the end of a phase-in period that runs from 2016 to 2019.


The US corporate lending market is subject to various federal tax considerations, most of which can be addressed with careful planning and drafting.

i Tax considerations applicable to US borrowers

The initial determination in any US corporate lending transaction will be whether the debt will be respected as debt for federal income tax purposes or characterised as equity. Interest on debt is generally deductible by the borrower (subject to an overall limit that interest deductions may not exceed 30 per cent of a payor’s taxable income (determined without taking into account interest expense and subject to certain other adjustments)), while dividends are not. Debt terms that raise the question of whether it may be characterised as equity include a long term to maturity (for example, in excess of 30 years), subordination to other instruments in the capital structure, a high debt-to-equity ratio at the borrower, and in some circumstances the right to convert into the stock of the borrower.

Another determination to be made is whether the debt will be treated as giving rise to ‘phantom interest’ that must be taken into account by the borrower and lender even when no payments are made. In general, a debt instrument sold with original issue discount will result in unstated interest equal to the difference between the issue price and the stated redemption price at maturity, and that interest will be taxed on an economic accrual basis pursuant to the original issue discount (OID) rules. The OID rules also apply to payment-in-kind and similar instruments. The OID rules will not apply if the original issue discount is less than a statutorily defined de minimis amount.

Borrowers subject to the US tax laws must also be careful to address the applicable high-yield discount obligation (AHYDO) rules, which substantially restrict interest deductions for debt characterised as an AHYDO. An AHYDO is any debt instrument with a term of more than five years, having a yield that exceeds the applicable federal rate at the time of its issuance by five percentage points or more, and that has ‘significant original issue discount’. Debt will have significant OID if, at the end of any accrual period ending after the fifth anniversary of its issuance, the aggregate amount of interest and discount required to be included in income by a holder exceeds the amount of interest and discount actually paid in cash by more than one year’s yield on the instrument. AHYDO rules may be avoided by incorporating a savings clause in the loan documentation that requires the borrower to pay the minimum amount of principal plus accrued interest on the loan necessary to prevent the deduction of any of the accrued and unpaid interest and OID from being disallowed or deferred.

US companies are generally not required to pay US taxes on the earnings of non-US subsidiaries, including upon the actual distributions of such earnings. The provision of a guarantee or the pledge of assets by a non-US subsidiary to support the loan obligations of a US parent, however, may result in an inclusion in gross income for the US parent of an amount of earnings of the non-US subsidy up to the amount of the credit support. In addition, a pledge by the US parent of two-thirds or more of the voting stock of a non-US subsidiary is considered tantamount to a pledge of that subsidiary’s assets, and is therefore subject to the same rules. Loan documents in the US will often provide that a non-US subsidiary of the borrower will neither guarantee the loans nor pledge its assets, and the pledge of the subsidiary’s voting stock will be limited to avoid these rules.

ii Tax considerations specific to non-US lenders

There are a number of US tax considerations specific to US borrowers and non-US lenders in corporate lending transactions. For example, if a lender is an offshore fund, then it is not likely to join a syndicate in a US loan transaction until after initial funding has been made by other lenders. This is because doing so could trigger tax filing and payment obligations in the US for the fund or its investors. In contrast, trading in outstanding securities acquired in the secondary market will not result in such obligations.

iii US withholding taxes

In general, the United States does not require withholding tax on interest payments to US lenders, but it will require withholding taxes on interest payments to non-US lenders in the absence of an available exemption. This tax is generally equal to 30 per cent of the gross amount of the payments made to the non-US person, and is required to be withheld by the borrower. Lenders that are otherwise subject to the withholding tax may avail themselves of one of three exemptions to reduce or eliminate this tax:

    1. the ‘portfolio interest exemption’;
    2. treaty eligibility; and
    3. effectively connected income.

The portfolio interest exemption is available to a non-US person that is not a bank if certain conditions are met, many of which can be satisfied by including certain non-controversial provisions in the loan documentation, together with submission of certain federal tax forms to the borrower certifying that the person is not a US person. In addition, if a non-US lender is resident in a country that has an income tax treaty with the United States, the provisions of the treaty may reduce or even eliminate withholding taxes. Finally, a non-US lender that makes a loan through a US branch that is engaged in a US trade or business will be exempt from US withholding taxes, but not US federal income taxes (imposed on a net basis), on interest payments made by the borrower. Most US loan documentation provides contractual protection against withholding by requiring the borrower to ‘gross up’ interest payments if withholding becomes payable, although this requirement is often limited to withholding that results from a change in law after the effective date of the credit agreement.

iv Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act

The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requires non-US financial institutions with US customers and non-US non-financial entities with substantial US owners to disclose information regarding the US taxpayers. FATCA became effective on 1 July 2014. If an institution or entity does not comply with FATCA, a 30 per cent withholding tax is triggered, and responsibility for collecting the tax generally falls on the US borrower. The tax is applicable on all payments normally subject to US taxation, such as dividends, as well as to income that is traditionally excluded, such as bank interest and capital gains. Payments of principal will also be subject to FATCA withholding tax beginning as early as 1 January 2019. Borrowers acting as withholding agents that fail to withhold will be subject to financial penalties. As such, loan documentation in the United States now usually requires that a lender must provide information to the borrower upon request to prove compliance with FATCA, and that in any event FATCA withholding obligations will not benefit from any gross-up provisions.


i Security

Taking a security interest in assets that are located in the United States is relatively streamlined, and is governed in most instances by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In general, a security interest will attach if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement or if the borrower has signed a security agreement that describes the collateral, value has been given and the debtor has a right to the collateral. If all three of these conditions are met, then the security interest ‘attaches’ and is enforceable. Notably, in the United States a single security agreement can effectively create a security interest in substantially all of the assets of a borrower. However, unless that security interest is ‘perfected’, it may not come ahead of other security interests taken in the same collateral, and perfection can differ depending on the assets comprising the collateral. Under the UCC, a lender may ‘perfect’ its security interest in collateral by satisfying the requirements for perfection outlined in the UCC, and once perfected that security interest will take priority over all other security interests that are not perfected or that have been perfected subsequently. It is important to note that each state has adopted variations from the standard UCC, so although they are generally very similar, one should refer to the UCC adopted by the relevant state when taking a security interest.

The most common way to perfect a security interest in assets covered by the UCC is to file a UCC-1 financing statement in the appropriate filing office. The UCC-1 financing statement generally requires the name of the debtor, the name of the secured party or its representative and a description of the collateral. The description can be as general as ‘all assets’ but will more typically track the description of the collateral found in the related security agreement. UCC filing fees are typically small, and there are few, if any, other costs related to taking security interests in the property covered by UCC filings. For borrowers that are US corporations, limited liability companies or registered partnerships, the appropriate filing offices will be their respective jurisdictions of organisation. For non-US entities that do not have a filing system for perfection in their home jurisdictions (which is most other jurisdictions besides provinces of Canada other than Quebec), the appropriate filing office would be the District of Columbia. Although a UCC-1 filing will serve to perfect most collateral, certain kinds of UCC collateral, most notably deposit accounts and cash, can only be perfected by control or possession, most often by housing the account with the agent or another lender or by entering into a control agreement with the bank where the account is located. In addition, some assets may be perfected by more than one method under the UCC, although one method may be preferable to another. For example, perfection by possession of a stock certificate will take priority over a UCC-1 financing statement that was filed earlier and covers the same stock.

In addition to deposit accounts, cash and stock noted above, there are a number of assets that are governed by special rules relating to perfection and priority or other special considerations. These include, but are not limited to, agriculture; aeroplanes; fixtures; intellectual property; letters of credit; vehicles; oil and gas and other mineral rights; railcars; real property; satellites; ships and warehoused inventory. The laws governing taking security interests in real property, for example, vary from state to state, generally take longer to satisfy, and can involve significant costs. There are often recording taxes and fees imposed by state and local laws, which can be excessive, so lenders sometimes take assignment of mortgages in connection with new financings rather than enter into new ones. Loans secured by mortgages may be limited to the value of the property rather than the amount of the loan to avoid onerous mortgage taxes. To secure interests in intellectual property, such as registered trademarks, copyrights and patents, federal filings will be required that specifically list each item, and these filings must be updated for any property acquired afterwards.

ii Guarantees

Guarantees are commonly provided by parents, subsidiaries and side-by-side subsidiaries of a common parent in the US corporate loan market. In large-cap transactions, parent guarantees are often limited in recourse to the stock of the subsidiary borrower, although this is less often the case in middle market loans. Subsidiary guarantees are typically full and unconditional, but they are often limited to guarantees from domestic subsidiaries to avoid adverse tax consequences to the borrower of a non-US guarantee (discussed in Section III), and may be limited to wholly owned domestic subsidiaries. Guarantees may be supported by security interests in the guarantors’ assets to the same extent that the loans are secured by the borrower’s assets.

iii Priorities and subordination

There are three primary methods of achieving priority in US corporate lending transactions:

  • a possessing a prior, perfected security interest in the assets of the borrower or being the beneficiary of an intercreditor agreement establishing priority in liens;
  • b being ‘structurally senior’ to the other debt; and
  • c being the beneficiary of a subordination agreement.

When a lender obtains a first priority perfected security interest in the assets of the borrower in a US loan, the lender obtains the right to receive a priority distribution equal to the proceeds of sale (or value) of that asset to the exclusion of any other creditors (except for holders of certain statutory liens). This means that in the event of a foreclosure, bankruptcy or other liquidation, the secured lender will be entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of the assets securing the loans before any lender having a junior security interest or no security interest in the asset may be paid. Priority in liens is typically established by perfection, as discussed in Section IV.i, but it can also be established contractually by an intercreditor agreement. Lenders under a senior secured credit agreement may agree to allow the borrower to incur additional first lien indebtedness or second lien indebtedness and enter into an agreement with the lenders of that indebtedness as to priority in security, as well as to how remedies will be enforced in respect of the collateral, among other things.

While achieving structural seniority in the US corporate loan market, like other markets, depends entirely on lending to a level within the borrower’s capital structure that is below the level to which another lender extends credit, contractual seniority is established by a subordination agreement. Contractual subordination is achieved by an agreement in which the subordinating creditor agrees that in the event of a bankruptcy or other distribution of assets of the debtor, any amounts otherwise distributable to the subordinating creditor will instead be paid to a specified creditor or class of creditors holding ‘senior debt’ until they are paid in full. The class of ‘senior debt’ is usually defined as all indebtedness for borrowed money whether now existing or incurred hereafter, as well as capital leases. It is not necessary that the subordination agreement be between the subordinated creditor and the senior creditor, and often the senior creditor is the third-party beneficiary of an agreement between the borrower and the subordinating creditor. Subordination terms in the United States also typically provide that if there is a payment default on the senior debt, no payment may be made on the subordinated debt until the default is cured or the senior debt is paid in full. In addition, many subordinated debt provisions state that, in the event of a non-payment default on the senior debt, there will be no payments on the subordinated debt for a specified blockage period, which typically runs between 90 and 180 days. Although subordinated debt issuances were common in the US market in the 1990s, they are relatively rare in the current US corporate loan market.


i Legal reservations

There are no financial assistance laws in the United States to speak of, but a federal bankruptcy court can void a guarantee or the pledge of assets by a subsidiary or parent of the borrower if the guarantee is deemed a ‘fraudulent transfer’, meaning that the guarantor was insolvent at the time of the guarantee or was rendered insolvent and the guarantee and the guarantor received ‘less than reasonably equivalent value’ for the guarantee. Given that both aspects of this test must be met for a guarantee to be deemed a fraudulent transfer, as long as a guarantor is solvent at the time of the guarantee, it does not have to receive equivalent value. Most states have similar fraudulent transfer laws, which can also be applied by the bankruptcy court to void the guarantee. This is less of a concern for parent guarantees than subsidiary guarantees, as a parent is typically deemed to have benefited from the loan to its subsidiary through its equity ownership.

ii Opinions practice

In the United States, it is typically the borrower’s counsel that provides a legal opinion in respect of loans to the loan arrangers or agent on behalf of the initial lenders. The opinion will usually cover the authority of the obligors to enter into the loan documents, the execution and delivery of the loan documents by the obligors, the enforceability of the loan documents, conflicts with laws, organisational documents and material agreements and the creation and perfection of security interests in collateral that may be perfected by filing a UCC-1 financing statement, possessory stock pledges, and sometimes collateral consisting of real estate, intellectual property or deposit and securities accounts. Depending on the jurisdictions in which the borrower and the guarantors are organised, there may be opinions as to authorisation, execution and delivery of loan documents, as well as to conflicts with organisational documents and perfection, by various local counsel.

iii Choice of law and enforcement of foreign judgments

In general, courts in the United States recognise choice of law provisions in contracts (sometimes subject to the requirement that the choice of law has a substantial relationship with the contract and the transactions contemplated by the contract) so long as the application of the chosen law would not be contrary to a fundamental policy of another jurisdiction with a materially greater interest in the determination of a particular issue and the application of the chosen law would not threaten public policy or violate any fundamental principle of justice. Similarly, US courts will enforce final judgments of foreign jurisdictions so long as, among other things, the judgments were rendered under systems that provide impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law, the other court had personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the cause of action was not repugnant to public policy.


In the United States, loan trades are either made by assignment or participation. Lenders typically trade in syndicated loans over the dealer desks of the large underwriting banks. In assignments, an investor becomes a party to the loan documents and participates as a ‘lender’ under the loan documents, including with respect to voting rights. As such, assignments are typically subject to a minimum threshold and will require the consent of the administrative agent and the borrower, which may not be unreasonably withheld. Upon an event of default, which is sometimes limited to payment and bankruptcy defaults, a borrower will lose its consent right. Investors may also purchase participations by entering into a participation agreement with a lender to take a participating interest in that lender’s commitment. The selling lender remains the holder of the loan. Consents are rarely required, and the participant has the right to vote only on items such as the rate, terms and release of all or substantially all of the collateral. Guarantees and security are granted to the administrative agent on behalf of all of the lenders, present or future, so new lenders benefit from them to the same extent as if they had been part of the original syndicate without the need for the guarantor to sign or otherwise approve the transfer documentation. Loan derivatives common in the US corporate loan markets include loan credit default swaps (LCDS), in which the seller is paid a spread in exchange for agreeing to buy a loan at par, or some other pre-negotiated price. In the event that the loan defaults, the LCDX, an index of 100 LCDS obligations that are traded over-the-counter, and total rate of return swaps, in which a purchaser buys the income stream from a loan with a 10 per cent down payment that serves as collateral and a loan from the seller and is obligated to purchase the loan at par or cash, settle the position upon a default.


As briefly discussed above, many of the current trends in the US corporate loans market are borrower-favourable terms that were popular at the height of the economic boom in 2006–2007. When these features largely disappeared from the market during the financial crisis, many believed it would be several years before these terms would return, yet these terms are again becoming widely available to borrowers. In the current market, borrowers negotiating credit agreements have been aggressive in testing the limits of what the market will bear.

i Covenant-lite

Covenant-lite deals remain a strong part of the US leveraged loan market. Some covenant-lite deals contain no financial covenants, but otherwise resemble traditional credit agreements. Other covenant-lite loans, in addition to lacking maintenance covenants, also have high-yield style incurrence tests allowing unlimited debt, liens and acquisitions upon pro forma compliance with applicable incurrence ratios, as well as restricted payments, investments or payment of junior debt subject to grower baskets based increasingly on a percentage of adjusted EBITDA. In a growing number of covenant-lite deals, asset-based lending (ABL) structures are becoming more common, with a stand-alone term loan lacking maintenance covenants, and a stand-alone ABL revolver having a ‘springing’ fixed-charge coverage ratio tested only if borrowing availability falls below a specified level. In these structures, term loans usually have cross-acceleration to the ABL, rather than cross-default, which prevents the term lenders from indirectly benefiting from the ABL’s financial covenant. In addition, ABL financial covenants have trended toward higher thresholds before testing is triggered, excluding outstanding letters of credit for purposes of testing the trigger and setting covenant levels at higher cushions over the financial model for the borrower.

In instances where there is a cash-flow revolver instead of an ABL, the covenant-lite documentation has typically contained a financial covenant that applies only to the revolver, and, in many cases, only if the revolver exceeds a specified threshold of outstanding borrowings. Breach of the financial covenant will not result in a breach of the term loan, or will only result in a breach of the term loan if the revolving lenders have not waived the default by the end of a 45- to 90-day standstill period. Until the expiration of the standstill, the revolving lenders will have exclusive rights to waive or amend the financial covenant or exercise remedies in respect of the breach.

ii Convergence of leveraged loans and high-yield markets

There is a continued convergence in the US leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, resulting in term loan B facilities with high-yield style terms. Trends contributing to this convergence include the tendency for the same company to raise capital in both the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, a switch by loan arrangers to a fee-based business model, shifting the emphasis from holding loans to syndication and trading, and the increasing influence in the loan market of institutional investors, hedge funds and other investors familiar with the covenant structure of the bond market. High-yield style terms being adopted in the loan market include incurrence-based covenants and builder baskets as discussed above, as well as greater refinancing flexibility.

iii Refinancing facilities

In addition to incremental facilities, which have been common to US loan agreements for some time, credit agreements in many large cap deals now include refinancing facilities. Refinancing facility provisions permit the borrower to refinance a portion of its existing credit facility either with new tranches of loans under the credit agreement or additional debt incurred outside the credit agreement. Debt incurred outside the credit agreement may be secured on a pari passu basis or by junior liens, in each case subject to an intercreditor agreement. This development allows the borrower to refinance loans with debt that is outside the credit agreement but still shares in the collateral, without requiring the consent of the lenders. Unlike incremental facilities, refinancing facility provisions rarely contain most favoured nation provisions affecting pricing.

iv Soft calls

If a prepayment premium is included for term loans in a large-cap deal, and even in some middle-market transactions, it now tends to be a ‘soft call’, meaning it is only payable if there is a ‘repricing event’. Repricing events occur when there is a refinancing at a lower interest rate or an amendment to reduce the interest rate. The soft call is typically priced at 1 per cent of the amount refinanced or repriced in the first six months or first year of the loan. Some loans contain exceptions for refinancings where the primary purpose is not repricing, such as change of control transactions, qualifying initial public offerings and transformative acquisitions.

v Stronger commitment terms

In underwritten financings, borrowers with strong market power, including portfolio companies of strong equity sponsors, have been successful in obtaining committed financial covenant levels and agreement upon detailed financial definitions in the term sheet stage. Increasingly, other significant terms once reserved for negotiation in the definitive loan documentation are being agreed upfront in the commitment papers, including material debt and lien baskets, restricted payment carveouts, builder baskets and other negative covenant carveouts. In many cases these borrowers have controlled the commitment documentation, often using the sponsor’s ‘form’, and requiring the committing lenders to agree to a prior sponsor precedent as the guiding documentation for all items not specified in the term sheet.

vi Loosened collateral requirements

Commitment letters have started relaxing the scope of the collateral requirements that need to be satisfied at closing. They have begun to allow lien searches (sometimes excluded UCC liens) to be included in the list of items that can be delivered post-closing, and they have limited perfection of collateral at closing to those items that may be perfected by the filing of UCC-1 financing statements and to the delivery of certificated securities of US subsidiaries only, or even material US subsidiaries only. Large-cap deals now often eliminate the requirement for bank account control agreements, except in the ABL context, and an expansive list of excluded collateral has become standard, including excluding owned real estate valued below a specified threshold, all leaseholds, non-US collateral, assets securing receivables financings and any liens resulting in adverse tax consequences, among others.


The market for US loans remains relatively strong, in part because of a relatively strong US economy and a continuing environment of relatively low interest rates. At the same time, loan supply has been dampened somewhat by an increase in regulatory constraints. With demand remaining strong, this could mean that qualified borrowers will continue to wield significant leverage when negotiating loan terms. In addition, the market has been adjusting, and should continue to adjust, to the new regulatory environment, with non-bank lending filling some or most of the void created by the constraints on the banks to make leveraged loans that do not fit within the regulatory guidelines. That said, the impact that the inability to borrow will have on companies that do not meet the lending criteria and cannot find alternative lending sources, as well as on the US loan market, generally, remains to be seen, especially for those seeking to refinance already bloated capital structures.

1 Monica K Thurmond is a partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP.