In my foreword this year, I will focus on the continuing interest that is being devoted to the position of wealthy families and the markedly different approaches that prevail in Western Europe and the United States in terms of tax information exchange and anti-money laundering policy.

While public beneficial registers for companies will be introduced in the EU in the first quarter of 2020, the United States continues to pursue its own agenda where the primary focus of its anti-money laundering policy continues to be around financial institutions.

In broad terms, it is still accurate to say that the principal impetus for ongoing policy initiatives in this area is being driven by the EU, OECD and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This has been underlined by two important events in the past week or so as I finalise this foreword. Firstly, the decision of the UK Crown Dependencies1 to voluntarily adopt public registers of beneficial ownership by 2023. Secondly, FATF's publication of its 2019 guidance for trust and corporate service providers (TCSPs) (the last version was published in 2008). I will return to both of these topics below but, in general terms, they underscore the sense of the 'transparency juggernaut' maintaining its momentum.

I will first deal with EU developments. The focus of activity here is the measures being introduced at Member State level to implement the Fourth and Fifth Anti-money Laundering Directives (4AMLD and 5AMLD, respectively). With some notable exceptions (including the UK, Malta Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Ireland), Member States have been quite slow to implement 4AMLD. In practice, implementation in other jurisdictions looks like it will be subsumed into the widened scope of 5AMLD.

So far as corporate registers are concerned, these are due to become public in the EU and wider EEA in early 2020 under 5AMLD (in the UK, the register was public from inception so the change here will be less marked). In the arena of trust registers, the scope of trusts that are within scope has been substantially expanded from those that generate tax consequences and those that are administered in the relevant jurisdiction. The Directive makes reference to 'express' trusts. There is significant uncertainty as to how this term will be construed as, on an expansive reading, it would require, in a UK context or co-ownership of land and joint bank accounts, to be reported. As a general proposition, trust registers are private and it would only be possible to gain access to the information on the beneficial owners of a trust where the applicant can demonstrate a legitimate interest.

It seems likely, from a consultation that has recently been launched by the UK government, that those seeking access to the trust register will have to demonstrate some specific evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing activity to justify this. In essence, general 'fishing' expeditions by investigative journalists into the affairs of the wealthy will, hopefully, be discouraged.

Some curious features of the directive implementing 5AMLD have potentially wide-ranging consequences for trusts that are not regarded as resident in the EU or EEA. On a literal reading of the directive, it could be argued that such trusts will be required to register in circumstances where they have a business relationship with an obliged entity – this includes not only financial institutions but lawyers, accountants and other equivalent professionals. We will have to await the detailed regulations to see the final policy stance taken on this issue.

One other area where 5AMLD leads to a surprising outcome is in circumstances where a trust is deemed to control any company that is not incorporated within the EU or EEA. In these circumstances, the directive makes provision for public access to information about the trust; the logic here is that if the relevant company does not open up its information to public scrutiny then the trust that owns it should be disclosed instead. What is completely unclear at this stage is whether this will provide de facto public access to information about trusts that control non-EU or non-EEA companies or whether it will only afford such access in circumstances where the applicant already has detailed information about the relevant company or trust.

Another interesting issue that arises in Luxembourg, where a trust is the ultimate beneficial owner of a Luxembourg company, is that information about the settlor, beneficiaries, protectors and any other natural person exercising effective control will be publicly available on the corporate Register of Beneficial Owners from 31 August 2019. This is markedly different from the position under the UK Corporate register in the case of a trustee owner where the persons with significant control or 'PSC' rules look to those who control the trustee decisions alone rather than those who are beneficiaries of a trust.

The general scope of trust registers in the EU under 4AMLD is starting to become clearer. Following on from the UK and Malta, Ireland recently published its regulations at the end of January 2019. These regulations will, as noted, be potentially subject to material expansion once 5AMLD is implemented.

One general concept within 5AMLD is the proposal that trusts can be effectively passported; in other words, once the trust can evidence registration on one EU or EEA register, this will avoid the need for duplicate registrations. Whether this will result in any practical compliance gains or advantages remains to be seen. In terms of its scope, the information being provided on trusts in the centralised Beneficial Ownership Register will be restricted to information about individuals and will not address (as is the case with Common Reporting Standard (CRS)) asset values.

There are clear signs that the EU is intent upon exporting its concept of centralised trusts and corporate beneficial ownership registers to the rest of the world. Recent commentaries have suggested a move to a global standard in this regard by 2023. NGOs active in the transparency arena have started to advocate the creation of an overarching integrated global asset register for wealthy families although it is difficult to gauge policymakers' enthusiasm for such a radical step.

The position of the UK if Brexit finally happens is also interesting. The UK seems intent upon implementing 5AMLD and has shown no signs of losing its enthusiasm for expanding measures in this area along with its European neighbours. The UK has also been putting pressure on both its crown dependencies (CDs) and overseas territories (OTs)2 to adopt the EU's position on public beneficial ownership registers for companies.

Before the CD's announcement on 19 June 2019,3 it seemed that the OTs were more likely to agree to the EU's position because of their constitutional status where the UK has a stronger formal say in how they make policy. What is interesting about the CD's position is, in the statement issued by the three Island Governments on 19 June, they describe a three-stage process as follows:

1. the interconnection of the islands' registers of beneficial ownership of companies with those within the EU for access by law enforcement authorities and Financial Intelligence Units;
2. access for financial service businesses and certain other prescribed businesses for corporate due diligence purposes;
3. public access aligned to the approach taken in the EU Directive.

It seems obvious that the CD's collective approach here is to forestall criticism from the EU in particular by being seen to take the lead in moving to public access in a phased manner. The fact that public access is the last stage of this process is revealing. The willingness in interim stages to share information with the EU and obliged entities in the regulated sector may well be a model that other jurisdictions will consider following.

Whether the voluntary adoption of public registers of beneficial ownership for companies in the CDs will stimulate other jurisdictions to follow suit remains to be seen. There have been some indications that the UK and EU stance here is to promote a new global standard of public registers for companies by 2023 mentioned above. Given the UK's pronouncements here, it seems inevitable that the OTs will be forced to adopt equivalent measures to the CDs. It will be interesting to see whether other major offshore jurisdictions such as Switzerland and the Bahamas will react to these events.

As a different matter, the separate subject of establishing centralised trust registers outside the EU is bound to be raised as a parallel issue. This may take longer to surface than pressure to establish corporate registers, but seems bound to raise its head at some stage.

From a wider FATF perspective, the key development in 2019 is the publication in late June 2019 of updated guidance to non-financial services professionals. Three sets of parallel guidance to lawyers, accountants and TCSPs4 have been issued. There has been a significant time gap since the previous edition, which was published in 2008.

One area where the new guidance will have an important impact in the context of TCSPs is in defining 'beneficial ownership'. In this regard, the new guidance follows an expansive view of what constitutes 'control' for the purpose of beneficial ownership akin to the approach taken in the UK Trust Register. This will be potentially significant going forward in considering who needs to be disclosed in the context of trust structures in governance terms. In particular, holding powers as a minority member of a group or a veto power with respect not only to the appointment and removal of trustees but also to the addition and removal of beneficiaries, for example, will be enough to render an individual as being characterised as a 'natural person exercising effective control'. This is potentially very significant because there has been no guidance offered by FATF since it published its 2012 recommendations on how to interpret this expression.

It is still very early to try and discern what the impact of the information flows triggered under CRS has been. For compliant structures, the provision of CRS information should only confirm what has already been disclosed by a taxpayer to domestic tax authorities. However, given the growing concerns being expressed by politicians on the 'inequality' theme, the assembling of information about asset holding positions of wealthy individuals may be the tool that is deployed in assessing the potential impact of future wealth or inheritance taxes where these are not currently employed.

There is also a potentially significant crossover from the FATF domain into CRS reporting. In particular, a broader concept of who may be regarded as a 'controller' in the anti-money laundering context is likely to be applied for CRS purposes in due course, given the express linkage that exists in CRS that directly imports FATF definitions of beneficial ownership into the concept of who may be reportable in a trust context as a 'controlling person'.5 This could, in particular, lead specifically to the disclosure of family members who have more subtle or 'indirect' means of influence over a family trust structure.

One development in an aligned field worth mentioning is the rules on substance for entities incorporated in offshore jurisdictions. These substance rules have taken on an increased significance recently.

The EU Council has created a code of conduct for business taxation to limit the impact of low tax regimes. In 2017, it established a code of conduct group tasked with considering the measures on business tax within a number of non-EU jurisdictions.

In response to assessments undertaken by the EU, the affected jurisdictions (which include a number of the CDs and OTs) have introduced new rules requiring economic substance that will take effect in 2019.

These rules impact companies carrying on 'relevant activities'. The substance requirements have three principal components. These are to demonstrate, that within the jurisdiction, the company:

  1. is directed and managed;
  2. undertakes core income-generating activities; and
  3. has physical presence.

While these measures are primarily relevant in a base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) context, they are indicative of wider trends in terms of being able to demonstrate the overall substance of these measures that are operated in offshore jurisdictions. This is of potentially greater significance to private wealth structures that may be seen as more passive than active.

There are nine relevant activities that cover banking, insurance, fund management and financing. One specific area includes the role of pure equity holding companies (PEHs). While supposedly aimed at private equity structures, it could conceivably impact a conventional holding company holding varied investments for a family trust.

At this early stage, there is no clear guidance that delineates the boundaries of what constitutes a PEH; what can be said is that family structures could find themselves impacted if the guidance is couched in wide terms.

There is no doubt that the increased cost and complexity of regulation is driving trends towards simpler structures with fewer layers and involving fewer jurisdictions. There appears to be a greater reluctance on the part of corporate service providers to offer a purely passive role as a registered office without any detailed understanding of the operation of the underlying entities themselves. This appears to be coupled with a trend towards re-domiciling entities into jurisdictions where substance can be demonstrated.

At the same time, an increasing awareness as to the implications of disclosure of beneficial ownership is also generating a more reflective view on the retention of control either by settlors or by beneficiaries or connected family members.

In summary, therefore, the theme of ever-greater levels of transparency and increased complexity of overlapping regulation continues. The dichotomy between Western Europe and the United States, in terms of their different approach to these issues, also remains very apparent to observers.


Footnotes

1 Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man.

2 A wider group that includes Bermuda, British Virgin Isles ,the Cayman Islands and Gibraltar.

5 See page 59 of OECD publication in commenting on meaning of 'controlling person' for CRS purposes.