i Competition enforcement
The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) enforces both European and national competition rules in Italy. Its enforcement powers encompass restrictive agreements, abuses of dominant position and merger control.2
The ICA’s competition directorate-general is composed of five directorates:
- energy and basic industry;
- financial, postal and travel services;
- foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and transport services; and
- manufacturing and other services.
Each of directorate scrutinises mergers, abuses and restrictive practices relating to their assigned business sectors.
In 2017,3 the ICA concluded five proceedings about agreements or concerted practices with findings of an infringement of antitrust rules.4 As to the investigations into abuses of dominance, the ICA found an infringement in five cases5 and accepted commitments in five other cases.6 Regarding mergers, in 2017 the ICA reviewed 64 notified transactions, and in two cases made clearance conditional upon remedies offered by the parties after an in-depth review of the transaction.7
ii Other areas of enforcement
The ICA also plays an important antitrust advocacy role. Pursuant to Article 21 of the Italian Competition Act,8 the ICA reports to the Italian Parliament and the government any laws, regulations or general administrative acts that give rise to distortions of competition not justified by general interest considerations. Further, pursuant to Article 21 bis of the Competition Act, the ICA may challenge general administrative acts, regulations and decisions of public administrations in court if they are incompatible with competition law.
i Significant cases
Major Italian cement companies and their trade association fined for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU
On 25 July 2017,12 the ICA fined 13 cement companies and their trade association AITEC over €184 million for collusion in violation of Article 101 TFEU. The parties allegedly coordinated their commercial behaviour to increase prices and stabilise their market shares since at least June 2011 until January 2016.
Price coordination was achieved by exchanging information directly among competitors and through common customers to artificially increase the transparency of pricing decisions. The ICA rejected the parties’ claim that receiving communications on future price increases before their effective application was in their customers’ interest. After achieving price alignment, the parties put in place an articulated system to monitor whether this coordination was respected. In particular, the ICA found evidence of target market shares being monitored through AITEC’s monthly volumes statistics.
Although the ICA qualified this infringement of Article 101 TFEU as a restriction of competition ‘by object,’ it nonetheless carried out an analysis of its actual effects on the market.
The ICA fines the accounting ‘big four’ for bid-rigging in a tender for the provision of technical assistance to the public administration in the management of EU structural funds
On 18 October 2017,13 the ICA fined the Italian branches of the ‘big four’ accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers) a total of €23 million for coordinating their participation in a tender procedure for the procurement of support and technical assistance to audit authorities in the framework of programmes co-financed by the EU.
The ICA found that the parties’ most competitive economic bids generally did not overlap on the same tender lots: in a ‘chessboard-like’ fashion, for each lot, only one of the parties submitted a very competitive economic bid, whereas the remaining parties submitted ‘supporting’ bids with lower discounts. The ICA also found contemporaneous evidence of horizontal contacts between the parties, both via email and in person.
The ICA calculated the amount of the fines based on the highest possible gravity multiplier provided for in its Guidelines on the method of setting fines (Fining Guidelines)14 (i.e., 30 per cent of the sales of products to which the infringement related). This approach may appear unusually harsh in light of the limited effects of the infringement (the parties’ bids were successful in only five of the nine lots). However, the ICA rewarded Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers with a 5 per cent fine discount in light of their proactive efforts (qualified as a mitigating circumstance of the infringement) to revisit and update their antitrust compliance programmes before the statement of objections was issued.15
ii Trends, developments and strategies
In 2017, some decisions issued by the Italian Council of State shed light on important procedural issues, such as the available remedies against the ICA’s decisions, standard of proof and calculation of fines.
The Council of State clarifies the standard of proof in concerted practices cases
On 7 March 2017,16 the Council of State upheld judgments of the TAR Lazio17 that had quashed the ICA’s decision18 against insurance companies Generali and UnipolSai. The ICA had fined Generali and UnipolSai approximately €30 million for rigging 58 tenders for third-party liability insurance for vehicles of 15 local public transport companies. The decision of the Council of State clarifies the standard of proof in concerted practices cases.
As far as the unlawful contacts between the parties were concerned (the ‘exogenous evidence’ of an anticompetitive agreement), the Council of State considered that the two main evidential elements on which the ICA based its findings were not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a concerted practice.
The first piece of evidence – the existence of a working group on local public transport within the Italian Association of Insurers (ANIA) – was discarded because the activities of this working group indeed appear to be lawful and did not facilitate any anticompetitive conduct, and, in any event, Generali and UnipolSai attended only two of the six meetings that the ICA had investigated.
The second piece of evidence on which the ICA relied – the existence of allegedly anticompetitive guidelines issued by ANIA – was also discarded. In fact, the interpretation of the relevant legislative framework provided in the guidelines was plausible and consistent with the interpretation provided by IVASS, the national insurance regulatory agency.
Finally, the Council of State recalled the settled case law according to which, in the absence of unlawful contacts, the ICA bears the burden to prove that parallel market behaviour is the result of an anticompetitive agreement and that no alternative explanation exists. In this case, the fact that the relevant tenders were not sufficiently profitable could explain why the parties had decided not to put forward any bid.
The Council of State clarifies the principles for setting antitrust fines in bid-rigging cases
The ICA found that Siman had taken part in a bid-rigging scheme affecting public tenders for the removal of asbestos from Italian naval vessels at the dockyards of Taranto, La Spezia and Augusta. The Council of State confirmed the finding of the antitrust infringement, but substantially decreased (by 70 per cent) the fine imposed on Siman, also providing additional guidance on the application of the ICA’s Fining Guidelines.
First, to determine the correct gravity multiplier (i.e., the percentage of the sales affected by the infringement to be taken into account when calculating the fine), the ICA must assess the actual effects of the anticompetitive agreement. In this case, the ICA did not provide any evidence of the infringement’s impact on the market, particularly in terms of higher prices for the contracting authorities.
Secondly, the Council of State found that the ICA erred in finding that Siman’s role as coordinator of the consortium of competing undertakings was in itself an aggravating circumstance. Instead, an assessment of Siman’s actual behaviour was required.
Finally, with regard to the proportionality principle, the Council of State concluded that the ICA wrongly estimated the value of the sales affected by the infringement for the purpose of calculating the fine. The ICA had made reference to the value of the tender as stated in the call for bids, although the value of work actually performed upon request of the contracting authority was significantly smaller.
In the coming months, the ICA will continue to focus its enforcement efforts on public tenders, particularly for waste management services in the Campania region and facility management services at universities and other public offices, as well as helicopter rescue and fire prevention services.22
The ICA also launched investigations into alleged cartels affecting the markets of packaging cardboard, taxi services and broadcasting rights for football events.23
III ANTITRUST: RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS AND DOMINANCE
i Significant cases
Vodafone Italia and Telecom Italia fined for margin squeeze in the markets of SMS services
In two decisions dated 13 December 2017,24 the ICA found that the telecommunication companies Vodafone Italia and Telecom Italia abused their respective dominant positions in the upstream market for SMS termination services, thereby hindering rivals from competing in the downstream bulk SMS markets.
When SMSs are sent from a given network to consumers in a different network, an SMS termination service is required: the mobile network operator (MNO) in the first network (originating operator) must purchase the wholesale SMS termination services from the MNO in the second network (destination operator or destination MNO).
When large companies need to send SMSs to a high number of clients (e.g., banks notifying their clients that their credit cards are being charged), they rely on retail SMS bulk services provided by the MNO itself or by other licensed operators (OLOs). These services comprise the origination of the message from the sender and the transmission to the network of the destination MNO, which then provides the SMS termination service.
Vodafone and Telecom Italia each hold a dominant position in the market for SMS termination services on their respective networks. They are also active, in competition with OLOs, in the downstream market for retail SMS bulk services.
With respect to Vodafone Italia, the ICA found that the company charged its internal divisions lower tariffs for the provision of its SMS termination service than it applied to independent OLOs, and that these tariffs were not replicable by an as-efficient competitor. The ICA also found that Vodafone Italia provided OLOs with interconnection services of lower quality and higher costs, compared to those reserved for the interconnection between Vodafone Italia itself and other MNOs. This conduct resulted in Vodafone Italia being able to offer conditions for its retail SMS bulk service (often coupled with retroactive rebates and long-term exclusivity) that could not be matched by OLOs.
Similar findings were established in relation to Telecom Italia. In particular, the ICA assessed the bids that Telecom Italia presented in recent tenders for retail SMS bulk services launched by large potential clients, and observed that Telecom’s offers were below the ‘critical threshold’: that is, below the cost of termination offered to independent OLOs. The ICA’s conclusion was further corroborated by the fact that Telecom Italia had won all but one of the above-mentioned tenders, and that certain competitors were forced to bid at a loss.
Unilever fined for abusing its dominant position in the Italian ice cream market
On 31 October 2017,25 the ICA imposed a fine of €60 million on Unilever for abusing its dominant position in the Italian market of single-serve ice creams.
The ICA noted that retailers selling ice creams (generally small outlets like bars and coffee shops) only earn a small part of their income from the sale of these products and are not interested in extending their portfolio to include offerings of several different suppliers. In turn, retailers’ commercial policies have a strong influence on final consumers’ choices: the consumption of single-serve ice cream is immediate and one-off, and therefore limited to the offer available at the retailer where the consumer is present at that point in time.
Taking advantage of these market characteristics, Unilever adopted a foreclosing strategy aimed at securing exclusive long-term relationships with a large number of retailers, therefore hindering rivals’ access to these commercial outlets. The strategy mainly consisted in the extensive application of single-branding clauses, as well as retroactive and incremental fidelity rebates.
According to the ICA, the infringement allowed Unilever to significantly expand its market shares at the expense of other competitors even in a period of low demand, also foreclosing smaller players whose products were particularly popular among consumers.
ii Trends, developments and strategies
In 2017, some decisions issued by the civil courts of Rome and Milan addressed important issues concerning follow-on actions in relation to abuse of dominance cases.
Light shed on the issue of proof of a causal link and damage in follow-on actions in abuse of dominance cases
On 2 January 2017,26 the Court of Appeal of Milan rejected an appeal brought by Telecom Italia against the decision of the local tribunal27 awarding damages in a follow-on action based on an ICA decision. The case concerned Telecom Italia’s abuse of dominance in the market for the supply of wholesale termination services, consisting of a margin squeeze against rivals in the downstream market for the supply of retail mobile communication services.28
In its appeal, Telecom Italia argued that there was no proof of a causal link between its abusive conduct and the damage suffered by the claimant, Brennercom, and the use of presumptive evidence amounted to a reversal of the burden of proof to be discharged by that claimant. However, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Tribunal had correctly applied the principle that the ICA’s decisions constitute evidence that has strengthened evidentiary value in follow-on actions. According to this principle, it was for Telecom Italia to provide evidence that no damage could have arisen as a consequence of the abuse and, in particular, that its anticompetitive offers were directed to customers for which there was no actual or potential competition with Brennercom.
Telecom Italia also argued that the Tribunal’s findings as to the existence of the causal link were only based on theoretical economic principles, without any evidence of customer diversion, modification of Brennercom’s prices or any change in its commercial strategies. Again, the Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument: given the asymmetry of information between the dominant party and the claimant, economic theories and analyses were to be given full evidentiary value.
The Tribunal of Rome rules on the evidentiary value of the ICA’s decisions
In January 2012, the ICA found that Pfizer Italia had abused its dominant position in the market of the drug Xalatan (used for the treatment of glaucoma). The abuse consisted of a complex strategy aimed at delaying the entry of generic companies in the market by means of an application for a divisional patent on the active ingredient of Xalatan.29 After this decision was confirmed by the administrative courts, the government brought a follow-on action against Pfizer Italia before the Court of Rome, claiming damages of approximately €14 million for the Italian National Health System.
In July 2017, the Tribunal of Rome rejected the government’s claims.30 The Tribunal excluded the applicability ratione temporis of Article 9 of Directive 2014/104/EU (as implemented by the Legislative Decree No. 3/201731) and the binding effect of the ICA’s final decision as to the existence of an infringement. It held that the existence of the infringement was questionable because, after the ICA’s decision, the European Patent Office confirmed the validity of Pfizer Italia’s divisional patent application.
Additionally, the Tribunal confirmed the necessity for the claimant to prove under all circumstances two elements, namely the actual existence of the damage and the causal relationship between the alleged damage and the infringement of competition law. The Tribunal found that the claimants had submitted insufficient evidence in these respects.
In the coming year, the behaviour of dominant undertakings in the telecommunication sector will remain under the ICA’s close scrutiny. In particular, the ICA has launched proceedings against Telecom Italia concerning its alleged application of predatory prices and lock-in clauses to foreclose competitors in the retail market of ultra-broadband telecommunication services.32
The ICA has also initiated proceedings for alleged infringements of Article 102 TFEU affecting the markets of local public transport, into-plane supply of aviation fuel, retail supply of electricity and copyright management.33
IV SECTORAL COMPETITION: MARKET INVESTIGATIONS AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES
i Significant cases
On 30 May 2017, the ICA, in cooperation with the Italian authorities on data protection and telecommunications, launched a market investigation into big data.
The ICA noted that the availability of large amounts of data is more and more indispensable in ensuring the optimisation of decision-making processes, the ability to innovate and the efficient functioning of markets. However, the development of a data-driven economy might be hindered by the commercial conduct of some undertakings. In particular, with a market investigation, the ICA aims to ascertain whether big data can be considered as an asset or input that might increase market power, if they can result in lock-in effects or barriers to entry or if they might affect the quality of product and services, particularly in terms of protection of consumers’ privacy rights.
ii Trends, developments and strategies
Within 60 days of receipt of the ICA’s annual report, the government is required to table a bill aimed at developing and supporting competition and protecting consumers (see Article 47 of Law 99/2009). At the end of an exceptionally long and burdensome parliamentary procedure, the bill tabled by the government in 2015 was finally approved and entered into force on 29 August 2017.34 The new law, whose original text has been almost entirely rewritten by the two branches of Parliament, introduces a number of significant reforms in a wide range of sectors.
With respect to the insurance sector, the law provides for mandatory discounts to be granted to consumers that install a black box on their vehicle or undertake not to allow third persons to drive it. The automatic renewal of insurance contracts is also limited, and insurance companies are requested to provide sufficient information to customers before the conclusion of a contract.
With respect to the legal profession, new rules concerning partnerships between lawyers have been introduced, as well as a duty to provide a written quote at the request of a prospective client. The number of notaries public has increased.
Finally, regulated tariffs for electricity and gas have been abolished, and the national government is empowered to adopt sectoral regulation concerning the provision of transportation services through online platforms such as Uber.
The ICA is expected to publish its next annual report soon. The report will highlight the main obstacles to effective competition that are still affecting different key sectors of the Italian economy and put forward detailed proposals to address them. On that basis, the government will submit to Parliament a new bill that, like the previous one, will probably be subject to a lengthy legislative procedure.
V STATE AID
i Significant cases
The Commission approves measures in support of the liquidation of failing Italian banks
On 25 June 2017, the Commission approved state aid measures in support of the orderly exit from the market of two failing banks, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. Because the Single Resolution Board had concluded that rescuing the two banks was not in the public interest, the two entities were to be liquidated under national insolvency law. The state considered that public support was necessary to avoid negative repercussions on the real economy in the north of Italy. Proposed measures consisted of cash injections of about €4.7 billion and state guarantees on the financing of the liquidation by Intesa Sanpaolo, a major Italian bank. Intesa Sanpaolo will also acquire and restructure the two banks’ remaining activities. The Commission found these measures to be in line with the 2013 Banking Communication,35 because the banks’ shareholders and debt holders fully contributed to the costs, and the banks’ activities were adjudicated to Intesa Sanpaolo after an open, fair and transparent sales process.
The Commission orders the recovery of illegal state aid granted to Ilva
On 21 December 2017, the Commission closed an investigation on the support measures granted by the state to steelmaker Ilva. Ilva is an insolvent company affected by a serious industrial, financial and environmental crisis and, in 2015, it was placed under the extraordinary administration of three state-appointed commissioners. The Commission found that the pricing conditions of a state guarantee on Ilva’s loans were in breach of the EU state aid provisions because they aimed to support Ilva’s commercial activity and not the costs related to the clean-up of pollution produced by the plant. Therefore, Ilva will have to repay €84 million to the state. However, the Commission made it clear that the future buyer of Ilva’s assets will have no responsibility to repay the illegal aid, provided that the acquisition of the assets results in an economic discontinuity between the old and new ownership.
ii Trends, developments and strategies
With two judgments,36 the Court of Cassation has spelled out some important principles concerning the recovery of illegal state aid granted to companies controlled by the state. The Court ruled that illegal aid must be recovered not only from state-controlled companies whose shares are in part held by private entities, but also from companies whose share capital is entirely owned by the state (‘in house’ companies). In fact, as far as ‘in house’ companies are active in a sector that is (at least partially) open to competition, state aid measures adopted in their favour provide them with an illegitimate competitive advantage compared to other entities active in the same market. The Court also confirmed that, in these circumstances, companies are not obliged to repay the illegal aid only if they can prove that this was de minimis (i.e., its amount was negligible).
In January 2018, the government notified the Commission of a proposed state aid measure in support of the failing airline Alitalia. The government has claimed that the measure, consisting of a €300 million loan, is in line with the state aid rules because it is being granted at market condition levels, will be recovered after the sale of the company and must in any case be repaid by September 2018. The Commission’s decision is expected in the coming months.
VI MERGER REVIEW
i Significant cases
In 2017, the ICA made merger clearances conditional upon remedies in two cases.
After reviewing the proposed acquisition of Italiana Editrice by Gruppo Editoriale l’Espresso, the ICA concluded that the transaction would have led to the establishment of a monopoly in the market for advertising services on newspapers in the provinces of Genova and Turin. In its assessment, the ICA took into account the market shares of the involved parties, the buying power of local customers, the competitive pressure exerted by alternative advertising channels and the likelihood of market entry by new players. On the other hand, the ICA found that the transaction did not raise any concerns in relation to the markets for newspapers, magazines, the distribution of periodicals and advertising services in other Italian provinces. The remedies offered by the parties consisted in the divestment of advertising spaces on the local editions of the major Italian newspaper La Repubblica, owned by Gruppo Editoriale l’Espresso.37
With respect to the acquisition of Cementir Italia by Italcementi, the ICA concluded that the transaction raised serious concerns in the local market for the supply of cement. The ICA found that the parties’ combined market shares, assessed in relation to catchment areas surrounding each cement plant, were particularly high. The ICA also took into account the significant closeness of competition between the parties, which, considering the homogenous nature of cement products, was mainly due to the geographic proximity of their plants. Finally, the ICA concluded that the transaction might have facilitated tacit collusion among suppliers, given the high barriers to entry in the affected markets, the homogeneity of the relevant products and the existence of commercial relationships between competing suppliers. The ICA did not raise vertical concerns with respect to the downstream concrete market. The completion of the transaction was made conditional upon divestiture of some cement plants in southern Italy.38
ii Trends, developments and strategies
Law No. 124 of 4 August 2017 revised the two cumulative turnover thresholds for the notification of concentrations to the ICA. The first threshold, applying to the combined aggregate domestic turnover of all undertakings concerned in the concentration, has been slightly lowered from €499 million to €492 million. The second threshold has been lowered from €50 million to €30 million, and now applies to each of at least two of the undertakings concerned, and no longer to the acquired undertaking alone.
This reform will not necessarily have a significant impact on the number of transactions falling within the scope of the Italian merger control regime. This is because the first threshold, which is very high, was left substantially unchanged. The ICA’s ability to review proposed transactions therefore could remain unaltered.
The old EU law distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures remains applicable under Italian competition rules. Accordingly, all joint ventures (including full-function ones) whose main object or effect is the coordination of their parent companies’ behaviour do not constitute a ‘concentration’ within the meaning of Article 5 of Law No. 287/1990. These joint ventures must be assessed under the restrictive agreements or market dominance provisions, or both. The ICA presented a reform proposal to the government, through Recommendation No. AS988 of 2 October 2012, suggesting adding into Article 5 an explicit reference to the applicability of merger control rules also to full-function cooperative joint ventures. The proposal has not yet become law.
The ICA has continued to pursue its approach in terms of both advocacy and enforcement, particularly in regulated sectors. Public tender procedures remain the main area of focus of cartel enforcement. Merger control is the area in which amendments continue to be most desirable, both in terms of filing thresholds (which are now too high) and substantive test analysis (moving away from the dominance test to the significant impediment to effective competition test). Moreover, in line with EU rules, efficiency should formally become part of the ICA’s assessment.
1 Giuseppe Scassellati-Sforzolini and Marco D’Ostuni are partners, Luciana Bellia is a senior attorney and Fabio Chiovini is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.
2 ICA decisions may be appealed before the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio (TAR Lazio), whose judgments are in turn subject to appeal before the Council of State.
3 A table summarising the ICA’s activities from 2011 to 2017 is available at www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/come-funziona/e27_file.pdf/download.html.
4 Based on European competition rules (Article 101 TFEU), the ICA adopted decisions in case I794 – ABI/SEDA, decision of 28 April 2017; case I742 – Tondini per cemento armato, decision of 19 July 2017; case I793 – Aumento prezzi cemento, decision of 25 July 2017; case I796 – Servizi di supporto e assistenza tecnica alla PA nei programmi cofinanziati dall’UE, decision of 18 October 2017. Based on Italian competition rules (Article 2 of Law No. 287/90), the ICA adopted the decision in case I797 – Consiglio notarile di Roma, Velletri e Civitavecchia, decision of 30 May 2017.
5 Based on European competition rules (Article 102 TFEU), the ICA adopted decisions in case A484 –
Unilever/Distribuzione gelati, decision of 31 October 2017; case A493 – Poste Italiane/Prezzi recapito, decision of 13 December 2017; case A500A – Vodafone – SMS informativi aziendali, decision of 13
December 2017; case A500B – Telecom Italia – SMS informativi aziendali, decision of 13 December 2017. Based on Italian competition rules (Article 3 of Law No. 287/90), the ICA adopted the decision in case A503 – Società iniziative editoriali, decision of 20 December 2017.
6 Based on European competition rules (Article 102 TFEU), the ICA adopted decisions in case A490 – Software processo civile telematico, decision 18 January 2017; case A489 – Nuovo IMAIE – Condotte anticoncorrenziali, decision of 22 March 2017; case A498A – Enel – Prezzi servizi di dispacciamento area Brindisi, decision of 4 May 2017; case A495 – Gara TPL Padova, decision of 11 May 2017; case A499 – Assicurazioni Agricole/Comportamenti escludenti CODIPRA, decision of 25 July 2017.
7 Case C12075 – Gruppo Editoriale l’Espresso/Italiana Editrice, decision of 1 March 2017; case C12113 – Italcementi/Cementir Italia, decision of 8 November 2017.
8 The Italian Competition Act (Law No. 287/90).
9 Law No. 192/1998.
10 Legislative Decree No. 206/2005.
11 Law No. 215/2004.
12 Case I793 – Aumento prezzi cemento.
13 Case I796 – Servizi di Supporto e Assistenza Tecnica alla PA nei Programmi Cofinanziati dall’UE.
14 See ICA, Resolution No. 25152 of 22 October 2014, ‘Linee Guida sulla modalità di applicazione dei criteri di quantificazione delle sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie irrogate dall’Autorità in applicazione dell’articolo 15, comma 1, della legge n. 287/90’ (Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed by the Authority pursuant to Article 15(1) of Law No. 287/90).
15 The same discount was applied in, inter alia, ICA decision Accordo tra Operatori del Settore Vending (case No. I783), 8 June 2016; ICA decision Gare Ossigenoterapia e Ventiloterapia (case No. I792), 21 December 2016; and ICA decision Aumento Prezzi Cemento (case No. I793), 25 July 2017.
16 Council of State, judgment of 7 March 2017, UnipolSai Assicurazioni SpA et al and ICA (judgment No. 1066).
17 TAR Lazio, judgments of 18 December 2015, UnipolSai Assicurazioni SpA and ICA and Generali Italia SpA and ICA (judgments Nos. 14282 and 14281).
18 Case I744ICA – Gare RCA per trasporto pubblico locale.
19 Council of State, judgment of 21 June 2017, Siman and ICA (judgment No. 3057).
20 TAR Lazio, judgment of 25 July 2016, Siman and ICA (judgment No. 8504).
21 Case I782 – Gare per servizi di bonifica e smaltimento di materiali inquinanti e/o pericolosi.
22 Case I816 – Gara SoReSA rifiuti sanitari Regione Campania; case I808 – Gara Consip FM4; case I806 – Affidamento appalti per attività antincendio boschivo.
23 Case I805 – Prezzi del cartone ondulato; case I801 – Servizio di prenotazione del trasporto mediante taxi; case I814 – Diritti internazionali.
24 Case A500A – Vodafone-SMS Informativi Aziendali and case A500B – Telecom Italia-SMS Informativi Aziendali.
25 Case A484 – Unilever/Distribuzione gelati.
26 Court of Appeal of Milan, judgment of 2 January 2017, Telecom Italia and Brennercom (judgment No 1/2017).
27 Tribunal of Milan, judgment of 27 December 2013, Telecom Italia and Brennercom (judgment No. 16319/13).
28 Case A357 – Tele2/Tim-Vodafone-Wind, decision of 3 August 2007.
29 Case A431 – Ratiopharm/Pfizer, decision of 11 January 2012.
30 Tribunale di Roma judgment of 24 July 2017, Ministry of Health v. Pfizer Italia Srl, No. 15020.
31 Legislative Decree No. 3 of 19 January 2017 implementing Directive 2014/104/EU of November 26, 2014 on Antitrust Damages.
32 Case A514 – Condotte fibra Telecom Italia.
33 Case A516 – Gara affidamento servizi TPL Bolzano, case A507 – Servizio rifornimento carburante avio aeroporto di Bergamo, cases A511, A512, and A513 – Condotte anticoncorrenziali nel mercato della vendita di energia elettrica, A508 – SIAE/Servizi intermediazione diritti d’autore.
34 Law No. 124 of 4 August 2017.
35 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of state aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis.
36 No. 17240 of 13 July 2017 and No. 25899 of 31 October 2017.
37 Case C12075 – Gruppo Editoriale l’Espresso/Italiana Editrice.
38 Case C12113 – Italcementi/Cementir Italia.