I OVERVIEW

The present-day competition regime in the Netherlands came into force with the enactment of the Competition Act on 1 January 1998. The substantive provisions of the Competition Act mirror those of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Competition Act prohibits anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of a dominant position. In addition, the Competition Act has a system of domestic merger control. The Competition Act established the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) as the domestic body responsible for the enforcement of competition law.

On 1 April 2013, the NMa merged with the independent Post and Telecommunication Authority and the Consumer Authority into a single regulator, the Consumer and Market Authority (ACM). The ACM is responsible for the enforcement of competition law, consumer protection law as well as sector-specific regulation in the energy, transport, postal and telecoms sectors.

The enforcement procedure in the Netherlands is typically administrative in nature. If the ACM finds that an undertaking has violated the Competition Act, it may take a decision imposing a (substantial) administrative fine. In addition, the ACM may impose fines on individuals to the extent that such individuals were in charge of the prohibited conduct.

As a standard element of Dutch administrative law, an internal appeal may be lodged against the first ACM decision imposing a sanction, after which the ACM must reconsider and take a second decision. The latter decision is open to appeal before the District Court in Rotterdam. A second and final appeal may be brought before the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal in The Hague.

Apart from public enforcement by the ACM, competition law cases in the private courts are starting to become more common. That not only includes follow-on actions for damages, but also cases in areas where the ACM is unlikely to act, such as in the field of vertical restraints and abuse of dominance (as explained in more detail below).

Early in 2016, the ACM identified six strategic themes on which it would focus in 2016 and 2017:

  1. ports and transport;
  2. clear prices and conditions;
  3. energy markets in transition;
  4. healthy collaboration in healthcare markets;
  5. competitive neutrality; and
  6. the online consumer.

The ACM’s agenda for 2018 has not yet been published.

II CARTELS

Article 6(1) of the Competition Act provides the prohibition on anticompetitive agreements. Its wording is similar to that of Article 101 TFEU. The provision prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions of trade associations and concerted practices between undertakings to the extent that they have an anticompetitive object or effect on the Dutch market. Differing from Article 101 TFEU, the Dutch prohibition does not require an effect on interstate trade.

Article 6(3) of the Competition Act provides an exception to Article 6(1) of the Competition Act and is similar to the exception laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU. Article 6(3) of the Competition Act holds that the prohibition does not apply to agreements, decisions and concerted practices that (1) contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to promoting technical or economic progress, while (2) allowing customers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and that do not (3) impose restrictions that are not indispensable to attain these objectives, and (4) that do not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the relevant products and services.

Article 7 of the Competition Act seeks to exempt agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises that would otherwise be prohibited under Article 6(1) of the Competition Act. Article 7(1) of the Competition Act provides that undertakings are allowed to make (otherwise anticompetitive) agreements if not more than eight undertakings are involved, and the joint year turnover amounts to a maximum of €5.5 million for goods and €1.1 million for services. Article 7(2) of the Competition Act contains the second exemption. It provides that the cartel prohibition does not apply if the aggregate market share of the parties is below 10 per cent. However, this exemption is not applicable if the concerned agreement falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.

The competition rules before the Competition Act did provide for criminal sanctions, even though in actual practice there was little, if any, enforcement. By contrast, the current Competition Act does not contain a criminal sanction regime. Notwithstanding the above, an administrative fine may still be considered as a ‘criminal charge’ within the meaning of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Since 1 July 2016, the fine for cartel infringements may be up to 10 per cent of the turnover of all the years of the infringement, up to a maximum of four years (i.e., 40 per cent of the annual turnover). The fine for repeat offenders will be doubled, which can lead to a maximum fine of 80 per cent of the undertaking’s turnover in the preceding business year.

The Netherlands has a leniency regime for both companies and individuals. The leniency guidelines grant complete immunity from fines to the first company that presents information to the ACM about a cartel prior to the start of an investigation. Leniency applications must be submitted to the ACM’s leniency office. The leniency applicant must provide the ACM with information that has significant added value, and has to fully cooperate with the ACM’s investigation. Apart from complete immunity for the first successful leniency applicant, three other categories of fine reductions exist, largely depending on timing and the added value of the leniency applicant’s information for the investigation.

The ACM may choose to accept commitments in lieu of further investigating a case. Such a commitment decision needs to ensure that an infringement is either prevented or seized. The ACM may thus take such a decision even where it has found no definitive evidence of an infringement. If the ACM decides to take this route, it must make clear, inter alia, why a commitment decision is more effective from an enforcement perspective. In the case of breach of the commitments, the ACM may impose a fine.

In December 2017, the ACM successfully concluded its first investigation as part of its campaign to improve competition law compliance in the ports and transport sector. After a joint investigation with the German Federal Cartel Office into cartel agreements by harbour towage service providers, the Federal Cartel Office imposed fines on three undertakings as part of a settlement procedure amounting to approximately €13 million.2 According to the ACM, the Federal Cartel Office was the most appropriate authority to conclude the investigation. The ACM thus decided to close its own investigation after the cartelists reached a settlement with the German authority. In addition to the harbour towage service decision, the departing president of the board of the ACM confirmed various investigations in the harbour sector are currently ongoing, including an announced investigation in the bunker sector.

On 30 June 2017, the AMC issued fines in one of the three BWMT investigations,3 resulting in €13 million in fines, concerning price agreements relating to a surcharge for lead in the sale of (imported) traction batteries, which amounted to 10 to 30 per cent of the total sale price of those batteries. In addition to the importers, the ACM also fined the BMWT trade association because it had ‘participated in the collusion with an active supporting role’, citing the Cement4 and Treuhand 5 criteria. In this regard, the ACM notes that:

  1. the BMWT offered the meeting space;
  2. the president of the trade association was present during the relevant meetings;
  3. the association had allowed the topic of the lead surcharge to return on the agenda various times;
  4. the association had circulated the lead-surcharge lists to the participants; and
  5. the association had provided secretarial support.

The ACM also reproached the BMWT for not intervening the moment that the agreements were made, and that it had actively followed up on these agreements in the period thereafter.

On 3 July 2017, the ACM closed the other two BMWT investigations6 relating to an information exchange concerning service costs of construction machinery and material handling trucks without finding an infringement. These therefore closed without any fines, despite almost five years of investigation. The Competition Department concluded in its report that there was an ‘inherent interplay’ between the costs of after-sales services (on the secondary market) and the purchase of the product (on the primary market). The ACM’s Legal Department, however, concluded that the investigation report did not demonstrate such an inherent connection between the primary and secondary markets. In particular, the investigation report did not show that the costs of services constituted an important factor in the selection choice of customers, and thereby in the competitive process between the importers of the machinery and trucks (on the primary market). The Legal Department concluded that the (factual) context provided by the investigation team, which formed the basis for the assessment of the behaviour as being anticompetitive, had not been proven. The implicit grounds for not finding an infringement on the secondary after-sales market appears to be the brand-specific nature of the after-sales services, which means that there was no competitive process between the parties.

The cautionary approach by the ACM’s legal service may be a result of the recent case law of the District Court of Rotterdam and the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb). A notable judgment in this regard concerns the annulment by the CBb of fines imposed for collusive behaviour with regard to sales under execution of houses.7 The case concerned more than 70 traders that had been fined for collusive behaviour in allegedly more than 2,000 sales under execution. The ACM had classified the behaviour as a single and continuous infringement, but had, in short, failed to sufficiently prove this classification.

The CBb started by considering that a finding of a single and continuous infringement requires, inter alia, that various acts form part of an ‘overall plan’ by virtue of a ‘common goal’. Applying this test, the CBb found that for the vast majority of the execution sales, the ACM had not proven that these acts were aimed at a common purpose to lower prices, and that such acts therefore could not constitute a single and continuous infringement. With respect to the execution sales for which the ACM had proved a common anticompetitive goal, the CBb noted that the factual context for the ACM’s conclusion for considering these acts as a single and continuous infringement were for a large part based on the evidence gathered regarding the erroneously ‘contaminated’ execution sales. The CBb therefore considered that an assessment of whether the remaining acts could be deemed to form part of a single and continuous infringement would require further analysis and assessment. However, because of (in particular) the fundamental nature of the deficiencies in the evidence and the excessive duration of the procedure, the CBb decided to annul the contested and primary administrative decision, without referring the case back to the ACM for a renewed decision.

A second notable judgment8 is that of the District Court of The Hague deciding in an interim procedure that the ACM is permitted to gather and investigate data obtained from mobile phones (smartphones) of employees. During a dawn raid at the company’s business premises, the ACM had made a full copy of the data on the phone (excluding videos, audio and ringtones). The ACM declared that it would make a selection of the copied data according to the procedure prescribed by the ACM Procedure for the inspection of digital data. According to this procedure, forensic IT specialists not forming part of the investigation will prepare an automatic selection of the data on the basis of search terms. An overview of the data and the relevant search terms will subsequently be provided to the individual involved, after which the individual can request an amended selection of search queries and can indicate whether the data set includes any privileged or ‘non-business’ documents. Any legal privilege claims will be reviewed by an ACM official independent from the case team. In its judgment, the Court considered that the inevitable copying of personal data is not unlawful, taking into account the investigation interest of the ACM. The Court considered that the right to privacy therefore carries less weight provided that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the ACM is not provided with insight into data to which it is not entitled. After considering the various safeguards, the Court concluded that sufficient safeguards are present, thus ruling in favour of the ACM.

The ACM published a draft decision in October 2017 in which it accepts commitments in the case of KLM/Schiphol. According to the ACM’s (preliminary) research, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Schiphol) had frequent contact with each other regarding the utilisation of airport capacity, and regarding Schiphol’s plans for airport facilities, its investments and marketing strategy, and airport charges. The ACM feared that due to these interactions, Schiphol would not set its strategy independently, but would change it to accommodate KLM’s wishes. The parties involved committed themselves to not have any contact about growth opportunities of other airlines, and to Schiphol independently developing its own plans for investments, charges and its marketing strategy. The ACM allowed six weeks for interested parties to provide their comments on the draft decision.

III ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

Article 24(1) of the Competition Act prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. The Dutch prohibition is substantively the same as that found in EU competition law (with the exception that the Dutch prohibition does not require an effect on trade between Member States). A dominant position exists where an undertaking can exert market power. As in EU competition law, a rebuttable presumption of dominance exists where the market share of an undertaking exceeds 50 per cent.

On 29 June 2017, the ACM published its decision of 22 May 2017 to impose a fine of nearly €41 million on the Dutch passenger rail transport incumbent, NS.9 According to the ACM, NS abused its dominant position on the main railway network during a public tender for public transport services in a region of the Netherlands. According to the decision, the abuse took place on markets adjacent to the market on which NS has a dominant position, and the two infringements were predatory pricing in the form of submitting a loss-making bid for the regional tender and a combination of impediments that cumulatively constitute abuse of dominance.

The ACM concluded that the loss-making bid submitted by NS constitutes predatory pricing. The ACM performed an ex ante assessment of the bid, and used NS’ internal investment manual to assess whether the submitted bid was considered as a positive business case. According to the decision, the investment manual prescribes that a business case is considered positive if the internal rate of return is higher than the weighted average cost of capital. The ACM considered that a bid with an internal rate of return lower than the weighted average cost of capital set by NS constitutes predatory pricing. It also considered that the business case presented in NS’ bid was too positive, inter alia, because NS’ expectation of the growth of revenue from passengers was too high. The ACM argued that the internal rate of return would be below the weighted average cost of capital if NS used a more realistic prognosis in its business case.

According to the decision, the second infringement consisted of hiring a director from a competitor and acquiring confidential information from that director; sharing requests for access by competitors with NS’ own bidding team, and delaying and providing incomplete answers to those requests; and favouring NS’ own bidding team by only providing them with important information on revenue from travellers. NS has announced its intention to lodge an internal appeal against the ACM’s decision.

IV SECTORAL COMPETITION: MARKET INVESTIGATIONS AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES

The ACM is the regulatory authority in the telecoms, energy, post and transport sectors. These sectors often involve natural monopolies (due to the existence of a network that cannot easily be replicated) or include a former incumbent that still holds an important market position. The regulatory regime typically seeks to replicate the conditions of effective competition as much as possible. For example, where a market party is found to have significant market power (SMP) – the regulatory equivalent of dominance – on an upstream wholesale market while its competitors rely on wholesale access to compete on the retail market, the ACM may impose obligations, often including rules on cost orientation and non-discrimination. As a final remark, the ACM also has various regulatory powers that are unrelated to market power and that apply to all companies active in the sector, as will be shown in the following paragraphs.

In terms of the telecoms sector, the ACM has various tasks such as:

  1. the registration of telecom companies;
  2. the allocation of phone numbers;
  3. ensuring that mobile number portability can take place;
  4. the protection of various consumer protection clauses; and
  5. dispute settlement.

The ACM’s tasks also include enforcing internet-related legislation, such as Dutch cookie and net-neutrality rules.

The ACM also functions as the national regulatory authority within the meaning of the European telecom directives. Every three years, the ACM conducts a market analysis to assess whether a company holds SMP in a given telecom market. In practice, these market analysis decisions usually focus on the position of KPN (the incumbent telecoms operator in the Netherlands), although these decisions may also relate to a wider group. For instance, the decision on fixed and mobile call termination applies to every phone operator in the Netherlands, as each operator is considered a monopolist for the traffic terminating on its network.

If the ACM concludes that a telecom company holds SMP, it may impose regulatory measures on the wholesale level to ensure competition at the retail level. For example, if the ACM sees a risk of excessive tariffs or margin squeeze (Article 6a.7(1) of the Telecommunications Act), it may require that the wholesale tariffs be cost-oriented (Article 6a.7(2) of the Telecommunications Act). The ACM’s market analysis decisions usually have great impact on the telecom companies that are concerned, and as a result are highly litigious.

The ACM also serves as the key regulator for the energy sector. One of its main tasks relates to the transport of energy. The ACM regulates the tariffs of transmission and distribution network operators for provision of access to their network.

The ACM is the competent authority for most of the regulatory rules in the postal sector. As of 1 January 2014, the Postal Act enables the ACM to conduct a market analysis comparable to those performed in the telecoms sector. If the ACM finds that a specific operator has SMP on any given postal market in the Netherlands, it may impose specific obligations (Article 13e-13k of the Postal Act). On 27 July 2017, the ACM found PostNL to be dominant in the markets for small, medium and large users of bulk mail and imposed stringent access regulation and related obligations.

Finally, the ACM is also active in the transport sector. In terms of rail transport, the ACM examines whether network operators comply with the principle of non-discrimination as to capacity allocation and applicable fees. The most important operators are Prorail, the operator of all major railways, and Keyrail, the operator of a specific railway route for goods linking the port of Rotterdam with Germany.

In terms of aviation, the ACM is active in the regulation of Dutch airports, such as Schiphol (Amsterdam’s international airport). The ACM examines whether airports apply reasonable and non-discriminatory tariffs and conditions for airlines (Article 8.25d(2) of the Aviation Act). Tariffs also need to be cost-oriented (Article 8.25d(4) of the Aviation Act), which means that airports may only charge costs to the extent that they actually relate to aviation or security. The ACM recently confirmed this principle that Schiphol is not allowed to pass on to airlines the costs of the public-transport card readers and ticket machines located on its premises.10

As a final part of transport regulation, Dutch law requires sea vessels calling at a Dutch port to take on a maritime pilot for navigation through that port. The Dutch pilotage company Loodswezen has a statutory monopoly on providing these services. As a result of this market position, the ACM determines a cost allocation system and sets the tariffs that maritime pilots are allowed to charge, thereby ensuring that no excessive fees apply.

V STATE AID

The European state aid rules directly apply in the Netherlands. Articles 107 to 109 TFEU provide substantive and procedural rules on distortions of competition as a result of state measures involving aid to undertakings, irrespective of the precise form in which the aid is provided.

State aid law is thus a matter for European Commission enforcement rather than enforcement by the ACM. However, the Competition Act does contain specific rules that seek to ensure that governmental bodies themselves do not distort competition. These rules, embodied in Article 25g to 25ma of the Competition Act, are also known as the Act on Government and Free Markets. Both central and decentralised public bodies are subject to the Act on Government and Free Markets.

A key part of the Act on Government and Free Markets is that a public body that enters into economic activities must at least charge the integral costs of that activity (Article 25i(1) of the Competition Act). That provision seeks to prevent activities by public bodies leading to unfair competition with private undertakings where a public body cross-subsidises its economic activities from other public tasks. Another important part of the Act on Government and Free Markets is that governmental bodies may not favour businesses in which they have a say or participate compared to privately owned competitors.

The educational sector and public broadcasters are largely exempt from the rules of the Act on Government and Free Markets. In addition, an exemption applies where the government conducts activities in the public interest or where the European rules on state aid apply.

In October 2017, the ACM published its decision that between 1 January 2017 and 1 November 2017, the municipality of Deventer competed unfairly with private parties by offering its service of protective guardianship free of charge.11 Specifically, the municipality reimbursed only its own service through general funds, while this funding was not available to private parties. This created an uneven playing field between the municipality and private parties. By not charging the integral costs for its service of protective guardianship, the municipality of Deventer violated Article 25i(1) of the Competition Act.

VI MERGER REVIEW

Chapter 5 of the Competition Act provides the rules of merger control in the Netherlands. Similar to other parts of competition law, the Dutch merger control rules are similar (and complementary) to those of EU merger control. The concepts of a merger (or ‘concentration’) and ‘control’ are equal to those at the EU level. The ACM also conducts its substantive analysis of mergers in line with the Commission’s guidelines. The Dutch and EU merger control systems are also very similar from a procedural perspective, although not identical. A procedural difference is that, unlike a notification at the EU level, Dutch competition rules do not contain a formal requirement of a pre-notification phase. However, in practice, pre-notification talks are often held in cases that are likely to receive more scrutiny. Another feature of the Dutch system is that the waiting period is suspended from the moment that the ACM sends formal questions to the notifying party until the moment that those questions have been answered.

The Dutch thresholds are met in the case of a concentration where the combined turnover of the undertakings involved exceeded €150 million in the previous calendar year. In addition, at least two of the undertakings involved must each achieve a turnover of at least €30 million in the Netherlands. Mergers that meet these thresholds require mandatory prior notification to the ACM. In line with the ‘one-stop shop’ principle of EU merger control, no notification needs to take place in the Netherlands once a merger has an EU dimension and thus has to be notified with the Commission.

The rules on merger control provide for a two-phase investigation procedure, starting upon notification. The ACM clears most cases in the first phase by deciding that no licence is required for the notified transaction. Where the ACM considers that a more in-depth investigation is necessary, it takes a Phase I decision holding that a licence is required. Phase II starts as of the moment the merging parties file a separate application asking for a licence. It seems that, in practice, the ACM uses a somewhat lower threshold to take a case into Phase II, opting for a more in-depth analysis as soon as it cannot exclude competition issues arising from the merger, rather than the ‘serious concerns’ test of the Commission.

The basic test under Dutch merger control is the same as the one under EU merger control (i.e., whether the concentration will significantly impede effective competition). Similar to the analysis of the Commission, the ACM examines not only the combined market share, but also factors such as the number of competitors and their respective market shares, the existence of countervailing power from suppliers or customers, entry barriers, etc.

Dutch law prohibits the implementation of the anticipated merger concentration before a notification is made and the waiting period has lapsed or, where a licence is required, before an application is submitted and the ACM has granted the licence.

An exception to the obligation to respect the waiting period is the exemption of Article 40 of the Competition Act. This exemption will only be granted in cases of overriding reasons and on the request of the party that has made the notification. Overriding reasons are deemed to exist if applying the waiting period would cause irreparable damage to the concentration. Of course, such an exemption does not prejudice the outcome of the ACM’s substantive analysis. The risk is upon the parties if the ACM does, after its examination, find that the – by now already implemented concentration – represents a significant impediment to effective competition. The ACM has recently granted several exemption requests, especially in the field of retail where many bankruptcies have taken place. In those cases, the ACM seems to see ample reason to grant an exemption to ensure business continuity of retail stores.

Both Phase I and Phase II decisions can be made subject to conditions or restrictions. The purpose of such conditions or restrictions is to remedy any adverse effects on competition that result from the concentration. Remedies can either be suggested by the parties or by the ACM on its own initiative. There are written guidelines indicating the types of commitments that the ACM deems acceptable and the procedure to follow.

There were interesting developments with regard to hospital mergers in 2017.

In September 2017, the ACM granted a licence for a merger between the two Amsterdam-based academic hospitals, Academic Medical Central and VU University Medical Center. In its Phase I decision, the ACM concluded that the merger may result in a restriction of competition in complex hospital care. The parties involved would control a large share of the market for complex hospital care in the greater area of Amsterdam. Moreover, the hospitals were considered to be each other’s closest alternatives. Consequently, the ACM considered that the proposed merger may leave patients as well as health insurers with a lack of sufficient reasonable alternatives. Health insurers also expressed their concern that the proposed merger would damage their bargaining power in the purchase of complex hospital care in the greater area of Amsterdam. Based on its research in Phase II, however, the ACM concluded that the merger would not lead to significant consequences for competition. The ACM found that the parties would have a relatively limited market share (30 to 40 per cent) on the market for (non-unique) complex healthcare, while the hospitals Onze Lieve Vrouwe Gasthuis (OLVG) and Antoni van Leeuwenhoekziekenhuis (AvL) would be viable alternatives for patients. OLVG and AvL – and to a lesser extent hospitals outside the greater area of Amsterdam – also provide healthcare insurers with sufficient alternatives after the merger to procure care. Thus, the merger was approved. The proposed merger was heavily scrutinised by, inter alia, the Dutch Healthcare Authority and parliament. There were concerns regarding the manageability of the merger hospital and the potential risks the merger could pose for public interests due to the size of the hospital.

In December 2017, the ACM published a report on the price and volume effects of hospital mergers. The ACM concluded that the investigated hospital mergers on average result in higher healthcare costs without a demonstrable improvement in quality. These findings led to increased scrutiny of hospital mergers by the ACM.

In November 2017, the ACM decided that the merger between the hospitals Stichting Catharina Ziekenhuis (Catharina) and Stichting St Anna Zorggroep (St Anna) required a licence and thus had to be assessed in Phase II.12 The ACM considered that the proposed merger could pose a risk for competition in the market for general hospital care. The merger would likely deteriorate the bargaining position of health insurers in the purchase of care in the greater area of Eindhoven. According to the ACM’s research, health insurers are currently able to use St Anna – the cheaper healthcare provider – to their advantage in their negotiations with the other two major players in the region, Catharina and Maxima Medisch Centrum (MMC). However, the proposed merger would leave health insurers with insufficient alternatives. Consequently, the proposed transaction could lead to price increases at the merger entity and the MMC to the detriment of the insured. In response to the decision of the ACM, the parties involved decided to discontinue the merger. The parties considered that the chances are too high that the ACM would disapprove of the merger in Phase II now that it has started to monitor hospital concentrations more stringently.

VII CONCLUSIONS

The level of ACM enforcement activity in 2017 seemed to pick up from the relatively low enforcement levels seen in 2016. The ACM concluded several cartel investigations (even though not all of them resulted in fines), accepted commitments in the KLM/Schiphol case and imposed a massive fine on rail operator NS. Equally notable is ACM’s strong message that it will scrutinise hospital mergers more closely. In next year’s edition, we can probably report on how the ACM has followed up on that promise.

1 Tjarda van der Vijver, Jochem de Kok, Koen de Wit and Iradj Nazaryar are associates at Allen & Overy LLP. With the kind permission of previous contributors, parts of the previous edition’s chapter have remained intact in this edition’s chapter.

2 ACM, ‘Collaboration between Bundeskartellamt and ACM leads to fines in towage sector’ (press release, 18 December 2017), available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/collaboration-between-
bundeskartellamt-and-acm-leads-fines-towage-sector; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt imposes fines on harbour towage service providers’ (press release, 18 December 2017), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/18_12_2017_Hafenschlepper.
html;jsessionid=9F5D83FABBCBFAB93896136377CD083B.1_cid387?nn=3591568
.

3 Case 7615, available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/17426/Boete-importeurs-van-accus-
vorkheftrucks-voor-prijsafspraken.

4 ECLI:EU:T:2000:7.

5 ECLI:EU:T:2008:256.

7 ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:204.

8 ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:14150.

9 ACM decision of 22 May 2017, available at www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/17397/Dutch-
Railways-NS-abused-its-dominant-position-in-regional-tender-process.

10 ACM decision of 14 July 2015, available at www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/14494/Goedkeuring-
toerekeningssysteem-Schiphol-2016-2018.

11 ACM decision of 31 October 2017, available at www.acm.nl/en/publications/dutch-municipality-
reimburse-costs-commercial-conservators.

12 ACM decision of 17 November 2017, available at www.acm.nl/en/publications/no-clearance-yet-merger-
between-two-southern-dutch-hospitals.