In May 2016, Mr Marek Niechciał was appointed to the position of President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP). In a number of public speeches, he has expressed an intention to increase detection of restrictive agreements. In this area, his main objective was to focus on hardcore restrictions, mostly cartels. During almost three years since his appointment, he has implemented some initiatives aimed at fulfilling declared objectives, for instance, the introduction of the whistle-blower system and publication of guidelines on how to submit a leniency application.2 Further, 18 dawn raids and two investigations into potential resale price maintenance initiated in 20183 prove that the OCCP is indeed attempting to increase detection of infringements of competition.
Polish antitrust enforcement has generally not developed substantially in 2018.
Since late June 2017, claiming damages for harm suffered as a result of a competition law infringement is supposed to be easier. The Antitrust Damages Directive has been finally transposed into Polish law, and the Polish Damages Act came into force on 27 June 2017. The objective of this Act is to facilitate the recovery of claims concerning legal presumptions, procedural facilitations and quantification of harm. The Act applies not only to cartel infringements but to all other infringements of competition law, including prohibited vertical agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Furthermore, it covers not only EU competition law infringements, but also infringements based solely on Polish competition law. The Private Enforcement Act introduces a number of solutions that should facilitate seeking compensation from competition law infringers through private enforcement. Nonetheless, despite the Act being in force since mid-2017, such cases remain relatively rare in Poland.
Another important development was the enactment of a new law aimed at limiting the use of contractual advantage and granting new powers to the OCCP. The Act on Countering Unfair Use of the Contractual Advantage in Trade of Agricultural and Food Product came into force on 12 July 2017. It lists examples of practices that may be considered as an unfair use of contractual advantage. Such practices pertain to agricultural and food products and include, inter alia, unjustified contract termination, a unilateral right to withdraw from a contract and the unjustified extension of a payment term. Pursuant to this Act, the OCCP has the power to initiate proceedings in such cases ex officio, and in cases of infringement it is entitled to impose a fine of up to 3 per cent of annual turnover. In 2018, the OCCP was quite active in applying the provisions of this new Act. It monitored the markets for agricultural and food products and intervened, for example, by instigating proceedings related to the use of the extensive payment terms.4 It also issued one commitment decision addressed to the manufacturer of food products who applied unfair terms in contracts concluded with farmers.5
i Enforcement agenda
In 2018, as in past years, the OCCP focused on consumer protection, in particular in the banking and financial sectors. We observe some developments in the antitrust enforcement exemplified by a substantial number of dawn raids and an increased interest in the vertical restraints, in particular resale price maintenance. As regards merger review, the vast majority of cases were closed in Phase I, which resulted in a reduction in the average length of proceedings. At the same time, we saw a slight decline in the number of merger cases decided in Phase II.
The President of the OCCP announced that it will be applying high fines, since the benefits from an infringement usually outweigh the amounts of fines imposed on infringers. Cartels and other restrictive agreements are expected to attract the close scrutiny of the authority. Mr Marek Niechciał explains that soft measures (i.e., written warnings sent to undertakings without instigating any proceedings) applied so far have not been effective; therefore, we may expect an increase in antimonopoly proceedings concerning vertical arrangements.
As regards cartels, the OCCP continued to focus on bid rigging. Up to May 2018, the authority had reviewed the legality of 172 tenders and 48 proceedings related to bid rigging were ongoing.6 Also, in May 2018 the authority imposed a fine of approximately €230,000 on three companies who colluded and fixed the bids in the course of three tender proceedings related to IT sector.7 Besides bid rigging, the OCCP was not very active in cartel enforcement.
i Significant cases
Since the 2017 OCCP's decision concerning the cartel between producers of fibre boards and particle boards, there was no major cartel decision issued in 2018. However, in June 2018 the OCCP instigated the antimonopoly proceedings against 16 companies operating fitness clubs and the company offering benefit packages for employees (including sports and recreation packages). The OCCP alleges that the companies entered into a market sharing agreement. Interestingly, the OCCP also instigated the proceedings against individuals since it found evidence confirming that the managers of six companies participated in the agreement. The proceedings are ongoing.8
Cartel between producers of particle and fibreboards
In late December 2017, the OCCP issued its decision, finding that Swiss Krono, Kronospan Szczecinek, Kronospan Mielec (both referred to as Kronospan), Pfleiderer Grajewo, Pfleiderer Wieruszów (both referred to as Pfleiderer) entered into an anticompetitive agreement.9 The authority established that the parties had bilateral and trilateral contacts during which they fixed prices and exchange confidential information on the sales conditions of fibreboards and particle boards. The OCCP gathered evidence during a dawn raid performed on the premises of the decision's addressees and information provided by the leniency applicant, Swiss Krono.
The OCCP based its decision on both national and EU competition law provisions. The authority imposed a fine amounting to approximately €32 million. Swiss Krono, as a successful leniency applicant, escaped the fine. It follows from publicly available information that Pfleiderer Group, a company listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, submitted an appeal against the decision to the Court of Competition and Consumers Protection (CCCP).
Agreement on sharing the markets for local bus passenger transport
In December 2018, the OCCP issued a decision concerning a market sharing agreement between companies offering bus passenger transport services.10 The authority found that two companies agreed on routes that would be operated by each of them. Interestingly, the explanatory proceedings were instigated as a result of a complaint by one of the addressees of the decision, who claimed that its counterparty was abusing its dominant position. During the investigation, the OCCP found that both companies in fact infringed the competition law by concluding an anticompetitive agreement. However, the authority did not impose a fine on the complainant considering that it informed the authority about the infringement on its own initiative. Such information was provided unintentionally as part of the notification of the alleged abuse of the dominant position. However, in the OCCP's opinion, imposing a fine would be unjustified and equal to punishing a complainant for its lack of legal knowledge.
ii Trends, developments and strategies
The detection of the most harmful anticompetitive agreements is the declared objective of the OCCP. To facilitate this, the authority tries to encourage individuals and undertakings to inform it about identified irregularities. The OCCP introduced a whistle-blower system as well as published guidelines on how to submit a leniency application.
The Polish Damages Act entered into force in 2017. It facilitates bringing claims for damages for competition law infringements; thus, we may expect that those who suffered harm as a result of such anticompetitive conduct may be incentivised to bring their claims to court. Despite this legislative development, private enforcement cases remain rare in Poland.
The Polish Competition Authority (PCA) launched the pilot whistle-blowing programme in April 2017 with the aim of increasing the detection of prohibited agreements between undertakings.11 This policy is aimed at allowing the OCCP to obtain information from anonymous individuals who have become aware of an illegal practice. Individuals are able to inform the authority through its dedicated telephone number or email address and provide evidence of competition-restricting practices. It follows from publicly available information that the authority has received numerous calls and emails informing about potential irregularities pertaining both to the competition and consumers laws. The OCCP is also working on legislative changes designed to ensure that the concept of a whistle-blower is incorporated into the provisions of Polish competition law on a permanent basis.
The whistle-blower system was quite widely used by potential informants. Up to 30 November 2018, the OCCP received 938 emails, 508 phone calls and held two meetings. This system also proved to be successful since in 2018, the OCCP instigated antimonopoly proceedings concerning resale price maintenance as a result of the information provided by a whistle-blower.12
Implementation of the Damages Directive
The Polish Damages Act, implementing the EU Damages Directive, entered into force in 2017. the Act covers not only competition law infringements relating to the European market, but also those related solely to the national market, and consequently does not multiply the regimes for claiming damages for competition law infringements. The most important aspects of the Act aim at facilitating the recovery of claims concerning legal presumptions, procedural facilitations and quantification of harm.
The Act raises hopes as to the facilitation of compensation claims for competition law infringements. So far, bringing a successful compensation claim has been difficult due to the demanding tort law rules regarding evidence. The Act does not extend the powers of the OCCP, but intends to supplement the authority's actions. Following its entry into force, undertakings infringing competition law will face not only fines imposed by the OCCP, but also will be exposed to the risk of civil proceedings that could result in potentially substantial amounts of damages to be paid.
Given the declarations of the OCCP regarding increased cartel detection, we may expect that various means already implemented (for instance, the leniency plus and whistle-blower system) will bring some results in terms of antitrust enforcement in Poland. More activities in the area of antitrust is also a prerequisite for the development of private enforcement of the competition law. Some damages claims proceedings are ongoing; nevertheless, the implementation of the EU Damages Directive is expected to further increase the rate of such claims.
III ANTITRUST: RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS AND DOMINANCE
i Trends, developments and strategies
As regards the enforcement of restrictive agreements, no substantial case law development was seen in 2018. Besides the cartel decision described above and a bid-rigging decision mentioned earlier, there were no more cases in 2018 concerning restrictive agreements.
As regards dominance, the OCCP discontinued long-lasting proceedings concerning abuse of a collective dominant position by three major telecommunications operators since it did not establish the existence of the collective dominance. It also issued a commitment decision addressed to the operator of a railway infrastructure after finding that provisions applied by this company in the agreement with suppliers may be unfair.13
ii Significant cases
Given the poor records of the OCCP's case law, below we provide a description of noteworthy judgments of the courts concerning antitrust matters.
In March 2018, the Appellate Court decreased the fines for the participants of the Cement cartel to 69 million zlotys from 411 million zlotys, which brought a close to almost nine years of appellate proceedings.14 The OCCP's issued the highest ever fine in this case in December 2009.15 The courts also lowered the fines for undertakings in several other cases concerning Sfinks16 (to 50,000 zlotys; the case concerned resale price maintenance in the restaurant franchising system) and Royal Canin17 (by 20 per cent, to 1.7 million zlotys; the case concerned restriction of form of sales, including online, of pet food).
Recently we have also seen three noteworthy judicial developments concerning procedural rights of the undertakings. First, in October 2018 the Polish Supreme Court indicated in its judgment concerning the OCCP's decision on interchange fees that the OCCP should change its current practice on restricting access to evidence contained in the case file for parties to antimonopoly proceedings on the basis that these constitute business secrets.18 According to the Polish Competition Act, the OCCP may, to the extent necessary, limit the right of access to specific pieces of evidence to protect business secrets of the undertakings. Such a restriction for access is made in the form of a resolution. The Polish Supreme Court found that the OCCP is using this right to often what effectively restricts undertakings' right of defence and right to be heard. This is because they cannot review the full OCCP's case file and comment on it while the OCCP may still rely on the pieces of evidence made confidential to the undertaking.
The issue of restricting access to file on the basis of the business secrets has also been considered by the Appellate Court, which considered that the resolution concerning treatment of the data provided to the OCCP during the proceedings as a business secret and restricting access to it to other parties to the proceedings is subject to two-tier review by the Polish courts – by the CCCP in the first instance, whose judgment is further subject to the appeal reviewed by the Appellate Court.
iii Abuse of dominant position
In 2018, the OCCP issued four decisions regarding abuse of dominant position. Three cases concerned local utilities markets. The authority terminated the proceedings without finding abuse of a dominant position. The other proceedings concerning an operator of the railway infrastructure – described above – ended with a commitment decision. The most remarkable decision was issued early this year and concerned one of the trickiest concepts in competition law: an abuse of a collective dominant position.
iv Abuse of a collective dominant position
In early January 2018, the OCCP issued a decision discontinuing antimonopoly proceedings concerning a potential abuse of a collective dominant position by three major telecommunication operators on the national market for retail mobile telecommunication services. The OCCP established that the three mobile network operators (MNOs) did not have a collective dominant position.
The proceedings were initiated in response to a complaint submitted to the authority by a fourth MNO, a maverick firm that entered the market significantly later than three previously mentioned MNOs. The complainant alleged that the three MNOs set higher retail prices for calls made by their customers to the complainant's customers, and that by carrying on this behaviour they had abused their collectively strong market position. The case proceeded on the basis of the provisions of both national and EU competition laws. In the course of the proceedings, the authority sent numerous requests for information, reviewed economic analyses provided by the parties and consulted the European Commission on the matter.
When analysing the potential existence of the collective dominant position, the OCCP referred to established EU case law. It found that the national market for retail mobile telecommunications services is relatively transparent, with homogenous services that facilitate anticipation of competitors' market behaviour. However, in the view of the authority, this was not sufficient for reaching an understanding of the terms of the collusion. Neither was the plausible implementation of any retaliation mechanisms by the parties to the proceedings. The OCCP established that the market behaviour of three MNOs towards the complainant differed significantly, and thus no signs of coordination were observed. Even though the authority found that prices for calls to the complainant's customers were higher, the OCCP considered that the three MNOs had legitimate interests to apply them. Given that the three MNOs were not collectively dominant, the OCCP discontinued the proceedings.
In 2018, the OCCP instigated two antimonopoly proceedings concerning resale price maintenance. This is in line with the antitrust enforcement trends in Europe. It is expected that the OCCP will continue to focus on vertical restraints. Further, the substantial number of dawn raids conducted in 2018 shall be rationally expected to translate into a corresponding number of antimonopoly proceedings.
IV SECTORAL COMPETITION: MARKET INVESTIGATIONS AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES
In 2018, the OCCP published information concerning three market investigations, regarding the market for investment funds, automotive insurance and production of milk.
i Trends and development
Given the OCCP's policy of declared openness and transparency, guidelines on publishing results of market inquiries have been issued.19 In the guidelines, the authority announced that information on the results of all market inquiries will be published. The scope of the information presented to the public may vary, depending on the educational value of the results and the scope of business secrets of undertakings questioned in the course of an inquiry. While deciding on the scope of information, the OCCP will also take into account the efficiency of proceedings conducted by the authority in which the results of the market inquiries may be used.
In its policy of declared openness and transparency, the OCCP proclaims the enforcement of competition law aimed at network-regulated industries such as telecommunications and energy. A framework of the single European telecommunications market is currently being discussed at the EU level. With the aim of the OCCP to ensure that telecommunications companies will compete on equal terms in the whole of the European Union, it is necessary to facilitate access to broadband networks and to allocate frequencies in a pro-competitive manner. In light of the above, it may be expected that the OCCP will continue to seek opportunities to support regulatory bodies in achieving said objectives. For instance, in November 2017, the OCCP issued a reasoned opinion on the competitive landscape in the television20 and radio21 transmission infrastructure markets within proceedings of the President of the Office for Electronic Communication regarding the market position of Emitel, the infrastructure owner, on those markets.22
V STATE AID
The European Commission and EU courts adopted several rulings concerning state aid enforcement in Poland in 2018 and early 2019 that are worth noting.
In January 2018, the Commission instigated formal proceedings concerning the Polish tax incentive for shipyards permitting them to use a 1 per cent flat-rate tax on sales of ships.23 The Commission is concerned that this aid scheme may in fact constitute operating aid that would not be compatible with the EU internal market.
In February 2018, the Commission approved the Polish capacity mechanism system,24 alongside the systems in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Italy. The Polish system, similarly to the one in Italy, is uses a market-wide capacity mechanism whereby electricity producers will be able to be paid for making their electricity generation powers available on demand. In Poland electricity producers will be able to be paid for making their electricity generation powers available. The Polish system is open to all electricity producers and is auction-based.
In January 2019, the Commission approved regional aid worth €36 million for LG Chem's investment in electric vehicle factory in the Dolnoslaskie region. The assessment of the aid was performed on the basis of the Regional Aid Guidelines 2014–2020.
VI MERGER REVIEW
i Trends, developments and strategies
Significant amendments in 2015 introduced a number of significant changes to the Polish merger control system, including two-phase proceedings, revised rules on turnover calculation and amendments to procedural aspects related to remedies. It proved to have positive effects for business, in particular as it resulted in reducing the average length of proceedings before the OCCP. The average proceedings in 2018 lasted 41 days,25 and remained at a level comparable to that seen in 2016 and 2017. However, the proceedings concluded in Phase I only lasted on average 36 days.
The OCCP issued a record 228 merger control decisions in 2018, 220 of which were Phase I decisions.
We saw a steady number of complex merger cases in 2018, with a slight decline in comparison to 2017 only. In eight cases, a decision was adopted after Phase II proceedings. A further five cases are currently being investigated in Phase II.26 In the extended review proceedings, the OCCP continued to widely use its market-testing competencies aimed at verification of the relevant market definitions proposed by notifying parties or at obtaining views on the notified transaction from other stakeholders. The OCCP largely relies on the results of such tests. Market testing significantly increases the duration of Phase II proceedings, which on average last approximately seven months.
The OCCP is also widely using statements of objections (SOs), an institution that was introduced in the 2015 review. In 2018, an SO, whereby the OCCP informs the notifying party of its views regarding potential competition concerns resulting from a concentration, was issued in two proceedings.
In concentrations where competition concerns arise, in the two most recent conditional decisions – Eurocash/Eko Holding27 in December 2016 and PGE/EDF Polska in October 201728 – the OCCP applied remedies that did not involve altering the structure of the transaction (i.e., a simple divestiture remedy and behavioural remedy consisting of an obligation to sell electricity on stock exchange). Nevertheless, the OCCP may continue to rely on 'fix-it-first' remedies ordering merging parties to limit the scope of a notified transaction to address any significant impediment to competition.
In 2017, the OCCP was active in gun-jumping enforcement cases, issuing two of the highest-level fines for breach of the standstill obligation in its history. In 2018 we saw no fines for implementation of the concentration without the required OCCP clearance, however one new proceeding was instigated in this regard.
In two cases in 2017 and early 2018,29 the OCCP requested the European Commission on the basis of Article 9(2)(a) of EU Merger Regulation to refer a case for its review under Polish competition law. In Discovery/Scipps,30 the European Commission rejected the request and issued a conditional decision. In turn, in Smithfields/Pini Polonia,31 the Commission accepted the request and referred the case in full to be reviewed by the OCCP.
ii Significant cases
The OCCP issued no conditional decisions in 2018 and one conditional decision in 2017, which concerned PGE's acquisition of EDF assets in Poland (i.e., a power plant in Rybnik and eight heating plants).
PGE is a Polish company listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange active in the production and distribution of electrical and heat power. EDF's business activity in Poland concentrates on the production and distribution of electricity and heat, and trading of production fuels such as biomass and coal.
The OCCP investigated the case in Phase II as the business activities of PGE and EDF Poland overlapped on nine national markets related to the production and sale of electricity, of which six markets were horizontally affected. During the market analysis, the OCCP surveyed major companies operating in the power sector and requested the President of the Energy Regulatory Office to submit his opinion on the case.
The OCCP assessed that PGE post-transaction may have a share in excess of 40 per cent on the Polish market for the production and wholesale of electricity in Poland, and pointed out that PGE could gain a dominant position in the electrical power production and distribution market. This could lead to a further drop in trade on the Polish Power Exchange and negatively affect those competitors of PGE that do not have their own generation sources. Consequently, the retail electricity market would also be negatively affected.
The OCCP therefore issued an SO, and PGE submitted its remedy proposals. PGE committed itself to selling additional power through the Polish Power Exchange in an amount effectively equal to the volume of power generated in EDF's power plant in Rybnik. This commitment, however, does not concern electrical power from cogeneration. The OCCP concluded that the proposed remedy removes the threat of a significant restriction of competition because it limits the possibility of PGE abusing its market power post-transaction. Moreover, according to the OCCP, the remedy also reduced other risks resulting from the vertical relations between PGE and EDF in Poland. The commitment will be in force until 31 December 2021 or until the acquired power plant in Rybnik ceases to belong to PGE. In addition, the OCCP set a requirement that PGE report quarterly on the execution of the commitment.
In 2018 and early 201932 the OCCP issued two SOs concerning the notified concentrations. The first was issued in November 2018 and concerned Air Products' acquisition of ACP Europe and Eurocylinder, which are subsidiaries of ACP that specialise in liquid carbon dioxide. In February 2019, the OCCP issued the SO concerning Multikino's, a subsidiary of Vue International, planned acquisition of Cinema 3D. The OCCP considers that this transaction may lead to a significant impediment of competition on the three local markets for network cinemas in Tricity and in Warsaw.
Although the OCCP did not forbid any concentration in 2018 and early 2019,33 the notifying party withdrew its notification in five cases after the OCCP issued an SO. In these cases, most likely, the commitment proposals were not good enough to mitigate the competition concerns identified by the OCCP.
In 2017, the OCCP imposed fines for breach of the standstill obligation in three cases: Bać-Pol34 in June, Fermy Drobiu Woźniak35 in September and MO36 in December. The cases show the OCCP's increased attention on cases pertaining to concentrations closing before required clearance.
In Bać-Pol, the OCCP concluded that Bać-Pol had infringed Polish competition law by acquiring control over Klementynka without the required OCCP clearance. The proceedings were instigated as a result of a complaint submitted by the previous co-owner of Klementynka. The evidence gathered indicated that Sezam had acquired the most important assets of Klementynka, such as key employees, contracts with key suppliers and customers, and goods designated for immediate shipment, which were Klementyka's main business assets. Although the proceedings did not reveal any written contract confirming the concentration, the OCCP found that the acquisition of those assets constituted a concentration based on other evidence such as mail correspondence and statements of witnesses. The OCCP fined Bać-Pol 527,000 zlotys, which is the highest fine imposed for breach of the standstill obligation in Poland so far. While determining the amount of the fine, the OCCP took into consideration both aggravating circumstances such as lack of cooperation in the course of the proceedings as well as mitigating factors such as no significant impediment of competition on the relevant market (i.e., non-specialised food wholesale) resulting from the completion of the transaction.
Fermy Drobiu Woźniak was also fined 339,000 zlotys for a similar infringement of the competition law. The OCCP concluded that Fermy Drobiu Woźniak acquired assets of Fermy Drobiu Borkowski without notifying the OCCP of its intention to concentrate, and thus violated merger control provisions laid down in the Act. Acting upon a complaint from Fermy Drobiu Woźniak's competitors, the OCCP collected evidence supporting the fact that Fermy Drobiu Woźniak acquired a part of Fermy Drobiu Borkowski's assets on the basis of a lease agreement of six poultry farms of Fermy Drobiu Borkowski. In the case, the OCCP confirmed that the lease agreement should have been classified as a form of notifiable concentration.
In MO, an undisclosed individual was fined 22,120 zlotys for the acquisition of joint control over Empik Media & Fashion. The OCCP concluded that MO acquired control at the moment of signing the shareholders' agreement, under which two major shareholders of Empik Media & Fashion agreed, inter alia, to act in concert as to the exercise of their voting rights at the company's shareholders' meeting.
No fines were imposed by the OCCP in 2018, but one ongoing proceeding is worth mentioning owing to the possibility of imposing a fine and precedent character. The OCCP alleges that Gazprom and five other companies breached Polish competition law by financing the creation of Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline without obtaining prior merger clearance. In 2015, the companies notified the OCCP of their intention to create a joint venture responsible for designing, financing and constructing a pipeline in the Baltic Sea. The OCCP raised concerns with regard to this concentration in July 2016 on the grounds that it could lead to a significant impediment of competition concerning gas supply to Poland. The notifying parties withdrew the notification. In April 2017, the OCCP instigated preliminary proceedings to re-examine the case as it learned that former JV parents signed the contract to finance the construction of Nordstream. This, in the OCCP's opinion, could constitute an attempt to circumvent the lack of consent to create a joint venture, given the similar objective of the JV and financing arrangements.
It is not anticipated that there will be a major shift in the current merger control policy in 2019.
As seen in 2017, 2018 also proved that consumer protection continued to be the OCCP's enforcement priority. Generally, Polish antitrust enforcement did not develop substantially in 2018: the OCCP continued to analyse various methods of improving cartel detection, including introducing rewards for whistle-blowers. In 2018, the OCCP announced its intention of closer scrutiny of resale price maintenance, a practice that had seemed to be of less importance to the OCCP in recent years. We also saw an increased number of dawn raids performed by the OCCP. Decisions concerning abuse of dominant position confirm that the main sector of enforcement in this respect remains the utilities sector, but at the same time actual enforcement is limited due to the declared application of soft measures. Considering the relative strength of the Polish mergers and acquisitions market, the OCCP was active in the field of merger review. The OCCP also paid increased attention to cases pertaining to closing concentrations before the required clearance.
1 Anna Laszczyk and Wojciech Podlasin are senior associates at Linklaters C Wiśniewski i Wspólnicy sp k.
6 Decision Nr RKR-3/2018.
7 Decision Nr RKR-3/2018.
10 Decision of the OCCP dated 12 December 2018, No. RPZ-11/2018.
13 Decision of the OCCP dated 20 December 2018, No. DOK-2/2018.
14 Ruling of 27 March 2018, No VI ACa 1117/14.
15 Decision of 8 December 2009, No DOK-7/2009.
16 Ruling of 10 January 2018, No VII AGA 828/18.
17 Ruling of 30 August 2018, No VII ACa 877/17.
18 Ruling of the Polish Supreme Court of 25 October 2017, No III SK 38/16.
20 Resolution DOK-071-81/17/MP of 28 November 2017.
21 Resolution DOK-071-80/17/MP of 28 November 2017.
22 Decision of the President of the Electronic Communication of 17 January 2018 – DHRT.SMP.6040.2.2017.177 and decision of the President of the Electronic Communication of 17 January 2018 – DHRT.SMP.6040.3.2017.166.
23 European Commission's case SA.46981.
24 European Commission decision of 7 February 2018 in case SA.46100.
25 As at 22 February 2018.
26 As at 22 February 2019.
27 Decision of the OCCP of 23 December 2016, No. DKK-191/2016.
28 Decision of the OCCP of 4 October 2017, No. DKK-156/2017.
29 As at 31 January 2018.
30 European Commission decision of 6 February 2018 in case M.8665.
31 European Commission decision of 23 January 2018 in case M.8611.
32 As at 22 February 2019.
33 As at 22 February 2019.
34 Decision of the OCCP of 5 June 2017, No. DKK-86/2017.
35 Decision of the OCCP of 19 September 2017, No. DKK-145/2017.
36 Decision of the OCCP of 29 December 2017, No. DKK-2010/2017.