Since the 1990s, Brazil has built a good legal framework for public-private partnerships (PPPs). However, we need to clarify how we use the term, PPPs, here, because there are some differences in terms of legal discipline.
There are two conceptions of PPPs in Brazil. The first has a broader meaning that entails any kind of relationship between public and private sectors, whereas the second has a specific meaning. Here, PPP refers to projects ranging from a simple contract regarding the use of public land by a private party to a complex concession for a railroad.
In this chapter we will address the second meaning of PPP. This meaning refers to concession agreements entered into and between the government or public administration (which comprises all entities of the Brazilian government, such as regulatory agencies, foundations, state-owned corporations on all federal, state and local levels) and private parties. For the purposes of this chapter, it does not matter if the public party is paying the concessionaire or not; what matters is the fact that there exists a concession or a delegation of some sort of public activity to a private person.
This chapter explains the modalities of PPP agreements, the necessary conditions for entering into such agreements and the main provision of such agreements as well as presenting the pipeline of federal PPP projects.
II THE YEAR IN REVIEW
PPP is currently a trending topic in Brazil owing to the budgetary constraints stemming from the economic crisis of previous years. In 2016, the federal government created the Investment Partnership Program (PPI), an initiative set out to enhance the government's planning capacity and coordination efforts regarding concession projects. The overall goal of the the PPI was to deliver better projects that could attract private sector investments for filling in the gap of public investments. From that point onwards, any federal infrastructure project involving a concession must be listed within the PPI in order to kick-start such project.
The PPI is comprised of two relevant bodies within the federal government: the PPI Board and the PPI Secretariat (SPPI). The main aim of the PPI Board is to examine infrastructure projects designed by other government agencies and recommend to the President those that should be included in the PPI. The SPPI is responsible for coordinating the activities of the PPI, working on the technical standards and consistency of qualified projects, as well as promoting interaction with market agents to disseminate investment opportunities, among other things.
Since the PPI is an agency of federal government, its scope is restricted and, in principle, it does not embrace state and municipal infrastructure projects. However, some states and municipalities have created their own PPI branch in order to develop projects. Recently, with the publication of Federal Decree No. 9.669/2019, the powers of the SPPI were extended and the secretariat is now responsible for the promotion of federal policies to foster state and municipal partnerships in public infrastructure projects and for supporting financial institutions with the structuring of projects that can be qualified under the PPI.
During the past year, the federal government announced new projects in the electric, rail, road and oil and gas sectors. At the same time, relevant infrastructure projects were concluded under the PPI, with emphasis on the public auctions of the North-South Highway, the Brazilian Lottery and several terminals in Brazilian public ports.
In addition, there are many ongoing discussions in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies around updating Brazilian administrative laws. One of them refers to the elaboration of a new federal law that may substitute Federal Law No. 8,666, of 21 June 1993 (the Federal Procurement Law) and Federal Law No. 8,987, of 13 February 1995 (the Federal Concession Law). Such discussions involve many normative changes in order to foster private (mainly foreign) investment in Brazil in the coming year, including matters such as financing, improvement of the public guarantee system and proof of technical capacity in public biddings, among others.
III GENERAL FRAMEWORK
i Types of public-private partnership
Concession agreement in Brazil refers to the delegation of the right to exploit a given public service or utility. Considering that the Federal Constitution ascribes to the government the provision of public services or utilities, the concession is a means to enable the private sector to exploit such service, and undertake investment for upgrading and expanding infrastructure.
The aforementioned restricted conception of PPP comprises the following types of concession agreements: common concession, administrative concession and sponsored concession.
The common concession has grounds in the Federal Concession Law. It was conceived as a way to delegate public services and utilities to the private sector, owing to the existence of concrete or potential end users that would pay tariffs. For instance, this type of concession is commonplace for toll road, railroad and airport projects.
Federal Law No. 11,079, of 30 December 2004 (the Federal PPP Law) provided for the administrative concession and the sponsored concession. These types of concession fall under the strictest meaning of PPP in Brazil.
The administrative concession serves to enable the delegation of public services or essential infrastructure for the provision of such services without the payment of tariffs. For instance, this type of concession is commonplace for public lighting projects, where the concessionaire is responsible for the operation, upkeep and expansion of public lighting points without receiving any tariff from end users. Therefore, the concessionaire receives payment exclusively from the government.
The sponsored concession combines payments from the government and tariffs from end users. For instance, this type of concession is commonplace for toll road projects that are not able to fully pay back the investments with tariffs from end users, and sanitation.
As a rule, concessions agreements refer to a specific service's scope, which refers to definition of quality standards, expansion goals, service level agreements, construction projects and implementation schedules, among other elements that are relevant for the service's description and specifications. Regarding water and sewerage projects, it is commonplace to set expansion goals for the service coverage that must be fulfilled by the concessionaire in accordance with a specific schedule.
The quality standards and service level agreements are a way to ensure that the concessionaire will provide a good quality service and not pursue revenue at all costs. To achieve such purpose, they are used as discount factors of payments owed to the concessionaire.
In federal toll road projects, there is the Road Exploitation Program, which is the plan that entails all relevant aspects and tasks of the project such as road duplication, asphalt upkeep, emergency services, implementation of bridges and viaducts, implementation of central control facility, draining systems and road interventions on urban areas, among others.
In airport projects, there are demand-based investment triggers that oblige the concessionaire to upgrade operational conditions. For instance, Salvador Airport Project provides for investment triggers related to runways, aircraft yards, passengers and cargo terminals and parking slots, among others.
The most recent state of São Paulo toll road projects stipulated a limit for increasing investments and thus the concession agreement's scope. For instance, the Florínea-Igarapava Road System Project provided for a 15 per cent limit on increasing investments regarding the original amount of investments. Nonetheless, this limit may be surpassed by means of adequate motivation by the government.
ii The authorities
In general, the separation of roles in the conception and implementation phases of PPP projects follows a top-down perspective, where government ministries or secretariats are responsible for formulating the general framework for sector-specific policies and other government entities conduct the operational aspects of the concession award.
Under this structure, ministries and secretariats hold the prerogative to prepare concession plans, to choose which projects will be subject to bidding and bidding schedules, as well as the the major features of such projects. For instance, in the roads and railroads sector, the Ministry of Infrastructure (MI) is responsible for advising the presidency and including specific assets in the concessionnaire's plans for later bidding.
Once the guidelines are set out, other government entities, such as regulatory agencies, are responsible for producing the relevant studies and documents (i.e., draft bidding documents and contract minutes) and for conducting the bidding procedures. Furthermore, the agencies remain responsible for issuing regulations and supervising the operation of private parties.
Therefore, important aspects of regulated sectors depend heavily on the norms produced by regulatory agencies, which regulate day-to-day aspects of the activities. Lastly, regulatory agencies have certain attributions under the relevant PPP agreements, as is the case for the granting of permission for the transfer of corporate control of the concessionaire.
As an example of this scenario, in the ports sector the MI is responsible for deciding on the public ports terminals that will be part of concessions' plans, as well as the major characteristics of the respective concessions. On the other hand, the National Waterway Transportation Agency (ANTAQ) is responsible for conducting biddings and preparing the relevant documents for exercising certain prerogatives under the PPP agreement (i.e., evaluating requests for the transfer of the corporate control) as well as for carrying out the regulatory and procedural affairs relevant to the sector.
iii General requirements for PPP contracts
The execution of PPP contracts requires the fulfilment of certain stages and conditions. These are inherent to the administrative proceeding and must precede the execution of concession agreements. The administrative proceeding derives from the need for public planning, as the decision to delegate must take into account the economic viability of a given project, its environmental aspects, existence of potential interested parties and budgetary aspects, among other things.
Hence, the first major point that the proceeding must address is the value-for-money analysis of a PPP project: the government must evaluate whether the potential provision of a service or utility by means of a concession is more efficient than the way such service or utility is currently performed. For example, the government evaluates whether the direct provision of water and sewerage services based on its own operational assets and infrastructure along with its financial availability for investing in upgrades and service expansion are 'worthier' than delegating such services to the public sector.
If the answer tends toward a private sector solution, then the first essential stage of the administrative proceeding is fulfilled. In Brazil, the lack of capacity of the public sector for undertaking heavy investments is often a relevant factor in justifying delegation.
Alongside the value-for-money analysis, the provisions of the future concession agreement, business plan models, and financial and economical studies are drafted within the administrative proceeding. For such purpose, the government can hire consultants to develop the aforementioned points, as explained below.
IV BIDDING AND AWARD PROCEDURE
i Expressions of interest
The development of PPP projects by the private party can occur by expression of interest, which is a procedure that the government starts by requesting private sector studies regarding a specific project, which may develop a business plan model, as well as financial and economic studies.
Interested parties must register their intention within a given time frame and afterwards develop and deliver their projects on a date set forth by the government in the expression of interest public notice. If the studies are actually used by the government on the development of the final PPP project, the party responsible for the studies will be entitled to receive a fee that shall be paid by the party that enters into the concession agreement.
Furthermore, the parties that take part in an expression of interest proceeding are allowed to participate in the public bid procedure.
Recently, Federal Decree No. 10,104, of 6 November 2019, allowed expression of interest proceedings to limit the amount of parties that can present studies and even to restrict the proceeding to only one party.
Public entities are currently carrying out bids to select private parties interested in developing studies for PPP projects. For instance, the Social Economic Development National Bank (BNDES) has been undertaking several bid procedures to hire parties with the goal of developing public lighting and water and sewerage projects, preparing studies for privatisation of state-owned corporations, among others.
ii Requests for proposals and unsolicited proposals
Private parties are also allowed to present unsolicited proposals. Unsolicited proposals trigger the launch of an expression of interest proceeding. It begins with a formal request by any interested party to the government seeking to assess the feasibility of a specific PPP project. The government will review the request, and in the case of approval, publish a notice or announcement with its intention.
iii Evaluation and grant
As a general rule, public bid procedures must precede the execution of concession agreements, being an essential part of the administrative proceeding. It is a formal and bureaucratic procedure that begins with the launching of a public bid notice setting out the date, scope of the concession, requirements to participate (legal, economic, financial and technical) and evaluation criteria.
The most typical evaluation criteria used for concession projects are highest granting value and lowest tariff value. Brazil's federal government is planning to combine such criteria for the next stage of toll road concessions. In this sense, bidders will have to offer a discount regarding the standard tariff, defined by the government as up to a 12 per cent limit. Afterwards, the bidders that reach such limit will be able to offer a granting value.
For administrative and sponsored concessions, the evaluation criterion is the lowest monthly payment value owed from the government to the future concessionaire.
Technical aspects can also be used as an evaluation criterion. The public bid notice can set technical standards whose fulfilment enables bidders to score points that will be used to rank them. The technical criterion is often combined with the lowest tariff value or highest granting value.
After qualification and evaluation, the government selects the best proposal and awards the concession agreement to the winning bidder.
Furthermore, the winning bidder must fulfil certain conditions precedent for signing the concession agreement.
Once all the main stages described herein are complete, the execution can start.
The Federal PPP Law states that the winning bidder must incorporate a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for signing the concession agreement, while the Federal Concession Law simply allows the government to request such incorporation. However, all new concession projects require the incorporation of an SPV due to a project finance matter.
The SPV must often be an anonymous corporation and its corporate goal must be strictly related to the execution of the specific concession agreement. Tender documents usually require that the SPV's by-laws contain certain provisions and changes to the SPV's bylaws usually depend upon the prior approval of the government.
Also, concession agreements require a certain level of capital stock of the SPV and stipulate a time frame for paying in said capital stock.
Sometimes the concession agreement also requires the concessionaire to register with stock exchanges for enabling the issuance of securities. For instance, the state of São Paulo's Piracicaba-Panorama Road Concession Project stipulates that the concessionaire shall register with the Brazilian Stock Exchange Authority within two years from the agreements' sign off.
Regarding the relationship between an SPV and its related parties (e.g., the controlling company), the concessionaire is usually forbidden from financing or supplying a guarantee to its shareholders. For instance, the concession agreements related to the fifth federal round of airport concession and federal toll road projects provide for such restrictions.
Also, any agreement entered into by and between an SPV and its related parties must be based on market values, as to mitigate overpayment risk.
In this respect, rules regarding change of control of the concessionaire's SPV vary according to the specific provisions of each concession agreement. Usually, concession agreements provide that any change of control depends upon the prior approval from the public administration. In such cases, due to the generic wording, all changes of control regardless of the corporate layer it takes place in should be preceded by the public administration's approval. In addition, the execution of shareholder agreements that imply controlling rights over the management of the SPV depend upon prior approval by the government. Furthermore, sometimes there are lock-up periods for SPVs to transfer their controlling shares. For instance, Salvador Airport Project sets a lock-up period of five years, during which the concessionaire will not be able to issue shares or transfer control.
Recently, there have been projects requiring prior approval only in cases of direct transfer of corporate control. For example: the state of São Paulo's Piracicaba-Panorama Road Concession Project.
V THE CONTRACT
This section describes the main provisions of concession agreements: payment; state guarantees; distribution of risks; adjustment and revision; ownership of of underlying assets; and early termination.
Concession agreements based on tariffs depend upon the issuance of invoices to the respective end users. Defaulting users can be cut out from service under certain conditions. For instance, in water and sewerage projects, the concessionaire can cut services to an end user that remain in default for a period exceeding 30 days.
Concerning administrative and sponsored concessions, the government must pay on a monthly basis, often after the completion of construction works by the concessionaire. The monthly public payment is usually divided into two tranches. There is a first tranche whose value stays the same throughout the concession while the other tranche varies according to the quality of the service.
In this sense, the second tranche reflects the capacity of the concessionaire of providing a proper service and is influenced by the quality and operation standards that are set forth in the service level agreements. The hiring of a third party that will assess whether the service level agreements are being duly fulfilled by the concessionaire is commonplace. Also, concession agreements can provide for government contribution when the concessionaire reaches a given milestone. Usually, such milestones are related to end of construction works or upgrades of physical infrastructure.
The monthly public payment is readjusted on a yearly basis to compensate for inflationary effects that may affect the concessionaire's costs. Concession agreements also enable the concessionaire to exploit alternative sources of income, as long as they are related to the reversible assets. Usually, the government sets forth a sharing percentage over the gross income stemming from such alternative sources of income and requires prior approval before its exploitation. For instance, the Teresina Public Lighting Project provides for that the concessionaire shall share up to 15 per cent of the gross income regarding the exploitation of an alternative source of income.
ii State guarantees
Public guarantees become more relevant as the concessionaire's income is more dependent upon the Public Administration's capacity to pay.
In this sense, public guarantees are essential on administrative and sponsored concession agreements. The Federal PPP Law provides that public guarantees can be established by pledging public revenues, incorporation of special funds and guarantees of state-owned corporations, among others.
A successful example of a public guarantee is linked to the public lighting sector. It is possible to use a tax, which is specifically related to the provision of such services: the public lighting tax (PLT).
Considering that the PLT must be used solely for the operation, upkeep and upgrade of public lighting assets, it functions as a natural source of payment for public lighting concessionaires.
In this sense, the values of PLT earned by the government can be deposited in escrow accounts. For example, the Teresina Public Lighting Project provided that a minimum amount of three times the due monthly public payment must remain deposited in the escrow account during the concession's term.
iii Distribution of risk
Proper risk allocation is fundamental for a successful concession project due to the lengthy term of concession agreements.
The general rule of risk allocation is to allocate certain risks to the party that is most able to deal with them before they take place. This serves to stimulate the party to take the necessary measures to prevent that risk from occurring.
Generally, private parties are responsible for operational, construction, management, technological, environmental, and business-related risks, such as insufficient demand. However, there are projects that demand that risks are shared with the Public Administration, such as the state of São Paulo Line 4 and Line 6 Subway Projects. On the other hand, the government is responsible for the risks that take place due to its actions or omissions, such as unilateral changes, enactment of law and regulations, creation of new taxes and idleness of governmental entities, among others. If any risks attributed to the government occur and affect the concessionaire, the latter becomes entitled to seek compensation against the former.
iv Adjustment and revision
The economic-financial balance refers to the relationship between the concessionaire's rights and duties arising from a given concession agreement.
Whenever there is a breach of such relationship, the concessionaire may be entitled to file compensation claims against the government (i.e., if certain events, which are not considered risks allocated to the concessionaire, take place and affect the operational costs of the concessionaire).
Compensation in such a scenario is usually referred to as extraordinary economic-financial rebalance. The compensation is usually made by:
- increasing the monthly payment or tariff's value;
- increasing the agreement's term;
- direct indemnification by the government; or
- exclusion of certain obligations of the concessionaire.
Furthermore, concession agreements may provide for cyclical ordinary rebalance proceedings that take place every each four or five years. This is a way to re-evaluate the conditions of execution due to technological outbreaks, assess the need (or lack of) for new or certain investments and distribute productivity gains, among others.
v Ownership of underlying assets
Assets allocated to the provision of services are deemed reversible assets, as the Public Administration is the responsible entity for public services in accordance with the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the concessionaire owns and operates such assets only during the agreement's term and transfers the ownership to the government at the end of such term.
Usually, there are strict rules regarding the freedom that a concessionaire has to manage the concession's assets. In this sense, the concessionaire is not allowed to dispose of assets unless he or she promotes its prior replacement and usually is not allowed to place liens upon the concession's assets.
Regarding the capacity to impose restrictions on third parties, concession agreements often grant the concessionaire power to expropriate private real estate and implement rights of way. The government will always have to issue a decree declaring the public relevance of the real estate that will be expropriated. Also, concession agreements may place the sole responsibility for paying indemnification due to expropriation upon the concessionaire or establish a cost-sharing mechanism with the government through a price cap.
vi Early termination
The term of the concession agreement is set in accordance with the project's investment bulk. The term serves to allow the concessionaire to duly amortise and depreciate all investments made regarding the provision of services.
There is no general rule limiting the time frame of common concessions, whereas administrative and sponsored concessions cannot exceed 35 years. For instance, in the railroad sector there is a concession agreement whose term is equal to 90 years. Nonetheless, the term of concession agreements tends to vary between 15 and 35 years.
With this in mind, the extinction of the concession agreement can happen by distinct means, namely:
- concessionaire's bankruptcy; or
The general rule of the Federal Concession Law provides that the return of assets shall be accompanied by compensation regarding the tranches of investments in these assets not yet fully amortised or depreciated when the agreement winds up. However, concession agreements have evolved in order to adapt such provision and avoid gold-plating practices linked to overinvestment.
For instance, the Federal Roadway System BR 364/365/GO/MG Project provides that the wind-up does not entitle the concessionaire to compensations regarding non-amortised or depreciated investments on reversible assets.
The forfeiture refers to the extinction owing to the concessionaire's recurring and systematic default. It takes place when the concessionaire repeatedly defaults on provisions of the agreement owing to the lack of capacity to provide services properly. Prior to the forfeiture, the government must provide a cure period for the concessionaire followed by due process if the former is not sufficient to remediate the applicable issues. Furthermore, the concessionaire is entitled to compensation regarding non-amortised or depreciated investments on reversible assets.
On 16 August 2017, the government, by means of the Land Transportation Regulatory Agency, declared the forfeiture of Federal Roadway System BR-153/GO/TO. The forfeiture of this concession agreement represents the first major federal project to end by such means. However, no compensation was due to the concessionaire, as the incipient investments made by the concessionaire did not result in any useful operational assets.
The takeover refers to the extinction owing to a public interest decision of the government. In such cases, the government must enact a specific law and compensate the concessionaire for non-amortised or depreciated investments on reversible assets prior to the takeover.
The annulment takes place when the public bid procedure ocurred in unlawful and non-remediable circumstances (e.g., corruption acts) or when the concession agreement has unlawful provisions. In this case, the concessionaire is only entitled to compensation when it is not responsible for the event that triggers the annulment.
The rescission relates to the extinction due to the government's default. In this sense, the concessionaire must file a lawsuit and keep operating the service while it awaits the court's decision.
Recently, concession agreements have been establishing conditions for friendly rescission. For instance, the state of São Paulo's Piracicaba-Panorama Road Concession Project establishes that the concessionaire's failure to obtain long-term financing within 24 months or force majeure events that compromise the operation of services allows the concessionaire and the government to negotiate the agreement's extinction.
The retender is a recent early termination method governed by Federal Law No. 13,448, of 5 June 2017. It was conceived as a way out for troubled concession agreements whose prior planning overestimated investment levels due to overestimation of demand.
Such an incident hit several toll road and airport projects that were auctioned during 2013 and 2014. In this sense, to avoid lengthy forfeiture proceedings and judicial dispute, the retender is a common ground solution between the government and troubled concessionaires.
Such proceedings involve analysis by the relevant regulatory agency, the Federal Court of Audits, followed by qualification of the PPI. Once the PPI qualifies the troubled project for retender, an amendment to the agreement must be signed by means of which:
- the concessionaire fully adheres to the retender;
- new conditions regarding the service's provision are set (until the end of the retender proceeding);
- the concessionaire commits not to withdraw capital stock, distribute dividends, or file for bankruptcy;
- the responsibility for compensation regarding non-amortised or depreciated investments is allocated to the future concessionaire; and
- the concessionaire commits not to take part in the new bid procedure. The retender reaches its purpose after a new public bid procedure is done and a new concessionaire is selected.
The main query regarding the retender proceeding was related to how the compensation would be calculated. The government decided to leave the preparation of such rules to the regulatory agencies responsible for the troubled projects. Therefore, the Civil Aviation Regulatory Agency and the Land Transportation Regulatory Agency have enacted rules regarding compensation. Both regulatory agencies provided that the book value of the assets shall be used for accounting the amount of investment. Currently, only Roadway System BR-040/DF/GO/MG is under the retender proceeding, but others should follow.
Just as with the early termination of concession agreements, early renewal also recently became a hot topic, specially in the railroad sector: in exchange for assuring that the agreement's term will be extended, the concessionaire commits to undertaking new investments. It was conceived as a way to address problems related to poor planning of concession agreements executed during the 1990s. Such problems are a common issue in the railroad sector, as many consequences related to the execution of concession agreements were left unregulated, such as the return of unused rail tracks and rolling stock, clear investment levels and service level agreements, among others.
In this sense, the early renewal became a means of rearranging several contractual provisions and addressing underinvestment instead of waiting for the agreements to reach their term, only to promote a new public bid procedure.
Furthermore, the federal government enacted Federal Law No. 13,448, of 5 June 2017, stipulating specific requirements and the proceeding for early renewal. However, the Federal Prosecutor's Office filed a motion of unconstitutionality against said law; this decision is still pending in the Brazilian Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, there are currently five early renewal proceedings considered a priority by the PPI. One of such proceedings, related to Rumo Malha Paulista's railroad, is nearing the execution of the amendment that will effectively implement the early renewal.
In Brazil, financing is totally attributed to the concessionaire. However, state-owned banks have historically played a large role regarding long-term financing of infrastructure projects until not long ago. This practice reached its limit after the economic-financial crisis Brazil underwent, and players are still adjusting to the new conditions.
A current trend in Brazil refers to project debentures, which are tax-exempt.
The government has been increasing the range of projects that can be tax-exempt in order to increase the market's interest in financing. The state of São Paulo's Florínea-Igarapava Road Concession Project raised 1 billion reais through project debentures.
Also, project finance plays a relevant role for long-term financing in infrastructure projects. The Belo Horizonte Public Lighting Project was the first of its kind to involve non-recourse project finance.
It is likely that in the near future, projects in Brazil will receive finance from the BRICS's New Development Bank.
Furthermore, financing agents are entitled to step-in rights when the concessionaire underperforms and defaults on the concession agreement. Recent projects are trying to bring clearer rules for the effective exercise of step-in rights. For instance, the state of São Paulo's Piracicaba-Panorama Road Concession Project provided for a direct agreement draft stating the kinds of default that may allow the financing agent to step-in, the range of powers regarding management over the concessionaire and the measures to solve problems (e.g., transfer of corporate control), among others.
The federal government has already indicated that it will provide for a direct agreement draft as a schedule of the concession agreement for the next toll road projects it launches.
The expectation is that PPP will continue to play a decisive role in ensuring the viability of major and much-needed infrastructure projects in Brazil in the next few years, including projects in the airport, railway, highway, sanitation services and public lighting sectors. The federal government, through the PPI, is focused on boosting confidence in the infrastructure market, aiming at attracting investors and providing better services to end users.
In this context, the federal government has established a large pipeline of infrastructure projects that will be put to auction in the following years. The table below gives a non-exhaustive list of such projects.
|Project||Model||Estimated investment (reais)||Current status||Public notice||Auction|
|EF-170 - MT/PA - Ferrogrão||Ordinary concession||16.6 billion||-||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|EF-334/BA - West East Integration Railway - FIOL (section between Ilhéus/BA and Caetité/BA)||Subconcession||3.43 billion||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|EF-354 - Central West Integration Railway - FICO||Ordinary concession||2.7 billion||Under studies||-||-|
|Highway BR -116/RJ/SP – Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo||Ordinary concession||-||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Highway BR -116/RJ – Além Paraíba to BR-040||Ordinary concession||-||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Highway BR -364/RO/MT - Porto Velho/RO to Comodoro/MT||Ordinary concession||8 billion||Under studies.||-||-|
|Highways BR -153/282/470/SC and SC-412||Ordinary concession||8 billion||Under studies||2nd quarter 2020||3rd quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 116/465/101/SP/RJ (Dutra) – Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo||Ordinary concession||10.9 billion||Public consultation||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 116/493/RJ/MG (CRT) - Beyond Paraíba to BR-040||Ordinary concession||7.92 billion||Under studies||3rd quarter 2020||1st quarter 2021|
|Highway BR - 101/SC - Paulo Lopes to São João do Sul||Ordinary concession||2.9 billion||Under bid procedure||4th quarter 2019||1st quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 040/495/MG/RJ – Juiz de Fora Rio de Janeiro||Ordinary concession||2.6 billion||Under studies||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 153/080/414/GO/TO - Aliança do Tocantins to Anápolis||Ordinary concession||7.5 billion||Under studies||2nd quarter 2020||3rd quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 153/282/470/SC e SC-412 – Navegantes à divisa RS/SC||Ordinary concession||8 billion||Under studies||4th quarter 2020||1st quarter 2021|
|Highway BR - 381/262/MG/ES - BR-381/MG between Belo Horizonte and Gov. Valadares and BR 262/MG/ES between João Monlevade/MG and Viana/ES||Ordinary concession||1.6 billion||Public consultation||2nd quarter 2020||3rd quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 163/230/MT/PA||Ordinary concession||1.6 billion||Public consultation||2nd quarter 2020||3rd quarter 2020|
|Federal Highways of Paraná: BR- 153/158/163/272/277/369/373/376/476/PR||Ordinary concession||-||-||2nd quarter 2021||3rd quarter 2021|
|Highway BR-040/495/MG/RJ (Concer) – Juiz de Fora to Rio de Janeiro||Ordinary concession||2.6 billion||Under studies||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|Highway BR -116/465/101SP/RJ (Dutra) – Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo||Ordinary concession||10 billion||Public consultation||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|Highway BR - 116/493/RJ/MG (CRT)||Ordinary concession||7.9 billion||Under studies||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2021|
|6th round of airport concessions: South Block: composed of 9 airports - Curitiba, Foz do Iguaçu, Londrina and Bacacheri, in Paraná; Navegantes and Joinville, in Santa Catarina; Pelotas, Uruguaiana and Bagé, in Rio Grande do Sul. North Block: composed of 7 airports - Manaus, Tabatinga and Tefé, in Amazonas; Rio Branco and Cruzeiro do Sul, in Acre; Porto Velho, in Roraima, and Boa Vista, in Roraima. Central Block: composed of 6 airports - Goiânia, in Goiás; Palmas, in Tocantins; Teresina, in Piauí; Petrolina, in Pernambuco; São Luís and Imperatriz, in Maranhão.||Ordinary concession||-||Under studies||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|Port Paranaguá's Grains Port Terminals/PR - (PAR 07, PAR 08 and PAR XX)||Leasing||328 million (PAR 07); 400 million (PAR 08) e 193 million (PAR XX)||Under studies||TBD||TBD|
|Liquid Bulk fuel Terminal in the Port of Itaqui/MA (IQI 03)||Leasing||29 million||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Liquid Bulk Terminal In the Port of Itaqui/MA (IQI 11)||Leasing||65 million||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Liquid Bulk fuel Terminal at the Port of Itaqui/MA (IQI 12)||Leasing||177 billion||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Liquid Bulk fuel Terminal at the Port of Itaqui/MA (IQI 13)||Leasing||178 billion||Under studies||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|ATU 12 - Leasing of solid bulk In Port of Aratu/ BA||Leasing||22 million||Public consultation||2nd quarter 2020||3rd quarter 2020|
|PAR 32 - General Cargo Terminal in Paranaguá Harbor||Leasing||-||Public consultation||3rd quarter 2020||4th quarter 2020|
|STS 08 - Liquid Bulk Terminal In Port of Santos||Leasing||-||Under studies||1st quarter 2021||2nd quarter 2021|
|STS 14 - Celullose Terminal in Port of Santos/SP||Leasing||120 million||Public consultation||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|STS 14A - Celullose terminal in Port of Santos Santos/SP||Leasing||131 million||Public consultation||1st quarter 2020||2nd quarter 2020|
|Privatisation of Companhia Docas do Espirito Santo - CODESA||Privatisation||-||Under studies||-||-|
|Privatisation of the Organised Port of São Sebastião/SP - Centro||Privatisation||-||Under studies||1st quarter 2021||2nd quarter 2021|
|Studies for privatisation of Port of Santos||Privatisation||-||Under studies||4th quarter 2020||1st quarter 2021|
|Equity sale by Infraero regarding Airports from the 2nd and 3rd Round||Privatisation||-||Under studies||TBD||TBD|
|Privatisation of Casa da Moeda||Privatisation||-||Under studies||TBD||TBD|
|CEAGESP Privatisation||Privatisation||-||Under studies||-||-|
|Brazilian Company of Urban Trains (CBTU) – Privatisation||Privatisation||-||-||2nd quarter 2021||4th quarter 2021|
|Urban Train Company of Porto Alegre (Trensurb) – Privatisation||Privatisation||-||-||-||-|
1 André Luiz Freire and Thiago Luís Santos Sombra are partners and Raul Dias dos Santos Neto is an associate at Mattos Filho, Veiga Filgo, Marrey Jr e Quiroga Advogados.