The Cartels and Leniency Review: Argentina
Enforcement policies and guidance
Antitrust legislation began in Argentina with the enforcement of Law No. 11,210, inspired by antitrust law provisions in the United States. This Law was replaced by Law No. 12,906, which was in turn replaced by Law No. 22,262 in 1980.
The enforcement of Law No. 22,262 resulted in the establishment of Argentina's first antitrust agency, the National Commission for the Defence of Competition (CNDC),2 which focuses on targeting and sanctioning anticompetitive conduct. Finally, on 25 August 1999, Law No. 22,262 was abrogated and replaced by Law No. 25,156 (the Competition Law) and by Decree No. 89/2011, which introduced the corresponding implementing regulations.3 Sections of the Competition Law were subsequently modified in September 2014 by Law No. 26,993.
On 24 May 2018, Law No. 27,442 (the Antitrust Law) entered into effect and currently remains in force. Decree No. 480/2018 also became effective on the same day, complementing the new Antitrust Law. The Antitrust Law has implemented substantial changes in the antitrust regime, in both the analysis of anticompetitive conduct and merger control reviews, and overall the new Law has moved the development of antitrust legislation in Argentina forward.
In addition to this specific legislation, the Argentine Constitution promotes effective competition and efficiency in the markets in Argentina and seeks to protect consumers' welfare.
The Antitrust Law provides for the establishment of the National Competition Authority (ANAC), which, once created, will enforce the Antitrust Law and its implementing regulations. The Anticompetitive Conduct Trial Secretariat, the Economic Concentrations Secretariat and the Antitrust Tribunal will operate within this new independent agency. However, until the ANAC is created, enforcement of the Antitrust Law will be the responsibility of the Secretariat for Domestic Trade, with the aid of the CNDC, currently led by Rodrigo Luchinsky.
Until the ANAC is created,4 the CNDC remains the agency that investigates both anticompetitive conduct and merger and acquisition (M&A) procedures as a formal requirement of the Secretariat, which has full power to investigate and decide on the existence of anticompetitive conduct, either at the request of a party or ex officio.5 Notably, a new bill was recently sent to Congress, Bill No. 2795/20 of 13 November 2020, proposing changes to the Antitrust Law. The main modification proposed by the Bill is linked to the creation of the ANAC.
The investigation of anticompetitive conduct or the analysis of M&A by the CNDC results in a non-binding recommendation to the Secretariat, which will make the final decision on the case, subject to analysis (this applies to both M&A reviews and investigation procedures). The decisions of the Secretariat may be appealed by parties to the judicial courts.
With the enforcement of the Antitrust Law, certain practices are considered per se illegal; this is new in the Argentine antitrust regime, taking into consideration that before the enforcement of the Antitrust Law, all anticompetitive conduct was analysed by the 'rule of reason' criterion. The practices that are considered per se illegal must be deemed null and will not generate any effects. Practices considered per se illegal are listed under Section 2 of the Antitrust Law as follows:
- to fix, directly or indirectly, the price of the purchase or sale of products or services;
- to establish the obligations (1) of manufacturing, distributing, buying or commercialising a limited amount of goods, or (2) to provide a limited number, volume or frequency of services;
- to divide, distribute or horizontally impose areas, portions or segments of the markets, clients or supply sources; or
- to establish or coordinate submissions or abstentions in public tenders.
Section 1 of the Antitrust Law establishes that acts or behaviours relating to the production or trading of goods and services that limit, restrict or distort competition or constitute abuse of a dominant position in a market in a way that may result in (potential or actual) damage to the general economic interest6 are prohibited and shall be sanctioned pursuant to the rules of the law.
Further, Section 3 of the Antitrust Law provides a detailed list of anticompetitive conduct that could be considered unlawful by the competition authorities. The types of anticompetitive conduct still analysed by the rule of reason criterion are:
- to fix, agree or manipulate, directly or indirectly, the price for the sale or purchase of goods and services for which they are tendered or asked in the market, as well as to exchange information for the same purpose or to the same effect;
- to establish obligations to produce, process, distribute, purchase or market only a restricted or limited quantity of goods or to render a restricted or limited number, volume or frequency of services;
- to agree upon the limitation or control of the technical development or investments bound to the production or commercialisation of goods and services;
- to prevent, render difficult or preclude third parties entering or staying in, or to exclude them from, a market;
- to regulate goods or service markets, by agreements to limit or control research and technological development, the production of goods or the rendering of services, or to render difficult the investments bound to the production or distribution of goods or services;
- to subordinate the sale of an asset to the acquisition of another or to the use of a service, or to subordinate the rendering of a service to the use of another or the acquisition of an asset;
- to impose a condition on a purchase or sale of not using, acquiring, selling or supplying goods or services produced, processed, distributed or commercialised by a third party;
- to impose discriminatory conditions on the acquisition or alienation of goods or services, with no warrantable basis in commercial uses and customs;
- to refuse, without justification, to meet specific orders for the purchase or sale of goods or services, made in the conditions standing in the market involved; and
- to suspend the supply of a dominant monopoly service in a market to a user of public utilities or public interest service.
One of the first cartel cases investigated in Argentina was Silos Areneros de Buenos Aires v. Arenera Argentina and others7 in 1986. In the history of Argentine antitrust cartel investigations, there are two significant cases regarding the cement and liquid oxygen markets.8 Both resulted in fines of approximately 310 million Argentine pesos. Both cases were appealed to the judicial courts and the Supreme Court of Justice, and the sanctions imposed by the competition authority were confirmed by the courts at both levels.
Argentine antitrust authorities (and antitrust authorities worldwide) consider cartels to be serious infringements of antitrust law and, as previously stated, this is evident from the fact that it is one of the practices most severely punished by the antitrust authorities.
It is noteworthy that there is no definition of a cartel or its equivalent in the Antitrust Law. Nonetheless, the CNDC has stated in a precedent9 that the following are the principal characteristics of collusive practices: price agreements, quantity agreements and market segmentation. Further, the CNDC has concluded – after several cartel investigations – that there are certain factors that facilitate collusion, namely buyer power, product homogeneity, symmetry, oligopolistic markets and multi-market contacts.
Further, it is important to highlight that the Antitrust Law has adopted the effects doctrine, whereby, in practice, any act or conduct or any agreement signed abroad that has an effect in Argentine territory may be challenged by the Argentine antitrust authorities.
Cooperation with other jurisdictions
Pursuant to Section 28(j) of the Antitrust Law, the Antitrust Tribunal has, by law, the following functions and powers: to 'act with the competent agencies in the negotiation of international treaties, agreements or regulation of competition policies and free competition'.
The Antitrust Law does not contain any statement of cooperation with other jurisdictions regarding international cooperation in cartel cases. This notwithstanding, informal international cooperation could be expected in cross-border cartel cases.
Argentina has signed several documents concerning cooperation with worldwide authorities in antitrust matters:
- a cooperation agreement with Peru, which was signed in 2017, promoting information exchange regarding anticompetitive behaviour and M&A assessments;
- a cooperation agreement with Brazil, which was ratified by Law No. 26,662 and entered into force in October 2010, regarding cooperation between its defence of competition authorities in the application of the relevant laws;
- a Protocol for the Defence of Competition and an Agreement for the Defence of Competition within Mercosur, which were approved in December 1996 and December 2010 respectively; and
- a collaboration agreement between Spain's National Commission on Markets and Competition and the CNDC in 2014.
Further, in November 2015, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reincorporated Argentina as an observer in its Competition Committee, which is in charge of monitoring transparency and the worldwide fight against, inter alia, cartel conduct.
In the past few years, staff at the CNDC have received exhaustive training from experts from other agencies. Among other things, the CNDC chaired the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's 15th session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, and rejoined the International Competition Network.
On 28 November 2018, the CNDC, and the competent authorities in other countries in Central and South America,10 signed a declaration in Paris highlighting the benefits of clemency programmes.
Jurisdictional limitations, affirmative defences and exemptions
Section 1 of the Antitrust Law establishes that acts or behaviours regarding the production or trade of goods and services that limit, restrict or distort competition or constitute an abuse of a dominant position in a market in a way that may result in a (potential or actual) damage to the general economic interest11 are prohibited and shall be sanctioned pursuant to the rules of the Antitrust Law.
Further, Sections 2 and 3 of the Antitrust Law list anticompetitive conduct that is considered illegal per se and provides a list of behaviours that could be considered unlawful by the Argentine antitrust authorities.
Additionally, it is important to highlight that the Antitrust Law has adopted the effects doctrine, which implies that any act performed or agreement signed abroad that has an effect in Argentine territory can be challenged by the Argentine antitrust authorities. With regard to collusive practices in a cartel case, for the Antitrust Law to be applicable, there does not need to be a formal and express agreement in place, merely an informal understanding between the parties involved.
There are no exceptions expressly included in the Antitrust Law regarding cartel cases. However, pursuant to Section 1 of the Antitrust Law, there is no prohibition on conduct involving parties that do not have sufficient market power to damage (potentially or actually) the general economic interest.
The Antitrust Law has introduced a leniency programme into Argentina's antitrust regime. From the outset, the authorities have supported the application and enforcement of a leniency programme and emphasise that it will help to encourage efficiency and transparency in markets and among competitors. In addition, clemency programmes play a preventive role.
The aim of introducing a leniency programme is to facilitate the investigation of cartels. The programme included in the Antitrust Law grants (1) full immunity to the first applicant as long as the applicant provides the authorities with significant evidence, (2) a reduction of between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of the fine imposed on other applicants, depending on the type of information and evidence provided for assessment of the case, and (3) a supplementary benefit, known as leniency plus, consisting of a reduction by one third of the fine or sanction that would otherwise have been imposed as a result of the applicant's participation in the first conduct, if the applicant reveals the existence of a second, different, cartel in the course of the investigation.
Further, to obtain full immunity, the applicant must comply with the following conditions. The applicant must:
- be the first of those involved in the conduct to apply and supply sufficient evidence;
- cease the anticompetitive behaviour, unless the authority requests that it be continued;
- cooperate fully with the CNDC;
- safeguard the evidence; and
- keep confidential the fact of the leniency application.
At the time of writing, there are no public records of any leniency applications or filings.
Penalties for anticompetitive conduct are detailed in Section 55 of the Antitrust Law.
Infringements of the Law regarding a cartel case may result in harsh consequences for both the infringing company (or companies) and any employees who took part in the conduct.
Under current Argentine legislation, penalties for infringing the Antitrust Law are determined as follows: fines will increased to the higher of (1) 30 per cent of the turnover of the business associated with the infringement in the previous fiscal year, multiplied by the number of years of the infringement (the latter with a cap of 30 per cent of the total Argentine consolidated turnover of the infringing parties in the previous fiscal year), or (2) twice the amount of the economic benefit caused by the infringement. In the event that both methods are applicable, the method that achieves the higher amount for the fine will be used.
Further, and if the foregoing criteria cannot be applied, fines will be imposed by the ANAC with a cap of 200 million adjustable units of account.12 In the case of a repeat offence, offenders' fines may be doubled. As well as the fine, the ANAC may require the immediate ceasing of the acts or conduct and, if considered necessary by the ANAC, the removal of offenders' effects.
To determine the sanctions, the authorities take into account, among other things:
- the loss suffered by all the individuals and companies that have been affected by the unlawful activity;
- the benefit obtained by all the individuals and companies that were involved in the activity;
- the position of the companies in the market that are involved in the investigation;
- the accounts of the companies involved in the investigation;
- the duration of the conduct subject to investigation;
- an estimation of the inflated prices generated by the conduct subject to investigation;
- the characteristics of the products involved and their contribution to the welfare of society; and
- the value of the products that are part of the investigation as well as the assets held by the individuals involved.
The CNDC has stated in a precedent13 that when sanctioning collusive conduct, penalties should be established for an amount that 'may compensate society for the damage caused; and be superior to the benefits obtained by the companies involved in the case'.
The logic behind the pecuniary fine is that the imposition and the amount of the fine act as disincentives for those considering engaging in anticompetitive conduct.
In the event of the recurrence of unlawful activity, the fine could be doubled. Without prejudice to other penalties applicable to the activity, where verified acts are deemed to constitute cartel conduct, or where a monopolistic or oligopolistic position has been acquired or consolidated in violation of the provisions of the Antitrust Law, the competent authority (currently the Secretariat) may impose conditions to neutralise the distortional effects of the activity on competition or appeal to a judge to have the offending companies dissolved, liquidated, decentralised or divided.
Further, the companies are liable for the acts of their employees (even those who are not in a managerial position) performed on their behalf, for their benefit or with their assistance.
As a consequence of the aforementioned, directors, managers, administrators, receivers or members of the surveillance commission who contribute, encourage or permit an infringement are jointly and severally liable regarding the imposition of the fine.
In addition to all the sanctions described above, the individuals or legal entities that are injured by the acts and behaviour forbidden by the Antitrust Law may sue for damages in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of Argentina.
Finally, any agreements or terms and conditions that infringe the Antitrust Law may be declared null and void.
'Day one' response
The antitrust authorities have very broad investigative powers to enforce the prohibition and investigation of cartel cases.
In practice, in the first instance, the antitrust authorities request either the parties involved or third parties that may have knowledge or information regarding the collusion to provide documents or information they deem necessary to pursue the investigation. Usually they request general information regarding the market and the product involved in the investigation, shares of the players involved, competitors, barriers to entry in the market, capacity and distribution channels, among other things.
The antitrust authorities, in the second instance, usually call the parties they believe are involved in the cartel case, or third parties, to hearings. The hearings are usually held in the antitrust authority offices and presided over by the lawyers and economists in charge of the case.
The antitrust authorities may also request a judicial order to inspect the companies that they believe are involved in the cartel case with the aim of obtaining evidence.
As part of the inspection, the authorities may review emails, diaries and documentation that they understand could have information or constitute evidence regarding the cartel case.
In addition, the antitrust authorities usually review all communications made by associated competitors.
With regard to private enforcement, Section 62 of the Antitrust Law provides that 'any person damaged by anticompetitive practices may bring an action for damages in accordance with civil law before a judge having jurisdiction over the matter'.
Two significant cases that involved claims for damages (and in which the CNDC had previously imposed sanctions) were initiated as a consequence of anticompetitive conduct. One was a cartel case and the other focused on an abuse of dominant position.
The first, Asociación Protección Consumidores del Mercado Común del Sur v. Loma Negra Cía Industrial Argentina SA y otros s/ ordinario, was rejected by the judge for lack of legitimacy.
In the second case, Auto Gas SA v. YPF SA y otros s/ ordinario, the judge awarded damages amounting to 13,094,457 pesos, plus costs for the proceedings.
The Antitrust Law includes new provisions regarding private enforcement; the changes focus on establishing a more efficient and faster procedure. The parties in a case should file the claim once the administrative decision imposing a sanction is final. The administrative decision will be binding on the civil judge and the case will be heard under expedited procedural rules. Further, parties who have benefited from leniency applications will be exempted from civil liability, with the following exceptions: (1) claims by defendants' purchasers or their direct and indirect suppliers, and (2) cases in which the defendants could not obtain complete redress of their claim from parties that have not benefited from leniency applications.
In January 2020, Rodrigo Luchinsky took office as the president of the CNDC (replacing former president Esteban Greco) and he will continue to lead the competition authority until the ANAC is constituted. Because of the pandemic, the resulting lack of activity means that it is too premature to say what course the CNDC will take under Mr Luchinsky's leadership.
The Antitrust Law, which was promoted by the CNDC, among others, entered into force in May 2018. The Antitrust Law will establish the ANAC as a new, independent national competition authority comprising (1) the Antitrust Tribunal, (2) the Anticompetitive Conduct Trial Secretariat (which will be in charge of anticompetitive conduct assessments), and (3) the Economic Concentrations Secretariat (which will be in charge of the merger control process). As regards anticompetitive practices, the Antitrust Law:
- considers cartel practices illegal per se;
- includes a leniency programme (see Section IV); and
- may consider interlocking directorates to be illegal, under a rule of reason approach.
In March 2019, the Secretariat for Domestic Trade issued Resolution No. 84/2019, initiating the candidate selection process to constitute the ANAC. In October 2019, Resolution No. 638/2019 was issued, approving the list of nominees for the vacant positions (with the former president of the CNDC, Esteban Greco, achieving the highest score). However, in October 2020, the Ministry of Productive Development (under the government newly elected in December 2019) issued Resolution No. 527/2020 revoking the whole selection process as it was considered illegal. Consequently, a new selection process shall be conducted for new appointees to the ANAC.
As regards cases of anticompetitive conduct, in September 2016, the CNDC served notice to Prisma Medios de Pago SA (Prisma) and its 14 shareholder banks of an investigation into three main counts of anticompetitive conduct. This case was initiated as a consequence of an investigation held by the CNDC, in early 2016, focusing on credit cards and electronic payment methods. The investigation concluded that there was a lack of competition and transparency in the market.
Prisma is the operator of Visa in Argentina and is owned by, among others, 14 of Argentina's larger banks. As part of the investigation, Prisma submitted a settlement proposal to the CNDC in March 2017, which was approved by the then Ministry of Production on 7 September 2017. The settlement proposal consisted of a structural and behavioural remedy. The structural remedy was a commitment by Prisma's shareholders to sell their stakes in Prisma; this related to the conditions for providing its processing services. The behavioural remedy also related to the conditions for providing its processing services, namely that Prisma would sign issuer-processing contracts with the banks with which it currently operates, providing guarantees of service provisions at 'market prices'. The CNDC stated that this settlement resolved the vertical integration issue between Prisma and the 14 banks, and mitigated concerns regarding horizontal integration. The CNDC expected this settlement would result in both an increase in competition within the market involved and the introduction of new electronic payment methods.
In December 2015, the antitrust authorities imposed a large fine on four important laboratories (B Braun Medical SA, Gobbi Novag SA, Fresenius Kabi SA and CSL Behring SA) and some of their representatives. The fines imposed amounted to 10 million pesos for each company and 200,000 pesos for the representatives.
This case was initiated by a claim made by a consumer report of the existence of a cartel between the named companies in the provision of gelatin for hospitals. The antitrust authorities started the investigation by requesting information from the hospitals and subsequently asked for a judicial order to review the companies in situ and to take any information that they deemed necessary to proceed with the cartel investigation. As a second step, the CNDC called the representatives of the companies and of the hospitals to attend hearings.
In its assessment, the CNDC highlighted the following as providing the definition and characteristics of a cartel: 'an agreement between competitors with the object of increasing benefits and prices for the companies involved without obtaining any objective compensatory advantage. In practice, this advantage is achieved by fixing prices, limiting production, spreading markets, assigning clients or territories, colluding in bidding processes or combining all these practices'.14
The most valuable evidence used by the antitrust authorities to sanction the companies was email exchanges between representatives of the companies. In this case, the authorities highlighted that another factor to consider when evaluating the possibilities of collusion in an oligopolistic market is transparency, as it is an efficient tool that allows companies to reveal the actions of their competitors.
Also of note is a case in which the former Secretariat for Trade, in Resolution No. 271/2014, imposed fines on eight automobile companies in December 2014, on the grounds of what was deemed to be a collusive agreement between the companies on the sale of automobiles in Tierra del Fuego, Buenos Aires. Fines were imposed on Volkswagen Argentina SA, Honda Motor de Argentina SA, Toyota Argentina SA, General Motors Argentina SRL, Renault Argentina SA, Ford Argentina SCA, Fiat Auto Argentina SA and Peugeot-Citroën Argentina SA.
The sanction was appealed and finally revoked by the Comodoro Rivadavia Court of Appeals.15 This was the first large sanction to be revoked by a court of appeals regarding cartel cases. One of the arguments that the court used to revoke the fines was that the evidence used by the antitrust authorities to sanction the companies was not sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel and specifically stated that 'there is no evidence that proves voluntary agreements that had as a consequence homogeneous conduct'.
Further, in July 2018, the Secretariat for Trade fined the Argentine Society of Authors and Composers of Music (SADAIC) 42 million pesos for excessive pricing of copyright fees charged to hotels and other establishments offering accommodation. The case was initiated on the basis of an investigation conducted by the CNDC. The antitrust authority stated that the measure would implicitly produce an improvement in competitiveness in the tourism sector and directly result in the reduction of the tariffs charged for the rights of authors and composers.
In its assessment, the CNDC used a novel method, making an international comparison of the fees paid for the reproduction of musical works. As a result of the analysis, the CNDC discovered that prices in Argentina were much higher than those in other countries. After conducting an assessment, the CNDC recommended that the Secretariat for Trade impose fines representing 10 per cent of the turnover obtained by SADAIC between 2009 and 2014.
The CNDC has published guidelines to make its interventions more predictable.
In this regard, the newest guidelines are focused on the prevention of anticompetitive practices for chambers of commerce (introduced in December 2018) and exclusionary abuses of dominance (introduced in May 2019).
The guidelines on prevention of anticompetitive practices for chambers of commerce help to distinguish between the right of association and the obligation not to engage in practices that may damage competition. The guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance aim to explain the practices that constitute infringements of the Antitrust Law and to contribute to predictability in decision-making, notwithstanding their application on a case-by-case basis and the use of complementary criteria that may be developed in the future.
Notably, in 2019, the OECD published its report on combating collusion in public procurement in Argentina, conducting an analysis of regulations and practices regarding public procurement. The report offered recommendations on measures to promote competition in the sector.
According to public CNDC statistics and published decisions, in 2021 the authority considered 67 mergers and 48 cases of anticompetitive practices.
Of the cases of anticompetitive practices, the most significant was that of Cervecería y Maltería Quilmes, in which the CNDC imposed a fine of 150 million pesos on the company.
Back in April 2016, the firms Compañía Industrial Cervecera SA and Compañía Cervecerías Unidas SA filed a complaint with the CNDC against AB InBev SA and Cervecería y Maltería Quilmes SAICA y G (CMQ), alleging violation of the Competition Law, through an abuse of dominant position of an exclusionary nature in the Argentine beer market, manifest in exclusivity agreements, advertising and discounts. Similarly, in September 2016, the Otro Mundo Brewing Company SA also filed a complaint with the CNDC claiming that practices by CMQ were in violation of the Competition Law.
In the course of the summary proceedings, which opened in April 2017, CMQ offered a compromise under the framework of the new published Antitrust Law, but this was rejected by both complainants, on the grounds that the proposal did not provide a remedy to the anticompetitive conduct. Ultimately, the CNDC issued Disposition No. 4 of 2 May 2019, charging CMQ with an abuse of dominant position of an exclusionary nature.
After analysing the evidence, the Secretariat for Domestic Trade concluded, among other things, that the loyalty channels offered by CMQ reflected an attempt to monopolise the different types of commerce, to the detriment of its competitors; that CMQ's vertical, horizontal and geographic integration clearly allowed it to determine the economic viability of competitors; and that its market power was reinforced by its portfolio of soft drinks and mineral water, which were offered jointly and allowed products to be acquired through a single supplier. In short, it considered CMQ's obstruction of the access, permanence or growth of competitors in the market to be verified in the execution of exclusivity agreements at points of sale and in spaces in gondolas and refrigerators. Accordingly, on 24 August 2021, the Secretariat resolved to impose a fine of 150 million pesos on CMQ and ordered it not to establish any type of commercial point-of-sale agreement with the purpose or effect of producing vertical restrictions on marketing channels. Furthermore, it was ordered to maintain an independent strategy with respect to the other beverages it markets, and limits were also imposed on its advertising and promotion agreements.
Finally, the current government has proposed a draft bill to modify the Antitrust Law, introducing some significant changes to the Law, namely:
- elimination of the leniency programme; and
- elimination of cessation commitments.
The draft bill has obtained the approval of the Senate but has still to be considered by the Chamber of Deputies. Nonetheless, there is a considerable amount of concern that these modifications would greatly set back the development of local antitrust regulation.
1 Camila Corvalán is a senior associate at Estudio Beccar Varela.
2 Argentina's first antitrust agency was constituted by Section 6 of Law No. 22,262.
3 Resolutions Nos. 40/2001, 26/2006 and 164/2001.
4 Section 80, the Antitrust Law.
5 Section 20, the Competition Law.
6 The Antitrust Law is intended to protect the general economic interest, generally understood as consumers' welfare.
7 Resolution No. 442/86 of the former Secretariat for Commerce.
8 CNDC v. Loma Negra and others (2005), Resolution No. 124/05 of the former Secretariat for Technical Coordination; and CNDC v. Air Liquide and others (2005), Resolution No. 119/05 of the former Secretariat for Technical Coordination.
9 'Oficina anticorrupción s/ solicitud de intervención CNDC (C. 1142) expediente No. S01:0320435/2006', 4 December 2015.
10 The declaration was signed by Argentina, Peru, Chile, Brazil and Mexico.
11 See footnote 6.
12 The adjustable unit of account (unidad movil) is a coefficient updated annually by the Argentine inflation index. The value of one unit is currently fixed at 40.61 pesos.
13 See footnote 9.
14 See footnote 9.
15 Honda Motors Argentina S.A. y otros v. Estado Nacional – Secretaria de comercio s/ recurso directo ley 25.156.