The Cartels and Leniency Review: India

Enforcement policies and guidance

i Statutory framework

The Competition Act, 2002 (the Act), in conjunction with various regulations, forms the competition regime in India. While there are many sectoral regulators responsible for maintaining fair competition in their respective sectors, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), established under Section 7 of the Act, is the principal regulator for anticompetitive behaviour across all sectors.

Provisions of Section 3 of the Act and various regulations, particularly the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009 (the Leniency Regulations), deal with anticompetitive agreements, including cartels. 'Cartel' has been defined under the Act to include 'an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement among themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services'. Therefore, to establish the existence of a cartel, the existence of an 'agreement' needs to be proved first.

'Agreement' under the Act has been defined very widely and includes an arrangement or understanding or acting in concert and is not limited to written formal agreements. Section 3(1) of the Act sets out a general prohibition on all agreements that have or are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) within India, while Section 3(3) specifically sets out that certain horizontal agreements, including cartels, will be presumed to have an AAEC in India, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the accused to rebut the presumption. These horizontal agreements include those that:

  1. directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices;
  2. limit or control production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services;
  3. share the market or source of production, or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market, or any other similar way; or
  4. directly or indirectly result in bid rigging or collusive bidding.

The CCI is the enforcing body, assisted by its investigative arm, the office of Director General, CCI (DG). Most cartel investigations have been initiated by the CCI upon receipt of information either as a complaint or a leniency application, although the CCI has also initiated suo moto action or has initiated proceedings upon receipt of a reference made by a government or statutory authority. The CCI directs the DG to commence an investigation if it is of the view that there exists a prima facie case warranting an investigation. The DG cannot initiate investigations suo moto. Once the DG submits an investigation report to the CCI, the CCI can either direct the DG to investigate further or it can continue with its inquiry and call upon the parties to make written and oral pleadings. On reaching a positive finding of the existence of a cartel and any resulting infraction, the CCI may impose a penalty and pass any other order that it deems fit. CCI orders can be appealed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).2 An NCLAT order is finally appealable before the Supreme Court of India (SC).

The penalty that may be imposed in the case of any anticompetitive conduct cannot be more than 10 per cent of the average of the turnover3 of the contravening enterprise for the three preceding financial years. However, in the case of a cartel, the CCI can impose a penalty of up to three times the profit of the contravening enterprise or 10 per cent of the turnover of the contravening enterprise, for each year of the continuance of the cartel, whichever is greater. Further, the directors and other employees of the contravening entity found responsible can also be penalised under the Act.

The CCI has held that an agreement by itself cannot be the basis of cartel prosecution and that there must be economic consequences arising out of such an agreement. Cases in which the CCI has prosecuted cartels shows that the CCI relies not only on direct evidence but also on indirect evidence and economic analysis.4

There are no criminal sanctions in India for cartelisation. However, non-compliance with the orders of the CCI or the NCLAT can attract criminal liability.

ii Guidelines and policy

The substantive provisions of the Act dealing with anticompetitive behaviour have only been in force since 2009. Competition jurisprudence is still developing in India. Both legal practitioners and the CCI rely on cases decided upon by the courts of the United States and the European Commission for guidance. The CCI has not issued any policy or guidelines for cartels.

iii Cartel enforcement

Cartel enforcement has been a focus for the CCI since the beginning but has taken time to gain traction. During the past year, owing to the covid-19 pandemic, CCI and related court proceedings have been slower than usual. Overall, eight months into the pandemic, there has been no discernible change in the CCI's priorities or responsiveness towards cartels. Since December 2019, the CCI inquired into 18 cases relating to cartels and found companies (including their officers) guilty only in two cases involving bid rigging. However, the CCI refrained from imposing monetary penalties in these cases and only issued a warning.

As at November 2020, the CCI has issued a total of 79 orders penalising companies (including their officers) for cartel infringements. The total monetary fines imposed by the CCI for cartel infringements to date is approximately 81 billion rupees.

In 2020, the CCI passed two orders in cases involving leniency applications. Interestingly, in one case, a Japanese auto-parts manufacturer (OES) had filed a leniency application with the CCI disclosing details of a cartel operated between certain OESs in Japan that affected the Indian market. The CCI entertained the application but dismissed the case, as the cartel has not affected Indian market.

Cooperation with other jurisdictions

The CCI has been granted extraterritorial jurisdiction over any anticompetitive conduct occurring outside India if such conduct has caused, or is likely to cause an AAEC within India.

Section 18 of the Act permits the CCI to enter into any memorandum or arrangement, with prior approval of the central government, with any agency of any foreign country for the purpose of discharging its duties or performing its functions under the Act. The CCI has executed memoranda of understanding on cooperation with several competition agencies, including those of the United States, the European Union and Australia, in an attempt to set up a framework for cooperation and exchange of information. The scope and content of these arrangements are not publicly known.

It is believed that there is a fair amount of coordination and dialogue with regulators in other jurisdictions through the International Competition Network and other channels, although there is no provision permitting the CCI to share information or documents with other jurisdictions without the consent of the concerned parties.

Jurisdictional limitations, affirmative defences and exemptions

An action taking place outside India that has or is likely to have an AAEC in the relevant market in India may be the subject of an inquiry by the CCI under Section 32 of the Act. The CCI has exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction in a few cases that involved operation of an alleged cartel outside India which affected the Indian market.

The Act provides for certain affirmative defences and exemptions, namely:

  1. joint venture: while certain horizontal agreements have been presumed to harm competition, an exemption from this presumption is offered to an efficiency-enhancing joint venture. The burden of demonstrating such efficiencies lies with the enterprise seeking the exemption. If the efficiency gain is shown to exceed the harm to competition, the party is not likely to be held to be in contravention of the anticompetitive behaviour on an application of the rule of reason;
  2. intellectual property rights defence: the Act provides that, notwithstanding the anticompetitive agreement provisions of the Act, a person shall be free to impose restrictions insofar as the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and for the protection of, and prevention of any infringements of, any intellectual property rights granted under India's intellectual property laws;
  3. export cartels exemption: the Act provides that restrictions relating to anticompetitive agreements, including cartels, do not apply to the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent that the agreements relate exclusively to production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services. This exemption may be read to exclude export cartels (i.e., cartelisation of markets outside India); and
  4. statutory exemption: under Section 54, central government can exempt any class of enterprise from the application of competition law in the interests of security of the state or public interest (exemption has been granted to vessel-sharing agreements within the liner shipping industry from the provisions of Section 3 of the Act for a period of three years from 4 July 2018).5

Leniency programmes

The leniency policy in India is governed by Section 46 of the Act read with the Leniency Regulations, which set out the requirements for qualification, the procedure to be followed for the imposition of a lesser penalty and the benefits available.

The Leniency Regulations provide for a reduction in penalty of up to 100 per cent if an applicant makes vital disclosures about the existence of a cartel to the CCI and if no reduction in penalty has been granted to any other applicant by the CCI. This benefit of reduction in penalty would be granted to an applicant only if the CCI does not have sufficient evidence, or any evidence at all, to establish the existence of a cartel.

In August 2017, far-reaching amendments were made to the Leniency Regulations (2017 Amendment). By way of the 2017 Amendment, the scope of an 'applicant' under the Leniency Regulations has been expanded to specifically include an individual who has participated in a cartel on behalf of an enterprise to make a leniency application to the CCI for a grant of a lesser penalty. Further, the 2017 Amendment provides an option to an enterprise making a leniency application, to include the names of individuals involved in the cartel (on behalf of the enterprise) for whom it wishes to seek a lesser penalty.

The most salutary development pursuant to the 2017 Amendment is that the grant of a reduction in penalty to an applicant (including an individual) who meets the conditions required, is now mandatory. Prior to the 2017 Amendment, it was left to the discretion of the CCI to reduce a penalty and by how much, if at all. However, the percentage by which a penalty would be reduced is still discretionary and there is still no guarantee of a full reduction.

The leniency regime also sets out a marker system for applicants. An applicant can approach the CCI on a no-names basis and provide details of the infringement and the evidence in its possession. The CCI will employ a priority status based on the time of the initial contact. The first applicant to contact the CCI, albeit orally, will be given the status of first applicant. If the initial contact is oral, the applicant will need to ensure that the documentary evidence is provided to the CCI within 15 calendar days of receiving a direction from the CCI to submit the application. Failure to do so will result in the loss of the priority status.

The Act and applicable regulations do not provide for any specific guidance as to the nature and level of detail of the evidence required. Once a marker has been given, the CCI does not deal with another applicant until a decision regarding the first applicant has been made.

The conditions that need to be met for an applicant to qualify for the benefit of a reduced penalty include:

  1. ceasing to have further participation in the cartel from the time of its disclosure, unless otherwise directed by the CCI;
  2. providing vital disclosure in respect of a violation under Section 3(3) of the Act;
  3. providing all relevant information, documents and evidence as may be required by the CCI;
  4. cooperating genuinely, fully, continuously and expeditiously throughout the investigation and other proceedings before the CCI; and
  5. not concealing, destroying, manipulating or removing the relevant documents in any manner that may contribute to the establishment of a cartel.

Subsequent applicants may be granted a reduction in penalty on making a disclosure by submitting evidence that, in the opinion of the CCI, may provide significant added value over and above the evidence already in the possession of the CCI or the DG to establish the existence of a cartel. The applicant marked second in the priority status may be granted a reduction of up to 50 per cent of the leviable penalty, while the applicant marked third or later in the priority status may be granted a reduction of up to 30 per cent of the leviable penalty. Neither successful, nor unsuccessful leniency applicants are provided any immunity from civil claims.

In terms of the applicable regulations, no leniency application can be entertained after the DG's investigation report is received by the CCI.

As such, under the Leniency Regulations, the CCI grants confidentiality regarding the applicant's identity, and the information and evidence furnished by an applicant. However, pursuant to the 2017 Amendment, the DG can disclose the information and evidence furnished by an applicant to any party if the DG deems the disclosure necessary for the purposes of the investigation. Nevertheless, disclosure can only be made after obtaining prior approval from the CCI in the form of a reasoned written order.

In 2020, the CCI passed final orders in two cases involving leniency applications, finding a contravention in one case and dismissing the other, finding no contravention of the Act in that case.

In the first case, the CCI initiated an investigation into an alleged cartelisation amongst suppliers of anti-vibration rubber products and automotive hoses (Products), in relation to requests for quotations (RFQs) issued by automobile original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The CCI initiated the investigation pursuant to a leniency application, which disclosed that certain OESs had reached agreements to fix the price to be quoted for RFQs, and allocation of RFQs issued by the OEMs between the OESs, by exchanging commercially sensitive information through in-person contacts, phone calls, emails, etc. Even though such conduct took place in Japan, the automobiles fitted with the said Products were directly or indirectly sold in India. After a detailed investigation, the CCI noted that while some of the OESs had contacts with their competitors, none of the OEMs actually sold vehicles in India with the Products fitted and, the said exchange of information happened prior to 20 May 2009 (i.e., prior to the enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Act).6 Accordingly, the CCI held that there was no AAEC in India.

The second case relates to cartelisation in supply of Industrial and Automotive Bearings to certain automotive manufacturers by Schaeffler, National Engineering Industries, SKF and Tata Steel, Bearing Division (Bearing Companies) between 2009 and 2011. The investigation was initiated by the CCI based on a leniency application filed by Schaeffler disclosing the existence of the cartel. The CCI noted that the Bearing Companies met to discuss pricing strategies to be adopted for seeking price increase from the OEMs including Bajaj and Maruti Suzuki. While the CCI held that the Bearing Companies indulged in cartelisation, it decided against imposing a monetary penalty and observed that the 'ends of justice would be met if the parties cease such cartel behaviour and desist from indulging in it in future'.7


Under the Act, in case of cartels, the CCI has the power to impose a penalty of up to three times the profit or 10 per cent of the turnover of each participating enterprise for each year of continuance of a cartel agreement, whichever is greater. If an enterprise is a company, any of its directors or officials who are guilty are also liable to be proceeded against.

While the CCI has not framed any guidelines or offered any sort of guidance on calculating penalties, the SC in Excel Crop limited the penalty levied on multi-product companies to the turnover attributable solely to the product that was the subject of the contravention (i.e., 'relevant turnover'). Further, the SC provided a two-step methodology for calculating penalty:

  1. Step 1: determining the relevant turnover – the relevant turnover should be the entity's turnover pertaining to products and services that have been affected by a contravention; and
  2. Step 2: determining the appropriate percentage of penalty based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The guidelines laid out by the SC will help to eliminate the application of disproportionate penalties on enterprises and demonstrate appropriate mitigating circumstances for the imposition of a lesser penalty.

In addition to the imposition of penalty, the CCI may also pass orders, inter alia, directing the parties to terminate the agreement and to refrain from re-entering such an agreement, or to modify the terms of the agreement.

The Act does not provide for criminal liability other than for wilful default in implementing orders issued by the CCI. Non-compliance with CCI orders may result in a fine of up to 250 million rupees or imprisonment for up to three years, or both, while non-compliance with orders issued by the NCLAT may lead to a fine of up to 100 million rupees or imprisonment for up to three years or both.

Non-cooperation during an investigation may also lead to the imposition of a penalty by the CCI. The CCI imposed a fine of 10 million rupees on Google for its failure to comply with the directions given by the DG seeking information and documents.8 The CCI also imposed a fine of 15 million rupees on Monsanto and its affiliate companies for their failure to provide information sought by the DG in respect of its authorised representatives.9 Further, in a recent case in which the CCI imposed a penalty on an individual for non-cooperation with the DG, the NCLAT set aside the penalty after the individual apologised.10

'day one' response

The information received from an 'informant' or collected suo moto is reviewed by the CCI to determine whether there exists a prima facie case that warrants an investigation by the DG.

Both the CCI and the DG have been conferred with the same powers as those of an Indian civil court, including the power to summon any person and enforce his or her attendance, and powers of discovery and enforcement of production of documents. Additionally, the DG has been vested with the power to conduct searches and seizures.

Following the repeal of the Companies Act 1956 and the enactment of the Companies Act 2013, the DG is no longer required to obtain a court-issued warrant to conduct a search and seizure. To date, the DG has conducted seven dawn raids, with the most recent conducted in December 2020 on cement companies for alleged cartelisation.

Private enforcement

The Act does not provide for private enforcement of rights. Compensation claims for damages by private parties must be filed before the NCLAT. The NCLAT is yet to pass an order addressing a claim for damages.

As per the Act, such claims can be made either after the CCI arrives at a finding of contravention, or after the NCLAT arrives at a finding of contravention if the decision by the CCI is appealed. However, as a matter of practice, the NCLAT awaits the decision of the SC on merits before proceeding to hear compensation claims. The Metropolitan Stock Exchange filed an application seeking compensation from the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) on the basis of a CCI order finding NSE guilty of abusing its dominant position to oust players from the derivatives trading market. However, the NCLAT has deferred hearing the compensation application until the SC decides finally on the merit of whether NSE abused its dominant position. Similarly, in three other cases,11 compensation applications were filed by Crown Theatre against Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation; by Sai Wardha Power Limited against Coal India Limited; and by East India Petroleum Private Limited against South Asia LPG Company Private Limited. These are currently pending before the NCLAT.

Although damages jurisprudence is yet to develop in India, it is possible for one or more persons, with the approval of the NCLAT, to file compensation claims on behalf of many.

If a loss is shown to have been suffered by a party as a result of a contravention of the substantive provisions of the Act, the suffering party can approach the NCLAT for an award of restitutive compensation. If many persons have suffered loss or damage from an action of the same enterprise or group of enterprises, an application for an award of compensation can be made by just one of those persons on behalf of them all. However, since the quantum of the fine is indicative of the severity of the offence, it may be an important factor that is considered when calculating the award.

Current developments

In February 2020, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released the">draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (Bill) inviting public comments on the proposed amendments to the Act. This was pursuant to the">recommendations of the Competition Law Review Committee constituted by the MCA to review and recommend amendments to the Act in line with international best practices and the changing economic reality. Key amendments proposed in the Draft Amendment Bill concerning cartels and leniency are as follows:

  1. Cartel facilitators can now be penalised: Under the existing framework, cartel agreements between competitors are presumed to have an AAEC in India. This presumption is proposed to extend to include a cartel facilitator, irrespective of such entity being engaged in a similar trade.
  2. Scope of anticompetitive agreements widened: Under the existing framework, under Section 3 of the Act, the CCI can only investigate and penalise horizontal and vertical agreements between parties. The Bill expressly covers all kinds of agreements including those which may not fall within the strict categorisation as a horizontal or vertical agreement.
  3. Introduction of a 'Leniency Plus' provision: The Bill proposes to introduce a 'Leniency Plus' policy, allowing an enterprise which files for leniency in one cartel and also helps in discovering a separate cartel to receive a reduction in penalty for both, the existing and newly discovered cartels.

On 30 March 2020, with a view to contain the spread of covid-19, the CCI through various notifications, partially suspended its regulatory function (i.e., submissions and hearings before the DG and the CCI) pertaining to: (1) anticompetitive agreements; (2) abuse of dominance; and (3) merger control. The CCI resumed its full functioning only from October 2020, pursuant to the issuance of a notification on 'Standard Operating Procedure for Virtual Hearings' for antitrust cases.

On 19 April 2020, the CCI issued an 'Advisory to businesses in times of Covid-19' (the Advisory). Taking cognisance of the disruption in the supply chains caused by covid-19, especially in healthcare and essential products and services, the CCI acknowledged that there is a legitimate reason for businesses to collaborate and coordinate to ensure supply and fair distribution of products and services. This collaboration includes sharing data on stock levels, timings of operations, sharing distribution networks, transport logistics, research and development production, etc. However, the Advisory specifically cautions enterprises 'not to take advantage of Covid-19 to contravene any of the provisions of the Act'. Without committing to any specific relaxations or providing additional safe harbours, the CCI emphasised that the Act already has in-built safeguards to protect businesses from sanctions for certain types of collaborations, such as efficiency enhancing joint ventures.

Apart from the Bill and Advisory, there have been some notable decisions pertaining to cartel enforcement in India during the past year.

In February 2020, the NCLAT upheld the CCI order concerning bid rigging by three entities, namely Pyramid Electronics, R Kanwar Electricals and Western Electric (OPs) in tenders issued by Indian Railways for procurement of brushless DC fans. The CCI initiated proceedings based on information received from the Central Bureau of Investigation. During the DG's investigation, Pyramid Electronics filed a leniency application disclosing existence of a cartel. The CCI concluded that the OPs had shared the market by allocation of tenders and exchanged price sensitive information amongst themselves under an agreement or arrangement and had indulged in bid rigging or collusive bidding. The CCI, while imposing penalties on the OPs and their representatives, took the leniency application into consideration and reduced the penalty applicable on Pyramid Electronics and its representative by 75 per cent. However, it imposed a penalty on the other two OPs and their representatives who appealed against the CCI order to the NCLAT. The NCLAT agreed with the findings of the CCI and upheld the CCI order.12

In February 2020, the CCI received a complaint from Plasser India Private Limited (Plasser) against five firms for indulging in bid rigging in the tender floated by the Ministry of Railway for procurement of dynamic track stabilising machinery. The terms of the tender disallowed (1) a firm from submitting multiple bids; and (2) an agent from representing more than one firm in the tender. Two firms acted as agents for two other firms and were also controlled by the same owner. Therefore, it was alleged that (1) participation in the tenders by the firms acting as an agent for more than one firm was in violation of the tender terms; and (2) there was a risk of exchange of commercially sensitive information by the agents. The CCI noted that mere breach of a tender condition is not violative of the provisions of the Act. Further, the mere possibility of collusion between parties due to common ownership of their agents without any evidence of actual collusion is insufficient to warrant an investigation. Accordingly, the CCI dismissed the case.13

In December 2020, the SC upheld the findings of the NCLAT and the CCI, dismissing a case against cab aggregators, Ola and Uber (collectively, OPs), for indulging in various anticompetitive activities, including that the business model of OPs acted as a hub-and-spoke cartel (the Cartel Allegation). It was alleged before the CCI that OPs were using their respective pricing algorithms to fix prices between their drivers, thereby facilitating a cartel. It was contended that absent the pricing algorithm, drivers would compete on prices that, in turn, would prevent them from commanding high prices (as calculated by the algorithm). The CCI dismissed the case, noting that for a hub-and-spoke to exist, there needs to be a conspiracy to fix prices, which requires the existence of collusion. The accession of drivers to the algorithmically determined prices by the platform could not be held as collusion. The complainant appealed to the NCLAT, which, inter alia, noted that the Cartel Allegation is based upon the US class action suit in accordance with US antitrust laws and cannot be imported directly into India, especially as the business model of the OPs in India does not manifest in restricting price competition among the cab drivers to the detriment of riders. It noted that the matter concerns foreign antitrust jurisdiction with different connotations and cannot be imported to operate within the ambit of the mechanism dealing with redressal of competition concerns under the Act. Accordingly, the NCLAT upheld the CCI order and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the complainant challenged the NCLAT decision before the SC, which upheld the findings of the NCLAT and the CCI in relation to the Cartel Allegation.

In July 2020, the CCI found 10 composite brake blocks (CBB) manufacturers guilty of cartelising and bid rigging of tenders floated by the Indian Railways (IR) between 2009 and 2017. The investigation was initiated by CCI based on a complaint by IR. The CCI found smoking-gun evidence of collusion including Whatsapp chats, SMS texts, call detail records between CBB manufacturers and admissions by the company representative during depositions, to decide prices to be quoted and quantity allocation inter se while bidding in the railway's tenders. While the CCI held that the CBB manufacturers indulged in bid rigging, it decided against imposing penalty because of mitigating factors such as 'cooperation & admission of cartel by the companies leading to expedited inquiry, low turnover of certain CBB manufacturer and economic impact of Covid-19 on the credit needs and liquidity of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises'.14

In October 2020, the CCI closed the case against 19 importers of phenol for alleged cartelisation. The CCI received a complaint from the Indian Laminate Manufacturers Association (whose members are involved in the manufacture of decorative laminate sheets), against the importers, alleging that they were artificially increasing the prices under the guise of its lack of availability during the period between January and June 2016 (the Relevant Period). On the basis of this information, the CCI referred the matter to the DG for investigation. The DG, after conducting a detailed investigation, concluded that there was insufficient evidence to indicate a cartel among the importers to manipulate phenol prices.

The CCI upheld the findings of the DG and noted that:

  1. the high correlation in prices of phenol between the Importers during the Relevant Period was due to strong competition, similar demand-supply conditions, local producers' price, anti-dumping duties, crude oil prices, exchange rate, etc.;
  2. an indication of price parallelism per se does not amount to collusion between the importers. Conscious parallelism is insufficient for a determination that the importers were engaged in concerted action as their pricing behaviour can be based on independent action or in response to the economic conditions; and
  3. the email exchange records, and call records of the importers did not reveal any meeting of minds or an agreement amongst the importers during the relevant period.

Accordingly, the CCI dismissed the case.15


1 Farhad Sorabjee and Vaibhav Choukse are partners, Ela Bali is a principal associate and Aditi Khanna is an associate at J Sagar Associates.

2 The NCLAT replaced the Competition Appellate Tribunal with effect from 26 May 2017.

3 Turnover is to be interpreted as relevant turnover as held by the SC in the case of Excel Crop Care Ltd v. Competition Commission of India, Civil Appeal No. 2480 of 2014.

4 Neeraj Malhotra v. Deutsche Post Bank Pvt Ltd, case No. 5 of 2009.

5 Notification No. SO 3250 (E) [F No. 5/20/2011-CS]. The exemption to vessel-sharing agreements has been repeatedly granted since 2013.

6 In Re: Cartelisation in the supply of anti-vibration rubber products and automotive hoses to automobile original equipment manufacturers, suo motu case No. 1 of 2016.

7 In Re: Cartelisation in industrial and automotive bearings, suo motu case No. 5 of 2017.

8 In Re: Consim Info Private Limited v. Google Inc USA and Ors, cases Nos. 7 and 30 of 2012.

9 In Re: M/s Nuziveedu Seeds Limited and Ors v. Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Limited and Ors, case No. 107 of 2015.

10 AKMN Cylinders (P) Ltd & Anr v Competition Commission of India and Anr, Competition (AT) No. 50 of 2018.

11 Crown Theatre v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation, CA (AT) (COMPAT) No. 1 of 2017 in Competition Appeal (AT) No. 16 of 2017; Sai Wardha Power Ltd v. Coal India Ltd & Ors, Transfer CA (AT) (Compensation) No. 1/2017 and East India Petroleum Private Limited v. South Asia LPG Company Private Limited, Competition Appeal (AT) No.70 of 2018.

12 Western Electronic & Trading Co. & Anr. v Competition Commission of India & Ors., TA(AT) Competition No. 37 of 2017 (Old Appeal No. 7 of 2017) and R. Kanwar Electricals & Anr., TA(AT) Competition No. 38 of 2017(Old Appeal No. 15 of 2017).

13 In Re: Plasser India Private Limited v. Harbour Sales Private Limited & Ors, case No. 45 of 2019.

14 In Re: Chief Materials Manager v. Hindustan Composites Limited & Ors, Ref case Nos. 3 of 2016, 5 of 2016, 1 of 2018, 4 of 2018, 8 of 2018.

15 In Re: Indian Laminate Manufactures Association v. Sachin Chemicals & Ors., case No. 61 of 2016.

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