The Foreign Investment Regulation Review: Editors' Preface

This ninth edition of The Foreign Investment Regulation Review provides a comprehensive guide to laws, regulations, policies and practices governing foreign investment in key international jurisdictions. It includes contributions from leading experts around the world from some of the most widely recognised law firms in their respective jurisdictions. This year, in keeping with the considerable increase in prominence of foreign investment review, we are delighted to include new chapters on Austria, Belgium, India, Israel, Japan and the Netherlands, along with several new contributors for countries covered in previous editions. We have also revised the format to focus on the aspects of foreign investment rules that are most critical for dealmakers.

Unprecedented challenges have arisen in 2020–2021 not only to the health and well-being of persons around the globe, but also to globalisation itself and, with it, the flow of capital. Whereas foreign investment has for a number of years been attracting increased attention, this trend has accelerated throughout the past 18 months. Prior to the covid-19 pandemic, the global economy was continuing its trend towards further integration, even with indications of emerging protectionism, and the number of cross-border and international transactions was increasing, while national governments continued to intervene in foreign investment based on a broadening set of criteria. Foreign investment reviews of cross-border mergers could not help but be affected by shifts in economic relations between countries, which in turn were driven by evolving geopolitical considerations. These included structural developments such as Brexit, now in its early post-implementation stages, as well as increased tensions over trade and related policies, as we have seen between the United States and China. These increased tensions have heightened concerns over national interest considerations such as the export of jobs, essential supply chains and industrial policies, as well as heightened national security concerns over cybersecurity, new technologies, communications and other strategic areas.

These and other developments discussed below have led, in the case of certain merger reviews, to increased tensions between normative competition and antitrust considerations, on the one hand, and national- and public-interest considerations on the other hand, the latter sometimes weighing heavily against the former. An example of the kind of differing regulatory decisions between the competition authorities and the Ministerial decision making in relation to concurrent foreign investment reviews occurred when BHP Billiton, the global leader in mining based in Australia, which has already engaged in previous significant mining investments in Canada, proposed to acquire the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, at an amount of approximately US$40 billion. Both Australia and Canada are members of the Five Eyes with respect to national security matters. That regulatory review process became a highly publicised matter of public interest through much of 2010. In the end, while the Canadian Competition Bureau cleared the proposed merger, the federal Minister of Industry, following his review under the Investment Canada Act and consultation with his Cabinet colleagues, issued an interim negative decision, in November 2010, on national interest grounds that were never really articulated. Rather than trying to then make further submissions, BHPB decided to withdraw the proposed acquisition. Some commentators at that time suggested that the reasons for the Ministerial position had more to do with the pending elections at the provincial level in Saskatchewan and at the federal level than any significant national interest issue (Potash Corp had a long standing perception among people in Saskatchewan as a historical corporate leader in that province).

A similar split in such regulatory decision making subsequently occurred in November 2013 in relation to the proposed acquisition of Grain Corp of Australia by Archer Daniels Midland Company of the United States. That also was cleared by the competition authority (the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) following its competition review; however, following subsequent concerns raised by the Foreign Investment Review Board, the Treasurer of Australia, one of the most senior Cabinet members, decided to block the proposed acquisition. Farmer concerns and distribution networks were apparently factors in that decision. Again, some commentators suggested real-world political considerations had some bearing on that negative decision.

As a result of cases such as these and other evolving considerations discussed below, more cross-border mergers have been scrutinised more intensely, with the process delayed or in some cases thwarted, by foreign investment reviews that are increasingly broader in scope.

Since the pandemic has taken hold, the underlying considerations that had been driving trends in the review of foreign investment moved to the front of national agendas, with the result that these trends have both been accelerating and increasing in scope. Concerns about the benefits of globalisation have been on the rise in an environment where nations have found themselves competing for supplies of critical medicines, equipment and personal protective equipment necessary to meet the public health emergency. This has led to a broadening of the types of businesses the takeover of which might be viewed as raising strategic, public interest or national security considerations. The increased focus on the stream of capital flowing from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that had already driven greater scrutiny of proposed investments took on heightened importance, particularly in economic sectors viewed as being critical to the pandemic response, such as public health and supply chains. As the impacts of the worldwide economic shutdown on the valuation of domestic businesses began to be felt, concerns around opportunistic hollowing-out of domestic sectors rose to the forefront of considerations of such matters as lowering financial thresholds that trigger foreign investment reviews.

This has all taken place in the context of efforts to overhaul the regulatory landscape that were already under way in the United States and Europe. In the United States, which saw the introduction of a mandatory notification regime and expansion of the review authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (known as FIRRMA) in August 2018, greater resources are now being allocated to monitoring and enforcement activities. This is making the voluntary filing calculus even more complex as there is no statute of limitations on CFIUS's jurisdiction if it has not cleared a transaction. As the policy focus has shifted to supply chain security across the globe, CFIUS is being used in conjunction with other US government authorities to wean critical US supply chains off their reliance on Chinese inputs; for example, by either blocking or subjecting to review even ordinary course transactions with blacklisted Chinese companies. Heightened CFIUS interest and commentary pertaining to certain China-related transactions, such as occurred in relation to TikTok, is a reflection of some of these evolving developments.

In turn, there is greater focus on foreign investment in Europe, where the European Union's foreign investment screening regulation, which became fully operational in October 2020, gives the European Commission a new central advisory role in coordinating increased scrutiny by Member States and obliges Member States to notify other Member States and the European Commission of foreign investments that they are screening under their national regimes. Furthermore, Member States have themselves introduced new foreign investment regimes (e.g., the Czech Republic and Denmark), are planning to do so (e.g., the Netherlands and Slovakia) or have further updated or tightened their existing foreign investment laws (e.g., Germany by introducing a variety of new sectors that it considers to be sensitive such as artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology). Currently, 18 EU countries have an FDI screening mechanism in place and a senior EU trade official has confirmed that dozens of foreign-investment vetting requests have been notified to the European Commission through the new EU screening mechanism since it came into force.

The United Kingdom has now aligned itself more closely with other countries by significantly strengthening its powers to intervene in deals that may threaten national security. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 marks a step change in the UK government's power to screen, impose conditions on and block deals that pose unacceptable risks. Once the new regime comes into force on 4 January 2022, it will require mandatory notification of investments in 17 strategically sensitive sectors that cross certain share or voting rights thresholds – a significant change in light of the UK's (continuing) voluntary merger filing regime. Transactions in all other sectors will be susceptible to 'call in' by the government should there be concerns.

The United States and Europe are not alone in elevating concerns over foreign investment during the pandemic and in response to increasing concerns over China's global influence. In Canada, during 2020–2021, timelines for national security reviews were temporarily extended and investments by SOEs as well as in Canadian businesses related to public health or the supply of critical goods and services were subjected to heightened scrutiny in response to the pandemic. The Canadian government has issued more detailed guidelines for the review of foreign investments, among other things, to include national security concerns relating to the potential of the investment to enable access to sensitive personal data that could be leveraged to harm Canadian national security through its exploitation, including personal data concerning government officials, such as members of the military or intelligence community. In Australia, on 1 January 2021, the Foreign Investment Reform Act came into effect, ushering in sweeping changes to that country's foreign investment review law. The temporary A$0 monetary screening thresholds for all investments that had been introduced in response to covid-19 were removed; however, this threshold was continued through provisions for the mandatory review of investments in sensitive national security businesses. New Australian regulations list businesses in critical infrastructure, telecommunications, military goods or defence or intelligence technology, the provision of service to defence or intelligence forces, the storage or access to classified security information and the storage, collection, or maintenance of personal information of defence and intelligence personnel. The symmetry between the Canadian guidelines and the Australian regulations should not be considered coincidental. Both countries are members of the Five Eyes together with the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The Australian Treasurer has also been given new, stronger enforcement and review powers under the legislation, including a new 'last resort' power, under which the Treasurer may review previously approved transactions where national security risks have emerged after approval by the Foreign Investment Review Board.

In addition to these significant developments, differences in foreign investment regimes (including in the timing, procedure and thresholds for and substance of reviews) and the mandates of multiple agencies (often overlapping and sometimes conflicting) continue to contribute to the relatively uncertain and at times unpredictable foreign investment environment. This gives rise to greater risk of inconsistent decisions in multi-jurisdictional cases, with the potential for a significant 'chilling' effect on investment decisions and economic activity. Foreign investment regimes are increasingly challenged by the need to strike the right balance between maintaining the flexibility required to reach an appropriate decision in any given case and creating rules that are sufficiently clear and predictable to ensure that the home jurisdiction offers the benefits of an attractive investment climate notwithstanding extraordinary circumstances.

The recently increasing breadth, scope and timelines for proposed acquisitions by SOEs and other proposed acquisitions giving rise to national security considerations have raised a potentially challenging issue in the context of proposed acquisitions of failing firms. There is a widely held view that, as a result of the disruptive economic effects of the covid-19 pandemic, there may be a sizeable number of distressed industries and failing firms in sectors that have been most significantly impacted by the pandemic. The number of failing firm cases is likely to increase the longer the pandemic continues to substantially affect the timeline for economic recovery from the effects of the pandemic.

In this exceptional environment, there may be failing firm cases where the proposed acquirer is an SOE, which in some foreign direct investment reviews includes a corporation that may be influenced directly or indirectly by a foreign government. There may also be proposed acquisitions of failing entities in the public health or supply chain markets, which may be regarded as more sensitive transactions in the context of the pandemic. If these types of proposed acquisitions are subjected to increased scrutiny and longer timelines in foreign investment reviews where the acquiree is a failing firm, and to the extent that there may be a parallel competition review conducted on a considerably more expeditious basis, the proposed acquisition risks not being completed if the acquiree cannot be sustained during that period. That may lead to an anticompetitive acquirer with existing operations in the same jurisdiction becoming the only purchaser in a position to complete the proposed acquisition, thereby avoiding liquidation of the assets and loss of jobs. The same result may follow even where the proposed acquirer is not an SOE or the failing firm is not in an apparently sensitive business because the increasing scope and timelines for foreign investment reviews, coupled with continuing geopolitical tensions, may raise sufficient uncertainty to dissuade a foreign entity from making a proposed acquisition. These developments could have a significant impact on domestic market concentrations going forward.

With respect to the interface of national interest and public interest considerations and the evolving breadth of national security reviews, including, in some cases, as they may relate to or interface with, normative competition reviews, the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section (ABA ALS) Task Force on National Interest and Competition Law prepared a report that was considered and approved by the Council of the ABA ALS in August 2019. In that report, the Task Force examined a number of cases in selected jurisdictions where these issues have been brought to the forefront. In addition, the ABA ALS Task Force on the Future of Competition Law Standards has delivered a further report in early August 2021 to the Council of the ABA ALS that, among other subjects, has considered recent developments pertaining to national interests and national champions in competition reviews. These evolving considerations in competition reviews cannot be viewed in isolation from the increasing scope of national interest factors in foreign investment reviews.

In the context of these significant developments, we hope this publication will prove to be a valuable guide for parties considering a transaction that may trigger a foreign investment review, which often occurs in parallel with competition reviews. It provides relevant information on, and insights into, the framework of laws and regulations governing foreign investment in each of the 21 featured jurisdictions, including the timing and mechanics of any required foreign investment approvals, and other jurisdiction-specific practices. The focus is on practical and strategic considerations, including the key steps for foreign investors planning a major acquisition or otherwise seeking to do business in a particular jurisdiction. The recent trends and emerging issues described above and their implications are also examined in this publication. Parties would be well advised to thoroughly understand these issues and to engage with regulatory counsel early in the planning process so that deal risk can be properly assessed and managed. Having regard to the changing regulatory environment pertaining to foreign investment reviews and the evolving protectionism as well as geopolitical considerations across a number of jurisdictions, regulatory counsel may recommend approaching the relevant government authorities at a comparatively early stage to engage in constructive discussions and to obtain an initial view from government officials of the proposed transaction.

We are thankful to each of the chapter authors and their firms for the time and expertise they have contributed to this publication, and also thank Law Business Research for its ongoing support in advancing such an important and relevant initiative.

Please note that the views expressed in this book are those of the authors and not those of their firms, any specific clients, or the editors or publisher.

Calvin Goldman QC

The Law Office of Calvin Goldman, QC

Toronto

Michael Koch

Goodmans LLP

Toronto

Alex Potter

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP

London

September 2021

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