The Public Competition Enforcement Review: Poland


Mr Tomasz Chróstny was appointed the new president of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) in January 2020 after the resignation of the former president Mr Marek Niechciał. Before his appointment, Mr Chróstny was the vice president of the OCCP and was responsible for consumer protection matters.

We observe that Polish antitrust enforcement has developed in 2020 and 2021. The OCCP conducted numerous dawn raids and instigated several antitrust proceedings. The antitrust enforcement also concerned individuals. In 2020, the OCCP for the first time used its powers to impose fines on the managers of companies.

Since late June 2017, claiming damages for harm suffered as a result of a competition law infringement is supposed to be easier. The Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed into Polish law and the Polish Damages Act came into force on 27 June 2017. The objective of this Act is to facilitate the recovery of claims concerning legal presumptions, procedural facilitations and quantification of harm. The Act applies not only to cartel infringements but also to all other infringements of competition law, including prohibited vertical agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Furthermore, it covers not only EU competition law infringements but also infringements based solely on Polish competition law. The Private Enforcement Act introduces a number of solutions that should facilitate seeking compensation from competition law infringers through private enforcement. Nonetheless, despite the Act being in force since mid-2017, cases of this kind remain relatively rare in Poland, which is mainly a result of low cartel detection.

Another important development was the enactment of a new law aimed at limiting the use of contractual advantage and granting new powers to the OCCP. The Act on Countering Unfair Use of the Contractual Advantage in Trade of Agricultural and Food Products came into force on 23 December 2021. It implements Directive (EU) 2019/633.2 The main differences compared with the former regime include (1) a larger number of prohibited practices, (2) differentiating between grey and black practices, and (3) use of turnover thresholds for the purpose of determining the existence of the contractual advantage.

In 2021, as in past years, the OCCP focused on consumer protection, in particular in the banking and financial sectors. But we also observe some developments in antitrust enforcement, exemplified by a substantial number of dawn raids and an increased interest in vertical restraints, in particular resale price maintenance (RPM). With regard to merger review, although the vast majority of cases were closed in Phase I, we observe a growing number of more complex reviews in Phase II.


As regards cartels, the OCCP continued to focus on bid rigging. According to publicly available information, in 2021 the OCCP initiated three new proceedings concerning alleged bid rigging, all of them regarding public procurement procedures for renovation and construction services.3 Moreover, in 2021 the OCCP initiated a number of explanatory proceedings on the basis of, inter alia, alleged bid rigging.4 In 2020 and 2021, the authority issued 12 decisions concerning bid-rigging arrangements and in 10 of them imposed fines on infringers. In addition to bid-rigging cases, the OCCP also issued significant cartel decisions whereby companies and their managers were fined.

i Significant cases

Following the 2017 OCCP decision concerning the cartel between producers of fibre board and particle board, the OCCP decided in 2020 and early 2021 on two major cartel cases and fined managers of the companies involved in the cartel as well.

Alleged bid rigging, price collusion and market sharing in the Warsaw heat market

The case concerned market-sharing, price-fixing and bid-rigging arrangements concluded between two heat providers in Warsaw: PGNIG Termika and Veolia. The OCCP established that the agreement lasted from 2014 until 2017. Although PGNIG Termika escaped the fine by filing a leniency submission, Veolia was fined approximately €26 million. This was the total fine imposed on a company that was directly involved in the execution of the infringement and its parent company, which not only was aware of the agreement but also was one of the initiators. Therefore, the parent company was also found to be directly involved in the infringement. There is no parental liability doctrine in the Polish competition law yet, but the planned implementation of the ECN+ Directive5 will bring substantial changes in this regard. This case is also novel because the OCCP for the first time imposed fines on Veolia's manager (PGNIG's manager escaped the fine as they benefited from the leniency granted to the company).6 The OCCP found that both managers acted deliberately and that their conduct led directly to the companies' infringements, including market sharing and price-fixing.

Market sharing by fitness clubs

In December 2020, the OCCP issued a decision concerning 16 companies operating fitness clubs and a company – Benefit Systems – offering benefit packages (including sports and recreation packages).7 Companies were found to have exchanged information and engaged in market sharing. In particular, they agreed on locations of fitness clubs to be opened. Benefit Systems had a role of supervisor and coordinator of the market-sharing agreement. At the same time, it realised its own business strategy consisting of acquiring fitness club chains and promoting its MultiSport benefit package among the companies participating in the agreement. The OCCP found that the anticompetitive practice lasted for approximately five years (from 2012 to 2017) and imposed fines of over 32 million zlotys. Despite the fact that the investigation was initiated in 2018 against 16 fitness club operators, the OCCP fined eight of them as some of the companies were acquired by Benefit Systems in the course of the investigation. Further, the authority also sanctioned six managers who were involved in the anticompetitive arrangement.8 Managers received fines amounting from 40,800 to 302,500 zlotys. One of the fines was reduced by 60 per cent via the leniency programme and settlement procedure.

In 2021, the OCCP issued three other decisions relating to anticompetitive conduct. In January and May 2021, Platinium Wellness and one of the members of its management board were fined for obstruction of a search.9 Further, in December 2021 the OCCP imposed an obligation on Benefit Systems to implement the commitments that the company had accepted in the course of the proceedings regarding market sharing.10 Commitments are intended to be pro-competitive measures. It is therefore required for at least one operator of sports and recreation packages to be admitted to fitness clubs in attractive locations, as well as for all the criteria relevant for admission of a fitness club to the MultiSport system to be made available on its website.

Market sharing, price-fixing and bid rigging by association of marketing agencies

In September 2020, the OCCP issued a commitment decision concerning the Association of Marketing Communication (SAR). The OCCP questioned SAR's actions of obliging agencies to resign from participation in tenders that did not envisage a rejection fee for providing results (such as a presentation) of a creative process. Further, the authority also considered that SAR had initiated a system of exchange of information on tenders. SAR withdrew from the practices questioned by the OCCP and accepted commitments. These require SAR to emphasise in its documents that participation in tenders should be an individual decision of every potential participant and not to make available to its members tools increasing transparency regarding tenders.

Alleged bid rigging by producers of railway sleepers

In April 2020, the OCCP fined six producers of railway sleepers.11 The case was interesting because producers acted as a consortium, which, in principle, under public procurement law, is a permissible cooperation. The OCCP explained that lack of an objective justification for the establishment of a consortium may lead to it being considered bid ridding. It was not the first decision in recent times targeting consortia. At the end of 2019, the OCCP came to an analogous conclusion in a case regarding undertakings providing air dump services for vaccines for foxes.12 Furthermore, similar decisions might be expected in relation to the undertakings operating in the waste market, as the OCCP declared that it would take action in that sector.

ii Trends, developments and strategies

The detection of the most harmful anticompetitive agreements is the declared objective of the OCCP. To facilitate this, the authority tries to encourage individuals and undertakings to inform it about identified irregularities. The OCCP introduced a whistle-blower system as well as published guidelines on how to submit a leniency application.

The Polish Damages Act entered into force in 2017. It facilitates bringing claims for damages for competition law infringements; thus, we might expect that those who suffer harm as a result of anticompetitive conduct might be incentivised to bring their claims to court. Despite this legislative development, private enforcement cases remain rare in Poland.

In 2020, the OCCP issued two sets of guidelines: guidelines concerning the methodology of imposing fines for individuals and clarifying how the rules will be applied in individual cases, and guidelines clarifying how the OCCP will use its powers during unannounced inspections. The former generally replicated the model of fining of undertakings for antitrust infringements, with a set of rules on how the basic fine and subsequently mitigating and aggravating factors will be applied by the OCCP. The OCCP published amended guidelines in April 2021. The latter can be regarded as a document codifying the current OCCP practice with respect to dawn raids.

Whistle-blower system

The OCCP launched a pilot whistle-blowing programme in April 2017 with the aim of increasing the detection of prohibited agreements between undertakings.13 This policy is aimed at allowing the OCCP to obtain information from anonymous individuals who have become aware of an illegal practice. Individuals are able to inform the authority through its dedicated telephone number or email address and provide evidence of competition-restricting practices. It follows from publicly available information that the authority has received 5,418 calls and emails informing about potential irregularities pertaining to both competition and consumer laws.14 The OCCP is also working on legislative changes designed to ensure that the concept of a whistle-blower is incorporated into the provisions of Polish competition law on a permanent basis.

To increase the effectiveness of the whistle-blower system, the OCCP launched a new online platform for potential whistle-blowers in December 2019.15 It aims to simplify the provision of information to the authority and at the same time to protect the anonymity of whistle-blowers. The OCCP receives numerous complaints and some of these have given rise to antitrust proceedings (e.g., antimonopoly proceedings concerning RPM against printers' manufacturer). Taking into consideration all the advantages of the online platform, it seems that it will be quite widely used by potential anonymous informants. In addition, in December 2021 the OCCP launched the campaign 'Market Collusion? Give us a Signal!', the aim of which was, inter alia, to promote the platform for potential whistle-blowers.16 It was a social media campaign addressed mainly to former and current employees of large and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in the construction, transport, automotive and IT sectors, for example.

Implementation of the Damages Directive

The Polish Damages Act, implementing the EU Damages Directive, entered into force in 2017. The Act covers competition law infringements not only relating to the European market but also relating solely to the national market, and consequently does not multiply the regimes for claiming damages for competition law infringements. The most important aspects of the Act aim at facilitating the recovery of claims concerning legal presumptions, procedural facilitations and quantification of harm.

The Act raises hopes as to the facilitation of compensation claims for competition law infringements. So far, bringing a successful compensation claim has been difficult because of the demanding tort law rules regarding evidence. The Act does not extend the powers of the OCCP but intends to supplement the authority's actions. Following its entry into force, undertakings infringing competition law will not only face fines imposed by the OCCP but also will be exposed to the risk of civil proceedings that could result in potentially substantial amounts of damages to be paid.

Implementation of the ECN+ Directive

In January 2021, the OCCP proposed amendments to the Polish Competition Act aiming to implement the ECN+ Directive.

The scope of changes includes the introduction of the parental liability doctrine to Polish competition law. In cases of competition law infringement, the OCCP will be able to impose a fine jointly on the company infringing competition law or abusing a dominant position, and on the company that has a decisive influence over the infringer. The proposition also regulates imposed associations of undertakings, an area not currently covered by the provisions of the Polish Competition Act. According to the proposition, the association may be fined up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of its members operating on the affected market in the financial year preceding the year in which the penalty was imposed. The planned changes also cover leniency, structural remedial measures, dawn raids and procedural guarantees for companies, such as complex regulation of legal professional privilege and statements of objections (which until now have not been covered by the provisions of the Polish Competition Act). The deadline for the implementation of the ECN+ Directive lapsed on 4 February 2021. As at December 2021, the proposal is still in the ministerial and public consultation phase.17 Thus, at this point it should be expected that the draft bill will proceed soon and will be enacted during 2022.

iii Outlook

Given the declarations of the OCCP regarding increased cartel detection, we might expect that various means already implemented (for instance, the leniency plus and whistle-blower systems) will bring results in terms of antitrust enforcement in Poland. Increasing activity in the area of antitrust is also a prerequisite for the development of private enforcement of competition law. Some damages claim proceedings are ongoing; nevertheless, the implementation of the EU Damages Directive is expected to further increase the rate of these claims.

Antitrust: restrictive agreements and dominance

i Significant cases

Given the rather undeveloped OCCP case law, below we provide a description of recently initiated proceedings.

Explanatory proceedings regarding possible abuse of a dominant position in the market for personalised advertising services

In December 2021, the OCCP initiated an investigation concerning amended rules in Apple's recently introduced Privacy Policy and Personal Data Processing Policy.18 The aim of the proceeding is to examine whether Apple's conduct is aimed at eliminating competitors in the market for personalised advertising services and to promote its own services. The proceedings are part of a wider trend to scrutinise the activities of 'big tech' companies. So far, similar concerns have been raised by French and German competition authorities in proceedings against Apple.

Abuse of a dominant position in the postal services market

In March 2021, the OCCP concluded that some of Poczta Polska's practices might have constituted abuse of its dominant position, and the authority obliged the company to change its market practices.19 The anticompetitive conduct related to commercial relationships with contractors – independent postal operators who often need to use Poczta Polska's infrastructure to provide their services to customers across the country. Poczta Polska required the postal operators to provide commercial information about the customers for whom it provided a given type of service at the contract signing stage, as well as information about the exact number of shipments in a given settlement period. What is more, the company did not apply a fixed price list for its services. The OCCP imposed a number of commitments on Poczta Polska, including prohibition from making pricing terms dependent on information about the postal operators' customers, to prevent Poczta Polska from taking potential customers from competitors.

Resale price maintenance high on OCCP's enforcement agenda

In late 2020 and in 2021, the OCCP issued several RPM decisions. In November 2020, the OCCP imposed a fine of approximately 0.5 million zlotys on Yamaha, the producer of music equipment, for imposing minimum resale prices on online resellers. The OCCP established that the company monitored retail prices and intervened in cases of non-observance of minimum prices. The retailers also contributed to monitoring and informed the manufacturer about the prices of its competitors. The manufacturer cooperated with the OCCP as it submitted a leniency application and entered into a settlement, so the initial level of the fine was decreased by between 50 and 10 per cent.

The OCCP also instigated several other proceedings concerning potential RPM – for example pharmaceutical wholesalers.20 Interestingly, in this case the OCCP ran dawn raids at the headquarters of six companies' headquarters.

Ongoing proceeding regarding an abuse of a dominant position in the e-commerce market

In December 2019, the OCCP started an investigation into the practices of the largest e-commerce platform in Poland – After complaints from many sellers using Allegro, the OCCP conducted a search of the company's premises and established that illegal practices might have taken place. The OCCP believes that Allegro might have used information on the platform's operation that was unavailable to other sellers to better position and display its own offers from the Official Allegro Shop in the search results. The Official Allegro Shop was also able to use some promotional features that were unavailable to other sellers. Considering Allegro's strong position in the market, these actions could potentially be regarded as an abuse of its dominant position according to Polish competition law.

ii Trends, developments and strategies

As regards the enforcement of restrictive agreements, no substantial case law development was seen in 2020 and 2021.

In addition to the proceedings described above and bid-rigging decisions mentioned earlier, at the end of 2020 a producer of equipment for the production and processing of compressed air was fined for an RPM infringement.21 It was the second time the settlement procedure has been applied. In 2021, the OCCP issued another two RPM decisions. They concerned an RPM arrangement concerning retail sales of sports equipment (the Spokey case)22 and office equipment and supplies for which the RPM concerned internet sales.23

Again, as with cartels, the OCCP instigated numerous antimonopoly proceedings – for instance proceedings regarding Apple's conduct described above.

No decision on abuse of a dominant position was issued in 2020 and only one in 2021, as discussed above.

iii Outlook

Given the ongoing proceedings concerning vertical restraints, it is expected that the OCCP will continue to focus on vertical restraints. These will be instigated not only against companies but also against individuals (i.e., managers). In 2020, following numerous public speeches by OCCP officials that the OCCP will always verify whether an individual, by their act or omission, contributed to a company's competition law infringement, the first decision imposing a fine on a manager was issued. Not long after, other managers were fined. It is possible that another decision to fine a manager will be issued this year.

Sectoral competition: market investigations and regulated industries

In 2020, the OCCP published information concerning market investigations, regarding the market for waste.24 This is a continuation of its investigation of the waste market (the first report was published in August 2019). The study concerned the market situation in the years 2014–2019 and covered all installations using the most popular mechanical-biological method of waste treatment in Poland – 171 installations in total. Most of them are managed by operators with a predominance of public capital, mainly local government, and about 30 per cent of the companies operating the installations are private owners.

The OCCP found that in 2019 the fees for municipal waste increased by almost one-third, on average, which is a sharp increase compared with recent years. The main reason was the increase in the prices for collecting municipal waste by regional municipal waste treatment facilities, which are key actors in municipal waste treatment in Poland.

The OCCP suggested establishing a regulatory body that would control costs and prices and potentially introduce maximum prices, in particular in areas where, as a result of existing market structures, the development of competitive mechanisms in the short term is unlikely.

i Trends, developments and strategies

Given the OCCP's policy of declared openness and transparency, guidelines on publishing results of market inquiries have been issued.25 In the guidelines, the authority announced that information on the results of all market inquiries will be published. The scope of the information presented to the public might vary, depending on the educational value of the results and the scope of business secrets of undertakings questioned in the course of an inquiry. While deciding on the scope of information, the OCCP should also take into account the efficiency of proceedings conducted by the authority in which the results of the market inquiries may be used.

ii Outlook

The OCCP continues to issue at least one report from a market investigation each year. In recent years, the investigations have been orientated to insurance,26 investment funds,27 waste management in municipalities28 and press printers.29

State aid

The covid-19 outbreak heavily impacted 2020 and 2021 and was the background for most of the decisions issued in the past two years. In 2020 and 2021, the European Commission adopted an unprecedented number of decisions concerning state aid in Poland.

In response to the social and economic situation resulting from the pandemic, the Polish government prepared its Financial Shield programmes aimed at assisting the economy. A large part of the support constituted state aid and was notified to the European Commission as such.

Major covid-19-related state-aid schemes were administered by the Polish Development Fund (PFR) and took the form of repayable advances for SME30 and liquidity loans31 and preferential loans32 that had a write-off element, in principle, for large enterprises. All those schemes were approved by the European Commission on the basis of the covid-19 Temporary Framework, whereas the write-off component of the preferential loan was based on Article 107(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as the write-off could amount to the damage that a given undertaking incurred as a result of the pandemic. All the above-mentioned schemes were approved by the European Commission in April and May 2020. In late 2020 and 2021, Poland prolonged application of certain previous aid schemes and introduced a new measure: the 'PFR Financial Shield for Large Enterprises – write-off of loans 2.0', which was approved by the European Commission in June 2021.33

In late 2020 and early 2021, Poland was in the process of establishing new covid-19-related programmes aimed at addressing the adverse economic effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the Polish economy. For instance, in December 2021 the European Commission cleared the new scheme for SMEs comprising principally two measures: limited amounts of subsidy for micro-enterprises and support for uncovered fixed costs for SMEs.34

Merger review

i Significant cases

The OCCP issued one conditional decision in 2020. The decision concerned the markets for cable television and providing services for accessing the internet, more specifically acquisition of Multimedia Polska by Vectra. So as to reduce a risk to competition, Vectra was obliged to sell its network infrastructure in eight towns where the combined shares of Vectra and Multimedia were the largest. Vectra was also obliged to enable clients to change operators without the need to incur costs in 13 other towns.35 These merger control proceedings have lasted almost 1.5 years.

In 2020, the OCCP issued three decisions regarding gun jumping, with the most significant one being that concerning Gazprom. No gun-jumping decisions were issued by the OCCP in 2021.

In October 2020, the OCCP imposed an unprecedented fine of €6.45 billion on Gazprom for financing the creation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline without obtaining prior merger clearance.36 In the same decision, the OCCP also imposed multimillion-euro fines on five other companies. In 2015, the companies notified the OCCP of their intention to create a joint venture (JV) responsible for designing, financing and constructing a pipeline in the Baltic Sea. The OCCP raised concerns with regard to this concentration in July 2016 on the grounds that it could lead to a significant impediment of competition concerning gas supply to Poland. The notifying parties withdrew the notification. In April 2017, the OCCP instigated preliminary proceedings to re-examine the case as it had learnt that former JV parents signed the contract to finance the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

In the decision, the OCCP found that, despite withdrawing the notification, the companies did not depart from their intention to create the JV and only altered the form of transaction to the contractual one. The OCCP observed that the loan agreements had an identical model of cooperation and structure of their financial contribution to the JV, and the parties reserved to themselves a wide range of rights that would enable them to interfere with Nord Stream 2's activity. Furthermore, the OCCP submitted that because of establishing a pledge on the stocks of Nord Stream 2, the companies were effectively rendered quasi-stockholders of the company. The OCCP concluded that the concentration took place but in a different format. As a result, the OCCP applied the concept of the JV very widely in a manner not previously seen in Polish merger control cases.

In January 2021, the OCCP banned Agora's, a Polish media conglomerate, acquisition of Eurozet, the owner of several Polish radio stations. The OCCP claimed that the transaction would result in the emergence of a strong radio group that could irreversibly disturb the competition in the local and national radio advertising market and the radio broadcast market. The OCCP also found that the transaction could lead to a duopoly and marginalisation of the smaller competitors' undertakings because, following the transaction, advertisers could use only the services of Agora and its main competitor RMF FM to reach the optimal number of recipients, irrespective of the other smaller and fragmented competition.37 As a part of the proceedings, the OCCP did not accept the remedies proposal made by Agora.

In 2021, the OCCP issued four conditional decisions regarding concentration in mechanical ventilation services businesses,38 private medical services,39 medical equipment businesses40 and retail sale of daily consumer goods.41 The latter decision concerned the acquisition by Carrefour Polska of a retail space previously used by the Tesco hypermarket. So as to reduce a risk to competition in the local market for retail sale of daily consumer goods via hypermarkets, Carrefour Polska was obliged to permanently and irreversibly reduce the sales area of another Carrefour store operating in the same relevant market. The proceedings lasted for approximately eight months.

ii Trends, developments and strategies

Amendments to the legislation in 2015 introduced a number of significant changes to the Polish merger control system, including two-phase proceedings, revised rules on turnover calculation and amendments to procedural aspects related to remedies.42 This proved to have positive effects for business, in particular as it resulted in reducing the average length of proceedings before the OCCP. The average Phase I proceedings in 2020 lasted 33 days and remained at a level comparable with that seen in 2019, whereas the Phase II proceedings lasted, on average, 190 days, which evidences a decrease in comparison with 2019. As at December 2021, the OCCP has not yet published statistics regarding the average length of merger control proceedings in 2021.

The OCCP issued a record 300 merger control decisions in 2021, 295 of which were clearance decisions; four, conditional clearances; and one, a prohibition.

In 13 cases, a decision was adopted after Phase II proceedings. In the extended review proceedings, the OCCP continued to use widely its market-testing powers aimed at verification of the relevant market definitions proposed by notifying parties or at obtaining views on the notified transaction from other stakeholders. The OCCP largely relies on the results of tests of this kind. Market testing significantly increases the duration of Phase II proceedings, which, on average, last approximately six months.

The OCCP continues to use statements of objections (SOs), an instrument introduced in the 2015 review whereby the OCCP informs the notifying party of its views regarding potential competition concerns resulting from a concentration. In 2020, an SO was issued in one proceeding.

In 2020, the OCCP actively pursued procedural merger control infringements, in terms of both gun-jumping and non-compliance with disclosure obligations. The OCCP issued three fines for implementing concentrations without the required OCCP clearance, although none in 2021. Two decisions in 2020 (and none in 2021) concerned breaches of disclosure obligation in response to the OCCP's request for information. It is noteworthy that the OCCP issued a fine of approximately €26,000 for non-participation in the market test performed by the OCCP in a Phase II merger control proceeding.43 The other fine, of €50 million, was imposed on Gazprom, which did not provide the OCCP with documents requested in the gun-jumping case concerning the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.44

iii Outlook

It is not anticipated that there will be a major shift in the current merger control policy in 2022.


As seen in 2018, 2019 and 2020, 2021 also proved that consumers continue to be the OCCP's enforcement priority. However, Polish antitrust enforcement has been developing: the OCCP has often conducted dawn raids and instigated numerous antitrust proceedings. Following EU trends, antitrust enforcement has focused on vertical restraints and restriction of competition in the online environment while also starting to impose fines on managers. Taking into consideration enforcement in the area of anticompetitive agreements, the decisions concerning abuse of dominant position are marginal. In 2020, the OCCP issued no decisions and in 2021 only one. Because of the relative strength of the Polish mergers and acquisitions market, the OCCP has been active in the field of merger review.


1 Anna Laszczyk and Wojciech Podlasin are managing associates at Linklaters C Wiśniewski i Wspólnicy sp k.

2 Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain.

5 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.

6 Decision of the OCCP of 3 December 2020, No. DOK-5/2020.

7 Decision of the OCCP of 30 December 2020, No. DOK-6/2020.

9 Decision of the OCCP of 28 January 2021, No. DOK-1/2021; Decision of the OCCP of 13 May 2021, No. DO K-3/2021.

10 Decision of the OCCP of 7 December 2021, No. DOK-5/2021.

11 Decision of the OCCP of 9 September 2020, No. DOK-2/2020.

12 Decision of the OCCP of 18 December 2019, No. DOK-2/2019.

19 Decision of the OCCP of 1 March 2021, No. DOK-2/2021.

21 Decision of the OCCP of 30 December 2020, No. RŁO-11/2020.

22 Decision of the OCCP of 4 March 2021, No. RŁO-1/2021.

23 Decision of the OCCP of 22 April 2021, No. RKR-1/2021.

24 Report available in Polish only at

25 Guidelines available in Polish only at

26 Report available in Polish only at

27 Report available in Polish only at

28 Report available in Polish only at

29 Report available in Polish only at

30 The European Commission's decision of 27 April 2020 in case SA.56996.

31 The European Commission's decision of 25 May 2020 in case SA.57306.

32 The European Commission's decisions of 29 May 2020 in case SA.57054 and of 17 June 2021 in case SA.62752.

33 The European Commission's decision of 17 June 2021 in case SA. 62752.

34 The European Commission's decision of 23 December 2020 in case SA.59763 updated by the decision of 12 January 2021 in case SA.60940.

35 Decision of the OCCP of 17 January 2020, No. DKK-25/2020.

36 Decision of the OCCP of 6 October 2020, No. DKK-178/2020.

37 Decision of the OCCP of 7 January 2021, No. DKK-1/2021.

38 Decision of the OCCP of 27 August 2021, No. DKK-191/2021.

39 Decision of the OCCP of 25 October 2021, No. DKK-233/2021.

40 Decision of the OCCP of 27 August 2021, No. DKK-191/2021.

41 Decision of the OCCP of 1 March 2021, No. DOK-2/2021.

43 Decision of the OCCP of 7 September 2020, No. DKK-158/2020.

44 Decision of the OCCP of 29 July 2020, No. DKK-141/2020.

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